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1 Finance and competitiveness
Framework and synthesis
José María Fanelli and Rohinton Medhora
The issues of international competitiveness and integration in the global economy
play a central role in the discussion on development and there is no indication that
their importance will decline in the near future. At the analytical level, and often
at the policy level as well, competitiveness is seen largely in real or trade terms,
at the expense of the key roles that financial factors, and institutional and other
micro-level features play in determining how successful a country’s trade and
competitiveness position is. Trade theories are for the most part silent on finan-
cial issues while policy makers cannot afford the luxury of seeing the two as sep-
arate or, worse, unconnected. Likewise, once financial issues are brought into the
picture it is not possible to ignore the role of the macroeconomic factors and their
interaction with the microeconomic structure of the economy.
The main goal of the research project whose results are presented in this book is,
precisely, to contribute to filling the theoretical and empirical gap which exists in the
development literature regarding the linkages of trade, finance and macroeconomic
factors. The project comprised eight country studies (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Tunisia and South Africa) which were elaborated
according to the same framework and four thematic papers that analyzed the rela-
tionship between competitiveness, finance and trade at a more abstract level. In this
chapter we present a framework for our analysis and an overview of the key results of
the studies. This chapter has two sections. In the first section we discuss why ‘achiev-
ing competitiveness’ is an important policy goal in the developing world and why it is
closely associated with the process of catching up. Then, we discuss four stylized facts
characterizing developing countries that explain why it is necessary to analyze the
relationship between trade, finance and macroeconomic issues. In the second section,
we elaborate on our view of the micro/macro and trade/finance linkages. We conclude
with the three most important questions that have been targeted in the project.
1. Competitiveness and the developing world
The challenges of economic policy
There are three facts that are crucial to understanding the ongoing debate on
development strategies and on economic policy in developing countries. The first
is that growth is the most important economic policy goal to these countries. It is
true that it would be hard to find someone involved in economic policy-making
or politics who would deny or ignore that development is a complex process that
entails much more than mere increasing per capita GDP, and, consequently, that
the results of a specific economic program should be assessed on the basis of 
an ample set of indicators including variables related to, say, income distribution
and the environment. In practice, however, it is growth that is privileged as the
measure of economic attainment. One important reason for privileging growth as
an indicator of development is that there is a firm consensus among politicians,
public opinion, advisors from multilateral agencies and policy makers that it is
much easier to undertake the difficult and often painful economic and social
changes required to ensure development in a context of sustained growth. Two
necessary conditions for sustainable growth are the steady increase of overall pro-
ductivity and macroeconomic stability. Hence, the preeminence given to growth
naturally implies that policies for productivity enhancement and for preserving
macroeconomic equilibrium take priority on the economic policy agenda.
The second fact is closely associated with the previous one. If growth is the
measure of attainment, how do we know whether a given rate of growth is high
or low? In other words, what is an acceptable rate of growth? For a developing
country, ‘development’ means, in the first place, approaching the per capita GDP
of industrialized countries and, hence, developmental success means reducing the
income gap between the country under consideration and the wealthier ones. In
this way, achieving a rate of growth in overall productivity which is higher than
the average rate observed in the developed world becomes a key target for eco-
nomic policy. Under these circumstances, Krugman’s (1996) reasoning that the
increase in national productivity is what matters to the improvement of the stan-
dard of living independently of what is happening with the productivity of the rest
of the world may be correct at first sight, but is politically vacuous. The common
consensus is that a sound development policy should set the country on a growth
path which would help it to catch up with the industrialized economies. To be
sure, the primary reason for using the industrialized countries’ income as a bench-
mark is neither the search for national prestige nor the belief that international
economic competition across countries resembles competition across firms, but,
rather, the need to fix a standard to assess how well a country is doing. It seems
only natural to set such a standard at the highest level of welfare observed at a
specific moment. 
The third fact is that, at present, integration in the global economy is conceived
of as central to fueling productivity and fostering growth (Sachs and Warner
1997). One important reason that accounts for the perception of the international
economy as a window of opportunity is the increasing interaction in recent
decades between domestic economies and the world economy. The most important
indicators of this ‘globalization’ process are the growing share of international
trade in world output and an extraordinary rise in capital mobility, including for-
eign direct investment.1 In such a context, it is believed that developing countries
could enlarge the size of their export markets and use the proceeds coming from
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higher exports to foster productivity gains via the acquisition of investment goods
abroad and improvements in the quality and variety of imported intermediate 
inputs used in production. The international capital market is also viewed as a
potential source of productivity enhancement. Specifically, it is assumed that a
greater supply of foreign direct investment means both greater availability of 
savings and technology, while accessing international capital markets implies
accessing not only more foreign savings but also better alternatives for the diversi-
fication of national risks. The most important piece of evidence flagged in the lit-
erature favoring these ideas is the experience of the Asian Tigers. Many studies have
concluded that countries that have expanded most successfully in the postwar
period heavily relied on external trade – or at least on an export-oriented strategy –
as a source of dynamism for the domestic economy. An additional piece of evidence
is that many countries which did not privilege external trade in their development
strategy have faced enormous problems not only to sustain growth but also to main-
tain a reasonable level of macroeconomic stability. Latin American countries usu-
ally serve as a paradigm of the problems that the lack of ‘outward orientation’ can
create. It was suggested that the domestic-market-oriented development strategy
these countries followed in the postwar period led to the misallocation of investment
and recurrent balance-of-payments crises, which were specially marked in the
1980s during the ‘debt crisis’.
The lessons drawn from the analysis of concrete development experiences and
the theoretical contributions of the ‘liberalization’ approach to development the-
ory crystallized in the so-called Washington Consensus in the mid-1980s
(Williamson 1990). The Washington Consensus was extremely effective at criti-
cizing the inefficiencies of the older development paradigm based on import sub-
stitution and state intervention and at establishing new guidelines for the design
of policies oriented to liberalizing repressed markets and reducing the size and
functions of the state. A good number of developing countries put into practice
the policy recommendations of the Consensus. In spite of its success as a frame-
work for designing market-oriented structural reforms and for eliminating many
of the inefficiencies of the old development model, the results of the reforms 
in terms of growth, productivity and macroeconomic stability, nonetheless, were
mixed. In general, after a decade of deep reforms, we do not see a spectacular
improvement in growth and catching up, not to mention social equity. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the Consensus is, at present, under scrutiny
(Rodrik 1999).
The three aspects of economic policy that we highlighted – preeminence of
growth indicators, the aim of catching up and outward orientation – suggest that
an analytical approach which can tackle the policy issues developing countries are
now facing should be able to integrate the interactions between the determinants
of productivity growth, macroeconomic stability and integration in the global
economy in a single analytical framework. The Washington Consensus attempted
to make such an integration in the 1980s and it was one of its main virtues. In fact,
one could argue that a good part of the popularity of the Consensus was due to
its ability to present a guide for policy design in a wide range of areas within
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a consistent framework. At present, nonetheless, the approach shows difficulties in
accounting for a set of highly relevant developments. Given the objectives of our
research, there are two features of those developments that we would like to high-
light. The first is that many countries that opened their capital markets and under-
took trade liberalization did not grow as fast as had been expected. These are, for
example, the cases of Turkey, Mexico, the Philippines and Brazil. Argentina, on
the other hand, grew much faster than in the 1980s after deepening trade liberal-
ization and privatization, but was severely affected by the Tequila effect and the
Asian crisis. The reforms were unable to radically eliminate the tendency to gen-
erate ‘excessive’ current account deficits that had been a structural characteristic
of the Argentine economy during the import substitution period. The experience
of these countries suggests that high productivity and competitiveness are not
automatically achieved as a result of market deregulation, financial and trade
liberalization, and integration in the international capital markets. The second is
that, somewhat unexpectedly, some of the most successful outward-oriented
countries, like Korea and other ‘new’ tigers like Indonesia, experienced deep
macroeconomic disequilibria which matched some of the characteristics of Latin
American instability, such as currency attacks, financial fragility and deep falls
in the activity level. These facts made it evident that imperfections exist in the
functioning of international capital markets which can jeopardize even the most
successful countries and that, under such circumstances, outward orientation
per se is not enough to protect a given country from exposure to capital flows
volatility. Likewise, the crises show that macroeconomic instability, financial
fragility and the capital structure of the firms are closely associated.
In most cases, the economies facing problems of current account sustainability
devalued their currencies in the 1990s. The diagnosis to support devaluation is
that the external imbalance is basically a macroeconomic problem: a ‘wrong’
exchange rate erodes the competitiveness of the economy and prevents the coun-
try from competing successfully in international markets. From the static point of
view this policy is correct since, if an equilibrium exists, there is always an
exchange rate which leaves the balance of payments in equilibrium and permits
the country to fully exploit its comparative advantage. When dynamic factors are
taken into account however, the experience of developing countries shows that to
ensure competitiveness countries need much more than just getting the real
exchange rate right. The experience of Latin American countries in the 1980s is
particularly relevant in this regard. The systematic use of devaluation as a means
of improving competitiveness accelerated inflation and damaged financial inter-
mediation, thereby increasing volatility in both prices and quantities. In this way,
the upward correction of the real exchange rate was achieved only at the cost of
a sharp worsening of the macroeconomic setting. The effects of increased volatil-
ity and the deterioration of financial conditions on investment were devastating.
There was a generalized fall in the investment/GDP ratio in the entire region.
This, in turn, resulted in the stagnation of productivity and the widening of the
productivity gap between Latin America and other more successful developing
countries such as the Asian NICs. The ultimate consequence of the attempt to get
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the real exchange ‘right’ in a context of high uncertainty and severe financial 
constraints was the opposite of the effect that was sought for: competitiveness was
severely hindered by the lagging evolution of productivity. 
To be sure, our reference to the Latin American experience during the debt cri-
sis is not meant to imply that the real exchange rate is irrelevant for a country’s
competitiveness. The lesson that we do draw, instead, is that competitiveness is a
complex issue which has price and non-price dimensions and that embraces
micro- and macro-elements which interact with each other. At the micro-level, it
is normal for a growing economy to experience rising and falling competitiveness
in different industries, since productivity growth is not a uniform process across
sectors. If the country is losing competitiveness in many industries simultane-
ously however, the loss of competitiveness can be caused either by a misalign-
ment of domestic costs or by low average productivity growth vis-à-vis the rest of
the world. If the problem is the misalignment of relative prices, devaluation may
be the cure. But if the problem is lagging productivity, we should not take it for
granted a priori that devaluation will be sufficient to enhance competitiveness.
When we take into account the micro-dimension of the problem, it is clear that if
a country specializes in the least dynamic industries (with flat learning curves,
low returns to scale, small scope for innovation) it will enjoy little productivity
growth and will lose competitiveness. If this is the case, it is plausible to think that
devaluation is not the best response from a long-run perspective. The real 
problem lies in the specialization pattern and the lagging path of productivity.
This makes it clear that trade specialization patterns, productivity growth and 
current account sustainability are not independent phenomena. In fact, the trade
specialization pattern might be a source of macroeconomic instability per se. For
example, a country which depends on the surplus generated by a narrow set of
products with high price volatility to close the external gap can be more unstable
than another with a more diversified surplus structure. Additionally, it must 
be taken into account that micro/macro-interactions are also relevant for the 
non-price dimensions of competitiveness. A highly unstable environment can
hinder the evolution of productivity via its effect on non-price determinants of
competitiveness, such as the level of financial deepening. For example, trade lib-
eralization may eliminate an anti-export bias in the economy. In the new scenario
one would expect that firms will be restructured to take advantage of the trade
opportunities offered. It is very doubtful, however, that firms will in fact get the
funds needed for restructuring in a context of credit rationing. 
We think that the traditional approach has difficulties with the issue of com-
petitiveness because it tends to ignore the kind of micro/macro-interactions that
we are stressing here. In this regard, one particularly inadequate characteristic of
the traditional approach is the excessive use of dichotomies as a methodological
recourse to simplify the analysis. There are marked dichotomies between micro-
and macro-problems, between the real and the financial side, and between open
and closed economies. It is undeniable that these dichotomies are powerful sim-
plifying devices, but it is also true that such dichotomies are often maintained
even under circumstances in which real/financial and micro/macro-interactions
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are extremely relevant for a specific economic phenomenon as in the case of the
turbulences in ‘emerging’ economies. In these economies, it is pretty obvious that
the problems of macroeconomic sustainability, capital flows and trade specializa-
tion are closely interrelated. 
Dichotomies play a particularly relevant role in the case of trade theory. There
is a long tradition in the field of international economics of sharply separating
trade and the ‘micro’-question of optimum resource allocation from monetary
and macroeconomic issues. For example, the typical international economics
textbook is divided into two parts. The first analyzes the real economy with 
a ‘micro’-perspective, omitting the existence of money, financial intermediation
and current account disequilibria. The second part studies open economy macro-
economics. In this part the trade specialization pattern plays no role and output is
highly aggregated. Some of the agents’ financial decisions (domestic vs foreign
bonds) come to the forefront and macroeconomic problems like the correct level
of the real exchange rate, aggregate domestic absorption, portfolio decisions and
balance-of-payments equilibrium take center stage. It is not clear what the rela-
tionship between the first and the second part is or how the results of each part
are modified by the results obtained in the other.2 As a consequence of this
dichotomy, in the literature on trade, the problem of achieving a sustainable
macroeconomic equilibrium is conceived of as being largely independent of the
question of competitiveness. Trade imbalances can always be corrected through
fiscal, monetary or exchange rate policies because competitiveness problems (i.e.
recurrent current account crises) have their roots in inadequate macroeconomic
policies rather than in weak productive structures. 
The dichotomy between the real and the financial side also plays a significant
role in trade theory. It is implicitly assumed that the firms seeking to exploit a com-
petitive advantage can always finance their productive projects and thereby ‘real’
decisions are isolated from financial ones. In fact, it is implicitly assumed that the
latter are irrelevant, as it would be the case under perfect capital markets. In such a
world, there is no chance that a firm which is potentially competitive at the inter-
national level will be forced to forego trade opportunities either because of liquid-
ity constraints created by credit rationing or because interest rates are abnormally
high as a consequence of an excessively volatile macroeconomic setting.
Another important weakness of the standard approach to the competitiveness
problem is that it is not clear enough what the sources of a sustained increase in
productivity are. This is apparent in the Washington Consensus’ policy recom-
mendations. It is generally explicitly assumed that market deregulation and out-
ward orientation (i.e. ‘undistorted’ integration in the world economy) should be
sufficient conditions to ensure an upward trend in productivity. The recent expe-
rience of many developing countries suggests, nonetheless, that market deregula-
tion alone is not enough to take full advantage of the creativity of the private 
sector and to enhance productivity growth. Although it is true that many countries
enjoyed important static efficiency gains after the liberalization and opening of
the economy, the growth path of productivity and competitiveness has been far
from satisfactory from the point of view of catching up and macro-stability. 
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In this regard, a central weakness of the traditional theory is that it downplays the
role of market failures. The assumption that product and factor markets will func-
tion well after liberalization may be unwarranted in the case of developing coun-
tries, where imperfections are pervasive in the markets for knowledge, human
capital, infrastructure services and finance. These markets have a determinant
influence on the evolution of productivity. 
This criticism of the traditional approach, however, is not meant to imply that
we should start from scratch to better understand the interactions of productivity,
stability and openness. In the first place, in spite of its flaws, the Washington
Consensus has clarified a variety of issues, particularly those related to static 
economic efficiency and macroeconomic stability originating in monetary and
fiscal imbalances. Second, there is a series of more heterodox contributions, both
analytical and empirical, which have shed light on key aspects of developing
economies. On the analytical side, there were new advances in trade, finance and
growth theory which take explicitly into account the existence of market failures
and, therefore, are specially useful for the analysis of developing economies
which have incomplete market structures. Likewise, researchers working in the
technological and industrial organization area have studied the determinants of
competitiveness and productivity in developing countries and have showed the
limits of the neoclassical approach for analyzing the dynamics of technical
change, trade and competitiveness in the developing world.3 This new intellectual
environment has led many researchers to challenge the orthodox interpretation of
the Asian NIEs’ experience. They demonstrated that many highly relevant facts
do not fit into and cannot be accounted for within the liberalization paradigm.4
From our point of view, these contributions are promising steps towards the con-
struction of a post-Washington Consensus approach. This new approach to devel-
opment problems will surely integrate many of these recent contributions as its
building blocks. 
Four stylized facts
In addition to the analytical advances in the study of economies with missing and
imperfect markets, any attempt to improve our understanding of the problems of
competitiveness and the challenges of economic policy should take into account
some specific features that characterize the structure of developing countries.
There are four of these features that we would like to highlight because of their
relevance for the present investigation. 
(a) Developing countries tend to be more unstable than developed countries
from the macroeconomic point of view. There is a large amount of empirical evi-
dence that documents this fact (IDB 1995). The central point that we would like to
emphasize is that a higher degree of volatility in the stochastic processes generat-
ing key macroeconomic prices represents a deadweight cost for the economy as a
whole which can severely hinder productivity (Fanelli and Frenkel 1995; Ramey
and Ramey 1995). The basic reason is that volatility affects the investment rate.
Greater volatility means greater risk and, consequently, higher discount rates.
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Under these circumstances, the minimum rate of return required for a project to
be considered profitable is higher and the rate of investment, ceteris paribus,
lower. In this way, macroeconomic instability has sizeable economic costs which
affect the sources of productivity enhancement at the micro-level, to the extent
that investment is correlated with learning, the adoption of new technologies and
the acquisition of skills. These micro/macro-linkages could play an important role
in explaining the existence of some vicious circles which are very frequently
observed in the developing world: the obstacles to developing dynamic compar-
ative advantages force the country to depend on a few export items to finance
imports and to close the external gap; this makes the country highly 
vulnerable to terms of trade shocks and the evolution of key macroeconomic 
variables becomes more volatile; the volatility of the macro-environment, in turn,
hinders the country’s capacity to develop new comparative advantages to the
extent that a weak investment rate creates an anti-innovation bias. This kind of
vicious circle may be relevant in explaining the experience of countries showing
chronic balance-of-payments problems and difficulties in strengthening their
competitiveness.
(b) The external constraint is a key source of aggregate instability. This is closely
associated with the existing imperfections in international capital markets and the
lack of trade diversification. There are two factors that play a central role in
explaining the relevance of the external constraint as a source of macro-instability.
The first is the lack of export diversification. When the prices and/or the quanti-
ties sold of a good or service which account for a high share of exports fluctuate,
large swings in the availability of foreign exchange are likely to result if exports
are not diversified. Under circumstances of greater volatility in the supply of for-
eign exchange, it is reasonable to assume the hypothesis that there will be a higher
volatility in key macroeconomic prices (particularly the real exchange rate) and
quantities. We consider that the roots of this problem lie in the lack of competi-
tiveness to the extent that the country is unable to diversify sufficiently its exports
via the acquisition of comparative advantages in new sectors or specific products.
The second factor has to do with the imperfections in international capital mar-
kets. In the context of perfect foreign capital markets, the lack of export diversi-
fication should be less of a problem because it would be possible to diversify the
risks implicit in the fluctuations of one country’s export proceeds by resorting to
capital markets. The market would make it possible to combine the financial
instruments of countries whose export proceeds are negatively correlated in a
well-diversified portfolio. Likewise, countries suffering temporal terms of trade
shocks could tap international credit markets in order to stabilize the level of
domestic absorption every year around its long-run national income. They would
run, say, deficits in bad years and surpluses in good ones. Fluctuations in the
terms of trade and, hence, in the availability of foreign exchange would not be an
obstacle to exploit investment opportunities and to develop dynamic comparative
advantages. Regrettably, international capital markets have proven to be unable to
diversify national risks efficiently and to finance temporary current account
deficits (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996; Obstfeld 1998). The existence of a credit 
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constraint means there will be a kind of accelerator mechanism working at the
aggregate level. In this way, the imperfections of capital markets on the financial
side of the economy become a problem on the real side. When financial con-
straints exist, a country needs to enhance its competitiveness to avoid a risky
dependence on the availability of credit in foreign markets. This association,
between the external balance of the economy and macroeconomic instability, is
aggravated in the present context of openness and free capital mobility because it
seems that herding behavior and other irrational phenomena in international cap-
ital markets could be an independent source of volatility for a country whose
financial needs are too high or somewhat inelastic in the short run.
(c) The economic structure comprises sectors characterized by different pro-
ductivity levels and growth potential. The economic structure of a country is a
complex system that includes physical and human resources, markets, organiza-
tions and institutions. It is a well-known stylized fact of the development process
that the economic structure experiences systematic changes as skills, technolo-
gies and capital accumulate. Chenery and Syrquin (1986), for example, studied a
broad set of countries and showed that as economies become industrially mature,
manufactured exports tend to move from simpler to more complex activities, use
more advanced products and processes within activities, and increase local con-
tents in physical inputs, services and technologies. In a situation of growth and
structural change, productivity growth at the aggregate level can be decomposed
into a shift in the production structure towards activities with higher levels of pro-
ductivity and into the growth of productivity in all existing activities (Llal 1995).
In such a context, it is very unrealistic to assume that firms in countries showing
different stages of development use identical production functions to produce
homogeneous products. It seems more plausible to adopt the hypothesis that there
will be some technological differences between firms in the same sector in dif-
ferent countries because learning curves and the evolution of technological capa-
bilities in general depend on the previous path of development as well as on the
overall economic environment (infrastructure, financial deepening, the quality of
government). Under this assumption, comparative advantages are determined not
only by the natural endowment but also by dynamic factors associated with tech-
nological capabilities and the whole economic environment. A country will not
show any tendency to catch up with developed countries if it specializes in 
low-productivity sectors with low growth potential. 
We have seen that the convergence with the productivity level of developed
countries is a privileged policy goal. A country, however, cannot freely choose
which sectors to specialize in precisely because, in the long run, the path of spe-
cialization is determined by factors such as the previous evolution of technologi-
cal capabilities and accumulation of physical and human capital. When the rate of
growth of aggregate productivity (which determines the competitive strength) 
is very low in a given country, a phenomenon that is often observed is that the
country recurrently runs into balance-of-payments problems. Normally it occurs
because there is a pressure to maintain the standard of living when a negative
shock hits the economy. In this situation, the authorities face a policy dilemma.
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To break the inertia behind the lagging path of productivity and induce a ‘jump’
in competitiveness in order to secure current account sustainability, it is necessary
to invest in physical and human capital and technologies. In the short run, how-
ever, higher levels of investment could worsen the current account. It is precisely
because of this sort of policy dilemma that it is interesting to investigate in detail
the micro/macro-linkages between the determinants of the evolution of aggregate
and sectoral productivity at the micro-level and competitiveness and current
account sustainability at the macro-level. 
(d) Factor markets show severe failures and such failures are much more
important than those observed in developed countries. This has an impact on
competitiveness and growth. It is a very well-known fact that there may be sig-
nificant failures in the factor markets where developing country agents operate.
In our research, however, we concentrate on financial markets. It is common to
observe the following phenomena in the developing country financial structure:
a high degree of segmentation in financial markets which acts against innovative
and smaller enterprises; a marked scarcity of long-term credit for the financing
of private investment; very low total capitalization of the stock exchange market
as compared to the size of the economy; severe difficulties to diversify non-
systematic risk because the range of activities quoted in the stock market is very
narrow; an elevated degree of financial fragility in the system which – via sys-
temic risk premia – results in excessively high interest rates (Fanelli and Medhora
1998).
When these imperfections exist in the credit markets, firms are not uniformly
affected (Fazzari et al. 1988; Hubbard 1998). Smaller firms with less net worth
or firms producing in more risky sectors or with less marketable assets to be used
as collateral will be more affected (Harris et al. 1994). In a context of tighter over-
all financial conditions, these firms will face a disproportionate widening in the
external finance premium or will be rationed out of credit markets. This means
that when the interest rate rises as a consequence of an increase in volatility
induced by a worsening in the macroeconomic situation, the financial conditions
will worsen in a disproportionate way for some enterprises. If these enterprises
are also those with the most profitable and innovative projects, macroeconomic
instability will be extremely costly for productivity growth. 
2. Competitiveness: Price and non-price dimensions
From our previous reasoning, it follows that to face the challenges of economic
policy and understand the determinants of sustainable growth in a small economy
that is open to international flows of goods and finance, we should be able to model
the links between productivity growth, macroeconomic stability and financing of
the firm. There are a growing number of researchers who are using the problems
posed by competitiveness as the pivot of their analysis of these questions. Com-
petitiveness is defined as ‘an economy’s ability to grow and to raise the general
living standards of its population in a reasonably open trading environment
without being constrained by balance of payments difficulties’ (Haque 1995).
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Although some academic economists are reluctant to apply the concept of com-
petitiveness because they consider it to be redundant, we believe that even if it is
not strictly necessary as a ‘primitive’ concept in economic theory, it is still very
useful. For one thing, it summarizes in a single concept the problems of growth,
openness and productivity which, as we argued before, are at the heart of policy-
makers’ concerns.5
A country’s competitiveness has two components: price competitiveness and
non-price competitiveness. Price competitiveness measures a country’s ability to
increase its share in world markets by selling at a lower price than its competitors.
If price competitiveness were all that mattered, a country’s market share would rise
(fall) as its real exchange rate or unit labor cost fell (rose) vis-à-vis the rest of the
world. The limitations of price-competitiveness indicators, however, came to the
forefront when Kaldor (1978) found that the industrialized countries which gained
market share (West Germany and Japan) were also the ones that experienced a rise
in unit labor costs vis-à-vis their competitors. Kaldor’s ‘paradox’ suggests that fac-
tors other than price, such as product differentiation, technological innovation and
capacity to deliver, must also be taken into account (Fagerberg 1988).6
The inclusion of non-price factors into the picture naturally calls for an
approach more akin to the Schumpeterian view of development. Specifically, this
requires recognizing the key role of technology and innovation, of financial 
constraints and of systemic elements in determining the evolution of competi-
tiveness. In Schumpeterian models of growth in an open economy, the rate of
technical progress and the pattern of international trade are jointly and endoge-
nously determined and dynamic comparative advantages become a critical factor
(Aghion and Howitt 1997). Finance matters because financial institutions 
contribute to fostering productivity and hence absolute advantage. Financial
intermediaries can spur technological innovation by identifying and funding those
entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully implementing innovative
products and production processes. In this way, the development of financial
institutions and markets is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process
(Levine 1997). Systemic factors need to be integrated into the analysis because
technological development significantly depends on the existence of a suitable
environment for learning, imitation and innovation. The most relevant systemic
factors that are usually highlighted in the literature are the quality of the physical
and institutional infrastructure, financial deepening, and the characteristics of the
national system of innovation.
The literature stressing the role of non-price and systemic factors, however, has
two weak points. The first is that there is no systematic research on the effects of
macroeconomic disequilibrium on competitiveness. There are two facts that make
this point important: (i) It is undeniable that the macroeconomic regime is a rel-
evant component of the systemic environment in which the firm operates. (ii) As
we have stressed, macroeconomic instability is much more significant in the spe-
cific case of developing countries. These two facts imply that it is very important
to identify what are the channels through which macroeconomic disequilibria
affect the microstructure. The second weak point is that the literature analyzing
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the links between growth and financial deepening has relied excessively on cross-
country evidence. As a consequence, too many unanswered questions remain
about the concrete features of the causal links between financial constraints,
growth and the creation of comparative advantages. We believe that much more
empirical research should be done. We need econometric analyses and case stud-
ies about both specific countries and industries. A deeper understanding of the
micro/macro and real/financial interactions at the country, firm and sectoral 
levels would greatly contribute to our understanding of the determinants of com-
petitiveness. The main objective of the project whose results we present in this
book is, precisely, to contribute to filling this gap in the development literature.
Micro/macro-linkages 
One important reason explaining the scarcity of studies analyzing micro/macro-
linkages is that, until recently, economic theory made a sharp distinction between
the economy’s growth trend and cycles. Traditionally, business cycle theorists
have analyzed de-trended data and considered the trend as exogenous to the cycle,
and growth theorists have focused on characterizing a long-run growth path. One
important weakness of this approach is that it cannot account for the existence of
stochastic trends (Aghion and Howitt 1997). The view that, under certain cir-
cumstances, macroeconomic disequilibrium can have permanent effects on the
microeconomic structure implies that temporary shocks are embedded into long-
run paths and hence is a view consistent with the approach of some endogenous
growth models. It is interesting to notice, in this regard, that although there is con-
sensus on the fact that in developing countries (particularly in Latin America)
excessive macroeconomic instability and sluggish growth have not been inde-
pendent phenomena, there have been no attempts until recently to analyze the
effects of volatility on the growth trend. It must be stressed, nonetheless, that tem-
porary shocks can either hamper or benefit growth. We have already given an
example in which volatility acts as an obstacle to growth. But we can also easily
think of situations in which a temporary boom can have permanent positive
effects. Suppose that there is a surge in capital inflows that reduce the interest rate
and, as a consequence, credit-constrained firms experience a long period of
excess liquidity. It is possible for the higher investment rate that will result from
a softer liquidity constraint to have permanent favorable effects on productivity,
if learning and skill accumulation are complementary to physical capital accu-
mulation. Mechanisms of this kind have been present in the experience of coun-
tries like Argentina and Peru in the 1990s.
When trends are assumed to be stochastic, not only the temporary shocks that
hit the economy but also the characteristics of the short-run macroeconomic
adjustment path may have long-lasting effects. This fact is a primary source of con-
cern for policy makers. The policy dilemmas associated with the choice between
alternative exchange rate regimes is a good example. Policy makers care about the
exchange rate regime because the adjustment paths under alternative exchange
rate regimes are different. If the effects of the adjustment path on the long-run
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equilibrium are non-neutral, the adoption of a particular exchange rate regime
matters for the evolution of competitiveness. Let us take the example of the
recent crises in Asia and Latin America. The balance-of-payments disequilibria
typically arose in the context of (approximately) fixed exchange rate regimes.
Under such circumstances, there were two basic policy reactions. The most usual
option was the devaluation of the currency and the change of the exchange rate
regime. Other economies (notably Argentina and Hong Kong), on the contrary,
did not resort to devaluation and privileged the maintenance of the regime over
the need to correct the exchange rate parity to preserve competitiveness.
Devaluation proved to be very effective to correct external imbalances in the short
run. Why, then, have there been countries which did not devalue? The case of
Argentina is very interesting in this regard. The diagnosis behind the decision 
to maintain convertibility was that changing the regime would be too costly. 
The most important costs were considered to be the higher volatility of key rela-
tive prices, inflation acceleration and, particularly, the increase in the fragility of
the financial system. These costs could more than offset the benefits of correct-
ing the misalignment of the exchange rate in the short run. Independently of
whether or not the Argentine authorities were right in their assessment of the costs
and benefits of a regime change, the Argentine case clearly shows that relative
prices are not the only channel through which macroeconomic factors influence
microeconomic decisions and competitiveness. 
One important conclusion that our analysis of micro/macro-interactions suggests
is that competitiveness means more than just getting the relative prices (and, partic-
ularly, the exchange rate) right. The presence of fragmented or missing markets and
weak institutions in developing countries determines that externalities, spillover
effects, financial constraints and strategic interactions between economic actors are
pervasive. Under these circumstances, when, say, a negative macroeconomic shock
occurs, the market forces (i.e. relative price changes driven by excess demand)
which should automatically restore equilibrium are too weak. As a consequence,
there will be a tendency for the disequilibrium to set in motion destabilizing forces
such as deep recessions accompanied by high and persistent inflation and/or unem-
ployment. We think that this is an important reason why it is frequently observed that
macro-disequilibria in developing countries are deeper and more unstable than the
disequilibria observed in economies with a more complete market structure.
When we adopt a more comprehensive view of the determinants of competi-
tiveness, many other elements enter the picture. In the first place, a static equi-
librium can be ‘bad’ from the point of view of both the level of welfare of the 
population and the incentives for productivity growth and the development of
dynamic comparative advantages. It is undeniable that an upward correction in
the real exchange rate can be, under certain circumstances, a strong incentive for
the production of tradable goods and it is also true that getting the exchange 
rate right may be of great help in reducing macroeconomic volatility. We should
not reduce the issue of the overall economy’s competitiveness, however, to the 
profitability of the tradable sector. For one thing, in the long run human capital
accumulation, the development of indigenous technological capabilities, and the
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quality of the physical, financial and institutional structures critically depend on
the efficiency of the non-tradable sector. In the second place, as we have seen, the
way in which the correction in the exchange rate is achieved is of no minor impor-
tance, since the path of relative prices will likely affect the long-run equilibrium.
In sum, in an open economy there is no guarantee that the equilibrium which will
result from getting the exchange rate ‘right’ will not be a sort of ‘bottom of the
well’ equilibrium characterized by sluggish productivity growth and/or high
macroeconomic volatility. Obviously, if we assume away market imperfections and
dynamic considerations, relative prices can only be distorted if the government
interferes in the functioning of markets. Under such circumstances, if the govern-
ment does not intervene, and we still observe low productivity growth, we should
accept that the ‘bottom of the well’ equilibrium is the best situation for the coun-
try under consideration. Such a dismal conclusion, though, is not warranted. Given
the characteristics of developing economies, assuming away market imperfections
and the role of the factors associated with resource accumulation, finance, and
technologies may be an erroneous starting point. 
Trade and finance
The traditional theory of international trade emphasizes efficient resource alloca-
tion and endowment as the main explanation for a country’s specialization pat-
tern. The pattern of specialization and trade does not depend on absolute but
rather relative costs of production, which under certain conditions are determined
by relative factor endowments. In this setting, the firm is not much more than a
production function and does not have to bother with financial questions to carry
out its production projects. If the project is good, it is undertaken. It can always
be financed in a perfect market setting. Under these circumstances, there is no
room for such financial phenomena as credit rationing or financial fragility to
influence the firm’s decisions regarding production, and hence competitiveness.
The ‘new’ trade theory has clarified the role of economies of scale, externalities,
learning by doing, technical progress, product differentiation, and oligopolistic
and monopolistic market. The firm is much more complex in this new framework
which incorporates some insights from industrial organization theory. But espe-
cial consideration of financial issues is yet to be made. There is no systematic
treatment of how financial decisions affect competitiveness either at a global or
firm level. Indeed, when we depart from traditional trade theory, financial issues
become more relevant in determining competitiveness. Compare, for instance, the
constant-returns-to-scale static comparative advantage case with the ‘learning by
doing’ dynamic comparative advantage perspective. Finance is unlikely to make
a difference in the former as firms of any size and experience will produce always
at the same unit cost. However, in the latter case, as experience becomes a crucial
determinant of unit costs, new entrants will initially produce at a loss that has to
be financed somehow. If capital markets are reluctant to finance these initial
losses, firms that have the potential to become competitive will never have a
chance, unless government intervenes to correct this market failure.7
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If we assume that it is possible to explain the competitive performance of a
firm without making any explicit reference to financial issues, we are implicitly
assuming that Modigliani–Miller’s theorem and Tobins’ and Fisher’s separation
theorems hold. The company’s funding decisions are irrelevant to the choice of
projects. The present value of each project is independent of the way in which it
is financed. This assumption is too strong in the context of most developing 
countries because, as we noticed, there are highly significant failures in factor and
capital markets.
If the idealized conditions that define a perfect capital market do not hold, and
finance matters, then it will be easy to find two firms with the same potential lev-
els of competitiveness but very different foreign trade performances. One might
be able to finance projects very easily while the other might not because of
extremely high interest rates or credit rationing. Often in developing countries,
suppliers of raw materials and intermediate goods provide credit to their buyers,
especially small- and medium-sized ones which do not have access to credit from
financial institutions (Petersen and Rajan 1996). This phenomenon has implica-
tions for the development of strong and competitive trading firms as well as for
the financial intermediation process in a country. Of course, this is a direct 
consequence of the existence of market segmentation.
Finance also matters for the allocation of resources for another reason.
Financial institutions are supposed to screen for the best projects and monitor
their development. Consequently, if key segments of the capital markets are miss-
ing it implies that there will be less screening and monitoring and, hence, a worse
allocation of resources. A company that has no bank monitoring may incur an
inefficient allocation of real resources and have a suboptimal risk management.
In a modern capitalist economy, the financial institutions have the important task
of collaborating in ‘picking the winner’ in a decentralized way.
Following the lines of thinking of Schumpeter, McKinnon and Shaw and the
more recent literature on finance and endogenous growth, Rajan and Zingales
(1998) state that capital markets make a contribution to growth by reallocating
capital to the highest value use while limiting risks of loss through moral hazard,
adverse selection or transaction costs. This implies that the lack of financial
development should disproportionately affect those firms that are heavily
dependent on external finance. From this hypothesis two testable facts follow: 
(i) Industries which are more dependent on external financing grow faster in
more financially developed countries. (ii) Given that new firms depend more on
external finance, financial development favors growth by disproportionately
improving the prospects of young firms. The Rajan and Zingales (1998) paper
uses the external dependency ratio of firms in different sectors to test these two
hypotheses using a panel of developed and developing countries. Their main con-
clusion is that ‘financial development has a substantial supportive influence on
the rate of economic growth and this works, at least partly, by reducing the cost
of external finance to financially dependent firms’ (p. 584). On the basis of the
evidence found, Rajan and Zingales advance two conjectures which deserve more
research. The first is that ‘the existence of a well-developed (capital) market in a
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certain country represents a source of comparative advantage for that country in
industries that are more dependent on external finance’. The second is that ‘the
costs imposed by a lack of financial development will favor incumbent firms over
new entrants. Therefore, the level of financial development can also be a factor in
determining the size and composition of an industry as well as its concentration’
(p. 584). These conjectures are in line with the two main hypotheses of our proj-
ect: finance matters and, specifically, finance matters to comparative advantage.
In fact, combining Rajan and Zingales’ assumptions about external dependency
ratios with the analyses of trade specialization pattern and firms’ capital structure,
we have found additional support for the hypothesis that the level of financial
deepening has an impact on competitiveness and trade patterns.
To be sure, the studies presented in this volume portray a picture of finance ‘mat-
tering’ crucially in determining competitiveness. The link operates through various
channels. At the micro and sectoral level, there is almost universal evidence for
credit constraints operating to determine the range and nature of trade specializa-
tion. The link between credit dependence and ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ firms and sec-
tors is remarkably tight, and best illustrated in the cases of Argentina and Brazil.
Indonesia and South Africa are illustrations of how the credit constraint has main-
tained specialization in traditional products. Indeed, an important lesson from the
country case studies is how the exploitation of dynamic comparative advantage and
genuine infant industry arguments in developing countries depends on the avail-
ability of credit, a point highlighted in the Philippines case study.
But not just any credit, as Schmidt argues in his paper, and a point also made
in the India and Tunisia case studies. Depending on the regulatory framework and
political imperatives within which they operate, banks in particular can lend too
much or too little. It is clear from the India, Indonesia and Tunisia studies that the
existence of a market failure in the financial sector need not automatically result
in an improvement with government intervention. It is here that caution is called
for in generalizing and presenting a ‘set’ of policy recommendations that may
then be followed in cookie cutter fashion.
The story and policy lessons emerging from the micro-level are further com-
plicated by the role that finance plays at the macro-level. The Asian crisis brought
to the lexicon of economics a word borrowed from the epidemiology literature –
contagion. To be sure, high and highly volatile levels of short-term capital played
havoc in the frontline countries of any crisis. But with contagion, Argentina and
Brazil were compelled to reassess their monetary and exchange rate arrangements
as a result of events in East Asia a few months earlier. In addition to short-term
volatility, financial flows can have more persistent effects which often go beyond
conventional Dutch disease explanations. There is, in all of this, a question of
what constitutes the equilibrium exchange rate. But the South Africa study and
chapters by Ros and Medhora suggest that this is not just a technical issue. There
are important consequences to having an imbalance in the trade and real sectors
on the one hand, and the financial sector on the other.
It is at this point that Guerrieri’s call for a more nuanced assessment of the link
between trade openness and economic development becomes a powerful one. Still,
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the purpose of this set of studies is not to suggest that no answers exist to compli-
cated situations. Rather, it is to suggest that answers do exist, but they have to be
actively sought out, and not inferred from a preferred approach, much less derived
from consensus. In large part, deep and well-run financial markets are indispensa-
ble to a successful strategy to link competitiveness in trade with economic growth
and, ultimately, development. The benefits of having such markets and the costs of
not having them are clear. Developing such markets often involves the active inter-
vention of the state, to a point. Finding the balance between market creation and
market liberalization is the ultimate challenge that faces all countries.
In sum, we believe that the concept of competitiveness represents a challenge
to economic analysis because the level of competitiveness a country shows results
from complex interactions of microeconomic, macroeconomic and financial fac-
tors and the analytical tools of the traditional approach are not especially useful
for analyzing such interactions. Indeed, one important motivation for undertaking
the country studies that we present here was, precisely, to investigate whether or
not micro/macro and real/financial interactions are as relevant for competitive-
ness, the trade pattern and current account sustainability as the stylized facts that
we have listed above seem to suggest. To be more specific, the hypotheses of our
research work have been: 
1 Both the degree of macroeconomic stability and the quality of financial mar-
kets are relevant in determining the evolution of competitiveness via their
influence on non-price factors.
2 The sectoral mix of specialization at the ‘micro’-level contributes to deter-
mining macroeconomic stability via its influence on the sustainability of the
current account. The hypothesis of an imperfect access to international capi-
tal markets is crucial for this hypothesis.
3 Financial factors matter at the micro-level via their influence on the firms’
capital structure and investment behavior, and they matter for competitive-
ness to the extent that there may be an anti-innovation or anti-trade bias in
the allocation of financial resources.
The studies that follow elaborate on these points and, we trust, highlight their
veracity while remaining true to the important distinctions and nuances that
always exist across countries and development experiences and, indeed, change
over time within countries.
Notes
1 On globalization, see Rodrik (1998).
2 For a paradigmatic example, see Krugman and Obstfeld (1991).
3 See for example Haque (1995) and Guerrieri (1994).
4 See World Bank (1993) and the references there.
5 The authors who propose leaving aside the concept of competitiveness should develop
an alternative and more efficient view that can consistently integrate the problems
implicit in this concept. Krugman, for example, after uncovering some mistakes which
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originated in an incorrect interpretation of competitiveness, calls for a counter–counter
revolution which would supersede the Washington Consensus (Krugman 1992). But
such a revolution is still wanting.
6 The inclusion of proxies of technological activity (R&D investments, patents granted)
and productive capacity (capital stock growth, investment rates) in regressions explain-
ing market shares or trade flows yielded the ‘right’ signs for the estimated coefficients
of price-competitiveness indicators (Fagerberg 1988; Amendola et al. 1993; Agénor
1997). The analytical underpinnings of non-price competitiveness determinants are to
be found in the new theories of trade and growth as explained, for instance, by Helpman
and Krugman (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (1991); see also Ocampo (1991) and
Dosi (1991). Other contributions stem from endogenous growth theory. For a compre-
hensive and consistent presentation of this issue, see Aghion and Howitt (1997) and
Fagerberg (1994).
7 We owe this example to Saul Keifman.
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2 Finance and changing trade patterns
in developing countries
The Argentine case1
José María Fanelli and Saúl Keifman
1. Introduction
Structural reforms, the creation of a customs union with Mercosur, and the
renewal of capital inflows into Latin America profoundly changed the structure of
incentives Argentine firms faced in the 1990s. One important consequence was 
a higher degree of heterogeneity in the performance of firms and sectors. The 
non-tradable sector was a privileged recipient of foreign funds as a result of 
the privatization process and the deregulation of foreign investment. Producers of
tradable goods faced greater competition as well as new opportunities from
Mercosur markets as well as the availability of inputs and investment goods at
international prices. The changing environment affected profitability across and
within industries in complex ways and obliged firms to restructure. Some firms
adopted offensive strategies to restructure, taking advantage of new market
opportunities, implementing organizational improvements and upgrading capital
equipment. Other firms, however, followed purely defensive restructuring strate-
gies, their principal objective being to ensure survival in a far more challenging
environment. This chapter explores how the changes in the macroeconomic 
setting and the interactions between developments in trade and finance created
winners and losers in Argentina’s recent past.
We will examine two different periods of the Argentine experience: the 1983–90
period when economic policies were dominated by the adjustment of the economy
to the financial constraints imposed by the international debt crisis, and the period
which followed the launching of Convertibility in 1991, when structural reforms
and liberalization were implemented. We will place more emphasis on the latter,
the richest in transformation, but also the least understood. The second section
analyzes the stylized facts related to the evolution of trade and specialization pat-
terns. The third part studies the characteristics of firms’ financial structure and
portfolio decisions in the context of imperfect capital markets such as those exist-
ing in Argentina. The fourth section builds on the stylized facts presented in 
the previous two sections and advances some hypotheses on micro–macro and
trade–finance interactions. In what follows in this introduction, we briefly review
the most important features of the overall evolution of the Argentine economy in
the period under analysis in order to set the context of our research.
Productivity, competitiveness and growth in postwar Argentina reveal clearly
differentiated periods. Until the mid-1970s, the country followed a strategy of
import substitution industrialization. Although the economy grew during this
period, the average growth rate was much lower than that observed in Latin
American countries like Brazil or Mexico that were following the same strategy.
In particular, the rate of productivity increase in Argentina was low and the 
country systematically lost competitiveness. This discouraging evolution in com-
petitiveness, in turn, resulted in recurrent balance-of-payments crises and stop-
and-go cycles determined by the availability of foreign exchange. In 1975, the
country suffered a huge macroeconomic crisis that set the economy on the brink
of hyperinflation. This crisis made it clear that the import substitution strategy
had been exhausted as a means of increasing productivity and competitiveness.
From the macroeconomic collapse of the mid-1970s to 1990, Argentina made
several fruitless attempts to reform its economy. Two features that were prevalent
until 1990 are highly relevant to the topic of this book: the recurrent balance-
of-payments crises which resulted in major macroeconomic instability, and the
strong drop in the demand for domestic financial assets which gave rise to an
unprecedented tightening in the rationing of credit toward productive firms, even
for larger ones. It is not surprising that investment activity collapsed during this
period and that productivity stagnated. Under such circumstances, the need to
close the current account deficit required a sharp trade-off between living stan-
dards and competitiveness since the only way to gain competitiveness in the short
run was to reduce domestic costs via huge devaluations. The maxi-devaluations
of the 1980s, however, affected not only human welfare and competitiveness but
also macroeconomic stability. Consequently, the economy underwent two hyper-
inflationary episodes by the end of the period.
In the 1990s the situation changed radically. In the first place, structural
reforms were deepened. The process to open the trade and capital accounts, as
well as the liberalization of the financial system, was completed, and state-owned
firms were privatized. In the second place, price stability was achieved via the
implementation of a currency board scheme which pegged the Argentine peso to
the US dollar (the so-called Convertibility Plan). Third, the greater availability of
foreign finance and the fall in international interest rates relaxed the external
financial constraint significantly, thus eliminating one of the causes of macro-
economic disequilibria during the debt crisis. This is perhaps the most important
fact that distinguishes the 1980s from the 1990s. In the 1990s it was possible to
finance the higher trade and current account deficits resulting from the structural
reform and stabilization processes. One significant factor generating the current
account deficit was the recovery in the private demand for capital goods. Another
important factor was that the private agents also increased their demand for con-
sumption goods. In this way, the recovery in investment was not accompanied by
savings, leading to a widening in the private deficit.
These macro-developments have had very important consequences at the
micro-level. While the increased macro-stability reduced uncertainty in decision
making, the greater availability of credit dramatically softened the credit
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rationing that firms were facing. Both factors heavily contributed to reversing the
stagnant path of productivity, particularly in the manufacturing industry. Exports
have shown a greater dynamism during the 1990s as compared to the 1980s, in
spite of the real appreciation of the peso, while the overall economy has been
growing at around 6 per cent per annum. This might indicate that the loosening
up of financial constraints made a difference, probably, via investment and pro-
ductivity. Table 2.1 shows the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables.
In the 1980s there was a systematic fall in the domestic demand for financial
instruments because of the extreme uncertainty. In the 1990s, the upsurge in cap-
ital inflows, together with the recovery in the demand for domestically issued
financial assets in a context of increasing stability, led to an increase in financial
deepening. This can be seen in Figure 2.1, which shows the evolution of M4 and
total credit. This not only softened the tight credit rationing of the 1980s, but also
opened up opportunities for firms to innovate in the form of financing capital
projects. Despite these remarkable changes, however, the new situation of the
1990s presents an important weakness. The macroeconomic equilibrium is highly
dependent on the stability of capital inflows, and the recent Mexican and Asian
crises have made it clear that international flows into ‘emerging’ countries are 
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Table 2.1 Evolution of selected macroeconomic variables
Period Real GDP GDP Investment/ Current Real Openness
average growth deflator GDP account exchange (X M)/
(%) change (%) (billion rate GDP
(%) (USD) (1990 100) (%)
1983–90 0.2 911.6 17.1 1.4 103.6 15.7
1991–7 6.2 23.1 21.0 5.7 78.4 27.6









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Credit Money (M4)
Figure 2.1 Evolution of money and credit (millions of pesos).
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Central Bank data.
far from stable. The figure also records the sharp reversal experienced by the
financial deepening process in 1995 as a result of the Tequila effect. It took over
one year for the economy to recover from the consequences of the instability trig-
gered by the crisis. In fact, a more severe crisis was avoided only because of
measures taken by both the Central Bank as lender of last resort, and by the IMF
in providing external support. 
2. Trade specialization and competitiveness: The stylized facts
This section is devoted to establishing the ‘trade facts’, that is, the evolution and
structure of trade flows in the recent past, the evolution of productivity and
domestic costs and their relationships with the current account. 
After a poor performance in 1983–90, trade flows increased dramatically in
1991–6. However, as imports grew much faster than exports, the trade balance
turned negative. An important factor behind the growth in exports was the launch-
ing of Mercosur (Southern Cone Common Market) in 1994. Import growth, in turn,
was driven by GDP growth, a real currency appreciation and trade liberalization.
Regarding the pattern of inter-industry specialization, food items remained the
main source of foreign exchange in the 1980s and the 1990s. This dependence on
primary sectors was reinforced in the 1990s as fuels became a surplus sector
while most manufactures increased their negative contribution to the trade bal-
ance. The rise in capital goods imports (machinery and transport equipment) was
an important factor behind this development.
A more detailed examination of trade flows, however, shows that intra-industry
trade experienced a significant and continuous increase throughout the 1980s and
the 1990s. That is to say, all sectors exported and imported more, including deficit
sectors (manufacturing) which managed to increase their exports, especially in the
1990s.
Real unit labor costs declined in the 1980s and rose in the 1990s, mainly as a
result of the ups and downs of dollar wages. Labor productivity grew dramatically
in the 1990s (after a slip in the 1980s) thanks to higher capacity utilization, 
technological change and the resumption of investment activity. 
Overall evolution of trade flows
The performance of trade flows between 1983 and 1990, the years of financial
restraint, was rather disappointing (see Figure 2.2). Imports remained stagnant,
hardly surprising given the lack of GDP growth. Exports, in turn, grew at 6.7 
per cent per annum, well below the 10.1 per cent annual growth rate recorded by
world exports. Additionally, exports behaved countercyclically2 and were also
strongly influenced by commodity prices. The annual average of the trade balance
was 3.9 billion USD in 1983–90. In other words, the goal of generating trade 
surpluses to serve the foreign debt was accomplished at a high social cost.
From 1991, trade flows increased dramatically. Imports took the lead, growing
at a 34 per cent yearly rate, mainly fueled by lower tariffs, real currency 
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appreciation and output growth. This brought about a trade deficit from 1992, but
exports soon caught up, closing the gap in 1995 and 1996. Between 1990 and
1996, the annual rate of export growth was 11.6 per cent, which favorably com-
pared to the annual growth rate in world exports which was 7.6 per cent. Most of
Argentina’s export growth took place in 1994–6, at a 22 per cent yearly rate.
Something remarkable about the export surge initiated in 1994 is that it seems to
have broken the aforementioned countercyclical pattern, occurring not only 
during the Tequila’s recessionary year (1995) but also in expansionary years, such
as 1994 and 1996. Trade balances in this period averaged a 1.2 billion USD
annual deficit, though this figure masks a yearly 4 billion USD deficit in 1992–4
and a near balance situation in 1995–6. 
As a result of the growth in trade flows, Argentina has recently become a much
more open economy. Total real trade flows as a percentage of real GDP3 have
increased from an average of 16 per cent in 1983–90 to an average of 28 per cent
in 1991–6.4
Changes in the pattern of inter-industry trade specialization
Table 2.2 provides information on the sectoral contributions to the trade balance5
according to aggregate Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) com-
modity groupings. This indicator is adjusted by the overall trade balance. When
the economy began to adjust to the debt crisis (1983–4), only food items made a
positive contribution to the trade balance. By the end of the first period (1988–90)
two more groups, Agricultural raw materials and Other manufactures, added pos-
itive contributions to the trade balance, while the remaining ones (Fuels, Ores and
metals, Chemical products, Machinery and transport equipment) reduced their
deficit shares. 





















Figure 2.2 Trade flows, 1983–96.
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Ministry of Economy data.
Changes in the intra-industry pattern of trade
Indices of contributions to the trade balance are good indicators of the pattern of
inter-industry specialization. When trade is driven by comparative advantage, that
is all there is to know. Trade is also driven by economies of scale, however, which
affects the volume of intra-industry trade. Therefore, the evolution of indices of
intra-industry trade gives important information on the structure of the economy
since they measure the exploitation of economies of scale and the degree of tech-
nological sophistication of an economy. 
Table 2.3 shows the evolution of intra-industry trade as measured by the 
indices proposed by Grubel and Lloyd,6 and Aquino,7 based on SITC three-digit 
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Table 2.2 Contributions to the trade balance
1983–4 1985–7 1988–90 1991–3 1994–6
Food items 647.50 556.07 448.35 521.50 456.43
Agricultural raw materials 20.40 7.87 2.21 3.20 16.73
Fuels 58.06 67.59 40.02 45.07 75.66
Ores and metals 42.95 38.69 41.62 17.63 10.83
Chemical products 173.69 157.69 155.79 100.59 103.41
Other manufactures 97.26 12.89 18.86 90.89 73.60
Machinery and transport 255.23 271.35 231.05 359.71 361.32
equipment
Unallocated 0.09 0.01 0.93 0.95 0.35
Cereals 301.39 175.97 91.32 110.93 97.99
Crude and manufactured 7.47 7.28 7.08 4.42 11.60
fertilizers
Crude petroleum 0.00 3.78 4.06 24.72 77.44
Medical and pharmaceutical 18.09 20.48 16.54 14.80 16.40
products
Textile fibers, yarn and 5.56 23.71 31.07 14.90 8.96
clothing
Metals and metal 66.45 16.96 7.82 5.72 11.31
manufactures
Machinery 206.89 234.99 201.73 268.42 279.84
Transport equipment 48.34 36.36 29.32 91.28 81.49
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Ministry of Economy data.
Table 2.3 Aggregate indices of intra-industry trade (based on SITC three-digit 
groupings)
Indices 1983–4 1985–7 1988–90 1991–3 1994–6
Grubel and Lloyd 0.159 0.205 0.250 0.273 0.320
Aquino 0.151 0.196 0.253 0.276 0.326
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Ministry of Economy data.
groupings. They both show a dramatic increase in the significance of intra-
industry trade, which more than doubles between 1983–4 and 1994–6.
The evolution of manufacturing trade flows, output, productivity 
and domestic costs
To better understand this story, we now focus on the evolution of the manufac-
turing sector that underwent serious structural change. The ratio of the trade 
balance in manufacturing to gross output rises from a surplus position in 1986
(1.7 per cent), peaks in 1990 as a result of a deep recession and hyperinflation (8.5
per cent), and then falls dramatically reaching a 5.4 per cent deficit in 1996 for
the overall manufacturing (Table 2.4). This might suggest that manufacturing is
one of the big losers of the opening-up process and that Argentina is being dein-
dustrialized. Furthermore, this ratio falls in most manufacturing branches. This
ratio, however, conceals the fact that both imports and exports increased faster
than total production (of course, the former more quickly than the latter). The rise
in the imports to gross output ratio from 3.4 per cent in 1990 to 20 per cent 
in 1996 is hardly surprising given the mix of currency appreciation and drastic
tariff reductions. It is more remarkable that export ratios also improved from 
12 per cent in 1990 to 15 per cent in 1996. We have already mentioned that export
growth in the mid-1990s seems to have broken the old countercyclical pattern. 
We now see that manufacturing is part of this change in behavior. Naturally, this
parallel increase in both imports and exports is closely related to the important
rise in intra-industry trade mentioned above.
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Table 2.4 Manufacturing: trade-balance-, exports- and imports-to-output ratios (%)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
(XM)/Q 1.7 0.7 3.0 5.8 8.5 2.7 3.9 5.2 8.1 3.1 5.4
X/Q 5.1 4.7 6.6 9.4 12.0 10.1 8.9 9.8 10.6 14.7 14.9
M/Q 3.4 4.0 3.6 3.6 3.5 7.4 12.8 15.0 18.8 17.8 20.3
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Ministry of Economy data.
(XM)/Q: trade-balance-to-output ratio; X/Q: exports-to-output ratio; M/Q: imports-to-output ratio.
Table 2.5 Manufacturing: indices of output, labor productivity and unit labor costs
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Q 128.6 130.2 121.2 110.6 100 109.9 121.1 127.3 135.2 125.8 132.4
Q/L 108.2 111.4 100.8 102 100 110.7 119.9 127.2 133.7 138.2 146.6
WL/QE 76.7 70.2 81.2 45.3 100 112.3 133.2 136.6 137.7 136.9 136.0
WL/QEPx 93.5 78.6 78.8 44.8 100 107.9 122.7 126.4 124.6 114.6 112.3
WL/QEPm 92.9 80.0 83.5 48.0 100 107.6 126.4 133.9 132.4 124.5 120.9
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Ministry of Economy data.
Q: output index; Q/L: labor productivity index; WL/QE: US dollar unit labor cost index; WL/QEPx:
US dollar unit labor cost index deflated by export prices; WL/QEPm: US dollar unit labor cost index
deflated by import prices.
In order to measure the importance of trade developments in the 1990s, it should
be noted that they took place in a context of a swift growth in manufacturing 
output (see Table 2.5). The driving force behind the expansion in manufacturing
output was productivity growth since employment actually declined. Indeed, the
record of labor productivity growth in manufacturing between 1990 and 1996 was
remarkable. Total manufacturing labor productivity increased by 46.6 per cent, 
or a 6.6 per cent annual rate of growth between 1990 and 1996. According to Katz
(1997), these developments made it possible to reduce the productivity gap
between Argentina and the United States from 45 to 33 per cent during the same
period.8 We are also certain that part of the measured growth in productivity is
due to cyclical rather than structural factors as manufacturing output reached 
a trough in 1990. This is an important point to keep in mind when trying to 
ascertain and gauge its sources, something we do not attempt to do in this paper.
Despite higher labor productivity, real unit labor costs9 increased for the man-
ufacturing sector and most of its branches as the increment in productivity only
partially compensated for the growth in dollar wages caused by the currency
appreciation that took place from 1991.
We suspect that there is a connection between the jump in productivity and the
recovery of investment spending which increasingly satisfied its demand via 
capital goods imports. If it is true that investment has affected productivity sig-
nificantly in the recent past, then it has also influenced competitiveness through
its impact on unit labor costs. In this regard, learning how investment is financed
becomes crucial to understanding the linkage between trade flows and finance. In
a context of credit rationing, access to credit might become the binding constraint
on investment decisions thereby hampering productivity change and the growth
of trade flows. We found some preliminary evidence on the linkage between
investment levels and export growth based on a regression run with data from
sixty-five manufacturing branches in 1994–7, as shown in Table 2.6. The depend-
ent variable is the growth rate of the export-to-output ratio between 1994 and
1997, and the independent variable is the average investment-to-value-added ratio
in 1994–6. We are aware of the limitations of this piece of evidence but this is as
far as we can go given the available data. 
3. Competitiveness, finance and macroeconomic stability
The objective of this section is to assess the extent to which finance matters in
explaining the degree of success or failure of firms and industries in Argentina.
The question is relevant because changes on the financial side of the economy
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Adj. R20.09; observations included 65.
were as marked as those that occurred on the real side in the last two decades.
Furthermore, since Argentina’s capital markets are far from perfect, it seems 
plausible to assume that finance does matter in explaining not only the results of
the restructuring process launched in the 1990s, but also the kinds of strategies
specific firms chose.10 In what follows, we will try to shed some light on this
issue based on available empirical evidence, using data from the financial system
and the sample of firms listed on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange.
We begin with some evidence on how the amount of credit generated by the
formal system influences the activity level of manufacturing in order to set the
context for the analysis that follows on the financial decisions of firms in manu-
factures.11 Our hypothesis is that, in a context of pervasive imperfections in finan-
cial markets (rationing), the availability of real credit in the banking system
(crtot) has a strong influence on the activity level of manufacturing (gdp) in the
short run, while there is a long-run relationship between the stock of real credit




Table 2.7 details the results obtained using this error correction model (ECM).
The coefficient of credit in the long-run equation (2) is positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent level and so it seems that these two variables are 
co-integrated. As coefficients 3 and 5 are also significant while coefficients 7
and 8 are not, it seems that credit Granger-causes manufacturing GDP. In sum,
 9  log crtott1  10  z2t
 log crtott  7 (log gdpt1  1  2 log crtott1)  8  log gdpt1
 5  log crtott1  6  z1t
 log gdpt  3 (log gdpt1  1  2 log crtott1)  4  log gdpt1
log gdpt  1  2 log crtott  st
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Table 2.7 Credit and manufacturing activity level











Adj. R2 0.48; observations included 32; sample
period: 1989:3/1997:2.
the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of a relevant influence of credit on
manufacturing output. 
Competitiveness and asset accumulation: Winners and losers
In this part of the study, we focus on the micro-level and try to investigate whether,
and in which way, financial factors were relevant in determining success or failure
in an environment with higher external competition. To this end, we use the empir-
ical evidence provided by the balance-sheet data of the sample of firms listed on the
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. We work with different aggregates of firms. First, we
differentiate between firms which produce non-tradable goods and services (mostly
newly privatized public utilities) and firms in the manufacturing industry which, in
the new open-economy environment, belong to the tradable sector. Given our goals
we concentrate on the tradable sector and use non-tradables as a benchmark. Second,
we work with disaggregates within the tradable sector so as to identify interactions
between real and financial factors at the sectoral level, and elaborate hypotheses on
the financial variables determining the success or failure of firms. Third, in order to
isolate the features associated with market imperfections we use other criteria to
divide up the sample by, for example, the size of the firm.
In spite of the important recovery in manufacturing output achieved in the
1990s, the value of total assets of the industrial firms in our sample was only 
20 per cent greater in the first half of 1997 than in 1986.12 This fact, however, con-
ceals marked differences in the firms’ dynamic paths in each manufacturing
branch. In order to capture such differences, we have classified the manufacturing
firms in the sample according to the branches they belong to, and then split them
into two groups: ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.13 A branch is defined as a winner if a rep-
resentative firm’s assets have grown by more than the average and as a loser if they
have not. Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the assets of winner and loser firms. 
The contrast between the evolution of assets of the firms in the winner and loser
sectors is striking. While the real value of the assets of the winners more than 
doubled, the aggregate assets of the losers were much lower in 1997 than in 1986.
While winners increased the size of their assets, investment in the latter sectors
became negative. Figure 2.3 clearly shows that there was a break in the dynamic
path of the variables under study at the beginning of the 1990s, followed by the
amplification of the differences in the economic behavior of losers and winners.
The important questions from the point of view of our study are, on the one hand,
whether financial factors matter in explaining these facts and, on the other,
whether there are relevant linkages between finance and changes in international
competitiveness. In answer to the second question, the stylized facts of the overall
evolution of competitiveness in the branches in which loser and winner firms 
produce are highly relevant. These are summarized in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. 
From the tables, it seems that both winner and loser firms faced important
changes in factors affecting competitiveness. First, all cases showed a marked
increase in the imports-to-output ratio (except tobacco). This can be interpreted as
evidence that these firms were experiencing far tougher competition from abroad.
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Table 2.8 Evolution of key real variables of loser sectors (1991/6; %)
Sector Output Labor Labor Exports/ Imports/ Trade
growth productivity costs output output balance/
growth growth output
1991 1996 1991 1996 1991 1996
Textiles 7.6 23.1 22.9 4.1 7.6 5.9 14.7 1.8 7.1
Paper-cell. 30.3 30.3 35.8 4.0 9.8 9.4 24.7 5.4 14.9
Metals 27.7 63.2 6.2 20.1 17.1 9.6 13.2 10.5 3.9
Chemicals 29.8 30.2 24.2 9.1 10.4 19.1 24.8 10.0 14.7
Source: Elaborated on the basis of INDEC data.
Table 2.9 Evolution of key real variables of winner sectors (1991/6; %)
Sector Output Labor Labor Exports/ Imports/ Trade
growth productivity costs output output balance/
growth growth output
1991 1996 1991 1996 1991 1996
Food 23.9 23.8 36.4 26.0 32.0 1.5 2.9 24.5 29.1
Wood 4.3 15.3 11.6 1.8 7.9 7.1 11.0 6.1 3.9
Petroleum 1.3 203.0 34.8 6.9 8.1 1.3 3.5 1.2 2.2
Electrical 40.1 71.6 16.1 3.2 5.0 37.0 58.2 1.8 21.2
machinery
Tobacco 14.1 89.0 41.5 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.5
Non-metallic 2.7 28.5 29.6 4.0 4.3 4.0 11.0 0.0 6.7
Transport 85.6 75.8 32.9 7.2 11.2 15.4 37.4 4.0 22.0
equipment











































Figure 2.3 Evolution of total assets (1986:1 100).
Second, all branches responded to the challenge by increasing productivity
and most managed to increase output levels. Another positive feature is that the
exports-to-output ratio also increased (except tobacco). Nonetheless, sectoral
trade deficits widened (except food).
One important difference in the performance between loser and winner
branches is that the former experienced increased labor costs while the latter
managed to reduce them (with a few exceptions: metals among losers and food
and non-metallic products among winners). The fact that labor productivity grew
much faster in most winner branches probably explains that outcome. All this
means, ceteris paribus, that winner firms were better positioned during the
restructuring process. If we assume that the increase in total assets is a reasonable
proxy for investment, it is clear that one specific and highly relevant difference
between winners and losers is that the former were able to invest and adopt a more
offensive strategy while the latter reduced their assets and increased their pro-
ductivity implementing a defensive restructuring of the firm. Why were winners
able to adopt a more offensive strategy based on increases in investment? In order
to assess the role of market imperfections, we first examine the determinants of
investment in assets and, second, study the differential patterns in which loser and
winner firms fulfill their financial requirements.
One hypothesis we would like to investigate is whether the chosen strategy was
either defensive or offensive because of firms’ ability to access the necessary
funds to finance their restructuring. We utilized panel data for the 1986–97 period
to analyze the determinants of changes in firms’ assets and to check for the pres-
ence of market imperfections. On theoretical grounds, the first candidate in the
search for determinants of a firm’s investment decision (asset) is its rate of
profit (profit). In a context of perfect capital markets the firm should invest in all
projects that are profitable under existing market conditions. When imperfections
in financial markets are present, however, cash flow and the ability to access
credit markets also matter.14 We utilized the operational income of the firm
(income) and leverage (leverage, measured as the total-debt to asset ratio) as
proxies for cash flow and the ability to obtain funds from credit markets, respec-
tively, and estimated the model represented in eqn (2.4).
. (2.4)
Using the fixed-effects approach we found that the three exogenous variables were
significant at the 5 per cent level, as shown in Table 2.10. The empirical evidence,
 assetit  1i  2 profitit  3 incomeit  4 leverageit  uit
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Adj. R2 0.51; F  65.1; D–W 2.06; total panel 
observations: 140.
then, does not reject the hypothesis that there exist imperfections in capital mar-
kets that constrain asset accumulation. Given this evidence, the question that nat-
urally arises is whether there are any systematic differences in the way in which
aggregate agents finance their stocks. In the next part, we focus on the evolution
of stocks (particularly on the liabilities side of the firms’ balance sheets) and
examine whether these reveal some clues that help answer this question. 
Imperfect capital markets and patterns of finance
Firms’ decisions about the proportion of debt and net worth on the balance sheet
are much more complex when market failures exist. In a world where the supply
of credit at the ongoing interest rate is not infinitely elastic and the cost of the
funds raised from distinct sources can differ significantly, the managers in charge
of the capital budgeting process face additional restrictions. In such a context, the
decision over the mix of owned and borrowed capital is crucial. It is not only
essential to maximize the present value of a firm’s assets but also to minimize the
probability of unexpected increases in financial fragility which could result in
financial distress and even bankruptcy. Figure 2.4  shows the evolution of total
assets, liabilities and net worth of the aggregate of firms in the industrial sector.
Between 1986 and 1996, total assets of aggregated manufacturing firms grew.
Between 1986 and 1990 large swings in the value of real debts and a sharp drop
during the hyperinflationary period (1989–90) made it harder for firms to satisfy
their financial requirements.
In the 1990s, financial deepening and capital inflows increased credit supply
allowing firms to increase their leverage after a long period of tight rationing.
This picture, however, conceals important differences between winners and 
losers. Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of the most important items that define the
balance sheet of winners: net worth, assets and liabilities. 
As can be seen, the substantial growth in the value of assets is accompanied by
a still higher increment in the stock of total liabilities. As a consequence, there is
a systematic elevation in the leverage ratio. In fact, the augmentation in the stock
of debt held by winners in the 1990s is impressive, between 1990:4 and 1997:2 it
grew by 229 per cent. The evolution of the stock of debt, however, exhibits a
greater variance than net worth and assets. Furthermore, the fact that the higher
level of uncertainty caused by the Tequila crisis in the 1995 to mid-1996 period
induces a sharp but temporary reversal in the upward trend of the leverage ratio,
and a fall in the real value of the outstanding stock of debt, suggests that the win-
ners’ ability to access credit markets did not suffice to isolate them from macro-
shocks. Figure 2.6 showing the performance of the losers’ balance-sheet items is
very different from that of the winners.
There are two salient features in the evolution of financial variables in the case
of losers. The first is that the three variables under study exhibit a clear downward
trend. It seems that it has been very difficult for losers either to generate funds
internally or raise them in capital markets. Under such circumstances, they were
even unable to maintain the size of their firms. The second feature is that the
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Assets Liabilities Net worth
Figure 2.4 Pattern of finance, manufacturing (1986:1 100).












































Assets Liabilities Net worth
Figure 2.5 Pattern of finance of winners (1986:1 100).












































Assets Liabilities  Net worth
Figure 2.6 Pattern of finance of losers (1986:1 100).
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sistema de Informacion Bursatil data.
effects of macroeconomic shocks on the balance sheet of losers differ from the
case of winners. Loser firms were able to increase their leverage in the context of
the greater macroeconomic stability in the 1991–4 period much like winners.
Unlike winners, however, losers never recovered from the fall in the stock of debt
and leverage ratio caused by the Tequila crisis, forcing them to undertake a defen-
sive restructuring of their balance sheets. This hypothesis is consistent with
Minsky’s view on the changes in financial fragility throughout the business cycle
and with Bernanke’s approach regarding the effects of credit crunches on the
external premium that firms pay for external finance.15 In both cases, market
imperfections play a crucial role in determining the change in the level of fragility
of (financially) heterogeneous agents. 
The balance sheets of non-tradable producers are shown in Figure 2.7. The
aggregate of non-tradable firms in the sample is a good standard to check for
market segmentation because it is basically composed of firms that are, on aver-
age, larger in size and produce in sectors where the variance of cash flow is much
lower. A priori, these firms should suffer from the effects of market imperfections
less than manufacturing firms.
The pattern in the relationship between assets, liabilities and net worth repro-
duces the one corresponding to winners in the 1990s. There is a fact, nonetheless,
that sharply differentiates this group from both the winners and losers: the effects
of the Tequila crisis are hardly discernible in the graph. It is clear that these larger
firms with a low standard deviation in cash flow have much more stable access to
financial markets and are, thus, better equipped to resist macroeconomic shocks. 
Market segmentation and foreign credit
We have seen that larger firms show lower financial volatility and seem to access
long-term finance more easily. On the other hand, it can be argued that the accu-
mulation of abundant liquidity can be a good strategy to avoid a liquidity crunch
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Figure 2.7 Pattern of finance of the non-tradable sector.
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sistema de Informacion Bursatil data.
and maintain creditworthiness for managers facing excessive instability in the
long-run segment of capital markets. Ceteris paribus the size of the firm, a strong
liquidity position can increase the firm’s access to long-run finance. Based on this
reasoning, we investigate whether the ability to obtain long-run finance (leverlp)
is explained by the size of the firm measured by the value of total assets (assets)
and the real value of liquidity (liquidity). We used quarterly observations from the
panel of manufacturing firms to estimate eqn (2.5).16 Table 2.11 presents the
results obtained using the fixed-effect approach. 
. (2.5)
All variables are significant at the 5 per cent level. This means that the hypothe-
ses that there exists a segmented market for long-run credit on the one hand, and
that managers use liquidity to signal a strong financial position as a means to
soften the rationing of long-term funds on the other are both plausible.
Additional evidence on the issues under consideration can be obtained by look-
ing at the evolution of different types of debt instruments and their distribution
across the aggregates of firms. In the 1990s, the greater availability of long-term
finance permitted enterprises to augment the proportion of long-term assets in the
portfolio without jeopardizing the soundness of their financial positions. At the
macroeconomic level this took the form of a strong recovery in the invest-
ment/GDP ratio. At the microeconomic level, though, the distribution of the
increase in long-term credit among firms was far from even. Figure 2.8  shows 
leverlpit  1i  2 log assetsit  3 log liquidityit  hit
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Table 2.11 The determinants of the long-run debt ratio
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
log assets 0.11 3.6
log liquidity 0.03 2.1
















































Figure 2.8 Evolution of long-run liabilities (1986:1 100).
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sistema de Informacion Bursatil data.
the evolution of real long-term liabilities of losers and winners within the 
manufacturing industry. 
While the real value of long-run liabilities in the case of winners shows a 
pronounced upward trend reaching a 1997 value which is eight times its 1986
level, that of the losers fluctuates around a mean of zero growth. Hence, the low
(and even negative in some firms) investment demand of losers may be correlated
with difficulties in obtaining long-term finance.
One important characteristic of financial underdevelopment is the inability to
generate long-run debt instruments. Argentina is no exception to this rule and,
consequently, international capital markets are a crucial alternative source of
long-term finance. Likewise, in the particular case of Argentina, the growth of the
dollarized segment contributed to the prolongation of debt contracts. The conse-
quence of all this is that there tends to be a positive correlation between the pro-
portion of long-run finance and the proportion of dollar-denominated debt held
in the portfolio. Figure 2.9 shows the evolution of the dollar-denominated stock
of debt in our sample of manufacturing firms. 
The upward trend in the dollar-denominated debt of the winners is very strong
while the opposite is true in the case of losers. At the beginning of the 1990s, the
upsurge in capital inflows increased the availability of finance for the entire 
manufacturing industry. However, after the Tequila crisis, while winners could
recover creditworthiness in international markets, losers could not. Why were 
losers unable to recoup credibility? A reasonable hypothesis is that the losers 
were less able to adapt to the post-Tequila scenario and, consequently, lost credit-
worthiness. The tight rationing triggered by the Tequila effect in financial markets
may have become an insurmountable obstacle for some firms to adapt to the new
export-oriented scenario without implementing a defensive strategy. The question is
why they tried to increase efficiency by means of a defensive strategy.17 We cannot
give a definitive answer to these questions because more research (and particularly
more data) is necessary, but we think that we have enough evidence to show that the
interactions between finance and competitiveness merit more attention. 
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Figure 2.9 Evolution of net-denominated debt (millions of USD).
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sistema de Informacion Bursatil data.
The data on the evolution of non-tradable firms is consistent with the previous
approach regarding the influence of segmentation and rationing on the productive
strategies of the firms. 
As Figure 2.10 shows, corporations in the non-tradable sector have privileged
access to international markets and to long-run funds. The supply of foreign
finance, on the other hand, seems to be much more stable than in the case of the
other aggregates under analysis. The Mexican crisis, for instance, had much softer
consequences on the ability of these firms to tap international capital markets to
fulfill their financial needs.
Patterns of specialization and finance
Following Schumpeter, McKinnon and Shaw and the more recent literature on
finance and endogenous growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) state that capital mar-
kets make a contribution to growth by reallocating capital to the highest value use
without substantial risk of loss through moral hazard, adverse selection or trans-
action costs. This implies that the lack of financial development should dispro-
portionately hinder firms who are typically dependent on external finance. From
this hypothesis two testable facts follow: (i) Industries which are more dependent
on external financing grow faster in more financially developed countries. 
(ii) Given that new firms depend more on external finance, financial development
favors growth by disproportionately improving the prospects of young firms.
One problem in testing these hypotheses is that the true optimal capital struc-
ture of firms cannot be observed in financially underdeveloped countries. Rajan
and Zingales make two assumptions in order to overcome this problem and iden-
tify the ‘technological’ demand for external financing that a firm operating in a
specific industry would choose in a perfect capital market. The first is that 
capital markets in the United States, especially for the large firms listed on the
stock exchange, are relatively frictionless and, therefore, it is reasonable to
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Figure 2.10 Evolution of debt items in the non-tradable sector (1993:3 100).
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Sistema de Informacion Bursatil data.
assume that the observed ratio of external finance reflects the technological
demand for external financing of the industry. Second, such a technological
demand carries over to the same industries in other countries. On the basis of
these assumptions, they identify the industry’s technological demand for external
finance using US data. The variable used is the external dependency ratio or EDR
(capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expen-
ditures), shown for nineteen ISIC sectors in the fourth column of Table 2.12. 
The Rajan and Zingales paper utilizes these EDRs to test the two aforemen-
tioned hypotheses using a panel of developed and developing countries. Their
main conclusion is that ‘financial development has a substantial supportive influ-
ence on the rate of economic growth and this works, at least partly, by reducing
the cost of external finance to financially dependent firms’ (p. 584). 
On the basis of the evidence found, Rajan and Zingales advance two 
conjectures that deserve more explanation. The first is that ‘the existence of a
well-developed (capital) market in a certain country represents a source of 
comparative advantage for that country in industries that are more dependent on
external finance’ (p. 584). The second is that ‘the costs imposed by a lack of
financial development will favor incumbent firms over new entrants. Therefore,
the level of financial development can also be a factor in determining the size
composition of an industry as well as its concentration’ (p. 584). These conjec-
tures are in line with the two main hypotheses of our project: finance matters and,
specifically, finance matters to comparative advantage. In fact, combining Rajan
and Zingales’ assumptions about EDRs with our previous analysis on the trade
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Table 2.12 Trade specialization and external dependence ratio
Rank ISIC sector CTB EDR (%)
1 Food products and beverages 42.5 14.0
2 Leather, fur products and footwear 5.8 11.0
3 Petroleum refineries 4.0 18.5
4 Basic metal products 2.1 9.0
5 Tobacco 0.1 45.0
6 Wearing apparel 0.0 3.0
7 Furniture 0.1 24.0
8 Printing and publishing 0.2 20.0
9 Non-metallic mineral products 0.3 19.0
10 Wood and cork products 0.4 28.0
11 Textiles 0.9 40.0
12 Metal products 1.5 24.0
13 Paper 1.8 18.0
14 Rubber and plastic products 2.0 68.5
15 Professional and scientific equipment 2.6 96.0
16 Transport equipment 8.0 31.0
17 Industrial chemicals and other chemicals 9.5 19.0
18 Electrical machinery 11.8 77.0
19 Non-electrical machinery 15.4 45.0
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Table 2.2 and table I in Rajan and Zingales (1998: 566–7).
specialization pattern and firms’ capital structure, we can find additional support
for the hypothesis that the level of financial deepening has a bearing on 
competitiveness and trade patterns.
In order to test the hypothesis about the relationship between finance and 
comparative advantage in Argentina, we ranked the ISIC sectors according to 
sectoral contributions to the trade balance (CTB), an indicator of comparative
advantage that is included in the third column of Table 2.12. If finance matters for
comparative advantage, there should be a negative association between the order
of the sectors ranked by CTB and their order ranked by the EDR. In a financially
underdeveloped country like Argentina, one would expect that sectors which have
a greater probability to develop their potential comparative advantage would be
those with a lower dependency ratio. We computed the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between the external dependence ratios and the contributions to the
trade balance and found a very strong association between the two rankings: 0.98.
A second piece of evidence regarding the role of finance in trade has to do with
the general hypothesis that those economies with weak capital markets develop a
bias against new firms and innovators. In this sense, the lack of access to exter-
nal finance acts as a barrier to entry. If this is true, firms which show stronger
competitive advantage and, hence, are successful in export markets should tend to
be older (traditional firms with established reputations and/or access to interna-
tional capital markets) and larger in size. Likewise, there should be an important
degree of concentration with few firms exporting a high share of total exports. In
order to evaluate whether these hypotheses are relevant in the case of Argentina,
we used the ranking of the top 1,000 exporter firms. The sample explains around
90 per cent of total exports. On the basis of such data it is possible to construct
concentration indices and analyze the characteristics of the most successful
exporter firms.
Table 2.13 clearly shows that there is a strong concentration in export markets.
The top five firms account for 20 per cent of exports while fifty out of 1,000 firms
explain 63.2 per cent of total exports. Likewise, the characteristics of the firms
which appear at the top are telling: the overwhelming majority are either large 
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Table 2.13 Indices of concentration of exports
Position in the ranking Accumulated value Share of total
of exports (million USD) exports (%)
Top five 4,977 20.0
Top ten  7,535 30.3
Top twenty 11,004 44.4
Top fifty 15,686 63.2
Top 100 18,202 73.4
Top 500 23,509 94.8
Bottom 100 45 0.02
Bottom 500 1,285 5.2
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Revista Mercado 1998 data.
traditional exporter firms (many of them belonging to ‘grupos’ – national hold-
ings) or multinational corporations.18 As we have seen in the previous section, the
larger firms have better access to both international and domestic capital markets.
Hence, it is plausible to assume that finance is much less of a binding constraint
for decision making in the case of these firms. On the other hand, it is clear that
firms operating in either non-traditional industrial sectors and/or innovative firms
are not present. These facts are consistent with the predictions that follow from our
approach: the level of a country’s financial deepening should be considered a very
important non-price determinant of competitiveness.
From macro to micro: Credit fluctuations and financial volatility
In highly unstable countries like Argentina in the 1980s, the most important
sources of instability are usually inflation and macroeconomic disequilibria.
Fanelli and González Rozada (1998) show that volatility has not been constant in
Argentina and has sharply declined under the Convertibility Plan. Here, we check
whether volatility is relevant to firms’ financial decisions at the micro-level and
explore differences in winners and losers and the tradable and non-tradable sec-
tors’ financial behavior. In a capital market where segmentation and market fail-
ures are pervasive it seems reasonable to expect a priori that financial volatility
differs if capital structure and access to capital markets differ among firms. 
We have shown that more fragile firms face wider variation in their access to
credit markets when shocks occur. Under such circumstances, we should observe
a greater volatility in the evolution of the stock of debt in the case of losers.
However, if macro-volatility has a bearing on the microstructure, we should also
observe a reduction in overall volatility under Convertibility to the extent that the
standard deviation of expectations will be lower. We will present some evidence
of these facts below.
In Table 2.14 we have estimated the trend of the debt series and taken the 
unexplained portion of the total variance of the dependent variable (1 – R2) as a
proxy for the level of volatility built into the time series. 
Since the unexplained portion of the variance of the liabilities series is signif-
icantly lower in the case of winners, these results are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the financial position of losers is more volatile than that of winners. The
table also presents the volatility of income. The objective is to show that there is
practically no difference in the amount of volatility in the income of winners and
losers. In other words, the higher volatility in the evolution of the stock of debt
cannot be attributed to a higher volatility in the flow of income.19 Imperfections
in capital markets do matter when explaining the facts under study. 
Table 2.15 can be used to check for differences in financial volatility in trad-
able and non-tradable sectors. The methodology is the same as before. The table
shows that all volatility indicators classify the group of firms in a way which is
coherent with our previous arguments: the losers are first in the volatility ranking
and the services sector is last. This occurs independently of the item on the bal-
ance sheet. The volatility of liabilities is higher than the volatility of assets in the
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three groups. This means that the short-run fluctuations in the stock of debt
around its long-run trend are more frequent and greater in size than the same
kinds of changes in the case of assets held by agents. This can be interpreted as
evidence that when a disequilibrium occurs in agents’ portfolios, the velocity of
asset adjustment toward equilibrium values is lower than the velocity with which
liabilities adjust. This is why firms are vulnerable to sudden and unexpected
changes in credit conditions when a shock of a certain magnitude occurs. Debtor
firms are ‘tied’ to assets more than creditors are ‘tied’ to the debt instruments that
firms issue. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the more unstable and volatile the
conditions are to access credit markets, the greater is the preference of the firm
for flexible assets. Under conditions of increasing uncertainty, the managers will
develop a strong preference for flexibility. The data suggest that this reasoning 
is not misleading. If we rank the firms by the volatility of their assets using 
Table 2.15, losers rank first, followed by winners while non-tradable firms come
last. This coincides with the previous findings regarding the ability of different
groups to access capital markets in a context of segmentation, and also suggests
that tradable sectors suffer from a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the
non-tradable sector from the financial point of view. 
4. Conclusions: Trade specialization and micro–macro and
trade–finance interactions
After a long period of high inflation, economic stagnation and recurrent balance-
of-payments crises, Argentina has achieved macro-stabilization in the 1990s. 
In addition, structural reforms such as trade liberalization and privatization of
state-owned enterprises were implemented. In turn, these developments were
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Table 2.14 Volatility measures for liabilities and income:
manufacturing industry (1986:2–1997:2)
Dependent variable Trend Volatility 
coefficient (1R2) (%)
log liabilities winners  2.5 19.8
log liabilities losers 0.6 69.6 
log income winners 0.6 93.2  
log income losers 0.3 93.8
Table 2.15 Volatility measures of balance-sheet items in services and
manufacturing (1993:3–1997:2)
Group of firms Liabilities Income Assets Net worth
volatility volatility volatility volatility
Services 6.9 47.6 2.6 6.3
Winners 23.9 70.8 9.3 11.3
Losers 47.0 95.8 33.4 43.8
accompanied by the rebound of economic growth and investment, a rapid rise in
trade flows, the resumption of capital inflows, an important increase in the level
of financial deepening, as well as a real currency appreciation and higher current
account deficits. The doubling of exports and the boom of imports, particularly
manufactures, was the flip side of a process that created both winners and losers. 
In spite of higher trade flows and greater intra-industry trade, the inter-
industry pattern of specialization has not been upgraded and the country’s balance
of payments still remains vulnerable to foreign shocks, as proven by the Tequila
effect, the Southeast Asian crisis and Brazil’s devaluation of the ‘real’. We believe
that both micro–macro-interactions and finance mattered in all these cases.
An important question that we tried to answer is whether finance has played
any role in the winner/loser game. We found evidence that supports the existence
of important imperfections in Argentine capital markets that constrain asset accu-
mulation, as cash flow and leverage ratios are significant determinants of asset
changes, besides profits. In this regard, the fact that loser firms, that is to say,
firms that contracted, seemed to have been less successful in increasing produc-
tivity suggests that financial market imperfections have forced these firms to 
pursue defensive restructuring strategies. 
Furthermore, we found that asset size and liquidity also affect access to long-
run finance, and verified that loser firms have had very little access to long-term
funding and foreign sources of credit.
We collected evidence for the hypothesis that finance also plays an important
role in determining the pattern of trade specialization. More specifically, we
found an almost perfect (0.98) negative correlation between the pattern of inter-
industry trade of Argentina and the EDRs computed by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), which suggests that the lack of financial development is distorting the
pattern of trade against sectors that are more dependent on external finance.
Finally, we examined the effects of financial volatility stemming from macro-
instability on winners and losers. While the difference in income volatility
between winners and losers is minor, the volatility of liabilities has been much
higher for loser firms. In addition, the fact that firms in the non-tradable sector
suffered from much lower levels of volatility in all categories of balance-sheet
items than manufacturing firms (whether winner or loser) shows how financial
market imperfections hinder firms in the tradable sector.
We conclude that the main lesson from the Argentine case study is that non-
price determinants of competitiveness such as the level of financial development
and macroeconomic stability are highly relevant to the degree of success of trade
liberalization and financial opening.
Notes
1 We are grateful to Martín González Rozada for his superb econometric advice and
Sebastian Katz for his helpful research assistance.
2 All jumps match recessionary years: 1985, 1988, 1989 and 1990.
3 See Table 2.1, last column.
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4 Measuring the same variables in nominal terms yields no increase because of the fall 
in the relative price of tradables vis-à-vis non-tradables, caused by the currency real
appreciation.
5 The contribution of sector (or industry) i to the trade balance (CTBi)is defined as 
* ,
where Xi and Mi are exports and imports of good i, respectively, and X and M are total
exports and imports. Summation of CTBi over i equals 0. See Guerrieri (1994).
6 The Grubel and Lloyd index of intra-industry trade for country j and industry i is
defined by
/ .
The Grubel and Lloyd indices of intra-industry trade can be aggregated according to
the following:
/ .
7 Grubel and Lloyd indices have been criticized for being sensitive to the overall trade
imbalance. Aquino suggested another index of intra-industry trade which corrects for
aggregate trade imbalances in the following way:
/ .
The aggregate Aquino index of intra-industry trade for country j is, in turn,
/ .
8 These figures merit a word of caution. Official statistics on recent expansion in manu-
facturing value added and, therefore, productivity, might be somewhat overestimated as
they do not adjust for the fall in the ratio of value added to gross output that took place
in the 1990s, most likely, as a result of the opening up of the economy. Until better esti-
mates are available, we can only conjecture on the order of magnitude of the bias. Our
guess is that actual productivity growth has been, nevertheless, outstanding in the 1990s.
9 Unit labor costs (ULC) are computed according to the following definition:
* P],
where W is the hourly wage rate, Q/L is output per hour worked, and P is either one of
three prices: export price, import price or the peso/US dollar exchange rate.
10 Levine (1997) discusses this issue in the context of endogenous growth theory.
11 For an overall assessment of Argentina’s financial deepening process with an empha-
sis on the role of credit factors in the business cycle, see Fanelli et al. (1998).
12 The activity level in 1986–7 represents a peak in industrial production for the 1980s
during the debt crisis.
13 The branches represented are food, fuels and petroleum, metals, textiles, transport
equipment, electric machinery, tobacco, chemicals, non-metallic products, paper and
cellulose, wood products and others.
14 See on this issue, Fazzari et al. (1988) and Harris et al. (1994).
15 See Minsky (1977) and Bernanke et al. (1993).
ULC  W/[(Q/L)
i (Xij/Xj  Mij/Mj)Qj  i (Xij/Xj  Mij/Mj)  iXij/Xj  Mij/Mj
(Xij/Xj  Mij/Mj)Qij  (Xij/Xj  Mij/Mj)  Xij/Xj  Mij/Mj
i (Xij  Mij)B  i (Xij  Mij)  i Xij  Mij 
(Xij  Mij)Bij  (Xij  Mij  Xij  Mij )
(Xi  Mi)/(X  M)]/[(X  M)/2]CTBi  [(Xi – Mi) – (X – M)
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16 The variable leverlp is defined as the long-run debt/total assets ratio, hit is the error
term. We corrected for the presence of first-order autocorrelation.
17 Unfortunately, firms that did not survive the Tequila effect are not included in our
sample and are, therefore, outside of this discussion.
18 The top twenty exporting firms are YPF, Cargill, Ford, Aceitera Gral Deheza, Grupo
Fiat, Volkswagen, Vicentin, Nidera, Louis Dreyfus, Aerolineas Argentinas, Molinos
Río de la Plata, Siderca, La Plata Cereal, Oleaginosas Moreno, Continental, Prod.
Sudamericanos, Perez Companc, Guipeba, Toepler and Renault.
19 We will see below, though, that income volatility was higher for the losers in the 1990s.
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3 Finance and changing trade patterns
in Brazil1
Maria Cristina T. Terra 
1. Introduction
Balance-of-payments crises have been recurrent throughout Brazilian history. The
depth and length of these crises depend basically on the country’s vulnerability to
external shocks and its capability to generate the necessary trade surplus after an
adverse external shock. These, in turn, depend on trade diversification and com-
petitiveness. With more diversified exports and imports, the country becomes less
vulnerable to specific sector shocks. Increased competitiveness, furthermore,
should facilitate trade balance reversals. This chapter focuses on one possible
determinant of competitiveness, which is the existence of credit constraints. In a
world with no missing markets, no informational asymmetries and no transaction
costs, credit supply and demand should be equalized by an appropriate interest
rate level, with no need for a financial sector. A vast literature, both theoretical
and empirical, studies the effects on the economy when these conditions do not
hold. In the real world, information asymmetries and transaction costs for acquir-
ing information create the need for a financial system. The role of the financial
sector is then, in summary, to allocate savings to the best investment projects, 
to monitor managers and to diversify risk (see Levine (1997) for a discussion on
the roles of the financial system). In such an environment, financial system
imperfections create credit restrictions, which in turn may affect firms’ invest-
ment decisions. Hence, financial sector underdevelopment may be harmful for
growth.
Moreover, it is plausible to presume that firms in different sectors have differ-
ent financial needs. Rajan and Zingales (1998) compute the external financing
pattern for different industries in the United States, and they arrive at large dis-
parities among them. If that is the case, the effect of credit restrictions should not
be equal among industries. In this chapter, I try to identify whether Brazilian
firms are credit constrained, and the relation between industries’ financial needs
and their competitiveness.
The period from 1974 to 1997 is studied, comprising four different situations
with respect to macroeconomic environment, trade policy and balance-of-payments
conditions. They are briefly described below. 
Period 1
From 1974 to 1982 the country was suffering from the adverse trade balance
effects of the two oil shocks. Despite implementation of import restrictions and
export promotion policies, a large current account deficit mounted up over the
period. The economy was nevertheless growing rapidly (7 per cent per year on
average), thanks to large capital inflows.
Period 2
From 1982 to 1990 the economy experienced the effects touched off by the
Mexican moratorium declared in 1982. Even stronger trade barriers were imposed,
and capital flows were very timid. The current account suffered a drastic reduction,
from a 6 per cent deficit in 1982 to zero balance in 1984. The economy faced
major macroeconomic instability, with two-digit monthly inflation rates in the late
1980s, and several unsuccessful price stabilization programs were attempted. 
Period 3 
From 1990 to 1994 the macro-instability scenario did not change, but drastic
trade liberalization was carried out. There was an upsurge of capital inflows to
Brazil, following the Latin American trend. 
Period 4
From 1994 to 1997 macro-stability finally was achieved, together with even
stronger capital inflows. Increasing current account deficits gave rise to concerns
about sustainability. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes the economic
environment over the time period studied, emphasizing the four distinct periods
outlined above. Section 3 analyzes trade pattern evolution in Brazil over time.
Section 4 studies the extent to which Brazilian firms have been credit constrained.
Section 5 synthesizes the results from Sections 3 and 4, analyzing possible influ-
ences of finance on the evolution of trade specialization. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Economic environment
Trade policy
Brazil has a long history of external trade intervention. After the Second World
War, it engaged in an import substitution strategy that lasted for decades, follow-
ing the trend in most Latin American countries. Import substitution meant 
a gradual process of industrialization based on domestic market protection and
subsidies for investments in specific industrial sectors. From the mid-1960s 
to 1973, the country carried out slow import liberalization, combined with export
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promotion policies, which included frequent exchange-rate devaluations, 
subsidized credit and tax and tariff exemptions for export activities. This combi-
nation of policies resulted in an important shift in the composition of exports,
favoring industrial goods to the detriment of traditional coffee exports. Coffee 
as a share of total exports was around 40 per cent in 1964, dropping to only 
20 per cent in 1973. The degree of diversification of imports did not achieve that
of exports. Although some import substitution occurred in the intermediate and
capital goods sectors, there was no substantial expansion of domestic oil produc-
tion. Imports continued to be concentrated on oil and intermediate and capital
goods. These are known as the ‘miracle’ years in Brazil. Gross national product
grew at an astonishing average yearly rate of 11.1 per cent, and annual industrial
growth averaged 13.1 per cent over the period.2
Period 1
Oil prices quadrupled at the end of 1973, and they would increase again in 1979.
Since oil was an important part of Brazilian imports (20 per cent in 1974), there
was a severe impact on the trade balance, which changed from a modest surplus
to a 4.7 billion USD deficit in 1974. The current account deficit deteriorated sub-
stantially, increasing from 1.7 billion USD in 1973 to 7.1 billion USD in 1974.
The government chose not to depreciate the real exchange rate. Non-essential
imports were discouraged, and the country borrowed internationally to level its
balance of payments and ensure the country’s fast growth path. A dynamic export
promotion policy was then implemented to compensate for the anti-export bias
created by the import restraints.3 Average growth from 1974 to 1982 was indeed
high – 6.6 per cent average GDP growth for the period (Table 3.1).4
Period 2
A new shock hit the economy in 1980 – the increase in international interest rates.
From 1975 to 1979, the LIBOR averaged 7.8 per cent, and world inflation 
8.9 per cent.5 Thus, over the period real interest rates were negative on average.
From 1980 to 1984, however, the LIBOR averaged 13.0 per cent and world infla-
tion only 1.2 per cent. As most of Brazilian external debt was at floating interest
rates, debt service increased substantially. The 1982 Mexican moratorium
induced a capital flow reversal from Latin America. The increasing current
account deficits could no longer be financed by capital inflows, so that a large
trade surplus would have to be generated to provide foreign reserves to pay the
debt service, and thereby equilibrate the current accounts (Table 3.1). A rapid
trade surplus was achieved by further import repression and active export pro-
motion policies.6 An industrial policy was also conducted, granting fiscal incen-
tives and subsidized credit from the state development bank to selected firms.
Although a restrictive trade policy had been in place in Brazil for decades, its 
justification changed over time, in three distinct phases. First, from the First World
War to the early 1970s it was part of an active import substitution program. Then,
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Table 3.1 Selected macroeconomic data
Inflation GDP growth Current Exports Imports Oila Coffee Terms International Real
(%) (%) account (% GDP) (% GDP) (% imports) (% exports) of trade reservesb exchange
(% GDP) (million USD) ratec
1974–82 63.6 6.6 4.7 7.3 8.4 33.6 13.0 125.2 7011.9 91.2
1983–90 699.0 3.2 0.7 10.3 5.8 30.9 7.4 103.2 8,756.3 175.4
1991–4 1,261.4 0.2 0.2 8.6 5.7 11.6 3.7 112.5 26,044.3 155.4
1995–7 11.9 4.2 3.3 6.4 7.2 2.9 4.3 115.2 56,521.7 123.7
1990 1,794.8 3.2 0.8 7.0 4.6 21.1 3.5 114.8 9,973 130.3
1991 478.1 4.6 0.4 8.2 5.4 16.0 4.4 117.6 9,406 151.2
1992 1,149.1 0.3 1.6 9.6 5.5 14.9 2.7 109.3 23,754 163.4
1993 2,489.1 0.8 0.1 9.0 5.9 8.5 2.8 109.1 32,211 160.2
1994 929.3 4.2 0.3 7.8 5.9 7.1 5.1 114.0 38,806 146.6
1995 22.0 5.7 2.5 6.5 6.9 5.2 4.2 115.3 51,840 126.4
1996 9.3 4.2 3.2 6.4 7.1 0.7 3.6 115.0 60,110 121.4
1997d 4.3 2.7 4.0 6.4 7.6 5.2 57,615 123.3
Sources: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, FUNCEX, International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Notes
a Oil and natural gas.
b International liquidity.
c e (WPI/CPI): nominal exchange rate, multiplied by US wholesale price index, divided by Brazilian consumer price index.
d Current account, export and import data up to July.
from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, the intent was to improve the deteriorating
trade balance due to the oil shocks. Finally, from the early 1980s to 1990, it served
as a drastic measure to deal with the debt crisis. Trade policy during the first phase
was designed as an incentive to selected sectors, whereas in the other two phases,
and especially in the third, trade policies in the form of both tariff and non-tariff 
barriers were created due to the macroeconomic instability.7
The effect of these policies on relative prices distorted microeconomic incentives.
By the end of the 1980s, a maze of incentives and disincentives was in place. It is
important to emphasize the harm of such a distorted and arbitrary system. It was
prone to stimulate rent-seeking activities, drawing resources to the unproductive
activity of seeking special treatment. It also displaced entrepreneurial effort from
productive activities to seeking the best path through the maze of policy incentives. 
Periods 3 and 4
A much-needed trade liberalization process was initiated by a new government in
1990. The BEFIEX program was immediately terminated (no new contracts were
to be signed). Trade liberalization was to be carried out in three steps:
1 the abolition of all ‘special regimes’ for imports;
2 the abolition of all quantitative restrictions and their replacement by tariffs; and
3 the lowering of tariffs, according to a preannounced schedule to be over four
years. By the end of the liberalization process in 1995, all tariffs would be in
the range 0 per cent to 40 per cent, averaging 20 per cent.
Trade liberalization was carried out as planned. Import levels did not increase
during the 1990–3 period, despite the lowering of tariffs and elimination of quan-
titative import restrictions. Two factors contributed to this: the real exchange-rate
devaluation during 1990–1 (between January 1990 and December 1992 the real
devaluation amounted to 36 per cent), and the low economic activity during the
period (the average GDP growth rate was negative 2 per cent).
Brazil, as other Latin American countries, experienced a capital inflow upsurge
in the 1990s. There was a substantial capital inflow increase after the implemen-
tation of the Real Plan, a successful price stabilization program introduced in 
July 1994. Real exchange-rate appreciation resulted, producing a mounting 
current account deficit, now led by a steep increase in imports. The reliance on
capital inflows was severely questioned after the Mexican crisis in December
1994. This led to a partial reversal in trade liberalization. Some quantitative
restrictions were temporarily reintroduced, and tariffs were increased for those
products most responsible for increased imports.
Real exchange rate, trade flows and the current account
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate and its volatility,8 and
Figure 3.2 shows the current account, imports and exports as a percentage of GDP
from 1974 to 1996. The charts are divided into the four subperiods described above.
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Period 1
During the first period, the real exchange rate (RER) appreciated more than in the
other periods. The crawling-peg exchange-rate regime maintained low RER volatil-
ity, except for the maxi-devaluation episode in 1979. Imports, which had increased
substantially after the oil price increase, decreased steadily until 1979 due to a
restrictive trade policy. The second oil price increase caused the trade balance to
deteriorate, leading to the currency maxi-devaluation in 1979. Figure 3.2 shows the
jump in export share after the devaluation (it increased from an average of 6.8 per
cent of GDP during 1973–9 to 8.5 per cent in 1980). The current account was 
negative throughout the period, reaching negative 6 per cent of GDP in 1982, despite
the trade balance surplus in that year. The current account deficit was caused by the
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Figure 3.2 Current account.
high debt service cost, due to the increase in international interest rates. The country
nevertheless experienced high GDP growth rates over the period (Table 3.1).
Period 2
There was a sharp RER devaluation during the debt crisis, accompanied by higher
volatility. The RER volatility increased over the period, reaching its peak in 1990.
The period was characterized by deep macroeconomic instability. As shown in
Table 3.1, inflation reached extremely high rates. Several heterodox price stabi-
lization attempts managed to reduce inflation from two-digit monthly figures to
zero in a very short period of time, only for it to take off again after failure of the
plans. Not even the crawling-peg regime pursued was capable of preventing high
RER volatility.
The more devalued RER was accompanied by a substantial trade balance
improvement, led mainly by increasing exports, as shown in Figure 3.2. The current
account moved from negative 6 per cent of GDP in 1982 to a near-zero balance over
the whole period. The investment rate decreased during the period. The sharp bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment was accompanied by bitter recession: GDP decreased
4.2 per cent and 2.9 per cent in 1982 and 1984, respectively. High growth rates were
experienced from 1985 to 1987, but they decreased again towards the end of the
decade.
Period 3
The third period started with very high RER volatility, during a short period of
RER appreciation. The RER depreciated again, but to a lower level compared
with the second period, while RER volatility decreased substantially. The current
account maintained its near-zero balance, while imports started an upward trend,
following the 1990s trade liberalization. GDP growth rates were near zero or neg-
ative over the period.
Period 4
The nominal exchange rate was allowed to float during the first months after the
Real Plan’s implementation in June 1994, causing a RER volatility increase. The
capital inflow during the period caused the exchange rate to rise, leading to higher
imports. The current account moved from a zero balance at the beginning of the
period to a 3.2 per cent deficit in 1996. Annual growth rates were between 4 and
6 per cent during 1994–6, but in 1997 growth declined to 2.7 per cent.
Labor productivity and unit labor cost evolution
Labor productivity was stationary between the mid-1980s and 1990.9 As shown
in Figure 3.3, it then increased continuously between 1990 and 1996 at an aver-
age annual rate of approximately 7 per cent. Over the whole period it increased
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by more than 50 per cent. To a large extent, this productivity increase reflects the
impact of greater international competition encountered by domestic producers. 
Labor productivity is a basic factor in explaining competitiveness. Hence, one
would expect that the significant productivity increase in Brazil has been trans-
lated into greater competitiveness. At least since 1994, however, this has not been
the case, since wages for most of the period have grown faster than labor 
productivity. 
















































































































































Figure 3.4 Labor productivity, wage and unit labor cost in industry (seasonally adjusted
data – Jan-94: 100).
Figure 3.4 shows labor productivity evolution, wages in US dollars and the unit
labor cost (ULC is the ratio of wages in dollars to productivity) for the industrial
sector as a whole. The ULC provides an indication of labor costs measured in the
relevant foreign currency per unit of output. Wages in dollars grew continuously,
totaling a 70 per cent increase between 1994 and 1997. Labor productivity, in
turn, increased by 32 per cent. ULC increased by 40 per cent until mid-1996 and
has been falling somewhat since then. The ULC increase in the initial period
resulted from the fact that wages grew faster than productivity, and vice versa in
the later period.
Hence, for the period as a whole, to the extent that the ULC is a good measure
of competitiveness, the latter has not increased since 1994. Based on this criterion,
overall competitiveness fell until mid-1996 and it has recovered slightly since then.
The price of tradable goods in dollars and ‘profitability’ as measured by firms’
profit margin may be more refined measures of competitiveness. Figure 3.5 shows
the evolution of the industrial goods producer price index (PPI), and the ratio
between PPI and ULC as a measure of aggregate profit margin. PPI increased
around 20 per cent between January 1994 and mid-1995 and then decreased
approximately 10 per cent. Profitability fell 20 per cent and then recovered. Both
the lower price index in dollars and the profitability increase in the more recent
period resulted from the ULC reduction.
Summarizing the main findings in this section, three aspects may be high-
lighted. First, external shocks, such as the oil price hikes and external debt crisis,
had crucial roles in determining both the macroeconomic environment and trade
policy choices. Second, trade liberalization had a positive effect on productivity
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Figure 3.5 Unit labor cost, prices in USD and profitability (seasonally adjusted data –
Jan-94: 100).
during the 1990s. Third, the macroeconomic environment played a decisive role
in ULC evolution, and hence competitiveness. 
3. Trade pattern evolution 
This section analyzes the pattern of trade since 1974, using several indexes that
characterize trade patterns. 
Contribution to trade balance
The first index used to characterize trade patterns in Brazil is the contribution to
trade balance (CTB) index. Table 3.2 presents the performance of this index from
1974 to 1997, in a ten-sector aggregation.10 The index of contribution of industry
i to trade balance was calculated using eqn (3.1): 
, (3.1)
where Xi and Mi are exports and imports of industry i, respectively, and X and M
are total Brazilian exports and imports, respectively.
The first term of the index represents net exports (by sector), whereas the sec-
ond represents ‘neutral’ net exports, that is, net exports (by sector) that would be
observed if the share of each product in overall net exports were equal to its con-
tribution to total trade. Thus, the index value equals zero for a given period when
the ratio of the net sector exports to overall net exports is equal to the sector’s 
contribution to total trade. Its value will be positive or negative depending on
whether net exports are larger or smaller relative to the ‘neutral’ value. Note that
if a country is running a trade deficit, a product may show a positive sign even if
its imports are larger than its exports. The opposite is true for a trade surplus.
Figures 3.6a and b show the index evolution for each of the ten industries. Note
that the industries in Figure 3.6a have a much stronger contribution to trade bal-
ance than those of Figure 3.6b: the scale in Figure 3.6a ranges from 0.6 to 0.6,
whereas in Figure 3.6b it ranges from only 0.1 to 0.1. Lines have been drawn
on the years corresponding to the periodicity used above.
There were important changes in the composition of imports and exports over
the period. The food and beverages sector presented the largest CTB decrease in
absolute terms over the period. Its CTB fell from 0.50 in 1974 to 0.22 in 1997,
representing a 54 per cent decrease. This shows the increasing importance of
other industries in Brazilian exports over the period. The strongest change
occurred between the first and the second periods (the oil shock and debt crisis
periods), when the food and beverages CTB decreased from an average of 0.43 to
0.22. After the Real Stabilization Plan, it increased slightly. Food and beverages
remains the sector with highest CTB. 
Energy material, on the other hand, exhibited the largest swing in CTB. Over
the first period (oil crisis), energy material CTB decreased from 0.26 in 1974
CTBi 
2
(X  M)(Xi  Mi)  (Xi  Mi)(X  M)(X  M) 
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Table 3.2 Contribution to trade balance (ten-sector aggregation)
Food Textiles, Transport Metal Chemical Wood, paper Construction Machinery Energy Other
products and apparel and equipment products products and products material material industries
beverages footwear
1974–82 0.4288 0.0702 0.0229 0.0371 0.0740 0.0175 0.0011 0.1244 0.3660 0.0110
1983–90 0.2223 0.0601 0.0312 0.1366 0.0793 0.0266 0.0012 0.0903 0.2953 0.0133
1991–4 0.1532 0.0467 0.0158 0.1805 0.0945 0.0437 0.0019 0.1337 0.1918 0.0217
1995–7 0.1980 0.0271 0.0199 0.1540 0.0774 0.0478 0.0004 0.1776 0.1282 0.0243
1990 0.1750 0.0515 0.0428 0.1856 0.0947 0.0320 0.0003 0.1417 0.2322 0.0186
1991 0.1327 0.0537 0.0330 0.2135 0.0986 0.0326 0.0009 0.1286 0.2191 0.0201
1992 0.1485 0.0562 0.0360 0.1749 0.0903 0.0406 0.0010 0.1273 0.2161 0.0235
1993 0.1513 0.0429 0.0133 0.1736 0.0910 0.0481 0.0034 0.1273 0.1924 0.0219
1994 0.1803 0.0340 0.0191 0.1599 0.0982 0.0534 0.0021 0.1515 0.1395 0.0214
1995 0.1807 0.0263 0.0433 0.1640 0.0773 0.0602 0.0018 0.1649 0.1225 0.0249
1996 0.1940 0.0303 0.0120 0.1646 0.0740 0.0428 0.0001 0.1747 0.1386 0.0324
1997 0.2193 0.0248 0.0045 0.1336 0.0809 0.0403 0.0007 0.1932 0.1233 0.0154
Sources: IBGE and FUNCEX.
to 0.46 in 1983. From 1983, on the other hand, it increased to 0.12 in 1997.
This movement reflects the decreasing importance of oil in Brazilian imports. In
1974 this sector had the lowest CTB, and in 1997 it had given up its last position
to machinery (which was second to last in 1974). 
In percentage terms, the sectors that underwent the largest changes in CTB
were wood, paper and products, and metal products, increasing 285 per cent and
291 per cent, respectively. 
Transport equipment CTB decreased steeply over the last period. Its value
increased during the first period, from 0.0191 in 1974 to 0.0593 in 1982.
During the second period its value averaged 0.0312, thereupon falling from 1992
to its lowest value of 0.433 in 1995. 
Both exports and imports became more diversified over the period. The index
variance across sectors ranged from 0.038 to 0.052 in the 1970s and early 1980s.
It started decreasing steadily in 1983, and its value has been around 0.013 in the
past few years.11 This means that the index has become more uniformly distrib-
uted across sectors over time. Hence, exports and imports have become less 
concentrated in specific sectors.
Revealed comparative advantage
The other index used to assess each sector’s role in inter-industry trade is
Balassa’s index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). This index measures
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Figure 3.6 Contribution to trade balance. Industries in (a) make a stronger contribution
compared to those in (b).
the relative importance of a sector in a country’s total exports with respect to the
relative importance of that sector in world total exports. It is given by eqn (3.2):
, (3.2)
where Xij is country j’s exports by industry i, Xj is country j’s total exports, XiW is
world exports by industry i, and XW is total world exports.
The evolution of RCA indexes is shown in Table 3.3. The index has been calcu-
lated for the period from 1986 to 1997, for ten aggregated sectors. The largest
movement occurred in the wood, paper and products sector. Its RCA increased 
85 per cent over the period (from 1.16 to 2.15). The CTB of that industry increased
42 per cent over the same period, indicating that its increased importance in
Brazilian exports surpassed the increase of the sector’s importance in world
exports. Other significant changes are a 22 per cent decrease in the RCA for tex-
tiles, apparel and footwear, also following its decrease in CTB, and a 22 per cent
and 29 per cent increase in transport equipment and construction material, despite
those sectors’ decrease in CTB.
The sectors presenting the highest RCA in 1997 are food and beverages (3.15),
metal products (2.82), and wood, paper and products (2.15). The lowest ones are
machinery (0.31) and chemical products (0.43).
Intra-industry trade
The Grubel and Lloyd intra-industry trade measure, presented in Table 3.4, is cal-
culated with eqn (3.3): 
, (3.3)
where its aggregate values, shown in the last column of Table 3.4, are calculated
with eqn (3.4):
. (3.4)
The aggregate index shows a steady increase over time. As for the index’s evolu-
tion for the different industries, it increases for most of them. The most spectac-
ular increase was in the textiles, apparel and footwear industry. The Grubel and
Lloyd index started at 29 per cent in 1974, decreased until reaching its lowest
level of 12 per cent in 1981, and then increased until reaching 82 per cent in 1995.
For metal products, on the other hand, the index decreased substantially.12 As the
performance of the index indicates, the advent of Mercosur had a positive effect
on intra-industry trade levels.
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Table 3.4 Grubel and Lloyd intra-industry index (ten-sector aggregation)
Food Textiles, Transport Metal Chemical Wood, paper Construction Machinery Energy Other Aggregate
products and apparel and equipment products products and products material material industries
beverages footwear
1974–82 0.3246 0.1861 0.7243 0.7583 0.3304 0.7272 0.7983 0.4835 0.1408 0.7427 0.3979
1983–90 0.2802 0.2426 0.5522 0.2889 0.6499 0.3438 0.6177 0.8725 0.5049 0.8904 0.4547
1991–4 0.4139 0.4578 0.7170 0.2704 0.5842 0.3265 0.6929 0.7544 0.4381 0.9340 0.5128
1995–7 0.5141 0.7746 0.8747 0.4238 0.5318 0.5545 0.9487 0.5149 0.3624 0.7341 0.5657
1990 0.3699 0.3811 0.5646 0.2933 0.5601 0.4016 0.7762 0.7057 0.4298 0.9710 0.4731
1991 0.4593 0.3992 0.6223 0.2639 0.5545 0.4121 0.7380 0.7440 0.3977 0.9581 0.4912
1992 0.3557 0.3206 0.5731 0.2502 0.6464 0.2762 0.6701 0.8176 0.4277 0.9837 0.4791
1993 0.3998 0.5137 0.7352 0.2620 0.6156 0.2975 0.6177 0.7853 0.4375 0.9164 0.5213
1994 0.4410 0.5977 0.9374 0.3054 0.5205 0.3203 0.7458 0.6709 0.4896 0.8776 0.5597
1995 0.5707 0.8184 0.7929 0.4304 0.4931 0.5238 0.9418 0.5122 0.3750 0.6969 0.5640
1996 0.5694 0.8017 0.8884 0.4227 0.5142 0.6204 0.9430 0.4770 0.3118 0.6165 0.5601
1997 0.4021 0.7038 0.9428 0.4183 0.5879 0.5194 0.9612 0.5555 0.4005 0.8888 0.5731
Table 3.3 Revealed comparative advantage – Balassa’s index (ten-sector aggregation)
Food Textiles, Transport Metal Chemical Wood, paper Construction Machinery Energy Other
products and apparel and equipment products products and products material material industries
beverages footwear
1986 3.1364 1.1520 0.7125 2.4402 0.4022 1.1629 0.6125 0.3245 0.5530 0.2955
1987 3.1567 1.1759 0.9625 2.3162 0.3107 1.0862 0.5708 0.3070 0.6740 0.3179
1988 2.9034 1.0938 0.8728 2.7100 0.2979 1.2804 0.5841 0.2993 0.8320 0.2173
1989 2.7652 1.0613 0.9287 2.8408 0.3457 1.1800 0.6370 0.3268 0.6682 0.2672
1990 2.9444 1.0293 0.8708 3.1946 0.3788 1.3065 0.5866 0.3103 0.5170 0.3176
1991 2.5808 1.0515 0.8072 3.5885 0.3857 1.3874 0.6111 0.3198 0.4882 0.3471
1992 2.6849 1.0564 0.9717 3.4264 0.3357 1.5768 0.6735 0.3314 0.5301 0.3291
1993 2.8163 1.1443 0.9949 3.4320 0.4525 0.8081 0.8957 0.3526 0.6067 0.2902
1994 3.1015 0.9062 0.9535 2.9531 0.3896 1.8603 0.7600 0.3186 0.6384 0.3221
1995 3.1510 0.8935 0.8725 2.8121 0.4389 2.1495 0.7896 0.3123 0.6017 0.3382
4. Liquidity constraints, finance pattern and 
corporate investment
This section studies Brazilian companies’ financing decisions, and the extent to
which they have been financially constrained. The empirical investigation uses
balance sheet data for firms that are required by law to publish them. The data was
collected by IBRE (Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Getúlio Vargas Foundation)
from the Gazeta Mercantil and Diário Oficial, from 1986 to 1997, with the num-
ber of firms each year ranging from 2,091 to 4,198. From the original sample, 
I selected those firms which had data published for all years considered13 – from
1986 to 1997 – a total of 550 firms. Non-industrial firms were excluded, as well
as those with missing data. The sample used is composed of 468 firms, broken
down by sector as in Table 3.5.
The data has two breaks over time, one in 1990 and the other in 1994, due to
changes in balance sheet reporting criteria after the implementation of inflation
stabilization plans (the Collor Plan in 1990 and the Real Plan in 1994). All the
analyses are carried out taking into account those two breaks in the time series.
The time frame for which we have firms’ level data is shorter, including
only three of the four periods described earlier. The analysis in this section
will therefore divide the period from 1986 to 1997 into three subperiods: the
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Table 3.5 Sample firms broken down by sector
Sector Number of firms Average value of 
assetsa (1994–7)
Apparel and footwear 16 151,226,212
Beverages 15 599,900,102
Chemical products 71 814,435,409
Drugs 11 137,409,771
Electric equipment 28 338,754,575




Metal products 60 606,166,766
Non-metal products 30 371,050,142
Other industries 9 92,482,669
Paper and products 19 857,736,540
Perfumery and soap 3 24,547,019
Plastic products 8 74,543,359
Printing and publishing 11 97,283,390
Rubber products 1 17,969,577
Textiles 40 121,148,883
Tobacco 1 409,941,742
Transport equipment 23 256,891,434
Wood products 7 252,427,396
Note
a  In 1996 constant Reals.
macro-instability and balance-of-payments crisis period (1986–90), the macro-
instability and trade liberalization period (1990–4), and the macro-stability and
capital inflow period (1994–7).
Pattern of finance
The analysis starts with a description of the firms’ patterns of finance. The set of
firms is divided into subcategories, trying to identify possible differences in
finance patterns across different groupings, or across different time periods. Two
leverage measures are calculated: the ratio between liabilities and assets, and the
ratio between debts14 and assets. Figure 3.7 presents both measures’ evolution for
the whole sample of firm averages, and Table 3.6 presents the averages across
periods. Over the first period, liabilities and debts were stable in relation to total
asset ratios, averaging 35 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. There was a slight
increase in both measures during the second period. Firms were clearly becoming
more leveraged over the last period, 1994–7, when liabilities averaged 47 per cent
and debts 16 per cent of total assets. 
First, the sample of firms is divided into subgroups based on an a priori
hypothesis with respect to firms’ credit accessibility. It is reasonable to assume
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Figure 3.7 Industrial firms.
Table 3.6 Pattern of finance
Debts/assets Liabilities/assets
Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard
deviation deviation
1986–9 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.35 0.32 0.17
1990–3 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.37 0.35 0.18
1994–7 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.47 0.41 0.41
1986–7 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.40 0.36 0.21
that larger firms would have more access to credit markets than smaller ones.
As Gertler and Gilchrist argue:
[W]hile size per se may not be a direct determinant [of capital market
access], it is strongly correlated with the primitive factors that do matter. The
informational frictions that add to the costs of external finance apply mainly
to younger firms, firms with a high degree of idiosyncratic risk, and firms
that are not well collateralized. [T]hese are, on average, smaller firms. 
(1994: 313) 
The finance pattern evolution for those two groups of firms is indeed interesting,
as shown in Figures 3.8a and b. Although leverage measured as liabilities as a
share of total assets does not differ between the two groups of firms, the debts to
assets ratio is quite different between them. Large firms have a higher debts to
assets ratio throughout the whole time frame compared to small firms. 
There are two possible explanations for the higher indebtedness of large firms
compared to that of small firms. Low debt for small firms may be either the result
of pure financial decisions or an indication of the credit restrictions they face. 
If the first alternative is true, some firms simply chose to use fewer external
loans, and those are coincidentally the small ones. If the latter is true, a group of
firms was credit restricted, and therefore it was not possible for them to be more
leveraged. The empirical exercise performed in the next subsection tries to iden-
tify which explanation is more consistent with the data.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct a measure of external dependence for dif-
ferent industries, using data on external finance for US industries. They assume
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Figure 3.8 Liabilities/assets (a) and debts/asssets (b) ratios for large (–––) and small 
(----) firms.
that there is a technological reason for some industries to depend more on exter-
nal finance than others. They argue that
… to the extent that the initial project scale, the gestation period, the cash
harvest period, and the requirement for continuing investment differ substan-
tially between industries, this is indeed plausible. Furthermore, we assume
that these technological differences persist across countries, so that we can
use an industry’s dependence on external funds as identified in the United
States as a measure of its dependence in other countries. 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998: 563) 
By using the measure constructed in that paper, firms also have been divided
according to their external dependence: firms in the sectors exhibiting more exter-
nal dependence have been separated from those firms in sectors presenting less
finance dependence.15 It is interesting to note that in Brazil, as Figure 3.9a shows,
more financially dependent firms are on average more leveraged than less finan-
cially dependent firms, looking at the ratio of liabilities to assets.16 That is, firms
more in need of external finance according to the external dependence measure
exhibit greater use of external finance. With respect to the debts to assets ratio,
there is no pattern for the difference between these two groups: in some periods
firms in less dependent sectors have a higher debts to assets ratio, compared 
to more dependent ones, whereas in other periods they have a lower measure 
(Figure 3.9b).
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Figure 3.9 Liabilities/assets (a) and debts/assets (b) ratios for more (–––) and less (----)
financially dependent firms.
Finally, the sample of firms is divided between multinational and domestic
firms. The motivation for this division is that multinational firms may have more
access to international credit markets, and therefore be less credit constrained. In
both leverage measures, Figures 3.10a and b show higher leverage for multina-
tional firms until 1993, and higher leverage for domestic firms since then. 
Credit constraints
There is ample literature that seeks empirical evidence of credit constraints 
by looking at the firm’s investment decision. Fazzari et al. (1988) were the first
of several to estimate models of investment demand, including cash flow, as an
independent variable. The reasoning is that if firms are not credit constrained,
their cash-flow variations should not affect investment decisions, after investment
opportunities are controlled for. Equation (3.5) is the general form for the invest-
ment equations they estimate:
, (3.5)
where Iit and Kit represent investment and capital stock of firm i at time t, X rep-
resents a vector of variables affecting firms’ investment decisions, according to
theoretical considerations, and uit is an error term. In some specifications, the Q
investment model is estimated by using Tobin’s q as the vector X, and including
the cash-flow variable in the equation. In other specifications, the accelerator
model of investment is used, and the X vector is replaced by contemporaneous
and lagged sales to capital ratios.
(I/K)it  f(X)  g(CF/K)it  uit
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Figure 3.10 Liabilities/assets (a) and debt/assets (b) ratios for domestic (–––) and 
multinational (----) firms.
Using a different method, Whited (1992) estimates Euler equations for an opti-
mizing investment model under two different assumptions: when firms are credit
constrained, and when they are not. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), on the other
hand, study whether small and large firms respond differently to monetary policy.
They find that smaller firms have a much stronger response to monetary tighten-
ing than larger firms, indicating they are more credit constrained. All these 
studies use data for US firms.
The accelerator model specification from Fazzari et al. (1988) will be reproduced
for Brazilian data to identify the existence (or not) of credit constraints.17 The
empirical exercises performed here are based on the sales accelerator investment
demand model, where investment is explained by current and past sales. Cash flow
is included as an explanatory variable for investment, as shown in eqn (3.6):
, (3.6)
where Sit represents the sales of firm i at time t. Cash flow should not be a signifi-
cant explanatory variable for investment, except when firms are credit constrained.
That is, the parameter  should not be significant for firms that are not creditcon-
strained, and it should be positive and significant for credit-constrained firms.
Table 3.7 presents the initial results. All regressions include firm-specific
effects and two dummies: one for 1990 and another for 1994 to account for the
breaks in the data.18 First, the investment accelerator model is estimated without
including cash flow as an explanatory variable. The best specification for our data
is the one including two lags of the sales variable. As column 1 of Table 3.7
shows, variations in the sales variables explain 52 per cent of investment changes.
When cash flow is included in the regression, independent variables explain 
81 per cent of investment variations, and cash flow has a positive and significant
coefficient (with t-statistics of 10.1). According to our conjecture, this is an indi-
cation that firms were credit constrained over the time period studied. 
One should note, however, that the period under study encompasses two 
distinct situations with respect to capital inflows. From 1986 to 1994 there was
very little external capital inflow into Brazil, and from 1994 to 1997 current
account deficits increased substantially, reaching 4 per cent in 1997, as shown in
Table 3.1. It is possible that the higher capital inflow increased the credit supply,
therefore lessening firms’ credit constraints. A slope dummy for cash flow for the
period 1994–7 has been included in the regression. This variable equals cash flow
and capital ratio for the years 1994–7, and is zero for the rest of the period. If
firms were less credit constrained over 1994–7, this slope dummy should not be
positive. That is not the case though. The slope dummy coefficient is positive,
with a t-statistic of 1.93. Thus, there is no evidence that firms became less credit
constrained with the external capital inflow.
The next step is to investigate possible differences in credit constraints across
groups of firms. First, as argued in the previous subsection, it is reasonable to
expect that small firms are more credit constrained than large ones. The sample
is then split according to firms’ size, and the regression results are presented in
columns 4–7.19 Cash-flow coefficients are also positive and significant for both
(I/K)it  i  0(S/K)it  1(S/K)i,t1  2(S/K)i,t2  (CF/K)it  uit
64 M. C. T. Terra
Table 3.7 Regression results (dependent variable: investment)
Independent variable Whole sample Large firms Small firms
and summary statistics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(CF/K )it 1.339 0.882 1.985 1.860 1.313 0.852
(10.111) (3.708) (4.793) (7.220) (8.405) (3.662)
CF/K slope dummy 0.553 0.138 0.604
1994–7 (1.933) (0.407) (2.005)
(S/K )it 0.284 0.127 0.118 0.233 0.239 0.137 0.134
(3.975) (5.462) (5.115) (1.299) (1.267) (6.695) (6.764)
(S/K )i,t1 0.284 0.101 0.084 0.319 0.328 0.112 0.100
(3.467) (3.397) (3.106) (1.632) (1.553) (3.926) (3.755)
(S/K)i,t2 0.034 0.001 0.004 0.034 0.038 0.004 0.001
(0.034) (0.069) (0.341) (0.882) (0.902) (0.309) (0.121)
R2 0.515 0.807 0.816 0.863 0.863 0.792 0.805
Number of firms 468 468 468 75 75 393 393
Number of observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 750 750 3,930 3,930
Notes: The dependent variable is investment–capital ratio. The CF/K slope dummy is a variable that has value equal to CF/K for the years 1994–7, and zero in all
other years. All regressions have been estimated using firms’ fixed effects and dummies for the years 1990 and 1994, but the coefficients are not reported. The 
t-statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
groups of firms (columns 4 and 6). Hence, there is no evidence that larger firms
are less credit constrained than smaller firms.20
Second, international credit markets may be more accessible for multinational
firms, compared to domestic ones. Columns 1–4 in Table 3.8 present the results
for the regressions estimated for multinational and domestic firms separately.
Again, all cash-flow coefficients are positive and significant, indicating credit
constraints for both groups. There is an important difference in the cash-flow
slope dummy in the period 1994–7 for the two groups, though for domestic firms
this coefficient is positive and significant, and for multinationals it is negative,
with a t-statistic of 1.238. This can be interpreted as an indication that multina-
tional firms were less credit constrained over the period 1994–7, when there was
a large capital inflow. Hence, the capital inflow seems to have lessened only
multinational firms’ credit constraint.21
The sample has also been divided according to external dependence, using
Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) measure, and the estimated regressions are presented
in Table 3.8, columns 5–8. The cash-flow coefficients are significant in all regres-
sions, but the coefficient is higher for less dependent firms. One interpretation is
that less dependent firms would use less external finance; therefore their invest-
ment would be more cash flow sensitive. The cash-flow slope dummy is positive,
but not significant for both subsamples.
The results so far indicate credit restrictions across the whole sample of firms,
and also across subgroups formed by larger and smaller, more and less externally
dependent, multinational and domestic firms. The only instance of credit-
constraint reduction was among multinational firms, from 1994 to 1997.22
Further results
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that investment-cash-flow sensitivities do 
not provide a useful measure of finance constraints, introducing controversy
regarding the validity of this methodology. An alternative empirical exercise is
then performed, without the use of cash flows. It was motivated by Rajan and
Zingales (1998).
Rajan and Zingales (1998) investigate the effect of financial sector development
on industrial growth. Their main hypothesis is that ‘industries that are more
dependent on external financing will have relatively higher growth rates in coun-
tries that have more developed financial markets’ (p. 562). They use industry-level
data for several countries to estimate an equation where industry growth is
explained by the interaction between an industry’s external dependence and the
country’s financial development, controlling for country indicators, industry indi-
cators, and that industry’s share in the country’s economy. That is, they have an
equation that tries to capture possible variables that explain differences in industry
growth rates in different countries, and they include a new variable in the equation,
namely external dependence times financial development. Their conjecture is that
if financial development is indeed important for growth, the coefficient of this
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Table 3.8 Regression results (dependent variable: investment)
Independent variable Multinational Domestic firms More dependent Less dependent
and summary statistics
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(CF/K)it 1.098 1.367 1.437 0.878 1.022 0.644 1.573 1.304
(5.939) (6.738) (8.036) (3.737) (6.040) (2.883) (9.014) (7.613)
CF/K slope dummy 0.284 0.737 0.520 0.302
1994–7 (1.238) (2.278) (1.669) (1.175)
(S/K )it 0.152 0.151 0.148 0.136 0.128 0.121 0.091 0.086
(1.762) (1.794) (6.346) (6.413) (5.466) (5.516) (1.904) (1.811)
(S/K )i,t1 0.040 0.052 0.115 0.098 0.128 0.108 0.037 0.033
(0.591) (0.714) (3.752) (3.516) (2.879) (2.644) (1.087) (0.993)
(S/K )i,t2 0.040 0.037 0.006 0.002 0.016 0.011 0.031 0.031
(1.130) (1.040) (0.469) (0.193) (1.139) (0.796) (2.001) (2.155)
R2 0.918 0.918 0.785 0.802 0.765 0.780 0.844 0.846
Number of firms 46 46 413 413 179 179 289 289
Number of observations 460 460 4,130 4,130 1,790 1,790 2,890 2,890
Notes: The dependent variable is investment–capital ratio. The CF/K slope dummy is a variable that has value equal to CF/K for the years 1994 –7, and zero in all other
years. All regressions have been estimated using firms’ fixed effects and dummies for the years 1990 and 1994, but the coefficients are not reported. The 
t-statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table 3.9 Credit to private sector (% GDP)
Argentina Brazil Philippines France Germany India Mexico South Africa Tunisia Uruguay United States
1991 12.5 33.1 17.8 96.6 89.7 25.6 20.2 53.8 28.5 66.7
1992 15.2 54.3 20.6 96.7 90.7 26.6 27.2 62.7 54.0 27.5 63.3
1993 16.5 82.2 26.4 92.0 96.5 25.7 30.4 62.4 53.9 27.0 62.5
1994 18.2 45.5 29.1 86.1 98.8 25.2 36.6 65.5 53.8 25.6 62.7
1995 18.1 30.8 37.5 84.9 99.8 24.3 26.7 67.5 54.5 28.3 65.0
1996 18.1 26.3 49.0 81.8 104.9 25.6 16.4 70.5 49.1 28.8 65.6
1997 19.3 26.0 56.5 80.7 108.2 12.7 73.5 50.2 31.1 67.1
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
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interaction variable should be positive: more dependent industries would tend to
grow faster in a more financially developed environment.
I borrow this idea from Rajan and Zingales (1998) in the following way. It
seems plausible to take Brazil as a financially constrained economy. As shown in
Table 3.9, Brazil has low domestic credit as a proportion of GDP compared to
developed countries. In this financially constrained environment, more dependent
firms that have access to credit should be relatively better off. Less dependent
firms, on the other hand, should not be much affected by credit access. Hence, when
explaining cross-firm investment levels, more dependent firms would tend to invest
more when they have more access to credit, in a credit-constrained environment.
The empirical implementation is carried out by estimating the investment accel-
erator model, including the interaction between external dependence and credit
access. Firm size is used as a proxy for credit access. If Brazil has a credit con-
strained economy, and if firm size is a good proxy for credit access, the coefficient
for the dependence and firm size interaction term should be positive. Table 3.10
presents the results. The estimated regression for the whole sample of firms is pre-
sented in column 1. The coefficient for the interaction term is indeed positive and
statistically significant; more dependent and larger firms do invest more.
In this empirical specification, it makes no sense to divide the sample of firms
into large and small, or more and less dependent, because the criteria used for
such divisions are already contained in the new independent variable used. An
alternative grouping of firms is used, based on asset growth. One group, denoted
‘winners’, is composed of those firms that presented an above-average asset
growth rate over the period, and the other group, ‘losers’, is composed of firms
Table 3.10 Regression results (dependent variable: investment)
Independent variable Whole sample Winners Losers
and summary statistics 1 2 3 
Interaction (external 308.985 206.645 959.942
dependence  firm size)
(2.601) (2.276) (3.508)
(S/K)it 0.284 0.325 0.272
(3.996) (4.831) (3.092)
(S/K)i,t1 0.283 0.277 0.286
(3.482) (4.375) 2.608 
(S/K)i,t2 0.035 0.032 0.036
(1.235) (1.515) (0.793)
R2 0.516 0.502 0.533
Number of firms 468 235 233
Number of observations 4,680 2,350 2,330
Notes: All regressions were estimated using firms’ fixed effects, but the coefficients are not reported.
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
with asset growth rate below average. The interaction term (external dependence
times firm size) is positive and significant in both subgroups, as shown in
columns 2 and 3. It is interesting to note, though, that the coefficient is more than
four times larger for the group of loser firms.23
5. Credit constraints and trade patterns
Section 3 describes industrial trade pattern evolution in Brazil, and Section 4
investigates the extent of credit constraint faced by Brazilian firms. In this 
section, I try to interact these two analyses in order to extract some evidence of
the working of credit constraint as one of the sources of comparative advantage.
I divide time into the four subintervals used in previous sections: oil crisis
(1974–82), debt crisis (1982–90), trade liberalization (1990–4) and capital inflow
(1994–7). Trade barriers increased over the first two periods, and started being
removed in the late 1980s. Trade pattern evolution over the first two periods
would not necessarily represent the response to comparative advantages, but
rather to distorted incentives. During the last two periods, on the other hand, trade
distortion diminished substantially, and trade pattern evolution can be taken as an
expression of the countries’ comparative advantages.
CTB averages are calculated for each subinterval, identifying whether they are
significantly different across subintervals, at a 5 per cent significance level. The
results are presented in Table 3.11. Winners are sectors which significantly increased
their CTB from one period to the next; losers are those significantly decreasing their
CTB; and stagnant are the ones that showed no significant change. The most inter-
esting features of the pattern observed in Table 3.11 are the following:
● Machinery is a winner from the first to the second periods only, that is, under
trade distortions. It is a loser from the second to the third, and stagnant from
the third to fourth. 
● Drugs, plastic products and electric equipment follow a similar pattern. They
are stagnant from the first to second periods, and losers over the other periods.
● The opposite is true for the sectors wood products, furniture, leather and
tobacco. These sectors are losers from the first to the second periods (except
tobacco, which was stagnant), and they are winners through the other periods. 
● Food products, metal products and rubber products are also interesting cases:
the first is a losing sector across all periods, except from third to fourth, and
the opposite is true for the other two sectors.
● Textiles is a losing sector in all periods.
It is reasonable to conclude that Brazil shows no comparative advantage in
machinery, drugs, electric equipment and textiles, and shows comparative advan-
tage in wood products, furniture, leather and tobacco. Our main question is
whether finance was one of the sources of this comparative advantage. Looking at
the external dependence measure, it is interesting to note that the four sectors with
lack of comparative advantage are among the seven most externally dependent
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ones. Tobacco and leather, on the other hand, are the two least externally depend-
ent – actually, they have negative measures of external dependence. 
For a statistical comparison of the two measures – CTB and external depend-
ence – the correlation between the two is calculated for each year, and the results
presented in Table 3.12. Not only is the correlation between CTB and external
dependence negative, it also decreases over time. This means that, on average,
more externally dependent industries have lower CTB measures, and this negative
relation is stronger over time. 
The nature of the relation between CTB and external dependence is investi-
gated in panel data regression, where external dependence by sector is used as an
explanatory variable of CTB. The results are presented in column 1 in Table 3.13.
The coefficient of external dependence is not significantly different from zero,
and solely fixed effects explain 78 per cent of cross-sector variation in CTB. The
correlation between the two measures, presented in Table 3.12, indicates that the
relation between them changes over time. An interaction term between external
dependence and time is then used as explanatory variable of CTB instead. 
As shown in column 2 in Table 3.13, this interaction term has a negative and 
significant coefficient. These results do not change when both the interaction
term and external dependence are used as explanatory variables (see column 3 in
Table 3.13).
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Table 3.11 Contribution to the trade balance across periods




Paper and products 
Apparel and footwear 
Non-metal products  
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Transport equipment  
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Chemical products  
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As I argued in the beginning of this section, the pattern of trade evolution
between 1974 and 1990 was responding to distorted trade incentives, whereas after
trade liberalization in the 1990s it could have become an expression of the coun-
try’s comparative advantages. In order to capture possible differences of the effect
of external dependence over the two periods, I have run a regression including two
variables as explanatory variables for CTB: external dependence, and a slope
dummy for external dependence for 1990–7. The slope dummy equals external
dependence for the years 1990–7, and equals zero in all other periods. As pre-
sented in column 4 in Table 3.13, the coefficient for external dependence is again
not significantly different from zero, and the slope dummy coefficient is negative
and significant. This indicates that external dependence explains cross-sector vari-
ations in CTB for the period from 1990 to 1997, but not from 1974 to 1990. When
all three variables are included in the regression (column 5 in Table 3.13), the only
significant coefficient is the negative coefficient for the slope dummy.
The results indicate that external dependence has a negative effect on cross-
sector CTB for the period from 1990 to 1997, and no relation in the previous
period studied. That is, sectors less external dependent are the ones with higher
CTB during the period under more liberalized trade in Brazil.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to investigate whether credit constraints may have influ-
enced trade pattern evolution in Brazil. The analysis started with a description of
economic development over the time period studied – 1974–97. The Brazilian
economy suffered several large external shocks over the period, leading, along with
other factors, to major macroeconomic disturbances. Macroeconomic volatility
was extremely high over the 1980s and early 1990s. Since the implementation of
the Real Plan in mid-1994, the country has experienced relative macroeconomic
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Table 3.12 Correlation coefficient between 































Table 3.13 Regression results (dependent variable: contribution to trade balance index)
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 
and summary statistics
External dependence 3.50E04 5.41E04 1.42E04 1.50E03
(3.79E16) (5.05E16) (1.03E16) (1.02E15)
Interaction (external 
dependence X time) 3.40E04 3.40E04 2.21E05
(7.01) (7.00) (0.18)
External dependence 
slope dummy 19907 7.21E03 6.85E03
(7.13) (3.64)
R2 0.780 0.820 0.82 0.828 0.826
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution to trade balance index. The external dependence slope dummy is a variable that has value equal 
to external dependence for the years 1990–7, and zero in all other years. All regressions were estimated using sectors’ fixed effects, but the coef-
ficients are not reported. All regressions include twenty-one sectors, with observations from 1974 to 1997.
stability. Trade policy was characterized by two main situations: severely restric-
tive trade policy until the late 1980s, and more liberalized trade in the 1990s. 
Trade pattern evolution was described through a series of indexes, and they
identified a clear trade diversification in the course of the time period studied.
Notably, the sector food and beverages represented a very important export sec-
tor at the beginning of the period, and its importance thereupon decreased sub-
stantially. An interesting feature of trade pattern evolution is the reversal in some
sectors’ CTB after trade liberalization in the 1990s. Some sectors, such as
machinery, drugs, plastic products and electric equipment, presented increasing
(or non-decreasing) trade balance contributions over the restricted trade period,
and decreasing contributions after liberalization. The opposite is true for some
other sectors, such as wood products, furniture, leather and tobacco.
Credit constraints were investigated using a firm’s balance sheet data. The
empirical exercise tried to answer two questions: whether firms are credit con-
strained, and whether credit constraints differ among different groups of firms.
Following an influential trend in the empirical literature in this area, an invest-
ment accelerator model was estimated, including cash flow as an explanatory
variable. If firms are not credit constrained, the cash-flow coefficient should not
be significant, once investment determinants are controlled for. Estimated results
indicated that Brazilian firms are indeed credit constrained. The only instance in
which credit constraints seemed softer was among multinational firms, during the
period 1994–7.
After describing trade pattern evolution, and establishing that Brazilian firms
are credit constrained, the concluding question is: is there a link between credit
constraint and trade pattern? The link is investigated by comparing the contribu-
tion to trade balance index to sectoral external dependence. External dependence
is a measure constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) that indicates the amount
of external finance an industry would use in an environment with no credit restric-
tions. Contributions to trade balance and external dependence are negatively cor-
related, that is, in any given year, sectors with higher CTB are the ones with lower
external dependence on average. It is interesting to note that the negative correla-
tion becomes stronger over time, especially after trade liberalization, when trade
started to reveal the economy’s comparative advantages with less artificial distor-
tions. This is an indication that sectors less in need of external financing would be
relatively better off in Brazil, which we identified as a credit-restricted economy.
Thus, credit restrictions may be a source of comparative advantage.
Notes
1 I am grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from José Fanelli, Saul Keifman,
Naércio Menezes and seminar participants at the IDRC workshop on Finance and
Changing Patterns in Developing Countries, FEA – Universidade de São Paulo, and the
PRONEX seminar held at Getulio Vargas Foundation. I am especially grateful to Edward
Amadeo, with whom this project started, for many insightful conversations, and the 
elaboration of the section on labor productivity and unit labor cost evolution. 
I thank Patrícia Gonçalves, from IBRE, Getulio Vargas Foundation, for kindly furnishing
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data on Brazilian firms’ balance sheets, Carla Bernardes and particularly Cristiana
Vidigal for superb research assistance. Financial support from IDRC is gratefully
acknowledged. I also thank CNPq for a research fellowship.
2 For an overview of the period from 1964 to 1973, see Bonomo and Terra (1999).
3 BEFIEX (Comissão para a Concessão de Benefícios Fiscais a Programas Especiais de
Exportação) coordinated export incentives. Long-term (usually ten-year) contracts were
signed between BEFIEX and the exporting firm, in which the firm would commit to a
certain amount of exports over the period, and in exchange it would have reduced import
duties and taxes. The program was effective – during the 1975 to 1990 period exports
grew over 7 per cent a year on average, accompanied by impressive diversification.
4 For further details, see Simonsen (1988).
5 World inflation is measured here as the rate of increase in world export prices in 
US dollars.
6 Among other measures, the government created the ‘Law of Similar National
Products’, determining that a product could not be imported if there existed a similar
good being produced domestically.
7 See Bonelli et al. (1993).
8 Real exchange-rate volatility is measured as the monthly real exchange-rate standard
deviation for a twelve month period. The measure is centered, i.e. the measure for June
corresponds to the standard deviation from January to December. The real exchange
rate was measured as RER e.(WPI)/CPI, where e is the nominal exchange rate pub-
lished by the Brazilian Central Bank, WPI is the US wholesale price index and CPI is
the Brazilian consumer price index (INPC series from IBGE).
9 In this section, the time period analyzed is shorter due to lack of data. 
10 FUNCEX provided by monthly sector data for imports and exports.
11 Looking at the CTB index for a twenty-three-industry aggregation, its variance ranged
from 0.0061 to 0.0115 in the 1970s and early 1980s, going down to around 0.002 for
the past few years.
12 The Aquino intra-industry trade index has also been calculated, and the results are 
similar to the ones reported here for the Grubel and Lloyd index.
13 This procedure may bias the sample of firms used, but I argue that the bias should not
favor the result I am investigating. We are trying to identify whether firms are credit 
constrained. It is plausible to believe that firms which survived throughout the period stud-
ied should not be the more credit-constrained ones. Hence, if this (possibly) biased sam-
ple presents credit constraints, the unbiased sample should also be credit constrained.
14 The measure for debt is the long- and short-term loans on the firm’s balance sheet.
Liabilities include all other accounts under liabilities, such as dividends and taxes to 
be paid.
15 Firms which are less dependent on external finance are those in the following sectors:
furniture, chemical products, wood products, transport equipment, textiles, machinery,
perfumery and soap, electric equipment, plastic products, drugs, and other industries.
16 Note that Rajan and Zingales’ external dependence measure refers to all sorts of exter-
nal financing, not only loans.
17 It is very difficult to replicate Whited (1992) for Brazilian data, due to a lack of data
on some crucial variables. For the same reason, it is also not possible to replicate the
Q model of investment used in Fazzari et al. (1988).
18 All regressions were also estimated in first differences, and the results were qualita-
tively similar to the ones reported here.
19 Instead of splitting the sample into subgroups, another specification is also used, which
will be denoted here as ‘slope dummy specification’. In this specification, slope dum-
mies are included in the regression with the whole sample of firms, which was equal
to cash flow for the alternative groupings of firms, and zero otherwise. These slope
dummies should capture differences in the cash-flow coefficient for the different
groups of firms. The same qualitative results were obtained.
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20 As a further result, in the slope dummy specification, the slope dummy for large firms
is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the cash-
flow coefficient is equal for the two groups of firms cannot be rejected.
21 In both other specifications – slope dummies and first differences – the slope dummy
coefficient for 1994–7 is negative and significant for the group of multinational firms.
22 All regressions were also run including only one and three lags for sales, and the results
were unchanged.
23 All cash-flow regressions were also estimated for the groups of winner and loser firms
separately, but no difference between them was identified in those regressions.
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1. Introduction
In 1990–1, the Indian economy underwent a severe balance-of-payments crisis.
By the summer of 1991, India’s foreign exchange reserves covered less than two
weeks of imports. The immediate cause of the crisis was the increase in world oil
prices and the drop in the remittances of migrant workers from the Gulf follow-
ing the annexation of Kuwait in September 1990. There was a realisation among
Indian policy-makers, however, that ‘the roots of the crisis were more structural
in nature and lay in the import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) strategy fol-
lowed by successive Indian governments since independence’ (Agrawal et al.
1995: 161). While the ISI regime had enabled India to develop a large and diver-
sified manufacturing sector, the net result of the protectionist policies was ‘the
growth of a high-cost, capital-intensive domestic industry that was by and large
incapable of withstanding international competition’ (p. 175). Not only did these
policies severely inhibit India’s export performance, they also served to limit the
possibility of growth based on domestic demand.2 In spite of four decades of
import-substitution policies, production in the Indian manufacturing sector
remained greatly import intensive. As a consequence, with India’s trade regime
providing little incentive to export, growth based on domestic demand would lead
to balance-of-payments problems sooner or later.3
In June 1991, the new government that assumed office (led by P. V. Narasimha
Rao) embarked on an economic reform programme along with several macro-
stabilisation measures. One of the major long-term objectives of the reforms was
to increase India’s international competitiveness, both in relation to its past and to
the fast-growing economies of East Asia. While the 1991 reforms could be seen
as a continuation of the deregulation measures that were initiated in the mid-
1980s by the Rajiv Gandhi government, they were far more comprehensive in
scope and radical in substance. The macroeconomic stabilisation programme ini-
tiated in 1991 yielded immediate benefits, with foreign exchange reserves recover-
ing from just over 1 billion USD at the time of the crisis to over 6.4 billion USD
at the end of 1992–3. The inflation rate, which had peaked at 17 per cent in 1991,
came down steadily to 7 per cent in 1992–3. Real output growth, which had
dipped to 1.2 per cent in 1991–2, recovered to 4 per cent in 1992–3. It is far from
clear, however, whether the long-term goal of the 1991 reforms with regard to
international competitiveness has been achieved.
International competitiveness refers to the ability of a country to expand its
share in world markets. The standard view on competitiveness is that it is essen-
tially determined by factor endowments and comparative advantage. Thus, to
exploit comparative advantage, it is necessary to minimize various distortions in
the economy and ‘to get the prices right’. In recent years, two more views have
emerged: One argues that technological differences across firms, industries and
countries are an important determinant of competitiveness. The other view locates
competitiveness in the firm’s investment decisions and hence in its ability to obtain
investible funds. Both these views stress the importance of non-price factors and
provide an important role for the government to build technological capabilities
and to ensure a financial environment that is able to identify and allocate resources
to the best investment projects.
In this study, we examine the international competitiveness of India’s manu-
facturing sector. We take the view that competitiveness is a multifaceted issue and
that no single theory (and the associated measures) adequately captures its com-
plexity. We thus use several measures of competitiveness to examine the relative
importance of various factors that influence it. Section 2 deals with competitive-
ness at the aggregate and sectoral level. Here we assess the relative importance of
the real exchange rate and trade specialisation patterns in explaining India’s trade
flows. We also examine the link between labour costs and competitiveness.
Further, we explore the technological intensity of India’s exports. In Section 3, we
analyse one important determinant of competitiveness, i.e. the financial environ-
ment. Specifically, we ask the question: to what extent has the Indian financial
sector provided an enabling environment for successful export performance by
manufacturing firms in the post-1991 period? We attempt to answer this question
in two steps. First, we examine firms’ sources and uses of funds to discern
whether there is any systematic relationship between export performance and
financing patterns. Next, we estimate investment functions for a sample of firms
in the Indian manufacturing sector to see whether finance constraints are less
severe for the exporters as compared to firms whose sales are primarily to the
domestic market.
We begin with a more explicit consideration of trade, industrial and financial
sector policies in India and the periodisation of the policy regime that we have
used in our study.
Policy regimes and periodization
The Indian policy regime can be categorised into three distinct phases. The first
phase was the era of planning from 1951 to 1984 when the state had strict control
over resource allocation. The second period was a period of partial deregulation
from 1985 to 1991 when the state retained a major role in resource allocation
even as private agents were given greater freedom in investment decisions.
Finally, in the post-1991 period, resource allocation was primarily market driven.4
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In what follows, we provide a brief overview of the economic policies followed
in each period.5
1951–84
During this period, India had a highly restrictive trade and industrial policy
regime. Nearly all imports were subject to discretionary import licensing or were
‘canalised’ by government monopoly trading organisations. The only exceptions
were commodities listed in the Open General License (OGL) category. Capital
goods were divided into a restricted category and the OGL category. While
import licenses were required for restricted capital goods, those in the OGL could
be imported without a license subject to several conditions. Intermediate goods
were also classified into the banned, restricted and limited permissible categories
plus an OGL category. As these names suggest, the first three lists were in order
of import licensing stringency. The import of consumer goods was, however,
banned. Like imports, exports were also subject to an elaborate licensing regime.
To counteract the anti-export bias of the trade regime however, there were a large
number of export incentives for manufactured goods.
The principal instrument of industrial policy was an elaborate industrial licens-
ing framework under the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951. The
Act stipulated that no new units (above a certain size) could be set up nor substan-
tial expansion be made to existing units without a license from the government. The
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) became effective in 1970
to ensure against concentration of economic power and check restrictive trade prac-
tices. Foreign investment in India was regulated by the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA) of 1974.
With respect to financial sector policy, there was a period of increasing financial
repression from the early 1970s. In 1969, fourteen of the largest commercial banks
were nationalised followed by six more in 1980. Moreover, commercial banks were
increasingly pressured to lend to the ‘priority sector’, comprising agriculture, small-
scale industry, retail trade, transport operators, professionals and craftsmen. While
the commercial banks essentially provided short-term credit to the manufacturing
sector, long-term loans were provided by All India Development Banks like
Industrial Development Bank of India and Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation of India. These term-lending institutions depended a lot on the gov-
ernment for resources (usually subsidised heavily), and their allocation of long-term
loans to firms was strictly monitored by the government according to plan priori-
ties. Interest rates both of commercial banks and term-lending institutions were
controlled by the government. The stock markets too were controlled by the
government with respect to pricing, quantum and timing of new issues.
Finally, with respect to exchange rate policy, the rupee was pegged to the
pound sterling till 1975 (except for a brief period when the rupee was pegged to
the US dollar). In September 1975, the peg was altered to a basket of currencies
with undisclosed weights. For much of the period, the peg was ‘passive’, with the
sole intention of keeping the real exchange rate constant.
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1985–91
With the advent of the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1985, piecemeal reforms were
initiated in trade and industrial policy. Several initiatives were taken to limit the role
of licensing, expanding the scope for contribution by large business houses to
growth, encouraging modernisation and allowing existing firms in certain indus-
tries to achieve minimum economic level of operations. The shift from quantitative
import controls to a protective system based on tariffs initiated in the mid-1970s
was considerably quickened from 1985 onwards. Also, beginning in the mid-1980s,
there was a renewed emphasis by the new administration on export promotion. The
number and value of incentives offered to exporters were increased and their admin-
istration streamlined. The allotment of REP licenses – tradable import entitlements
awarded to exporters on a product-specific basis – became increasingly generous.
There was also a steady devaluation of the Indian rupee during this period.
Effectively, India operated an ‘active’ crawling peg from 1986 onwards to produce
a sharp real depreciation of the rupee in the period 1986–90.
Post-1991
As noted earlier, the year 1991 marked a watershed in Indian economic policy. As
a part of the structural adjustment programme, quotas on the imports of most
machinery and equipment and manufactured intermediate goods were removed.
REP licenses were abolished and a large part of the import licensing system was
replaced by tradable import entitlements linked to export earnings. There was also
a significant cut in tariff rates, with the peak tariff rate reduced from 300 per cent
to 150 per cent and the peak duty on capital goods cut to 80 per cent. There was,
however, little change in trade policy with respect to consumer goods which
remained banned. With respect to industrial policy, industrial licensing was abol-
ished altogether except for a select list of environmentally sensitive industries.
MRTP was substantially revised so that regulations restricting the growth and
merger of large business houses were eliminated. FERA was altered in 1993 so
that the earlier policy of restricting foreign investment became one of actively
promoting it.
From 1991 to 1993, India moved gradually to full current account convertibil-
ity of the exchange rate, first in March 1992, with the replacement of the tradable
import entitlements, with a dual-exchange rate system, and then in March 1993,
moving to a unified ‘market-determined’ exchange rate system (i.e. a managed
float). Nonetheless, strict controls over the capital account, especially capital out-
flows, remain.
In the financial sector, from the point of view of the financing decisions of
firms, the two most important changes were the deregulation of interest rates
(both of commercial banks and term-lending institutions) and the freeing of pric-
ing restrictions on new issues of shares through the stock markets.
Our study is mostly confined to the 1985–91 and post-1991 policy regimes.
In the next section, we attempt to trace the effects of these policy changes on
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export competitiveness of the Indian manufacturing sector. Specifically, we look
for breaks in the trend in competitiveness across these two periods. In Section 3,
where we analyse financial factors at the firm level, we confine ourselves to the
post-1991 period for obvious reasons.
2. Productivity and the price determinants of competitiveness
In this section, we assess the relative importance of the real exchange rate and
labour productivity (and domestic costs) in explaining India’s trade performance in
the recent past. We begin with overviews of India’s trade performance and the evo-
lution of the current account. We then attempt to determine the importance of the
real exchange rate in explaining India’s competitiveness in both total and manu-
facturing exports. Next we examine in detail India’s trade specialisation patterns.
We compute export shares and indices of revealed comparative advantage to assess
competitiveness at a sectoral level. ‘Winner’ and ‘loser’ industries are then identi-
fied and the links between competitiveness, labour productivity and domestic costs
are explored. We end by examining alternate measures of trade specialisation such
as intra-industry trade and the technological complexity of exports.
Overview of trade flows
India had a persistent deficit in the trade account during the period 1971–96
(Figure 4.1). The trade deficit as a percentage of GDP was smaller in magnitude
in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. This, in spite of a rapid increase in imports
as a ratio of GDP, was due to a strong performance by the export sector. It is clear
that due to the sharp increase in both the ratios of exports to GDP and imports to
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Figure 4.1 India’s exports, imports, trade balance, current account balance and openness
measure.
GDP since the mid-1980s, the economy has been increasingly ‘open’ during this
period (Figure 4.1).6 There has also been a steady increase in manufacturing
exports as a proportion of India’s total exports since the 1980s, from less than
60 per cent in 1979–80 to about 75 per cent in 1995–6. Nonetheless, market shares
of India’s total and manufacturing exports in world exports have not improved sub-
stantially and continue to remain at less than 1 per cent. There does not seem to be
any perceptible increase in the annual growth rates of both total and manufactur-
ing exports in the post-1991 period. For the period 1981–90, the average annual
growth rates for total and manufacturing exports were 9.4 and 11.8 per cent,
respectively, while for the period 1991–6 the average annual growth rates for total
and manufacturing exports were 8.9 and 9.9 per cent, respectively. Therefore, the
1991 reforms do not seem to have had any perceptible positive effect on India’s
export performance.
Evolution of the current account and the real exchange rate
It is evident from Figure 4.1 that it is only in the early 1980s that India had large
deficits in the current account. In the 1990s, while India still had a deficit in its
current account, the current account deficit to GDP ratio was considerably lower
than in the 1980s. We have already observed earlier that India had a rapidly
falling deficit in its trade balance from the early 1980s as exports grew rapidly
during this period (see Figure 4.1). Moreover, the real effective exchange rate
(REER) had been steadily depreciating since the mid-1980s (Figure 4.2). During
this period, India followed a policy of steadily devaluing the rupee in combination
with other export promotion measures to boost exports. Clearly then, the
worsening current account deficit in the 1980s cannot be attributed to a weakly
performing export sector.
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Figure 4.2 Real effective exchange rate of the rupee (1979 100).
Joshi and Little (1994) argue that the increase in the current account deficit to
GDP ratio in the 1980s could be linked to an increase in the investment–savings
gap. Underlying this was the widening fiscal deficits of the central government,
with the public investment–savings gap increasing from 7.1 per cent of GDP in
1982–4 to 8.4 per cent of GDP in 1985–9. With the fiscal retrenchment initiated
in 1991, there was a narrowing of the investment–savings gap in the 1990s and a
consequent decrease in the current account deficit to GDP ratio. Thus, the large
current account deficits of the 1980s could be attributed to a macroeconomic
imbalance (related to a widening fiscal deficit) rather than a stagnant export sec-
tor or an inappropriate real exchange rate. The structural adjustment programme
of 1991 led to some correction in this imbalance and, hence, a more sustainable
current account deficit. It should be noted, however, that in contrast to its behav-
iour in the mid-to-late 1980s, the real exchange rate (RER) has shown a slight
appreciation in the very recent past.
We have observed earlier that India followed a discretionary crawling peg in
the 1970s and 1980s to maintain an ‘appropriate’ level of the RER. Yet there were
periods, particularly in the early 1980s, when the nominal exchange rate was kept
fixed in spite of a high inflation rate prevailing in the domestic economy. It is
commonly agreed that sustained RER misalignment may contribute to severe
macroeconomic disequilibria and a balance-of-payments crisis. Moreover, there
is evidence to suggest that more ‘successful’ countries owe much of their success
to having been able to maintain the RER at its ‘appropriate’ level (Edwards 1994).
To what extent can it be argued that India had ‘misaligned’ RERs during the
period under consideration? Elbadawi (1994) estimates the degree of misalign-
ment in India’s real exchange rate for the period 1965–88. The degree of mis-
alignment is defined as the deviation of the actual RER from the equilibrium
RER. The latter is itself the level of the RER which allows the economy to simul-
taneously attain internal equilibrium (i.e. the non-tradable market clears, the
budget is balanced and portfolio equilibrium holds) and external equilibrium
(the current account is in balance). Elbadawi has developed a model of the equi-
librium RER where the equilibrium RER is determined by domestic absorption
and government expenditures (both as ratios of GDP), terms of trade and a
measure of the degree of ‘openness’ of the economy. Elbadawi finds that except
for 1965 and 1986, which witnessed episodes of overvaluation of 16.3 per cent
and 10.6 per cent, respectively, the period is characterised by single-digit RER
misalignments, most of which are actually quite small. This, according to the
author, supports the view that ‘India, while maintaining an elaborate ensemble of
economic controls, has nonetheless adopted a rather conservative macroeconomic
policy’ (Elbadawi 1994: 126).
Aggregate competitiveness
To measure competitiveness at the aggregate level, we use the constant market
share (CMS) analysis. According to the CMS method, the proportionate increase
in exports over time comprises a number of effects: (a) standard growth effect,
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(b) commodity composition effect, (c) market distribution effect, and (d) a residual
effect which may be termed ‘competitiveness’. In other words, the increase in
exports can be ‘explained’ in terms of four factors: the general growth of world
exports to the focus destination; the commodity mix of exports and differential
growth in import demands; the extent to which the particular market represents
growing centres of demand; and finally, a residual term which captures the net gain
or loss in the market shares presumably due to changes in the relative price and/or
quality of the product, not to mention the marketing effort and skill of the exporters.7
The estimates of each of the above-mentioned effects depend on the ‘standard’
against which the focus country’s exports to the focus destination is to be compared.
This study has used the world standard, assuming that the commodity composition
of world exports bears a reasonably good relationship to that of the focus exporter.
The CMS methodology is used to decompose the annual change in India’s total
exports, all commodities and manufacturing commodities separately, over the
period 1970–92.8 The data set used is the World Trade Database from Statistics
Canada made available through the NBER (Feenstra et al. 1997). Based on the
trade data from the United Nations Statistical Office, this database provides on a
consistent basis the annual bilateral trade values for all countries of the world over
1970–92.9
In Figure 4.3, we plot the competitiveness measure for all commodities as
obtained from the CMS methodology along with the annual growth of total
exports. Similarly, in Figure 4.4, we plot the competitiveness measure only for
manufacturing commodities along with the annual growth of manufacturing
exports. In both cases, the change in competitiveness is correlated with export
growth. However, there is a closer correlation between the growth rate and the





























Figure 4.3 India’s competitiveness and export growth – all commodities (SITC two-digit
level).
change in competitiveness of manufacturing commodities than there is between
the growth rate and the change in competitiveness for all commodities (the cor-
relation in the former case is 0.861 as compared to 0.796 for the latter case). This
indicates that competitiveness may play a greater role in determining the export
performance of the manufacturing sector than it does for all other sectors.
The CMS methodology decomposes the change in a country’s exports into four
components – the world trade effect, the commodity composition effect, the mar-
ket effect and the competitiveness effect. In Table 4.1, we decompose exports into






























Figure 4.4 India’s competitiveness and export growth – manufacturing commodities
(SITC two-digit level).
Table 4.1 Decomposition of India’s exports (%)
World trade Commodity Market Competitive Export 
effects effects effects effects growth – actual
(USD 000)
All commodities
1971–5 66.4 28.3 50.7 87.5 2,415,207.2
1976–80 168.7 14.2 14.8 69.3 3,583,957.3
1981–5 6.6 12.9 22.9 103.5 1,473,356.8
1986–90 87.9 7.3 20.5 25.3 8,965,485.2
1991–2 140.3 1.7 78.5 160.2 2,598,590.4
Manufacturing
1971–5 32,964.5 17,278.3 18,974.5 34,560.7 933,390.1
1976–80 128.3 1.5 17.9 44.6 2,740,358.5
1981–5 52.0 11.2 6.1 53.0 810,632.4
1986–90 604.6 35.0 277.6 1,017.2 7,394,295.2
1991–2 182.3 3.3 111.1 32.1 2,531,672.7
these four components for all commodities and for manufacturing commodities.
We find that the relative importance and the direction of change of the four
components for all commodities is quite different from the relative importance of
these components for manufacturing commodities for most subperiods. For
example, in 1971–5 and in 1986–90, the competitiveness effect is large in mag-
nitude (and opposite in direction, for the period 1971–5) for manufacturing
exports as compared to all exports. This may indicate that the factors explaining
competitiveness for manufacturing exports may be different from those explain-
ing competitiveness for all exports. The periods 1971–5 and 1986–90 are striking
in that we find that for manufacturing exports, the competitiveness effect is neg-
ative and large in magnitude in the first period and positive and, again, large in
magnitude for the second period. What explains these large variations in the
aggregate competitiveness of both total exports and total manufacturing exports?
We examine this below.
The real exchange rate and aggregate competitiveness
The real exchange rate is often viewed as the most important determinant of the
overall competitiveness of an economy. We examine this relationship for aggre-
gate competitiveness measured over all commodities (CMSA) and over manufac-
turing commodities (CMSM) as estimated earlier using the CMS methodology
(Table 4.2). Towards this, we regress CMSA on the change in the real exchange rate
(RER) (Model 1a), and on the change in the nominal exchange rate (NER) and
the inflation differential between India and the US (INF) (Model 1b). Similarly,
we regress CMSM on the change in the real exchange rate (RER) (Model 2a), on
the change in the nominal exchange rate (NER) and the inflation differential
between India and the US (INF) (Model 2b), on the change in the sector-specific
real exchange rate (RERM) (Model 2c), and, finally, on NER and on the sector-
specific inflation differential between India and the US (INFM) (Model 2d). A
linear functional form was specified and estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS) over the period 1971–92.
For CMSA, the change in RER is positive and significant at the 5 per cent
level, albeit with a lag (Model 1a). The current change in RER was found to be
insignificant. Decomposing the RER into its components, we find that it is the
change in NER with a lag that explains the variations in CMSA (Model 1b).
Similarly, for CMSM, the change in RER is positive and significant with a lag
(Model 2a), with the decomposition again indicating that it is the change in NER
that matters (Model 2b). Further, sector-specific RER does not have as much
explanatory power as the economy-wide RER (Models 2c and 2d).
As noted earlier, India has followed an active exchange rate policy to boost
exports since the mid-1980s. The evidence above shows that such a policy has
indeed been effective. With a shift towards a more market-determined exchange
rate since 1991 however, such a policy option may no longer be available.
86 A. Ganesh-Kumar, K. Sen and R. R. Vaidya
Table 4.2 Real and nominal exchange rate, inflation differentials and competitiveness
Dependent Explanatory variables D–W
variable
Constant RER(1) RERM(1) NER(1) INF(1) INFM(1)
CMSA 58,864.2 439,952.2 0.287 1.846
(1a) (0.32) (3.01)*
CMSA 216,538.0 7,520,050.0 2,184,505.0 0.309 2.007
(1b) (0.99) (3.28)* (0.59)
CMSM 17,959.2 316,787.7 0.285 2.797
(2a) (0.13) (2.99)*
CMSM 97,534.9 5,047,609.0 2,036,369.0 0.247 3.006
(2b) (0.59) (2.92)* (0.74)
CMSM 6,400.6 476,982.1 0.185 2.795
(2c) (0.04) (2.36)*
CMSM 133,039.6 4,640,995.0 2,650.5 0.225 3.073
(2d) (0.81) (2.67)* (0.001)
Notes: t-tests are reported in brackets; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level.
CMSA: change in competitiveness – all commodities; CMSM: change in competitiveness – manufacturing; RER(1): 1 period lag in change in real
exchange rate – all commodities; RERM(1): 1 period lag in change in real exchange rate – manufacturing; NER(1): 1 period lag in change in nominal
exchange rate; INF(1): 1 period lag in change in inflation differential between India and USA – all  commodities; INFM(1): 1 period lag in change in




The database used is obtained from the International Economic Data Bank
(IEDB) at the Australian National University and provides trade and industry data
at the ISIC four-digit level. The source of the industry data is UNIDO’s Industrial
Statistics databank, which in turn is compiled from the Annual Survey of
Industries published by the Central Statistical Organisation, India. The export
data is obtained from the United Nations Trade Database and uses a commodity
concordance developed by the United Nations and further refined by the IEDB.
The commodity concordance involves a mapping from the SITC classification
system used by the Trade Database of the United Nations in reporting export data
to the ISIC classification system used by the UNIDO in reporting industry data.
While all the commodities that are usually included in the SITC definition of
manufacturing exports (SITC 5 to 8 less 68) have been reclassified according to
their industry of origin at the ISIC four-digit level, the ISIC classification con-
tains some additional commodities not included in the SITC classification. As is
well known, one limitation of the SITC classification of manufacturing exports is
that it excludes processed food items and tobacco products (which are included
in SITC 0 and 1). In contrast, the ISIC (i.e. industry-based) classification of
manufacturing includes all such commodities in ISIC 311 (food products), 313
(beverages) and 314 (tobacco products). Furthermore, the ISIC classification of
manufacturing also includes non-ferrous metals (ISIC 372), which are usually
excluded from the SITC-based classification of manufacturing. Therefore, the
coverage of manufacturing exports using the ISIC-based definition (i.e. the defi-
nition used in this chapter) may be considered to be more comprehensive than the
more commonly used SITC-based definition.
Export shares and indices of revealed comparative advantage
In Table 4.3, we present the top two dozen commodities (at the ISIC four-digit
level) in terms of export shares in India’s total manufacturing exports over the
period 1971–96. It is evident from the table that the shares of ISIC 3211 (spin-
ning, weaving and finishing of textiles) and ISIC 3231 (tanneries and leather fin-
ishing) have declined significantly in the period under consideration from a total
of around 34 per cent in 1971–5 to less than 14 per cent in 1991–6. On the other
hand, the shares of ISIC 3220 (wearing apparel excluding footwear) and ISIC
3901 ( jewellery and related articles) have increased in this period from a total of
less than 8 per cent in 1971–5 to around 32 per cent in 1991–6. Basic industrial
chemicals (excluding fertilisers, ISIC 3511) also seem to be increasingly impor-
tant in India’s manufactured export basket over time. The shares of most other
commodities do not show any significant change in trend over the period
1971–96. It is also evident from Table 4.3 that these twenty-four commodities
have consistently accounted for more than 85 per cent of the manufacturing
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Table 4.3 Export shares of select commodities
ISIC Industry code and name 1971–5 1976–80 1981–5 1986–90 1991–6
3111-SLGHTRG, PREP, 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.0 0.8
PRESERV MEAT
3115-MANUF VEG, ANL 7.3 4.6 3.1 2.6 3.8
OILSFATS
3116-GRAIN MILL 3.1 6.4 7.8 4.6 4.1
PRODUCTS
3118-SUGAR FACTORIES 7.0 3.5 1.3 0.1 0.5
REFINERS
3121-MANUF OF FOOD 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.6
PRODS NEC
3211-SPINNG, WEAVG, 24.6 14.8 12.3 10.5 11.9
FINSHG TEXTS
3212-MAN MDUP TXT GDS 7.5 3.4 2.7 1.3 0.8
EX WEARG APP
3214-CARPETS 2.0 3.0 4.3 3.9 3.3
3220-MANUF WEARG APP 4.9 10.1 13.7 18.0 19.7
EX FTWR
3231-TANNERIES, LTHER 9.2 7.9 5.7 4.4 1.7
FINISHNG
3233-MAN PRODS LTER 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.7
EXC FWR, APP
3240-MAN FTWR EX 0.9 1.3 2.9 3.7 2.8
RUBBR, PLASTC
3511-BASIC IND CHEMS 1.5 1.7 1.8 3.8 5.3
EXC FERT
3522-DRUGSMEDICINES 0.8 1.3 2.5 2.6 2.6
3523-SOAP, CLNS PRPS, 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.0 0.7
PERF, COSM
3530-PETROLEUM 0.8 0.5 4.2 6.9 2.5
REFINERIES
3710-IRONSTEEL BAS INDS 4.2 6.5 1.2 1.7 3.8
3720-NON-FER METAL 2.5 2.5 0.4 0.5 0.9
BASIC IND
3819-FAB MET PRD EX 1.2 2.1 1.6 1.1 1.5
MACH EQP NEC
3824-SPEC IND MACH 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.9
EQP EX 3823
3829-MACH, EQUIP 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.1
EX ELECT NEC
3839-ELEC APPAR 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.1 0.5
SUPPLIES NEC
3843-MOTOR VEHICLES 1.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.4
3901-JEWELRYRELATED 3.0 6.4 9.4 13.1 12.1
ARTICLES
Cumulative share of the 88.0 85.8 86.7 88.4 86.0
above 24 commodities
Note: Export share of industry i (export of industry i/India’s total manufacturing exports) * 100.
exports during this period. This seems to suggest that India’s manufacturing
exports have not diversified over the past twenty-five years.
We computed the revealed comparative advantage (RCA)10 of India’s manufac-
turing exports for each year over the period 1971–96.11 The RCA computations
showed that for a vast majority of industries, India is just not competitive in export
markets as indicated by RCAs that are less than 1 over the entire period. In the
post-1991 period, India was most competitive in ISIC 3901 ( jewellery), followed
by ISIC 3214 (carpets). In the case of jewellery, in particular, the increase in RCA
has been dramatic, from 2.4 in 1971–5 to 12.8 in 1991–6. Other commodities
whose export competitiveness has been increasing over the period 1971–96 are
ISIC 3116 (grain mill products), ISIC 3220 (manufacture of wearing apparel
excluding footwear), ISIC 3233 (manufacture of leather excluding footwear,
apparel) and ISIC 3551 (tire and tube industries). Commodities with declining
competitiveness are ISIC 3212 (manufacture of made-up textile goods excluding
wearing apparel) and ISIC 3231 (tanneries and leather finishing).
Winner and loser sectors
In order to determine which industries ‘gained’ and which industries ‘lost’ in com-
petitiveness, we adopt a non-parametric approach involving essentially a t-test (and
an associated F-test) on the sample mean of RCAs across different subperiods of
interest. The theme of the t-test is to split the whole time series of RCAs into two
subsamples (say, Period I and Period II), compute the means of the series over the
subsamples and test for equality or inequality of these two subsample means. At a
given level of significance, a significant positive (negative) t-statistic would indi-
cate a significant increase (decrease) in the mean level of the RCAs in Period II
compared to Period I. An insignificant t-statistic would indicate equality of the
mean level of the RCAs between the two subperiods, i.e. the RCAs are more or
less constant over the full sample. The mathematical expression for the test statis-
tic can be found in Brockett and Levine (1984) and Kanji (1993).
As we have noted in Section 1, the Indian economy has undergone two sets of
reforms in the recent past, once in 1985, and the second in 1991. To see whether
these two rounds of reforms have had any discernible effect on external compet-
itiveness of the Indian manufacturing sector, we conduct the t-test on the sample
means of RCAs once between the periods 1970–84 and 1985–91 and a second
time between the periods 1985–91 and 1992–6. An industry whose RCA showed
a significant increase (decrease) is considered to be a ‘winner’ (‘loser’) industry
over the relevant period. Industries whose RCA did not show a significant change
are considered to be ‘stagnant’. We confine the t-tests to those industries which
had RCAs greater than one for at least one of the subperiods. The results are tab-
ulated in Table 4.4. A summary of these results is reported in Table 4.5.
From these results it is clear that some industries have gained in competitiveness
while others have lost following the two rounds of reforms. Furthermore, there
have been more winners than losers after the 1991 reforms as compared to the 
earlier reforms of 1985. Only one industry, namely leather products (excluding
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Table 4.4 t-Test on sample means of RCAs





3115-MANUF VEG, ANL OILSFATS 3.8139 3.0220 1.58 12.89 3.0220 4.8482 2.33 4.20
3116-GRAIN MILL PRODUCTS 3.8752 5.9993 3.41 0.34 5.9993 7.6897 1.44 21.04
3118-SUGAR FACTORIES REFINERS 3.3591 0.5569 4.09 0.08 0.5569 1.8683 2.31 6.01
3121-MANUF OF FOOD PRODS NEC 2.7737 1.8439 3.44 0.88 1.8439 1.0759 2.81 2.29
3211-SPINNG, WEAVG, FINSHG TEXTS 5.0223 3.6114 4.15 0.05 3.6114 4.4774 2.14 5.78
3212-MAN MDUP TXT GDS EX WEARG APP 17.4034 6.5477 5.24 0.01 6.5477 3.8569 3.56 0.92
3213-KNITTING MILLS — — — — 0.8682 1.0096 0.45 66.15
3214-CARPETS 8.3973 12.8104 4.75 0.02 12.8104 12.3311 0.48 64.17
3215-CORDAGE ROPE, TWINE INDS — — — — 0.5291 1.7030 6.62 0.01
3220-MANUF WEARG APP EX FTWR 3.1098 4.9518 5.24 0.00 4.9518 5.0752 0.33 75.05
3231-TANNERIES, LTHER FINISHNG 25.5586 13.4599 2.89 0.91 13.4599 5.0011 5.09 0.14
3233-MAN PRODS LTER EXC FWR, APP 2.0642 4.9482 2.84 1.01 4.9482 5.9971 2.28 4.58
3240-MAN FTWR EX RUBBR, PLASTC 1.9479 3.9214 8.61 0.00 3.9214 3.1289 8.39 0.00
3511-BASIC IND CHEMS EXC FERT — — — — 0.7722 1.2161 3.13 1.21
3521-PAINTS, VARNISH LACQUERS 1.2697 1.4107 0.36 72.37 1.4107 0.1447 7.22 0.02
3522-DRUGSMEDICINES 1.3252 2.1755 1.18 25.03 2.1755 1.5513 1.20 25.65
3523-SOAP, CLNS PRPS, PERF, COSM 1.8687 1.8269 0.09 92.98 1.8269 0.7205 3.98 0.26
3530-PETROLEUM REFINERIES 0.2373 1.7062 4.90 0.17 1.7062 0.9406 2.54 3.88
3551-TIRETUBE INDUSTRIES 0.8314 1.1584 1.11 28.11 1.1584 1.7966 2.50 4.66
3692-CEMENT, LIME AND PLASTER 1.1028 0.4034 2.45 2.47 0.4034 2.0359 2.77 3.96
3699-NON-MET MINL PRODS NEC 1.2433 0.8894 1.17 25.72 0.8894 2.0929 5.32 0.11
3710-IRONSTEEL BAS INDS — — — — 0.4119 1.1236 4.07 0.23
3811-CUTLY, HAND TLS, GEN HDWRE 1.3135 1.0637 2.41 2.81 1.1584 1.7966 2.50 4.66
3813-STRUCTURAL METAL PRODUCTS 1.0962 0.6143 5.05 0.01 — — — —
3819-FAB MET PRD EX MACH EQP NEC 1.1295 0.8542 2.63 1.57 0.8542 1.0363 1.15 27.74
3844-MOTOR CYCLESBICYCLES 2.1411 2.2228 0.16 87.62 2.2228 2.5623 0.72 48.61
3901-JEWELRYRELATED ARTICLES 5.8760 13.3393 9.55 0.00 13.3393 12.7182 0.57 57.87
3903-SPORTINGATHLETIC GOODS 1.9433 1.1650 3.37 0.29 1.1650 0.9652 1.54 16.19
Note: t-Tests were done only for those industries for which the average RCA is greater than one in at least one of the subperiods.
footwear and apparel), has been winning over both rounds of reforms. In contrast,
three industries have lost in both rounds of reforms. These are food products
(NEC), textile goods (excluding wearing apparel) and product of tanneries and
leather finishing. There have been some industries which gained in one round of
reforms but lost in another round, such as footwear (excluding rubber and plastics)
and sugar factories. One possible explanation for this could be that these industries
may have gained/lost (as the case may be) due to inter-industry effects of the
reform measures that dominated the direct effects of reforms.
Evolution of labour productivity and unit labour costs
It is well recognised in the literature that a key determinant of external competi-
tiveness is unit labour costs (see Fagerberg 1988). To what extent this hypothesis
is relevant in the Indian context is of great significance given that India is per-
ceived to be a labour-surplus economy. There has been a significant increase in
labour productivity in the manufacturing sector since the early 1980s, with a lev-
elling off in the 1990s (Figure 4.5). Real wages followed labour productivity for
much of the 1970s and 1980s, leading to no perceptible change in unit labour
costs during this period. In the late 1980s however, there was a slight decline in
unit labour costs in the manufacturing sector, as labour productivity growth over-
took growth in real wage per worker. In the early 1990s, with stagnation in labour
productivity, unit labour costs began to increase. We observe that the movements
in unit labour costs during the 1980s and early 1990s seem to have a fairly strong
negative correlation with India’s market share in world manufacturing exports.
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Table 4.5 Winner and loser industries
1985–91 1992–6 over 1985–91
over
1970–84 Winners Losers Stagnant
Winners Man Prods Lter Petroleum Refineries Grain Mill Products
Exc Fwr, App Man Footwear Carpets




Losers Spinning, Weaving, Manuf of Food Sporting Athletic
Finishing Texts Prods Nec Goods
Cutly, Hand Tls, Man Mdup Txt Gds
General Hardware Ex Wearing App
Sugar Factories Tanneries, Leather
Refiners Fab Met Finishing
Prd Ex Mach 
Eqp Nec
Stagnant Manuf Veg, Anl Paints, Varnish Lacquers Drugs Medicines
Oils Fats Soap, Clns Prps, Motor Cycles 
Tire Tube Perfumes, Cosm Bicycles
Industries
During the early 1980s, with little change in unit labour costs, there was no sig-
nificant change in India’s market share. With the decline in unit labour costs in
the late 1980s, India’s market share improved. Finally, in the early 1990s, with a
slight increase in unit labour costs, there was a fall in India’s market share. There
is preliminary evidence, then, that at the aggregate level, the behaviour of unit
labour costs may have played an important role in determining India’s interna-
tional competitiveness in the period under consideration.
Data on changes in unit labour costs by industry show that there is no consis-
tent pattern on unit labour cost growth across industries (Table 4.6). In keeping
with the trend in unit labour costs at the aggregate level however, a larger pro-
portion of industries witnessed declining unit labour costs in the period 1986–90
as compared to the periods 1982–5 and 1991–2. The correlation coefficients
between growth in unit labour costs and the change in RCAs across industries
indicate that for the period 1982–5, growth in unit labour costs in a particular
industry may be negatively correlated with the change in the international
competitiveness of that industry (the correlation coefficient between the two
is 0.25). On the other hand, there is little correlation between growth in unit
labour costs and the change in RCAs for the other two subperiods. Moreover,
when we attempted to relate changes in unit labour costs with the classification
of industries into winners and losers, no discernible pattern emerged at the sec-
toral level on the linkage between domestic costs and export competitiveness (see
Table 4.6). It should be noted nonetheless that such an analysis is incomplete until
we can compare the evolution of unit labour costs at the sectoral level in India
with a world norm. Clearly, what is of relevance for export competitiveness of a
particular sector is the relative movement of its domestic costs with respect to the























Figure 4.5 Labour productivity, real wages and unit labour costs (ULC).
Table 4.6 Percentage change in unit labour costs (ULC), India, 1982–92




3111-SLGHTRG, PREP, PRESERV MEAT 0.23 0.03 0.23 —
3112-MANUF OF DAIRY PRODUCTS 0.27 0.03 0.34
3113-CANNG, PRES FRUITS VEGS 0.03 0.15 0.04
3114-CAN, PRES, PRS OF FISH, CRUS 0.06 0.04 0.16
3115-MANUF VEG, ANL OILSFATS 0.00 0.16 0.37 Stagnant Winner
3116-GRAIN MILL PRODUCTS 0.08 0.14 0.32 Winner Stagnant
3117-MANUF OF BAKERY PRODUCTS 0.15 0.07 0.21 — —
3118-SUGAR FACTORIES REFINERS 0.10 0.13 0.15 Loser Winner
3119-MANUF COCOA, CHOCSUG CONF 0.01 0.57 0.34
3121-MANUF OF FOOD PRODS NEC 0.07 0.16 0.40 Loser Loser
3122-MANUF OF PREPD ANL FEEDS 0.12 0.10 0.37
3131-DISTG, RECTG, BLENG SPIRITS 0.16 0.09 0.28
3132-WINE INDUSTRIES 0.10 0.25 0.50
3133-MALT LIQUORS AND MALT 0.14 0.04 0.44
3134-SFT DRNKS CARB WTRS IND 0.12 0.02 0.08
3140-TOBACCO MANUFACTURES 0.01 0.06 0.23
3211-SPINNG, WEAVG, FINSHG TEXTS 0.07 0.02 0.27 Loser Winner
3212-MAN MDUP TXT GDS EX WEARG APP N/A 0.38a 0.22 Loser Loser
3213-KNITTING MILLS 0.17 0.15 0.20
3214-CARPETS N/A 0.73a 0.21 Winner Stagnant
3215-CORDAGE ROPE, TWINE INDS N/A 0.30a 0.05
3219-MANUF OF TEXTILES, NEC N/A 0.07a 0.27
3220-MANUF WEARG APP EX FTWR 0.12 0.08 0.35 Winner Stagnant
3231-TANNERIES, LTHER FINISHNG 0.12 0.02 0.28 Loser Loser
3240-MAN FTWR EX RUBBR, PLASTC 0.10 0.11 0.18 Winner Loser
3311-SAWMLS, PLNG OTH WD MILLS 0.10 0.00 0.28
3312-MAN WD, CNE CNTS, SML CNWR 0.08 0.02 0.33
3319-MAN WOOD CORK PRODS NEC 0.05 0.04 0.35
3320-MAN FURN, FIXT EX PRIM MTL 0.16 0.01 0.29
3411-MAN PULP, PAPER, PAPERBOARD 0.14 0.02 0.30
3412-MAN CONTS, BXES PPR, P/BRD 0.17 0.03 0.47
3419-MAN ART PULP, PPR, P/BRD NEC 0.09 0.33 0.19
3420-PRNTNG, PUBLNG ALLIED IND 0.07 0.07 0.07
3511-BASIC IND CHEMS EXC FERT 0.20 0.00 0.39
3512-FERTILISERS PESTICIDES 0.10 0.11 0.04
3513-SYN RESINS ETC EXC GLASS 0.01 0.12 0.01
3521-PAINTS, VARNISH LACQUERS 0.11 0.02 0.22 Stagnant Loser
3522-DRUGSMEDICINES 0.07 0.07 0.24 Stagnant Stagnant
3523-SOAP, CLNS PRPS, PERF, COSM 0.08 0.07 0.10 Stagnant Loser
3529-CHEMICAL PRODUCTS NEC 0.10 0.01 0.25
3530-PETROLEUM REFINERIES 0.09 0.02 0.20 Winner Loser
3540-MISC PRODS OF PETR, COAL 0.15 0.14 0.13
3551-TIRETUBE INDUSTRIES 0.10 0.20 0.13 Stagnant Winner
3559-MANUF OF RUBBER PRODS NEC 0.05 0.03 0.42
3560-PLASTICS PRODUCTS NEC 0.05 0.14 0.31
3610-POTTERY, CHINA, EARTHWARE 0.24 0.02 0.22
3620-GLASSGLASS PRODUCTS 0.00 0.08 0.24
3691-STRUCTURAL CLAY PRODUCTS 0.20 0.06 0.13
3692-CEMENT, LIME AND PLASTER 0.06 0.04 0.45
3699-NON-MET MINL PRODS NEC 0.09 0.08 0.22
3710-IRONSTEEL BAS INDS 0.11 0.01 0.32
3720-NON-FER METAL BASIC IND 0.10 0.13 0.21
3811-CUTLY, HAND TLS, GEN HDWRE 0.08 0.04 0.14 Loser Winner
3812-FURNFIXT PRIM OF METAL 0.05 0.04 0.71
3813-STRUCTURAL METAL PRODUCTS 0.09 0.30 0.10
3819-FAB MET PRD EX MACH EQP NEC 0.09 0.07 0.28 Loser Winner
Table 4.6 Continued




3821-ENGINESTURBINES 0.07 0.07 0.08
3822-AGRIC MACHINERY AND EQUIP 0.14 0.04 0.32
3823-METALWOODWORKING EQUIP 0.14 0.03 0.29
3824-SPEC IND MACH+EQP EX 3823 0.04 0.08 0.20
3825-OFF, COMPUTG, ACCOUNTG MACH 0.06 0.25 0.16
3829-MACH, EQUIP EX ELECT NEC 0.12 0.10 0.13
3831-ELEC IND MACHAPPARATUS 0.11 0.06 0.24
3832-RADIO, TELE, COMM EQP, APPAR 0.13 0.11 0.08
3833-ELEC APPLNCSHOUSEWARES 0.11 0.09 0.28
3839-ELEC APPARSUPPLIES NEC 0.16 0.02 0.14
3841-SHIPBUILDINGREPAIRING 0.11 0.14 0.25 
3842-RAILROAD EQUIPMENT 0.08 0.01 0.33
3843-MOTOR VEHICLES 0.10 0.17 0.31
3844-MOTOR CYCLESBICYCLES 0.14 0.10 0.22 Stagnant Stagnant
3845-AIRCRAFT 0.02 0.10 0.24
3849-TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT NEC 0.24 0.25 0.01
3851-PROF, SCIEN, MSRG, CNTRL EQU 0.05 0.08 0.20
3852-PROF, SC, MSRG, CONT EQU NEC 0.02 0.26 0.46
3853-WATCHESCLOCKS 0.21 0.13 0.36
3901-JEWELRYRELATED ARTICLES 0.19 0.53 0.30 Winner Stagnant
3902-MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS 0.39 0.35 0.02
3903-SPORTINGATHLETIC GOODS 0.04 0.04 0.20 Loser Stagnant
3909-MANUF INDUSTRIES NEC 0.03 0.12 0.21
Correlation with change in RCA 0.253 0.072 0.006
Notes
a Some years are not available and the average has been adjusted for missing data.
N/A: data not available.
domestic costs of the destination country and that of other competitors in the
same sector.
Alternate measures of trade patterns
Hitherto, our analysis has been based on an implicit assumption that trade spe-
cialisation is based on comparative advantage emanating from perfectly compet-
itive domestic and international markets. In reality however, markets, both in
India and abroad, would generally be characterised by product differentiation and
economies of scale. We look at two measures of competitiveness that incorporate
such assumptions.
Measures of intra-industry trade12
If a significant proportion of the industrial sector is characterised by imperfect
competition, measures of intra-industry trade may indicate the extent of product
differentiation and the presence of economies of scale in a particular industry.
Furthermore, with trade reforms, one would expect an increase in the share of
intra-industry trade in total industry trade as firms specialise in the production of
certain products and not in others within an industry group (Helpman and
Krugman 1989). As is clear from Figure 4.6, there has been a significant increase
in aggregate intra-industry trade in the Indian manufacturing sector since the mid-
1980s. Interestingly, one notes a slight downturn in total intra-industry trade in the
mid-1990s. Measures of intra-industry trade by industry13 show that the industries
with the highest share of intra-industry trade in total trade (0.8 and above) are ISIC
3215 (cordage, rope and twine industries), 3311 (sawmills, plying mills), 3312
(wooden and cane containers), 3521 (paints, varnishes, lacquers), 3620 (glass and





























Figure 4.6 Aggregate intra-industry trade.
glass products), 3691 (structural clay products), 3710 (iron and steel basic indus-
tries), 3819 (fabricated metal products), 3831 (electrical industrial machinery),
3833 (electrical apparatus and supplies) and 3843 (motor vehicles).14 It is an open
issue, however, to what extent the high volumes of intra-industry trade evident in
these industries are due to the existence of scale economies and differentiated
products or due to industry classifications that are not comprehensive enough (see
Loertscher and Wolter 1980).
Technological complexity of exports
A classification of India’s manufactured exports by technological complexity indi-
cates that India’s manufactured exports are very much at the low end of the ‘tech-
nology spectrum’ (Table 4.7).15 Labour-intensive and resource-based products are
the two dominant categories in India’s manufacturing export basket. There has
been some increase in the total share of scale-intensive, differentiated and science-
based products in India’s manufacturing exports from 18.1 per cent in 1980 to
23.2 in 1995. Nonetheless, it is far below that of China (38.4 per cent), Malaysia
(79 per cent) and Thailand (53.6 per cent).16 A closer look at the ‘winners’ in either
of the two subperiods, 1985–91 and 1992–6, shows that these are either labour-
intensive, resource-intensive or scale-intensive products.
The comparison with China is particularly revealing. As of 1995, 9.7 per cent
and 16.3 per cent of China’s manufactured exports were in science-based goods
and differentiated products, respectively, as compared to 5 per cent and 4.1 per
cent for India. Differentiated products are technology-intensive engineering prod-
ucts while science-based products use leading-edge technologies (Lall 1998).
Both these types of goods could be classified as ‘high technology’. While China
and India are both large labour-surplus economies with comparative advantage in
labour-intensive manufactures, China is also diversifying into the low-medium
technology end of export-oriented activity, with India doing poorly in this area.
Clearly, the relatively slow progress in ‘climbing up the technology ladder’ with
respect to exports may act as a constraint on India’s long-term export perform-
ance and growth potential.
The evidence presented in this section does not allow for an unequivocal inter-
pretation of the role of price factors in determining India’s external competitiveness.
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Table 4.7 Distribution of manufactured exports
by technological complexity (%)
Category 1980 1995
Resource based 26.5 31.4
Labour intensive 55.4 45.3
Scale intensive 11.2 13.5
Differentiated 4.1 4.7
Science based 2.8 5.0
Source: Lall (1998).
While at the aggregate level, the real exchange rate and unit labour costs seem to
have a definite link with external competitiveness in the Indian context, the pic-
ture is far less clear at the sectoral level. This may indicate the importance of
firm-level and industry-level non-price factors that may impinge on export per-
formance. We explore in the next section one important determinant of competi-
tiveness at the firm level, namely the availability of external finance. This factor
acquires greater significance in the context of the wide-ranging reforms in the
Indian financial sector since 1991.
3. Competitiveness and finance
There is widespread agreement in the literature that price competitiveness is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for export success. Among the non-price
factors, the ones most commonly identified in Indian policy discussions are tech-
nology upgradation, product quality and infrastructural bottlenecks. One non-price
factor that has received less attention, however, is the financial environment, i.e.
the extent to which the financial sector provides an enabling environment for suc-
cessful export performance. In the context of this study, an important question that
arises is whether there has been any relationship between export performance of
firms and financial factors in the Indian context. This question can be framed in
two parts. First, is there a systematic relationship between export performance and
the financing patterns? Here, we classify firms in certain selected industries into
three categories, namely ‘domestic firms’, ‘winning exporters’ and ‘losing
exporters’. For each of these categories, we study the Sources and Uses of Fund
Statements as well as a few other financial performance indicators to look for 
differences in their financing patterns and financial performance.
Second, do successful exporters face less information-based capital market
imperfections than the not-so-successful exporters? Modern theories of finance
which attempt to explain differences in financing patterns across firms emphasise
differences in costs associated with different providers of funds. It stresses the lack
of substitutability between internal sources (retained profits and depreciation) and
external sources (different types of debt and new equity) of funds. This imperfect
substitutability arises primarily due to asymmetric information between the suppli-
ers and users of funds and incentive problems between managers and owners of the
firm. It has generally been argued that these information asymmetries and incentive
problems make external funds more costly than internal funds. In the new equity
markets, this manifests as a ‘lemons premia’ (as pointed out by Myers and Majluf
1984) and in credit markets as credit rationing or loan mis-pricing (as pointed out
by Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, and others). Further, this view contends that the cost dif-
ferential between internal and external funds would vary across firms depending
upon the extent of the information asymmetry. Besides, this view also suggests that
simple transaction costs might also vary across firms. The implication of a higher
cost of external funds is that internal funds would be more important than external
funds in financing investments. Clearly, to the extent that a firm is forced to depend
on internal sources for investment, its growth is said to be finance constrained. 
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If exporting firms are finance constrained then this would be a major impediment
to sustaining their competitiveness in international markets.
In what follows, we explore this hypothesis by estimating investment functions
which explicitly allow for the presence of finance constraints, i.e. models that
allow the costs of internal and external sources of finance to be different (see
Hubbard (1997) and, in the Indian context, see Athey and Laumas (1994)).
Classification of firms
Classification of firms into the above three categories proceeds as follows: firms
are first categorised as ‘domestic firms’ and ‘exporting firms’ based on the share
of exports in their total sales. If the exports to sales ratio of a firm exceeds 5 per
cent over more than half the number of years in the sample period, then the firm
is considered to be an ‘exporting firm’ whereas it is a ‘domestic firm’ otherwise.
The reasoning behind this first level of categorisation is that there exist a large
number of firms even in the tradable sector (be they winner or loser industries)
who primarily sell only in the domestic market.17 Issues such as export competi-
tiveness obviously are of little relevance to these ‘domestic firms’. ‘Exporting
firms’ are then further classified into ‘winning exporters’ and ‘losing exporters’
based on a comparison of the annual growth rates of their exports vis-à-vis the
annual growth rate of exports for the industry to which they belong. If the growth
rate of exports of a firm exceeds the industry export growth rate for more than
half the number of years in the sample period, then the firm is classified as a
‘winning exporter’; otherwise it is considered a ‘losing exporter’. It may be noted
here that this way of classifying exporting firms into winners and losers is largely
consistent with the procedure adopted earlier for classifying industries.18
Furthermore, this procedure allows for the possible existence of winning
exporters within a losing industry and vice versa. Consider, for example, a losing
industry (the analogy runs similarly for winning industries also), i.e. an Indian
industry whose exports are growing but whose RCA is falling over time.19 The
growth rate of exports of some firms in this industry may be higher than the indus-
try average. We consider such a firm to be a winner firm as it has outperformed
the industry. This indicates that there could be some firm-specific characteristics
(unobserved as yet) that enable such firms to outperform the industry. Similarly, 
a losing firm is one which has not been able to match the industry performance in
terms of export growth, again perhaps due to certain firm-specific characteristics.
We feel that it may be important to distinguish these two types of firms.
This analysis is done for firms belonging to five industries. Earlier, we have iden-
tified ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ industries based on whether their RCAs have been
increasing or falling over time, respectively. Three winner industries from that clas-
sification, namely ISIC 3220 (manufactured wearing apparels excluding footwear),
ISIC 3511 (basic industrial chemicals excluding fertiliser) and ISIC 3901 (jew-
ellery and related articles), and two loser industries, ISIC 3211 (spinning, weaving,
finished textiles) and ISIC 3839 (electrical apparatus and supplies NEC), have been
selected for this analysis. The average share of these industries in total exports over
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the period 1991–6 was 19.7 per cent, 5.3 per cent, 12.1 per cent, 11.9 per cent and
0.5 per cent, respectively (see Table 4.3).
The database used is PROWESS provided by CMIE, Mumbai. The PROWESS
names for the above industries are readymade garments, industrial chemicals,
gems and jewellery, cotton textiles and electrical machinery, respectively. It must
be noted that the mapping from ISIC to PROWESS may not be perfect. Only
those firms for which data are available for all the years of the sample period are
considered for the analysis here. Table 4.8 reports the number of firms in the bal-
anced panel for the three categories for the sample period, 1993–7.
Descriptive statistics on financial variables
The indicators of the financial performance of firms used here are assets,
export–sales ratio and profitability ratio (profit before interest, depreciation and
taxes to sales). Movements in these indicators over the time period 1993–7 are
studied by pooling firms across industries within each category. We present in
Table 4.9 the average values of these variables. It may be noted that these sum-
mary statistics for the ‘exporters’ reported in these tables are estimated over win-
ning and losing exporters combined. The following broad conclusions emerge:
1 The average size and the rate of growth in assets are found to be the lowest
for domestic firms. Among exporters, winning exporters outperform the los-
ing exporters in both average asset size and growth.
2 The export to sales ratio, which was similar for both winning exporters and
losing exporters at the beginning of the period, grew for the former while it
fell for the latter.
3 Winners and domestic firms, on an average, have been more profitable than
the losers. Moreover, this ratio has been more or less stable over the years
for all three groups.
4 We also found that the correlations between assets (i.e. firm size), prof-
itability and the export to sales ratio were all insignificant.20
The above patterns must, however, be interpreted with caution as all these three
variables show substantial variation across firms within the groups for each year.
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Table 4.8 Sample size (sample period: 1993–7)
Domestic Winner Loser Total
Ready-made garments 0 4 3 7
Cotton textiles (cloth) 13 12 10 35
Electrical machinery 58 19 9 86
Industrial chemicals 44 15 11 70
Gems and jewellery 0 2 4 6
Total 115 52 37 204
Note: The number of exporting firms equals the sum of winners and losers.
With the exception of profitability, the other two variables have coefficients of
variation greater than 1.0. 
We now examine the sources and uses of funds to see if there are differences
in the financing pattern of firms in these three categories. The sources and uses
of funds statements for the domestic firms, and all exporters (winners and losers)
are reported in Table 4.10. These statements for winning exporters and losing
exporters are reported in Table 4.11. The following broad patterns emerge:
1 In 1993, the average amount of funds raised and used was more or less iden-
tical across the three groups. Over time, however, winning exporters on an
average have been able to raise more funds from various sources than losing
exporters and domestic firms.
2 Across all the three groups and over the entire period, external sources are
the most important, accounting for more than 60 per cent of the funds
raised.21 For domestic firms, the importance of internal sources has risen by
over 10 percentage points. For winning exporters, the importance of internal
sources has fallen over time by around 5 percentage points. For losing
exporters, no clear pattern is found in the share of internal sources.
3 Within external sources, funds raised through capital markets have been most
significant for the winning exporters.
4 On an average, borrowings have been more important for domestic firms and
losing exporters than for winning exporters. 
5 The share of gross fixed assets in the uses of funds has risen substantially for
the winning exporters. There seems to be no discernible trend for losing
exporters and for domestic firms.
The broad conclusions above seem to suggest that exporters as a group are likely to
be less financially constrained than domestic firms. Further, it is likely that winning
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Table 4.9 Firm characteristics
Average over firms Firm type 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Assets Domestic 70.56 93.64 121.54 151.38 183.38
Winners 100.68 132.79 186.08 235.81 264.39
Losers 73.78 99.22 131.38 156.97 169.08
Exporters 89.50 118.84 163.34 203.04 224.77
Export to sales ratio Domestic 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Winners 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.32
Losers 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23
Exporters 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Profitability ratio Domestic 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.06
Winners 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.15
Losers 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.12
Exporters 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14
Source: Firm-level data are from PROWESS, CMIE, Mumbai. The aggregates reported are based on
the authors’ calculations.
Table 4.10 Sources and uses of funds – domestic and exporting firms
Domestic firms Exporting firms
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Sources of funds
Internal sources 23.9 26.1 34.7 39.1 32.0 29.9 25.1 22.7 27.1 33.1
Retained profits 10.2 20.5 22.2 27.1 15.8 14.8 15.2 14.8 16.9 7.7
Depreciation 13.7 5.6 12.6 12.0 16.2 15.1 9.9 7.9 10.2 25.4
External sources 76.1 73.9 65.3 60.9 68.0 70.1 74.9 77.3 72.9 67.0
Capital markets 34.4 40.9 30.4 7.0 14.0 39.0 47.3 41.1 12.7 27.9
Fresh capital 5.4 9.4 4.3 2.9 3.1 6.7 7.0 6.2 2.4 1.9
(excl. Bonus issue)
Share premium 6.1 16.9 31.8 8.4 3.2 20.5 33.1 27.9 8.7 10.3
Debentures/bonds 23.1 14.0 5.8 4.2 7.2 11.4 5.3 5.1 1.6 15.3
Fixed deposits 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 2.0 1.9 0.0 0.5
Borrowings 29.9 16.7 23.3 32.8 42.7 27.4 11.2 18.5 43.3 20.9
Bank borrowings 9.5 0.8 17.2 13.1 18.0 15.1 2.4 11.1 31.0 4.4
Financial institutions 16.7 13.1 5.2 5.2 8.5 10.9 2.4 7.0 8.4 16.5
Loans from corporate 0.5 0.3 2.6 0.9 3.4 2.1 0.3 0.9 0.2 2.6
bodies
Other borrowings 3.2 4.7 1.6 15.4 12.8 0.7 6.7 0.6 4.1 6.3
Current liabilities and 11.8 16.4 11.6 21.2 11.3 3.7 16.4 17.7 16.8 18.1
provisions
Sundry creditors 6.0 12.0 6.3 15.3 9.1 8.7 11.8 11.8 12.1 13.7
Uses of funds
Gross fixed assets 62.4 55.0 40.1 56.2 50.7 45.8 38.0 37.9 53.6 74.6
Work in progress 36.4 17.0 20.0 12.4 16.2 2.0 1.9 10.4 8.9 13.5
Investments 3.8 15.2 8.2 0.0 0.5 4.1 17.5 17.2 1.4 1.6
Current assets 33.8 29.8 51.7 43.9 48.8 50.1 44.6 44.9 45.1 23.8
Inventories 7.4 2.3 14.0 11.2 9.2 18.4 11.6 13.0 13.1 4.4
Debtors 17.7 13.9 23.7 25.8 21.2 23.0 16.2 13.7 20.7 5.7
Cash and bank balances 0.9 1.1 1.0 2.1 6.8 6.7 2.8 5.9 1.1 7.2
Total sources/uses of funds 2,137.3 2,779.7 3,343.4 3,810.4 4,053.1 1,710.5 2,875.9 4,300.6 3,892.6 2,337.3
Total sources/uses of 18.6 24.2 29.1 33.1 35.2 19.2 32.3 48.3 43.7 26.3
funds-average
Total sources/uses of 66.2 96.0 66.8 77.7 110.0 52.2 83.0 100.0 86.0 61.0
funds-standard deviation
Total sources/uses of 23.6 5.5 8.5 7.7 29.7 79.2 7.0 6.3 2.1 86.4
funds-minimum
Total sources/uses of 591.3 745.2 451.1 538.5 844.8 378.4 550.2 611.1 480.9 429.8
funds-maximum
No. of companies in panel 115 115 115 115 115 89 89 89 89 89
Source: Firm-level data are from PROWESS, CMIE, Mumbai. The aggregates reported are based on authors’ calculations.
Note: Individual items of sources and uses of funds are reported as percentages of the total while the rest are in Rs Crores.
Table 4.11 Sources and uses of funds – winning and losing exporters
Winner exporting firms Loser exporting firms
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Source of funds
Internal sources 29.6 27.3 21.5 24.9 23.0 30.3 21.2 25.5 32.8 70.6
Retained profits 15.1 18.6 14.0 15.8 5.8 14.5 9.3 16.7 19.6 14.9
Depreciation 14.6 8.7 7.5 9.1 17.3 15.8 12.0 8.8 13.2 55.7
External sources 70.4 72.7 78.5 75.1 77.0 69.7 78.8 74.5 67.2 29.4
Capital markets 58.0 47.2 45.0 13.6 36.3 12.8 47.5 32.4 10.4 3.4
Fresh capital 9.1 6.3 6.5 3.0 2.8 3.3 8.1 5.6 1.1 1.3
(excl. bonus issue)
Share premium 31.5 37.3 31.4 8.0 14.8 5.3 25.8 20.0 10.6 6.7
Debentures/bonds 17.1 2.1 4.4 2.7 17.8 3.5 10.9 6.6 1.3 5.9
Fixed deposits 0.2 1.5 2.7 0.0 1.0 0.6 2.8 0.2 0.0 1.3
Borrowings 21.4 7.9 15.1 43.6 29.1 35.8 16.9 26.1 42.6 9.9
Bank borrowings 13.1 0.3 12.6 29.7 5.2 17.9 6.2 7.9 34.3 40.5
Financial institutions 8.7 3.1 3.6 12.1 23.8 14.0 1.0 14.8 0.9 10.8
Loans from corporate 2.0 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 2.3 1.4 1.6 0.4 11.0
bodies
Other borrowings 2.4 5.8 1.6 2.0 0.2 1.6 8.3 1.7 9.6 30.4
Current liabilities and 9.0 17.5 18.4 17.8 11.6 21.2 14.3 16.0 14.2 42.6
provisions
Sundry creditors 2.5 11.2 12.1 13.0 5.9 17.2 12.8 11.0 10.0 43.1
Uses of funds
Gross fixed assets 42.3 36.9 40.9 60.3 75.1 50.7 39.8 31.1 36.1 72.7
Work in progress 6.7 7.6 15.7 10.7 12.5 13.8 8.0 1.9 4.3 16.9
Investments 6.1 13.6 9.8 1.9 4.6 1.3 24.2 34.0 9.8 9.6
Current assets 51.6 49.5 49.3 41.6 20.3 48.1 36.1 34.9 54.0 36.9
Inventories 19.2 12.5 11.3 14.2 6.0 17.3 10.2 16.8 10.1 1.5
Debtors 25.2 17.5 15.9 18.5 6.8 20.0 13.9 8.6 26.2 1.4
Cash and bank balances 13.5 3.5 7.6 2.1 4.7 2.7 1.7 1.9 1.5 16.2
Total sources/uses of funds 991.3 1,823.4 2,988.8 2,804.9 1,844.5 719.1 1,052.5 1,311.8 1,087.7 492.8
Total sources/uses of 19.1 35.1 57.5 53.9 35.5 19.4 28.5 35.5 29.4 13.3
funds – average
Total sources/uses of 57.0 81.1 104.1 96.4 72.2 45.6 86.7 93.8 67.5 37.7
funds – standard deviation
Total sources/uses of 79.2 0.2 0.6 0.1 81.6 9.5 7.0 6.3 2.1 86.4
funds – minimum
Total sources/uses of 378.4 550.2 611.1 480.9 429.8 184.9 393.8 534.4 369.1 175.9
funds – maximum
No. of companies in panel 52 52 52 52 52 37 37 37 37 37
Source: Firm-level data are from PROWESS, CMIE, Mumbai.  The aggregates reported are based on the authors’ calculations.
Note: Individual items of sources and uses of funds are reported as percentages of the total while the rest are in Rs crores.
exporters are less financially constrained than losing exporters. In the next section
we attempt to estimate investment functions separately for these categories to test
the extent of financial constraints that firms in various categories face.
Investment function
Specification22
In the empirical literature on firms’ investment behaviour, two sets of hypotheses
relating to finance constraints are usually tested. First, the presence of a finance
constraint is explored using the specification for a panel of firms in eqn (4.1):
(4.1)
where I is investment, K is capital stock, Q is an estimate of Tobin’s q, IS is inter-
nal sources of funds,  is the error term, i is the firm subscript and t is the time
subscript. If in the above specification the estimated coefficient c turned out to be
positive and significant, it is taken as evidence in favour of the finance constraint
hypothesis. Sometimes, besides IS, a variable measuring leverage is also added to
the above specification.
The second hypothesis explored in this literature is the so-called ‘excess sensi-
tivity hypothesis’, which states that the degree of finance constraints varies across
firms of different characteristics representing inter-firm differences in informa-
tion costs. In order to test the excess sensitivity hypothesis, firms are grouped into
‘high information cost’ and ‘low information cost’ categories based on some a
priori criteria (such as firm size). A higher value for the estimated coefficient c
for the ‘high information cost’ group points to the excess sensitivity of this group
to financing constraints.
Empirical work within this framework in the developing country context is
sparse. In the few studies available, Tobin’s q is replaced by a traditional sales-
accelerator model of investment. In this approach, fluctuations in output/sales
motivate capital spending. To such a model, cash flow and leverage ratios are
added to capture finance constraints. A typical specification is as follows in eqn
(4.2) (see Harris et al. 1994):
(4.2)
I is investment, K is capital stock, S is sales, IS is internal sources of funds, D is
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time effect,  is the idiosyncratic component of the error term, i is firm subscript
and t is time subscript. Positive and significant estimates of 
2 indicate the pres-
ence of finance constraints. Tests of the excess sensitivity hypothesis can be done
as described earlier. The coefficient 
3 reflects the premium above the safe rate
that must be paid as the debt to capital ratio increases and it may vary across
groups of firms.
In this study, we intend to estimate an investment function such as eqn (4.2) to
test for the presence of finance constraints. Earlier, we had seen that the share of
external finance in the total sources of funds is larger for exporters than for domes-
tic firms. Moreover, external funds raised through capital markets as a percentage
of total external funds are higher for exporting firms. The relative success of
exporters in raising funds through capital markets possibly suggests that these firms
might belong to the low information cost category while the domestic firms might
belong to the high information cost category. From the perspective of the suppliers
of funds, the quality of investment projects is likely to be superior for exporters who
have a proven record in international markets – given that international markets are
perceived to be highly competitive. The flip side to this is that success (or mere con-
tinued presence) in domestic markets, which were largely protected in the pre-1991
regime, is not sufficient assurance that the firm will remain successful in the
increasingly competitive environment that is evolving in the domestic product mar-
kets since 1991. This suggests that finance constraints are likely to be more severe
for domestic firms than for exporters (excess sensitivity hypothesis). In an exactly
analogous way, even among exporters, losers are likely to face more severe finance
constraints than winners (winners and losers as we defined above). In what follows,
we attempt to empirically test the above propositions.
It may be noted here that the criteria we have used to classify firms into high and
low information cost categories are, to our knowledge, unlike any used hitherto in
the literature. Traditionally, a common criterion used to distinguish firms into high
and low information cost has been firm size (usually measured in terms of net fixed
assets). We also attempt to evaluate if the above-mentioned excess sensitivity
hypothesis (exporters versus domestic firms) holds after controlling for firm size.
Prior to 1991, the Indian Government strictly controlled the creation of new
firms and the expansion of existing firms through a rigid licensing regime in
accordance with plan priorities. The plans had both industry-specific real capac-
ity targets and a financial plan to ensure the realisation of these targets. Control
was exercised on the financial side by public ownership of financial institutions
providing long-term loans to the private corporate sector. The government pro-
vided subsidised credit to these financial institutions, which were in turn directed
to the private corporate sector at a fixed rate of interest implying that these insti-
tutions had a limited screening role to perform. Private corporate firms faced
severe restrictions on the pricing, quantum and timing of new issues and the gov-
ernment also forced certain industry-specific debt/equity ratio norms on firms,
leaving little leeway for firms to choose their capital structure.
In such a scenario, de facto, finance did not matter for investment and the tra-
ditional finance literature that focuses on informational asymmetries and agency
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costs faced by suppliers of funds can be argued to be of little relevance for the
pre-1991 period. Furthermore, during the period 1991–3, rapid changes were tak-
ing place in the financial sector so we chose to exclude these years from our
analysis. We, therefore, estimate the investment function for the period 1993–7.
Empirical results
The investment functions are estimated using the pooled data, namely for five
years (1993–7) across 204 firms (total 1,020 observations). For the construction
of the dependent variable (I/K) and explanatory variables (S/K, IS/K and D/K),
we need a measure of the real capital stock. We estimate the beginning of the
period capital stock from book value using a method similar to that of Athey and
Laumas (1994). The following assumptions are made:
1 All the firm’s capital has an identical useful life Li.
2 The firm’s initial end of period capital stock equals the book value of net
fixed assets in current rupees.
3 Firms use the straight line method of depreciation and actual depreciation is
exponential with depreciation 1/Li.
4 All investments are made at the beginning of the year and all depreciation is
subtracted at the end of the year.
We estimate the beginning of the period’s capital stock by eqn (4.3):
(4.3)
where P is the wholesale price index of capital goods.
Besides the above three explanatory variables, we also construct various
dummy variables to represent firms according to different categories such as
domestics, winners, losers, etc. Table 4.12 lists the variable notations used and
also their definitions.
Finance constraints – Overall sample
The investment function – eqn (4.2) – for the entire sample (i.e. no distinction is
made between domestics, exporters, etc.) is estimated using panel data techniques
(a) in levels allowing for both firm and time effects, and (b) in first differences
allowing only for time effects. Time effects were found to be insignificant in both
cases whereas firm-specific effects were found to be significant in the levels.
Table 4.13 reports the GLS estimates for the levels regression and OLS estimates
for estimation in first differences. The positive and significant coefficient for
IS/K shows that for the entire sample financial constraints are important in
explaining investment behaviour.
Ki, t   PtPt1 [Ii, t1  Ki, t1] 11Li,
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Table 4.12 Variables and their definition
Notation Definition
S/K Change in sales as a ratio of real capital stock
IS/K Internal sources as a ratio of real capital stock
D/K Long-term debt as a ratio of real capital stock
EDUMMY Dummy variable: one for exporting firm, zero otherwise
EIS/K EDUMMY * IS/K
ED/K EDUMMY * D/K
WDUMMY Dummy variable: one for winning exporter firm, zero otherwise
WIS/K WDUMMY * IS/K
WD/K WDUMMY * D/K
LDUMMY Dummy variable; one for losing exporter firm, zero otherwise
LIS/K LDUMMY * IS/K
LD/K LDUMMY * D/K
SF Dummy variable: one for small firms (NFA Rs 25 crore)
LF Dummy variable: one for large firms (NFA Rs 25 crore)
SFIS/K SF * IS/K
SFD/K SF * D/K
SFD SF * DDUMMY
SFE SF * EDUMMY
LFE LF * EDUMMY
SFDIS/K SFD * IS/K
SFEIS/K SFE * IS/K
LFEIS/K LFE * IS/K
SFDD/K SFD * D/K
SFED/K SFE * D/K
LFED/K LFE * D/K
WW Dummy variable: one for winner firm in winning industry, 
zero otherwise
LW Dummy variable: one for loser firm in winning industry, 
zero otherwise
WL Dummy variable: one for winner firm in losing industry, 
zero otherwise
LL Dummy variable: one for loser firm in losing industry, 
zero otherwise
WWIS/K WW * IS/K
LWIS/K LW * IS/K
WLIS/K WL * IS/K
LLIS/K LL * IS/K
WWD/K WW * D/K
LWD/K LW * D/K
WLD/K WL * D/K
LLD/K LL * D/K
Exporting firms versus domestic firms
To test the excess sensitivity hypothesis between exporting and domestic firms,
dummy variables are introduced into the regression for both the intercept and the
slope coefficients attached to IS/K and D/K. The dummy variable takes the value
one for exporting firms and zero for domestic firms. The estimation is carried
out using OLS without allowing for any firm-specific effect or time effect.23
The regression results in both levels and in first differences are reported in
Table 4.14. It is seen that the slope dummy attached to IS/K is negative and
significant in both the levels and first-difference regressions. This suggests that
finance the constraint is less binding for the exporting firms than for domestic
firms upholding the excess sensitivity hypothesis. We, therefore, re-estimate the
investment function separately for the domestic firms and for exporting firms
(Table 4.14). These show that the finance constraint is unambiguously binding for
domestic firms. For exporting firms the coefficient of IS/K is clearly lower than
that for the domestic firms in both the levels and first-difference regressions.
There is, however, some ambiguity as to the significance of the coefficient
between the levels and first-difference regressions.
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Table 4.13 Investment function estimates – all firms
Levelsa First differenceb
Constant 0.0843 (2.82)c 0.0113 (0.85)
S/K 0.0133 (2.90) 0.0100 (2.19)
IS/K 0.5406 (37.85) 0.6417 (40.20)
D/K 0.0973 (3.66) 0.2106 (6.33)
D-o-F 813 608
Notes
a In levels, estimation is using GLS allowing for firm-specific effects.
b In first-differences, estimation is using OLS.
c t-values are reported in parentheses.
Table 4.14 Investment function estimates – exporting firms versus domestic firms
Levels First difference
All firms Domestic Exporting All firms Domestic Exporting 
firms firms firms firms
Constant 0.0902 0.0898 0.1943 0.0235 0.0218 0.0310
(8.17) (7.05) (17.80) (1.49) (1.19) (2.34)
EDUMMY 0.1029 0.0065
(5.55) (0.27)
S/K 0.0143 0.0361 0.0002 0.0095 0.0232 0.0016
(3.18) (4.39) (0.04) (2.31) (2.92) (0.43)
IS/K 0.5169 0.4577 0.0718 0.6686 0.6299 0.0345
(36.15) (19.15) (3.03) (45.15) (25.41) (0.78)
EIS/K 0.4609 0.7280
(13.8) (12.2)
D/K 0.1723 0.2241 0.0490 0.2929 0.2556 0.1024
(6.65) (6.68) (1.13) (9.34) (6.33) (1.37)
ED/K 0.1253 0.3910
(1.94) (3.60)
D-o-F 1,013 571 441 605 341 263
Note: Estimation is using OLS. t-values are reported in parentheses.
Small versus large firms
As indicated earlier, firm size has often been used as a criterion to classify firms
into high information cost and low information cost categories. From our point of
view, it is important to ensure that the excess sensitivity hypothesis between
domestic firms and exporters continues to hold after controlling for firm size.
Towards this end, we first define a firm to be a small firm if its net fixed assets
are less than Rs 25 crore (i.e. Rs 250 million).24 Dummy variables for small firms
and large firms are accordingly defined. Investment functions incorporating size
effects are estimated first without distinguishing exporters and domestic firms
(Table 4.15) and next by making this distinction (Table 4.16). 
From Table 4.15 we find that the slope dummy for small firms attached to IS/K is
negative and significant (in both levels and first differences), indicating that finance
constraints are less important for small firms than for large firms – a somewhat
counter-intuitive result. A similar conclusion was arrived at by Athey and Laumas
(1994), who attribute it to the government’s policies that favoured small firms.
We now turn to the question of whether the excess sensitivity hypothesis
between exporters and domestic firms holds after controlling for size. We con-
centrate on the slope dummies attached to IS/K which correspond to small
domestic firms, small exporting firms and large exporting firms. From the results
reported in Table 4.16, we see that these slope dummies are negative and signifi-
cant (in both levels and in first differences). Moreover, the results suggest that the
finance constraint is less severe for (a) small exporters than for small domestic
firms, and (b) large exporters than for large domestic firms.25 Thus, the excess
sensitivity of domestic firms to finance constraints over exporting firms holds
well across firms of similar size.
Winning and losing exporters
A similar approach as above is adopted to test the excess sensitivity hypothesis
between winning exporters and losing exporters. Two sets of dummy variables are
used to distinguish the winners and losers vis-à-vis the domestic firms. As above,
the dummy variables are used in both the intercept and slope terms. Table 4.17
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Table 4.15 Investment function estimates – small versus large firms
Levels First difference
Constant 0.1260 (10.16) 0.0204 (1.22)
SF 0.0439 (2.55) 0.0044 (0.19)
S/K 0.0060 (1.38) 0.0053 (1.35)
IS/K 0.5466 (39.21) 0.6864 (48.48)
SFIS/K 0.4728 (17.07) 0.7383 (15.15)
D/K 0.1303 (5.21) 0.3235 (10.79)
SFD/K 0.1181 (1.90) 0.4145 (3.91)
D-o-F 1,013 605
Note: Estimation is using OLS. t-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.16 Investment function estimates – exporting firms versus domestic
firms and small versus large firms
Levels First difference
Constant 0.1021 (5.98) 0.0302 (1.31)
SFD 0.0714 (3.03) 0.0013 (0.04)
SFE 0.0701 (2.77) 0.0062 (0.18)
LFE 0.0690 (2.13) 0.0035 (0.11)
S/K 0.0060 (1.39) 0.0052 (1.32)
IS/K 0.5465 (38.69) 0.6887 (48.18)
SFDIS/K 0.4286 (9.23) 0.6815 (8.37)
SFEIS/K 0.4888 (14.77) 0.7717 (12.8)
LFEIS/K 0.0850 (0.62) 0.4311 (2.60)
D/K 0.1298 (5.10) 0.3304 (10.95)
SFDD/K 0.4606 (2.73) 0.0128 (0.04)
SFED/K 0.0751 (1.14) 0.4638 (4.19)
LFED/K 0.1130 (0.76) 0.2101 (0.80)
D-o-F 1,007 599
Note: Estimation is using OLS. t-values are reported in parentheses.
Table 4.17 Investment function estimates – winning and losing exporters
Levels First difference
All firms Winners Losers All firms Winners Losers
Constant 0.0902 0.2181 0.1575 0.0235 0.414 0.0170
(8.19) (14.94) (9.67) (1.49) (2.36) (0.86)
WDUMMY 0.1267 0.0133
(5.50) (0.46)
LDUMMY 0.0667 0.0064 
(2.69) (0.19)
S/K 0.0137 0.0051 0.0003 0.0095 0.0203 0.0042 
(3.06) (0.54) (0.05) (2.31) (1.76) (1.10)
IS/K 0.5184 0.1087 0.0492 0.00684 0.0812 0.0557





D/K 0.1710 0.0016 0.1122 0.2928 0.1104 0.1738 
(6.61) (0.03) (1.75) (9.30) (1.41) (0.58)
WD/K 0.1727 0.3875 
(2.06) (3.46)
LD/K 0.0608 0.4629 
(0.66) (1.09)
D-o-F 1,010 256 181 602 152 107
Note: Estimation is using OLS. t-values are reported in parentheses.
reports the estimation results. The slope dummies attached to IS/K for both win-
ners and losers turn out to be negative and significant as expected. Nonetheless,
when the investment function is estimated separately for winners and losers, the
coefficient of IS/K turns out to be substantially lower for both these types of firms
than for the domestic firms (Table 4.14). In fact, in first differences the coeffi-
cient is insignificant for both these categories.
These results should, however, be interpreted with caution. While the excess
sensitivity of domestic firms versus the exporters is clearly established, the same
cannot be said between winners and losers. Possibly this is due to the fact that
sample size is rather small for the winners and losers. It may be pointed out here
that while the criteria used to categorise firms into domestics and exporters are
rather straightforward, the same cannot be said about the criteria used to cate-
gorise exporters into winners and losers. This is because we have essentially com-
pared the annual growth rate of a firm’s export with a benchmark growth rate of
the relevant industry’s exports. One may expect that the growth rate in exports is
more volatile for individual firms than for the industry as a whole. Considering
that we have only five years of data this could lead to misclassification of some
firms as either winners or losers, thus affecting our results.
Another possible reason for not obtaining clear results at the level of winner
and loser firms could be that we have not controlled for the fact that a
winner/loser firm belongs to a winner/loser industry. We attempt to control for
this factor below.
Winner/loser–industry/firms
A priori we would expect that the information cost would be the least for winner
firms in winner industries, followed by loser firms in winner industries, winner
firms in loser industries, loser firms in loser industries, and finally domestic
firms in that order. Accordingly, the severity of finance constraints would
increase in the above order.
We define dummy variables that distinguish firms into four categories, namely
winner firms in winner industries, winner firms in loser industries, loser firms in
winner industries and loser firms in loser industries. Distinction of domestic firms
by winner/loser industries is not made here since the focus is on the severity of
finance constraints within different categories of exporting firms. Table 4.18
reports the results of this dummy variable regression.
These results indicate that:
1 The severity of finance constraints is highest for domestic firms followed
by exporting firms in loser industries and is the least for exporting firms in
winner industries (compare the coefficients of WWIS/K and LWIS/K on the
one hand with those of WLIS/K and LLIS/K on the other).
2 The above expected progression in the severity of finance constraints is found
to hold true for exporting firms within loser industries but not for exporting
firms within winner industries (compare the coefficients of WWIS/K with
LWIS/K and that of WLIS/K with LLIS/K).
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Coefficients of S/K and D/K
The coefficient of the accelerator (S/K) is in most of the cases positive and sig-
nificant in both levels and first-difference regressions as expected. The excep-
tions are the regressions in first differences for exporters, winners and losers, and
in levels for winners and losers. With respect to the coefficient of the leverage
term (D/K), however, no clear pattern emerges either on the sign of the coefficient
or its significance. This could perhaps be due to the small size of our sample. We
may note here that some other studies have also reported similar results (see Hall
1992; Harris et al. 1994).
Examining the financing patterns of firms, we have found that winning
exporters have been able to raise more funds from various sources than losing
exporters and domestic firms. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
while financial constraints are important in explaining investment behaviour for
all firms in our sample, they are less binding for exporting firms, particularly
those in the winner industries.
4. Stylised facts on micro–macro and trade–finance interactions
Trade specialisation and sustainability of current account
From the policy-maker’s perspective, issues such as patterns of trade specialisa-
tion and competitiveness are of interest primarily because of their implications for
the link between economic growth and current account sustainability. It is well
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Table 4.18 Investment function estimates – winner/loser–industry/firms
Levels First difference
Constant 0.0903 (8.20) 0.0234 (1.49)
WW 0.1147 (3.50) 0.0141 (0.34)
LW 0.0530 (1.54) 0.0027 (0.06)
WL 0.1307 (3.71) 0.0181 (0.53)
LL 0.0583 (1.62) 0.0106 (0.25)
S/K 0.0130 (2.88) 0.0107 (2.59)
IS/K 0.5205 (36.30) 0.6652 (44.99)
WWIS/K 0.4411 (8.35) 0.6810 (3.29)
LWIS/K 0.5069 (10.34) 0.8731 (11.26)
WLIS/K 0.4089 (2.95) 0.5808 (2.80)
LLIS/K 0.3125 (3.11) 0.4234 (3.52)
D/K 0.1692 (6.53) 0.2897 (9.27)
WWD/K 0.1073 (0.94) 0.5439 (3.74)
LWD/K 0.0566 (0.59) 0.2794 (0.54)
WLD/K 0.2328 (1.99) 0.1614 (0.97)
LLD/K 0.0846 (0.24) 0.7865 (1.09)
D-o-F 1004 596
Note: Estimation is using OLS. t-values are reported in parentheses.
known that the current account balance is influenced both by micro-factors (such 
as trade specialisation and competitiveness) and macro-factors (mainly the 
savings–investment gap). In India, in the 1980s and 1990s, macro-factors played 
a dominant role in determining the current account balance (as has been noted in
Section 2). Our findings suggest that with greater amounts of resources flowing
into the exporting sectors since the 1991 reforms, poor export performance due
to resource constraints is unlikely to be a source of concern for current account
sustainability. Other factors, however, such as the lack of adequate infrastructural
facilities (roads, ports, power, etc.) may prove to be a generalised constraint on
the supply side, which could affect export performance and thus ultimately the
trade balance.
Labour costs and trade competitiveness
The non-dynamism of the export sector has long been an issue of policy concern
in India. Given India is a labour-surplus country, it has been suggested that trade
patterns should follow comparative advantage and that India should specialise in
the export of labour-intensive commodities. The 1991 reforms were an attempt to
provide an impetus to India’s manufacturing exports, especially of the labour-
intensive type. There is little evidence, however, of a significant increase in man-
ufacturing exports (labour intensive or otherwise) in the post-1991 period.
Moreover, we do not observe any correlation at the sectoral level between unit
labour costs and export competitiveness. The lack of importance of price factors
in determining competitiveness at the sectoral level could be taken to provide sup-
port for the view that non-price factors (such as finance constraints) may be
important determinants of competitiveness at the firm and industry levels.
Equally, it could also be due to the possibility that, notwithstanding the economic
reforms of 1991, there remain severe distortions in the Indian economy, which are
far too deep and in extent to enable the country to exploit its labour resources.26
Financial environment and finance constraints
In the restrictive policy environment prior to 1991, financial intermediaries were
passive conduits of funds from the government and the banking sector to manu-
facturing firms. The 1991 reforms have empowered financial intermediaries to
play an active role in resource allocation. We have argued that in a regime where
resources are allocated according to government directives, the very concept of
finance constraints is of little consequence (as all real plans are backed by a
financial plan). Finance constraints (caused by informational and agency costs)
are relevant when financial intermediaries screen projects. In our empirical work,
we have demonstrated that in the new environment financial intermediaries seem
to take export performance as an indicator of a firm’s competitive strength. Thus,
investments by exporters in general and, in particular, among exporting firms in
winning industries are not restricted by the availability of internal funds. On the
other hand, financial intermediaries seem to view firms that operate primarily in
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domestic markets as lacking in competitive strength and, consequently, invest-
ments by these firms are constrained by the availability of internal funds.
Notes
01 We gratefully acknowledge comments by Mustapha Nabli, José María Fanelli, Ari
Kuncoro, Paolo Guerrieri and other participants in the Interim Workshop held at the
Philippines Institute for Development Studies, Manila, during 21–23 April 1998, and
in the Final Workshop held at the Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat,
Johannesburg, during 30 November–2 December 1998. Usual disclaimers apply.
02 As we shall see in Section 2, there was, in fact, an improvement in India’s export per-
formance since the mid-1980s, due in great part to the export-promotion policies
followed during this period.
03 There was another mechanism by which the foreign exchange constraint would prove
to be binding on domestic demand-driven growth in the Indian context. An increase in
aggregate demand would lead to higher food prices and, hence, inflation. Given the
aversion of Indian policy-makers to high inflation, this would invariably trigger off
deflationary fiscal and monetary policies (as the lack of adequate foreign exchange
reserves precluded the possibility of large-scale imports of food).
04 It should be noted that such a periodisation is widely accepted in the literature. For
example, see Ahluwalia (1991) and Joshi and Little (1994).
05 Further details of these policies can be found in Ganesh-Kumar et al. (1998).
06 Openness as conventionally defined is the sum of exports and imports as a ratio of
GDP.
07 A full discussion of the CMS methodology is available in Kumar, Sen and Vaidya
(1999).
08 The definition of manufacturing used here is the SITC-based one and includes all com-
modities in the SITC categories 5 to 8 excluding 68. It should be pointed out that this
definition differs from the definition of manufacturing exports used in Section 2 begin-
ning with ‘The real exchange rate and aggregate competitiveness’.
09 It should be noted that the CMS analysis ends in 1992 while the rest of the empirical
results in this section are until 1996. The CMS analysis requires data on bilateral trade
flows for all commodities and all countries. Such detailed data for the post-1992 period
were not readily available at the time of the study.
10 The RCA measure expresses the share of country i’s export of product j in total world
exports of product j, as a ratio to the share of country i’s total exports of manufactures
in world total exports of manufactures. An RCA of unity would imply ‘normal’ export
performance of product j relative to the size of country i, as an exporter, while a ratio
of 2 would suggest that the product j’s share in country i’s exports is twice the corre-
sponding world share, and so on. An RCA of more than unity is usually taken as an
indicator of competitiveness, while an increase in the RCA supposedly suggests a
strengthening of the competitiveness so revealed (see Balassa (1965) for further details).
11 Commodity-wise time series of RCAs are not presented here but will be made avail-
able upon request.
12 We use the Grubel and Lloyd (1975) measure of intra-industry trade (IIT), defined as
where Xit is India’s exports of commodity i at time t, and Mit is India’s imports of com-
modity i at time t. The variable IITit can be between 0 and 1, with higher values indi-
cating greater intra-industry trade.
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13 Details available from the authors upon request.
14 We have excluded ISIC 3909 from the above list as it includes manufacturing indus-
tries not elsewhere classified. Therefore, by definition, ISIC 3909 would have a high
volume of intra-industry trade. 
15 We have used Lall’s (1998) classification of the technological complexity of various
exports, which is a refinement of OECD (1998). 
16 See Lall (1998) for further details.
17 The presence of such domestic firms can be explained primarily in terms of the
extremely restrictive trade and industrial policy regime that prevailed prior to 1985.
18 Recall that an Indian industry was classified as winner/loser by comparing its export
performance with a world norm for that industry: winner if it outperformed the world
norm; loser otherwise.
19 Note that RCA of an industry can rise/fall over time even when the world trade in that
industry is falling over time. None of the industries (both winners and losers) chosen
below in our analysis fall in such a category. Hence this case is not discussed further.
20 We have not reported the correlations matrix for brevity.
21 The figures for 1997 for both winners and losers seem to be influenced by some
extreme values and thus need to be interpreted with caution.
22 We draw upon Hubbard (1997), Athey and Laumas (1994) and Harris et al. (1994) in
this discussion.
23 Note that introducing a dummy variable for exporting firms and simultaneously allow-
ing for firm-specific or time effects through relevant dummy variables would result in
the equation being collinear. Hence, we ignore firm and time effects.
24 Note that the Government of India defines a small firm as one whose gross fixed asset
is less than Rs 1 crore for its priority lending policies. Historically, this limit was much
lower.
25 The small size of our sample in each of these four categories prevented us from
estimating the investment function separately.
26 Two such distortions that may be relevant here are the lack of an exit policy in labour
market and the widespread reservation of products for the small-scale sector.
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5 International trade, productivity
and competitiveness
The case of the Indonesian
manufacturing sector
Ari Kuncoro
1. Introduction: Competitiveness, macroeconomic
and financial problems
The growth path of the Indonesian economy from the late 1960s to the early 1990s
was not always smooth. Indonesia experienced several economic crises, usually
dictated by the development of external events, which resulted in the deterioration
of the current account. The problem stemmed from the fact that throughout the
1970s, Indonesian exports depended heavily on oil, gas and primary products.
From 1973 to 1980, the value of Indonesian exports was dominated by oil, gas and
timber, which made up approximately 60 per cent of the total exports. As more and
more processing plants developed domestically, the share of semi-processed goods
in total exports rose steadily, and from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s became
one of the most important foreign exchange earners.
According to Haque (1995), competitiveness is defined as an economy’s ability
to grow and to raise the general living standard of its population without being
constrained by balance-of-payment difficulties. In other words, competitiveness is
defined as the capacity to increase productivity without generating a balance-
of-payment crisis. We use this definition of competitiveness to examine the evolu-
tion of economic growth and current account sustainability in Indonesia.
The structure of Indonesian exports (heavily dependent on oil and gas and nat-
ural resource products) made the current account very vulnerable to international
price fluctuations. The increase in oil prices in 1973 helped the government
finance its economic development plan.1 On the negative side, the heavy depend-
ence of the government on oil export revenues made the economy very vulnerable
to the fluctuations in oil and other primary commodity prices on the international
market. It is not too surprising that in an economy where government expenditures
constitute most of the domestic purchasing power, any balance-of-payment crisis
immediately translates into low or even negative economic growth. In the 1982–3
period, Indonesia was hit by the economic crisis that resulted from the drop in oil
prices. The crisis worsened because of the fall in primary commodity prices in
international markets as industrialized countries entered economic recession. The
current account deficit suddenly soared from a mere 0.67 per cent of GDP in 1980
to 6.2 per cent of GDP in 1982 and 8.1 per cent of GDP in 1983. 
This event brought strong impetus for a change in development strategy. It was
acknowledged that export revenues from oil and primary commodities were unre-
liable and it was seen as urgent to develop and diversify non-oil sectors in the
economy, particularly manufacturing and agriculture. As a first step, the govern-
ment announced the Banking Deregulation in 1983, followed by an overhaul of
the taxation system.
Another economic crisis taking place in 1986, once again caused by the sharp fall
in oil price, caused the current account deficit to jump from 2.2 per cent of GDP in
1985 to 6.2 per cent in 1986. This crisis increased the need to speed up economic
reforms. The government launched broad-based economic reforms in 1986, which
covered all aspects of the economy: labor markets, the goods and services market
and financial markets. The reforms also encompassed the improvement of market
infrastructures, including administrative procedures, licensing systems and the legal
system. The economic reforms marked changes in trade and industrial policies,
from the import substitution industrial policy with emphasis on the development of
capital-intensive manufacturing in the upstream and resource-based industries to
labor-intensive export-oriented industries.
Foreign and domestic investors responded favorably to improvements in invest-
ment climate and the impact was felt in the structure of Indonesian exports. Foreign
direct investment made a significant contribution to the diversification of exports,
especially manufactured exports. Exports of manufactured goods produced by
cheap labor such as textiles, processed woods, electronics and shoes started to rise.
In 1991, the share of non-oil exports in the total exports surpassed oil and gas
exports. The share of non-oil exports in 1985 was 32 per cent, of which 8 per cent
consisted of manufactured exports. In 1991, the share of non-oil exports reached 62
per cent, of which 32 per cent was manufactured goods (Table 5.1). In the 1990s,
Indonesia was no longer as dependent on oil exports. Oil exports are still important,
however, since without them, the trade balance remains negative.
The emergence of unskilled labor-intensive industries as foreign exchange earners
creates a new problem for the current account. These industries are very dependent
on imported inputs, and this, as in the current economic crisis, makes them very
vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. Their contribution to the trade balance in
relation to their contribution to employment creation is still relatively small.2 The
problem of labor-intensive export-oriented industries’dependency on imported inputs
comes, to a large extent, from a government policy to provide incentives to both
export-oriented and import substitution industries. To offset negative incentives cre-
ated by the structure of protection to export activities, the government has designed a
so-called duty drawback scheme in which producers are eligible for reimbursement
on the taxes paid on imported inputs, provided that the final products are destined for
export markets. Obviously, with this scheme there is no incentive for export-oriented
producers to use inputs from domestic suppliers since it will be more expensive and
also it cannot qualify for the duty drawback scheme. As a result, there is minimal link-
age between export-oriented producers and domestic suppliers of inputs.
Besides export-oriented producers, there are also domestically oriented industries.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the presence of domestic industries with heavy
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dependence on imported inputs and low exporting activity has burdened the current
account. Why do these industries exist at all? The issue has something to do with the
effective protection rate (EPR). The combination of an overvalued exchange rate, a
high degree of protection given to final products and low tariffs imposed on indus-
trial inputs has prevented the development of linkages between producers of final
goods and domestic suppliers of inputs. Given the low backward linkages of these
industries with domestic suppliers of inputs, the expansion of aggregate demand
very soon resulted in the deterioration of the current account, with little multiplier
effects in the Keynesian sense. As shown in Table 5.2, in 1995 and 1996, a new wave
of deregulation measures spurred economic growth to around 8 per cent, leading to
the worsening of the current account deficit to around 4 per cent of GDP.
High dependency on imported inputs is the main weakness of the Indonesian
manufacturing industry. The sharp depreciation of the rupiah in the current eco-
nomic crisis affects the manufacturing sector negatively across the board, including
segments that are highly export orientated. Under normal conditions, exports would
be expected to rise when the exchange rate depreciates. This does not seem to be
the case, however, for Indonesia’s labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing
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Table 5.1 Structure of  Indonesian exports (selected commodities, % of total exports)
1985 1991 1993 1995 1997
Total exports
Oil and gas 68.42 37.39 26.47 23.04 21.75
Non-oil exports 31.58 62.61 73.53 76.96 78.25
Unskilled labor
intensive
Shrimp 0.17 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.17
Fish 0.14 0.75 0.91 0.70 0.69
Coffee 1.52 1.28 0.89 0.50 0.58
Textiles 1.18 6.13 7.26 6.20 6.84
Garments 1.83 7.86 9.53 7.46 5.38
Resource intensive
Rubber 3.68 3.29 2.89 4.82 3.72
Plywood 4.44 9.85 11.56 7.62 6.38
Sandwood 1.65 0.61 1.06 1.00 0.71
Palm oil 0.89 1.15 1.28 1.65 2.71
Paper and 0.11 0.92 1.36 2.23 1.76
paper goods
Technology intensive
Tin 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.12 
Aluminum 1.21 2.35 1.42 0.58 0.41
Nickel 0.29 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.08
Fertilizer 0.43 1.02 0.42 0.61 0.58
Chemicals 0.31 0.51 0.71 1.14 1.35
Cement 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.07 
Electronic 0.77 2.29 4.45 2.03 2.56
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Indicator.
industry. Export-oriented industries are not able to capitalize on the depreciation
of the rupiah, not only because of their high dependency on imported inputs, but
also because they have difficulty obtaining trade finance due to the deterioration
of the Indonesian banking system’s creditworthiness. In addition, foreign
importers are reluctant to import from Indonesia due to the general perception
that Indonesian exporters are unable to guarantee continuity in supply. 
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Table 5.2 Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1990–7
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Real GDP 9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.1 7.8 4.7
growth
Agriculture 2.3 2.9 6.3 1.7 0.6 4.2 1.9 0.6 
Industry 13.2 11.6 8.2 9.8 11.1 10.2 10.4 6.2 
Services 7.6 9.3 6.8 7.5 7.2 7.9 7.6 3.8
Inflation (CPI) 9.5 9.5 4.9 9.8 9.2 8.6 6.5 11.1
Fiscal balance 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.2
(% of GDP)
Current account 2.8 3.7 2.2 1.6 1.7 3.7 4.0 2.3
balance
Net capital 4.9 5.0 3.8 1.9 2.4 4.6 5.0 
inflows
Net portfolio 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.1 2.2 2.0
investment
Net direct 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 2.2 
investment
Other capital 3.3 3.6 3.5 1.4 0.9 1.3 
Net error and 0.7 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.1 0.9
omissions
Total external 222.0 236.9 221.8 211.9 195.8 205.0 194.0 
debt (% of 
exports)
Short-term 15.9 17.9 20.5 20.1 17.7 20.9 24.8 
debt  (% of 
total external 
debt)
Short-term 11.1 14.3 18.1 18.0 17.1 24.3 29.3 
debt  (billions 
of USD)
Debt-service 30.9 32.0 31.6 33.8 30.0 33.7 33.0 
ratio (% of 
exports)
Exports 26.6 27.4 29.4 25.9 26.0 26.0 26.2 
(% of GDP)
Exports 15.9 13.5 16.6 8.4 8.8 13.4 9.7 
(% growth rate)
Exchange rate 1,901 1,992 2,062 2,110 2,200 2,308 2,383 5,700
(Rp/USD)
Sources: International Financial Statistics, various issues.
In 1991, the good economic performance that marked the 1986–91 period
began to show signs of leveling off.3 Several macroeconomic indicators illus-
trated this slackening off. After managing to grow around 21 per cent a year dur-
ing 1985–91, export growth fell to 12.4 per cent in 1993 and 8 per cent in 1994.
This performance could be attributed to the disappointing performance of manu-
factured exports, which recorded 15 and 12 per cent growth in 1992 and 1993
respectively, in comparison with an average growth rate of 30 per cent per annum
during 1985–91.4 In the case of foreign investment, the economy also seemed to
lose its attractiveness to foreign investors. Post-1992, the value of new foreign
investment continued to fall. In the first half of 1994, for example, the number of
approved foreign investments declined by 43 per cent when compared to 1992.
In 1992 and 1993, the total value of approved foreign investments amounted
to 10.32 billion USD and 8.4 billion, respectively.
In response to this situation, the government in 1994 announced a bold economic
reform, including the abolition of the limitation on foreign ownership, a reduction
in trade barriers in the form of tariff cuts, and the opening up of ten previously
closed sectors to foreign investment. Foreign investors were allowed to have full
ownership (i.e. a 100 per cent stake) of business entities in Indonesia. Investors
responded favorably to these measures, reflected in the influx of foreign investment
during the second half of 1994 such that, by the end of the year, the value of
foreign investment projects reached an all time high of 23.7 billion USD.5 The
resurgence of flows of foreign investment continued well until the middle of 1997
when the currency crises hit Indonesia. In 1994, for the first time the value of
approved new domestic investment projects exceeded approved foreign investment.
Various deregulatory measures announced in the middle of 1994 changed many
aspects of economic incentives, including consumption, investment and exports.
The government itself seemed to underestimate the impact of deregulation on the
expansion of aggregate demand. Economic growth rebounded to 7 per cent, and
even reached 8 per cent during the 1994–6 period. At first glance, the figures of
economic growth are impressive. Looking more deeply however, the growth was
hardly sustainable. Economic growth actually took place in non-tradable sectors
like residential and non-residential construction and infrastructure (e.g. roads and
telecommunications), contributing very little to foreign exchange generation as it
was intended to meet domestic demand. To complicate matters, most of the expan-
sion of the non-tradable sector was financed by short-term foreign commercial
loans.6 So Indonesia experienced not only a problem of currency mismatch, but
also a maturity mismatch.
It soon became apparent that the domestic economy was overheating. The expan-
sion of domestic aggregate demand was reflected in the ballooning of the current
account deficit. The current account deficit rose from 2.9 billion USD in 1994 to
7.9 billion USD in 1995, approximately a two and a half times increase. This
increase could be attributed to rising imports of intermediate goods due to the
expansion of domestic demand. The flood of foreign direct investment also con-
tributed to a soaring current account deficit as a result of a rise of capital good
imports and rising demand for foreign consultants, especially for setting up plants.
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To contain the economy from overheating, the monetary authority continued to
pursue a tight monetary policy. At the same time, to maintain the competitiveness
of non-oil exports the central bank adopted a policy to depreciate the currency at
the rate of 5–6 per cent per annum. Within the targeted depreciation rate, the cur-
rency was allowed to fluctuate within a band. In the long run, however, these poli-
cies proved to be inconsistent. High interest rates attracted huge capital inflows
that had to be bought or sterilized by the central bank if the currency depreciation
was to be maintained. This operation injected new liquidity in the economy,
which in turn had to be absorbed by a high interest rate. Thus, the central bank
has been burdened by two conflicting tasks, namely to maintain a low inflation
rate and to maintain a competitive exchange rate. As the purchasing power parity
theorem tells us, the combination of a high domestic interest rate and a low
expected currency depreciation produced an overvalued rupiah, making import
activities and borrowing from abroad artificially cheaper in the domestic cur-
rency. Moreover, the high interest rate policy that led to the currency appreciation,
as well as the policy to depreciate the rupiah, required timely interventions which
were themselves susceptible to currency speculation.
The current account deficit reached approximately 4 per cent of GDP in 1996
and 1997, reflecting Indonesia’s vulnerability to external events. In the past, soft
loans and foreign direct investment mainly financed the deficit. Starting in 1991,
portfolio investment that was lured by high domestic interest rates and the per-
ception of Indonesia as a stable and booming economy was increasingly playing
an important part in financing the deficit. Meanwhile, high domestic interest
rates and an overvalued rupiah encouraged the private sector to borrow heavily
from overseas to finance their domestic ventures, many of which were intended
for the domestic market. For this reason, the deficit was also increasingly
financed by short-term private loans. To make matters worse, the predictability
of exchange rate movement with a steady depreciation of around 4–5 per cent
provides very little incentive for borrowers to hedge their foreign debt.
Various macroeconomic conditions such as a huge current account deficit, a
mounting foreign debt and a weak banking system with large non-performing loans
put Indonesia in the same category of countries like Thailand and Korea, and to a
lesser extent with Malaysia and the Philippines. The 1994–6 economic boom did not
last very long, coming to an abrupt end in August 1997 when Indonesia sunk into
the worst economic crisis in its history. The Indonesian crisis started as a currency
crisis triggered by the economic crisis in Thailand. After the Thai crisis, suddenly
there was doubt about Indonesia’s economic stability that brought about a reversal in
expectations. As the direction of capital inflows started to reverse, the external value
of the rupiah plummeted – between June and November 1997, the external value of
the rupiah depreciated by 35 per cent. It became apparent then that the monetary
authority did not have sufficient reserves to defend the rupiah; instead after increas-
ing interest rates it opted first to enlarge the band and finally to move to a free float
system. Despite a high interest rate, capital outflows continued to accelerate and as
a result the currency continued to weaken. The move towards a free float created a
panic among domestic corporations with large exposure to overseas loans. Due to
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the stability of the rupiah in the past, these debts were largely unhedged. As they
scrambled to buy US dollars, it put further pressure on the domestic currency. Worse
still, as the crisis continued to deteriorate, the international banking community cut
its credit line to Indonesian banks (including trade financing). The lack of credit
financing, particularly for export-oriented sectors, was partially blamed for the fail-
ure of Indonesian exports to benefit from the currency depreciation.
In the short run, Indonesia’s recovery will depend on its ability to regain mar-
ket confidence. The economic stabilization program sponsored by the IMF is only
the first step in this direction, and by itself does not guarantee a speedy recovery.
The return of the private sector’s money – foreign or domestic – is what Indonesia
needs in the short run. In the long run, there is a need to change the strategy of
economic development away from the current import substitution approach to a
more export-oriented strategy, including in agro-business-related industries.
Based on the Indonesian experience, many researchers have largely accepted
the notion that both competitiveness and external trade were key to its rapid
growth and stability, and that to achieve this requires liberalizing the economy. It
is true that important improvements in resource allocation were observed after the
1986 deregulation. Nonetheless, the last economic deregulation in 1994 seemed
less successful than the 1986 economic deregulation, also because it culminates
in the 1997 currency crisis. Some cite an overvalued exchange rate and a weakly
supervised banking system as the main weaknesses of the Indonesian economy.
Some claim that other factors such as a reversal of international expectation and
corruption were the main causes behind the crisis. The 1994 economic deregula-
tion, although at first appearing to spur economic growth between 1994 and 1996,
also produced unsustainable trade account deficit in the following years, which
was followed by the 1997 currency crisis. 
The apparent failures of the 1994 deregulation measures, however, are not
interpreted as flaws of traditional theory. Rather, the failures stem from the prob-
lem of sequencing market liberalization. It is hypothesized that the comparative
static of the model is correct and that more research is necessary regarding the
dynamic of the liberalization model.
At present, it seems researchers have reached some consensus on two issues.
First, there is little disagreement over the crucial role of competitiveness and trade
in fostering growth and avoiding recurrent balance-of-payment crises. Second,
there is agreement that more research needs to be done to settle the question
regarding the relationship between trade, competitiveness and macroeconomic
stability.
Accordingly, this study will examine the linkages between international trade,
productivity and competitiveness in Indonesia. Since comprehensive data is only
readily available for the Indonesian manufacturing sector, the study will focus on
this area. Two specific linkages will be the focus of this study: the relationship
between trade specialization and productivity growth and, second, the linkages
between productivity and current account sustainability. In order to achieve these
ends, the research strategy will proceed in two steps. The first step is to analyze
the country’s trade specialization by examining the Indonesian export commodity
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base available from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Data from 1980 to
1994 is used to construct an index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). The
pattern of trade specialization emerging from the RCA analysis will then be used
to examine the relationship between trade specialization, the evolution of com-
petitiveness and the sustainability of the current account. 
2. Trade specialization, productivity growth and
current account sustainability
The effort to examine the linkage between trade and competitiveness can only be
accomplished by examining the annual survey on manufacturing firms, which
contains important information regarding export–import activities and produc-
tion processes at the firm level. Based on the definition of competitiveness,
we try to identify winner and loser sectors in the Indonesian economy.
Competitiveness at the sectoral level is defined as the capacity to increase pro-
ductivity as well as to contribute to the closing of the current account deficit.
Indonesian manufacturing surveys are well suited for this purpose since they
provide information on export strategy and imported inputs at the firm level which
can easily be aggregated to the industry level. It is quite possible that a highly pro-
ductive firm or sector does not meet the above definition of competitiveness due
to a heavy dependence on imported inputs such that its net contribution to the
current account is negative. The effort to assess the evolution of sectoral competi-
tiveness necessitates the measurement of productivity. The manufacturing surveys
provide information on the values of output and inputs, such that by assuming a
specific functional form for production process, it is possible to construct the level
of labor productivity and labor productivity growth at the sectoral level. 
Trade specialization 
RCA is one method to measure comparative advantage in a geographic area. The
argument behind this approach is that the flow of goods between countries is the
reflection of the comparative advantage of the nation. The pattern that emerges
from this measure does not only reflect the cost to produce such commodities, but
also the difference in other non-price factors. 
Applying the RCA method to the Indonesian non-oil export data, twenty com-
modities (three-digit SITC) that have relatively constant comparative advantage
during the period 1990–4 can be identified, and thus are supposed to be lead-
ing export commodities. Most of these consist of primary products, while the rest
are manufactured goods. In the category of primary products, agricultural
products such as coffee, coconut, tea, spices, rubber and vegetable oil (SITC
071–5, 121, 231, 422 and 431) dominate. Other primary products include miner-
als such as iron ore, non-ferrous metal, coal and tin (SITC 283, 284, 321 and
087). One primary product that dropped out from the leading commodities
in the period 1990–4 was forestry goods (SITC 024), which in the 1980s still
dominated primary product exports. Apparently, the government decree that
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banned the export of unprocessed timber as well as other products such as rattan
was responsible for the disappearance of forestry products from the list of lead-
ing commodities. 
Looking at manufactured goods, products that possessed comparative advan-
tages were textiles (SITC 651, 652, 653 and 656), household appliances from
metal (SITC 697), furniture (821), garments (841) and footwear (851). If we look
at the growth rates of exports from 1985 to 1997, the conclusion drawn from the
RCA exercise seems to be confirmed (Table 5.3). Textiles, garments, paper, chem-
icals and electronics showed high rates of growth. Although their shares in total
exports are still relatively small, products that have good export potential are paper
and electronic products. It would be interesting to know whether these products
derived their competitiveness from productivity. To achieve this purpose, the
manufacturing database is needed since the export database does not possess infor-
mation on production processes and related items such as value added, output,
number of workers, etc. 
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Table 5.3 Trend of Indonesian exports (selected commodities, million USD)
1985 1991 1997 GR 85–91 GR 91–7 GR 85–97
Total exports 18,586.7 29,142.4 53,443 7.78 10.64 9.20
Oil and gas 12,717.9 10,894.9 11,622 2.55 1.08 0.75
Non-oil exports 5,868.8 18,247.5 41,821 20.81 14.82 17.78
Unskilled labor
intensive
Shrimp 30.8 93.6 92.1 20.35 0.27 9.56
Fish 26.3 217.2 369.3 42.17 9.25 24.63
Coffee 282.7 371.7 307.9 4.67 3.09 0.71
Textiles 219.7 1,785.1 3,658 41.79 12.70 26.41
Garments 339.6 2,289.9 2,875.6 37.45 3.87 19.49
Resource  intensive
Rubber 683.3 959.9 1,988 5.83 12.90 9.31
Plywood 824.7 2,871 3,410 23.11 2.91 12.56
Sandwood 307.2 177.3 380 8.75 13.55 1.79
Palm oil 166.2 335.4 1,446 12.41 27.58 19.76
Paper and 20.9 267.6 938.5 52.95 23.26 37.31
paper goods
Technology intensive
Tin 21.1 29.2 64.1 5.56 14.00 9.70
Aluminum 225.2 683.7 221.4 20.33 17.13 0.14
Nickel 54 42.3 41.8 3.99 0.20 2.11
Fertilizer 80 297.6 312.4 24.48 0.81 12.02
Chemicals 56.7 147.2 721.2 17.23 30.32 23.61
Cement 21.5 43.2 39.5 12.33 1.48 5.20
Electronic 144 668.7 1,370.6 29.16 12.71 20.66
Sources: Economic Indicator, various issues.
The evolution of productivity 
After looking at the figures of labor productivity (LP) at the three-digit level, one
thing is certain: it is hard to make any generalizations (Table 5.4). There are three
distinct high value-added industries: high physical capital intensity such as basic
metal (371–2), basic chemicals (351) and cement (363); high-skill intensity sectors
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Table 5.4 Index of labor productivity and productivity growth
ISIC Industry 1986 1991 1995 GR 86–91 GR 91–5
311 Food 50.12 109.34 78.79 16.88 6.34
312 Food 47.43 47.43 62.09 0.00 5.53
313 Beverages 152.59 161.68 224.95 1.16 6.83
314 Tobacco 113.30 56.23 214.09 13.08 30.66
321 Textiles 95.54 60.41 115.25 8.76 13.79
322 Garment 40.43 44.61 61.49 1.99 6.63
323 Leather products 111.45 73.29 88.80 8.04 3.91
324 Footwear 112.27 30.46 65.06 22.96 16.39
331 Wood products 87.79 83.93 107.56 0.89 5.09
332 Furniture 30.17 64.93 42.12 16.56 8.29
341 Paper and 78.04 132.37 189.27 11.15 7.41
paper products
342 Printing and 68.97 109.72 130.52 9.73 3.53
publishing
351 Industrial chemical 172.63 242.13 329.05 7.00 6.33
352 Other chemical 129.04 110.62 110.24 3.03 0.07
353 Petroleum refinery N/A N/A 627.54 N/A N/A
354 Oil and gas N/A 70.26 124.73 N/A 12.17
processing
355 Rubber products 47.74 65.25 49.09 6.45 5.53
356 Plastics 37.47 35.12 55.84 1.29 9.72
361 Ceramics 40.22 62.04 69.22 9.05 2.21
362 Glass products 161.29 70.61 145.07 15.23 15.49
363 Cement 171.74 229.53 173.30 5.97 5.47
364 Structural clay 13.87 96.27 16.39 47.33 29.82
369 Other non-metallic 47.49 175.70 79.55 29.91 14.66
mineral
371 Iron and steel 1,008.75 287.29 896.99 22.21 25.57
372 Basic metal exc. N/A 721.94 1,021.92 N/A 7.20
iron and steel
381 Metal products 73.34 67.65 100.78 1.60 8.30
382 Non-electrical 46.82 140.49 186.62 24.58 5.84
machinery
383 Electrical equipment 108.88 106.83 192.52 0.38 12.50
384 Transportation 87.27 133.65 323.34 8.90 19.33
equipment
385 Professional 22.00 55.43 98.19 20.30 12.11
equipment
390 Miscellaneous 41.97 38.65 57.86 1.63 8.40
Total 91.66 82.88 125.46 1.99 8.65
Sources: Calculated from Industrial Surveys.
such as machinery (ISIC 381–4); and highly differentiated products such as
beverages (313) and tobacco (314). Caution is needed when interpreting the high
figures of value added for electronics (383), transportation equipment (384) and
chemicals (ISIC 35) since they are influenced, to a certain extent, by the degree
of protection given to these industries. 
On the other hand, there are also labor-intensive industries with low productiv-
ity. Food (311–12), textiles (321), garments (322), leather (323), footwear (324),
rubber products (355), plastics (356) and several non-metallic mineral industries
(such as bricks, tiles and ceramics), professional equipment and miscellaneous
industries can be considered as labor-intensive sectors with LP less than half of
highly productive industries. Resource-based industries cover a wide range of
factor intensities from relatively more labor-intensive wood and rubber products
to relatively more capital-intensive ones such as basic metal and cement. In this
category, LP is usually lower in the more capital-intensive ones.
An examination of the figures of LP growth at the three-digit level reveals that
manufacturing productivity growth is very erratic (Table 5.4). The range of total
factor productivity growth is very broad. The manufacturing sector as a whole
experienced negative LP growth during the 1986–91 period. Manufacturing is
one sector that benefited the most from a series of deregulation measures since
1986. Previously, we have seen that manufacturing export growth accelerated
immediately once economic liberalization started. The impact on productivity
growth, however, was only apparent almost five years later. Obviously there are
many factors behind this fact. It is possible that a better investment climate did
not produce an instant improvement in the productivity of capital and labor. For
example, it takes time to produce better quality labor. Another explanation is also
possible: the 1991–6 period were years of prosperity for Indonesia. In this period,
flows of capital, foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment accel-
erated. Outward orientation created by the 1986 economic liberalization gave
firms the opportunity to gain better access to the global market, which allowed
the acquisition of technology, the import of capital goods, management and
professional services and new products and process. This eventually led to
improvements in firms’ productivity.
Another interesting observation is that in the period 1991–5, the productivity
gap among industries seemed to decrease. If we use the whole manufacturing LP
growth as a benchmark, there is a huge gap between industries with high positive
total factor productivity (TFP) growth and industries with negative ones. Between
1986 and 1991, for example, structural clay (364) recorded the highest positive
TFP growth around 47 per cent, followed by other non-metallic minerals (369) in
second place. The worst case is footwear (324) with almost 23 per cent negative
LP growth. This is in contrast with the 1991–5 period where the productivity
disparity narrowed. The highest LP growth is recorded by tobacco (314), while
structural clay posted the lowest LP growth. 
Even after the era of economic liberalization, there remains some of the legacy
of the era of import substitution industrial policy. High valued-added industries
usually enjoyed higher effective rates of protection compared to other industries.
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In the period 1986–95, the performance of these industries varied. Cement (363),
for example, showed better performance in 1986–91 with positive TFP growth. In
the period 1991–5, the impact of the 1986 economic liberalization in terms of
reduced trade barriers started to have a harmful impact on the cement industry as
LP growth turned negative. The steel industry (371), on the other hand, recorded
negative LP growth during the first half of the 1986–95 period, and then showed
a dramatic improvement in the later period.
Machinery industries (ISIC 381–4) also enjoyed a high degree of protection dur-
ing the era of import substitution policy. Judging from the figures of LP growth,
however, these industries appeared to benefit from a better investment climate
after the 1986 economic deregulation. Good performance of LP growth was also
reflected in the strong growth of domestic demand and greater penetration of global
markets. In the 1986–95 period, electrical machinery showed dramatic improve-
ments in LP growth, from near zero initially to around 16 per cent in 1991–5. This
proved that greater inflows of foreign investment had a favorable impact on this
industry. The only shortcoming was that there is almost no linkage between local
firms producing parts and export-oriented producers. This can be attributed, in part,
to the present structure of protection along with the duty drawback scheme.
Garments (322) and footwear (324) are among the most important foreign
exchange earners for the country. In the period 1986–91, footwear in particular
showed negative LP growth that confirmed that these industries based their com-
petitiveness on low labor costs rather than productivity gains. The pattern of pro-
ductivity improvement observed earlier in the case of machinery industry seems
to appear again – economic liberalization tended to have positive impact on LP
growth later in the 1986–95 period rather than earlier. Aside from the improved
investment climate discussed above, another explanation involved the expansion
of domestic aggregate demand after 1991 as a result of the injection of capital
inflows into the economy. These industries were able to capitalize on apparent
increase in per capita income brought about by a booming domestic economy. In
other words, the resurgence of LP growth might have come from an aggregate
demand shock. 
After comparing the RCA analysis with productivity in the manufacturing
industry, it is clear that Indonesia is still specializing in products with low
productivity. The base of Indonesian manufactured exports is still narrow and
mainly consists of wood products, textiles, garments and footwear. The good thing
is that these main export products continue to record at least positive LP growth.
Performance in terms of LP growth, however, is not sufficient to determine com-
petitiveness since we have to look at industry’s contribution to the trade account.
Contribution to the trade balance and sectoral competitiveness
Using information from the manufacturing surveys, it is possible to distinguish
export-oriented producers from domestically oriented ones. It is possible that
highly productive firms or sectors do not meet the definition of competitiveness,
which involves both the capacity to increase productivity and to contribute to the
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closure of the current account deficit. Production activity may require a lot of
imported inputs, such that an attempt to increase productivity will put a heavy
burden on the current account gap. It seems that the contribution of the manu-
facturing sector in Indonesia to foreign exchange generation is much less than its
neighbors in Southeast Asia. For this reason, examining trends in export orienta-
tion is incomplete without examining firms’ input structure (Tables 5.5–5.7). 
The Indonesian manufacturing surveys provide information on imported inputs
in terms of their dollar value and as a percentage of total inputs. Using the most
recent data (1990–5), it can be observed that the entire manufacturing sector’s
contribution to the trade balance is positive, meaning it generates more foreign
exchange through exports than it uses to purchase imported inputs, excluding
capital goods. The net contribution of the manufacturing sector rose from merely
1.8 billion USD in 1990 to 7.7 billion USD in 1995. In general, multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) are more dependent on imported inputs than their local coun-
terparts. The portions of imported inputs for the manufacturing sector were
between 29 per cent in 1990 and 27 per cent in 1995, while the figures for MNCs
were almost twice as high (57 per cent in 1990 and 56 per cent in 1995). For this
reason, in 1990 local industries made a net positive contribution of 590 million
USD to the trade balance, while the deficit of MNCs amounted to 839 million
USD (Table 5.6). 
The same observation can be extended further in more detailed fashion to the
three-digit ISIC code. First, we look at industries characterized by a very high
export orientation (i.e. exported more than 50 per cent of total output). These
industries include garments (322), footwear (324), wood products (331), furniture
(332) and rubber products (355). Some of these industries have substantial import
content (for 1995), notably textiles (31 per cent), garments (33.12 per cent)
and footwear (58 per cent). Despite their high dependency on imported inputs,
these industries are the top three foreign exchange contributors to the trade
balance, with footwear the highest contributor, followed by garments and textiles.
Industries with high or moderate export orientation made a positive contribution to
the trade balance in 1995. These industries include food (311), beverages (313),
tobacco (314), leather (323), furniture (332), paper products (342), basic chemicals
(351), petrochemicals (354), rubber products (355), ceramics (361), glass products
(362), structural clay products (364), non-ferrous basic metal (372), professional
equipment (385) and miscellaneous industry (390). Electrical equipment is one
exception since it has high export orientation (43 per cent) and thus has the ability
to generate a substantial amount of foreign exchange. However, it is not high
enough to offset its high dependency on imported inputs such that the contribution
of electronic industry to the trade balance is still negative.7 High dependence on
imported inputs can also be found in low export-oriented industries. In general,
these industries export less than 10 per cent of total output, although imported
inputs are more than 30 per cent of output, and in some cases like machinery (ISIC
38) exceed 50 per cent.
Referring back to the definition of competitiveness, i.e. the ability to improve
productivity without worsening balance of payments, it seems that few industries
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Table 5.5a Net exports by industry (1990)
ISIC Industry Exports Exports Imports Imports Net exports 
(%) ($000) (%) ($000) ($000)
311 Food 11.39 487,046.90 9.39 225,932.00 261,114.90
312 Food 18.19 197,846.10 17.53 101,329.00 96,517.10
313 Beverages 1.94 4,595.61 25.38 17,617.00 13,021.39
314 Tobacco 1.29 39,085.31 10.94 126,524.00 87,438.69
321 Textiles 15.84 628,259.20 30.09 722,401.00 94,141.80
322 Garment 40.85 485,568.50 32.04 224,513.00 261,055.50
323 Leather products 46.44 57,361.22 16.15 12,720.00 44,641.22
324 Footwear 53.08 188,261.60 44.16 67,114.00 121,147.60
331 Wood products 47.35 1,776,936.00 3.32 68,468.00 1,708,468.00
332 Furniture 49.19 143,633.10 2.29 3,606.00 140,027.10
341 Paper and paper products 10.03 128,458.80 38.88 231,608.00 103,149.20
342 Printing and publishing 1.82 7,866.46 27.88 77,642.00 69,775.54
351 Industrial chemical 10.50 220,156.20 54.22 640,495.00 420,338.80
352 Other chemical 4.50 70,232.18 51.85 388,396.00 318,163.82
353 Petroleum refinery N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
354 Oil and gas processing 0.00 0.00 27.75 3,801.00 3,801.00
355 Rubber products 42.48 690,879.40 19.24 203,349.00 487,530.40
356 Plastics 9.31 68,743.32 44.71 209,288.00 140,544.68
361 Ceramics 10.44 17,734.37 67.09 34,952.00 17,217.63
362 Glass products 6.14 12,802.84 18.08 17,812.00 5,009.16
363 Cement 10.00 74,727.53 17.67 33,281.00 41,446.53
364 Structural clay 0.60 226.44 54.66 6,781.00 6,554.56
369 Other  non-metallic mineral 8.67 8,871.50 45.32 17,004.00 8,132.50
371 Iron and steel 8.90 201,966.70 43.77 447,529.00 245,562.30
372 Basic metal exc. iron and steel 33.83 202,214.90 64.63 262,857.00 60,642.10
381 Metal products 8.29 101,367.00 36.30 304,756.00 203,389.00
382 Non-electrical machinery 1.32 5,868.33 65.52 180,325.00 174,456.67
383 Electrical equipment 13.52 173,873.70 61.91 515,828.00 341,954.30
384 Transportation equipment 1.36 31,191.91 54.92 684,560.00 653,368.09
385 Professional equipment 8.16 2,089.64 61.92 8,164 6,074.36
390 Miscellaneous 15.88 25,754.41 32.92 31,472 5,717.59
Sources: Calculated from Industrial Surveys, CBS.
Table 5.5b Net exports by industry (1995)
ISIC Industry Exports Exports Imports Imports Net exports
(%) ($000) (%) ($000) ($000)
311 Food 19.96 1,662,922.02 4.84 277,421.00 1,385,501.02
312 Food 16.12 384,797.01 26.63 401,383.00 16,585.99
313 Beverages 10.77 63,201.17 22.97 40,651.00 22,550.17 
314 Tobacco 36.81 1,949,429.78 8.33 97,592.00 1,851,837.78 
321 Textiles 24.90 2,337,334.09 21.16 1,712,733.00 624,601.09 
322 Garment 54.05 1,304,675.93 33.12 487,313.00 817,362.93 
323 Leather products 33.08 91,782.22 24.53 42,592.00 49,190.22 
324 Footwear 70.68 1,587,613.60 58.54 728,945.00 858,668.60 
331 Wood products 65.78 4,007,056.24 2.79 96,207.00 3,910,849.24 
332 Furniture 53.33 453,448.87 3.39 16,966.00 436,482.87 
341 Paper and paper products 7.33 219,968.56 33.37 551,498.00 331,529.44
342 Printing and publishing 23.81 242,206.51 16.65 87,013.00 155,193.51 
351 Industrial chemical 24.58 868,285.04 44.91 730,133.00 138,152.04 
352 Other chemical 5.74 187,737.54 48.34 776,398.00 588,660.46
353 Petroleum refinery 0.00 0.00 6.51 357.00 357.00
354 Oil and gas processing 24.03 8,377.36 17.18 2,380.00 5,997.36 
355 Rubber products 61.23 1,688,168.55 8.91 184,592.00 1,503,576.55 
356 Plastics 14.88 343,230.42 37.58 505,779.00 162,548.58
361 Ceramics 13.57 59,387.41 44.63 49,658.00 9,729.41 
362 Glass products 22.90 97,477.31 41.81 54,489.00 42,988.31 
363 Cement 1.75 25,715.60 9.17 35,896.00 10,180.40
364 Structural clay 11.21 9,713.36 34.38 8,191.00 1,522.36
369 Other non-metallic mineral 14.01 40,917.51 39.06 44,998.00 4,080.49
371 Iron and steel 8.99 374,954.85 51.02 958,696.00 583,741.15
372 Basic metal exc. iron and steel 45.53 498,959.15 83.62 494,500.00 4,459.15 
381 Metal products 13.06 368,429.90 38.89 604,045.00 235,615.10
382 Non-electrical machinery 8.53 106,445.69 58.59 469,722.00 363,276.31
383 Electrical equipment 43.02 2,404,342.94 72.29 2,523,430.00 119,087.06
384 Transportation equipment 2.41 155,459.53 52.32 1,990,615.00 1,835,155.47
385 Professional equipment 47.65 97,847.13 75.84 84,389 13,458.13 
390 Miscellaneous 44.59 230,799.61 31.76 102,229 128,570.61 
Sources: Calculated from Industrial Surveys, CBS.
can satisfy such a definition. According to 1991 data, some industries like paper
(341), industrial chemicals (351), cement (364), non-electrical machinery (382)
and transportation equipment (384) possess above-average LP growth but are not
very export oriented and often negatively contribute to the trade balance. These
industries generally enjoy a high degree of protection; therefore their value-added
figures might be inflated by the degree of protection. The picture is not quite
so different in 1995; although most industries have positive LP growth, many
domestic-oriented industries such as paper products (341), plastic (356), iron and
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Table 5.6 Net exports according to ownership status 
Exports Exports Imports Imports Net exports 
(%) ($000) (%) ($000) ($000)
1990
Local 19.03 3,601,927.08 29.94 3,011,151.00 590,776.08
MNC 16.91 1,210,319.25 57.58 2,049,369.00 839,049.75
Other 13.02 1,241,373.12 15.36 809,602.00 431,771.12
1991
Local 24.58 5,459,593.44 29.66 3,597,036.00 1,862,557.44
MNC 20.28 1,530,312.61 55.31 2,311,197.00 780,884.39
Other 14.88 1,687,624.90 23.97 1,540,316.00 147,308.90
1993
Local 22.96 5,530,395.91 24.28 3,185,139.00 2,345,256.91
MNC 29.52 3,455,223.21 54.74 3,309,260.00 145,963.21
Other 18.73 4,199,743.03 19.18 2,580,721.00 1,619,022.03
1995
Local 28.96 9,676,576.78 27.18 4,818,921.00 4,857,655.78
MNC 33.70 7,019,409.90 56.12 6,310,679.00 708,730.90
Other 21.22 5,175,678.23 21.46 3,031,219.00 2,144,459.23
Sources: Manufacturing Surveys.
Table 5.7 Net exports according to firm size
Exports Exports Imports Imports Net exports
(%) ($000) (%) ($000) ($000)
1990
Large 18.29 4,090,604.30 33.48 3,748,327.00 342,277.30
Medium 16.52 1,704,142.46 29.21 1,790,515.00 86,372.54
Small 8.75 255,086.48 17.34 325,898.00 70,811.52
Total 6,049,833.24 5,864,740.00 185,093.24
1995
Large 31.81 16,508,543.07 38.59 10,228,534.00 6,280,009.07
Medium 22.79 4,774,463.38 25.78 3,417,420.00 1,357,043.38
Small 10.27 587,398.39 15.55 513,940.00 73,458.39
Total 21,870,404.84 14,159,894.00 7,710,510.84
Sources: Manufacturing Surveys.
steel (371), metal products (381), non-electrical machinery (382) and transportation
equipment (384) are negative contributors to the trade balance. Some industries
such as textiles, garments, footwear and wood products emerge from the RCA
analysis of the 1995 sample as the most competitive sectors since they recorded
positive productivity as well as made a positive contribution to trade balance.
Overall competitiveness and the current account sustainability
The overall competitiveness of the Indonesian economy is measured by the evolu-
tion of real exchange rate (RER) (Table 5.8). RER is obtained by combining a
measure of domestic inflation, as a proxy for the costs of domestic producers, with
foreign inflation, as a measure of the change in world prices, and the nominal
exchange rate. RER is calculated as nominal exchange rates times a measure of
tradable prices (the attractiveness of export versus import substitutes) divided by a
domestic price index, which serves as a proxy for domestic costs of production.
RER can serve as an indicator of the domestic producer’s competitiveness vis-à-vis
the rest of the world. Operationally, RER is defined as a weighted average of the
bilateral exchange rate of trading partners. It is common to use the value of trade
(exports plus imports) as a weight. To measure the prices of tradables, three indexes
are often used, industrial countries’ consumer price index (CPI), industrial coun-
tries’ wholesale price index (WPI) and import/export unit value indices, where CPI
is used to measure domestic costs. In this study the United States, Japan, United
Kingdom, Germany and France are chosen as trading partners because of the size
of their bilateral trade with Indonesia.
Trade, productivity and competitiveness 139
Table 5.8 Nominal and real exchange rate
Year IRER IRERD INER INERD INFL* INFLDOM CA/GDP
1988 80.19 88.30 1.7
1989 86.80 8.24 90.50 2.49 3.43 6.42 1.2
1990 100.00 15.21 100.00 10.50 3.97 7.76 2.8
1991 99.18 0.82 105.10 5.10 3.70 9.40 3.7
1992 86.27 13.02 103.56 1.46 2.56 7.59 2.2
1993 79.74 7.57 104.89 1.28 2.07 9.60 1.6
1994 76.60 3.94 111.36 6.16 1.52 8.53 1.7
1995 79.36 3.61 118.43 6.35 1.16 9.43 3.7
1996 92.03 15.97 122.45 3.39 1.28 8.03 4.0
1997 137.98 49.93 284.51 132.35 2.08 4.71 2.3
1997:Q1 95.33 121.90 1.31 0.98
1997:Q2 92.09 123.34 1.33 0.87
1997:Q3 102.68 163.27 0.25 1.62
1997:Q4 122.35 232.42 0.04 5.91
1998:Q1 150.62 415.08 0.25 15.24
Source: Calculated from Economic Indicator, Central Bureau of Statistics. 
IRER: index of trade-weighted real exchange rate; IRERD: trade-weighted real exchange rate
depreciation; INER: index of trade-weighted nominal exchange rate; INERD: trade-weighted
nominal exchange rate depreciation; INFL*: inflation rate in six biggest trading partners;
INFLDOM: domestic inflation rate based on CPI.
It is quite obvious that the appreciation of the RER in recent years has been
significant. There was an indication that the Indonesian economy was experiencing
gradual erosion of competitiveness. This phenomenon was a part of the wider trend
taking place in Southeast and East Asian countries like Thailand, Malaysia,
Philippines and Singapore (Wallace 1997). The reason behind this appreciation was
higher inflation in Indonesia compared to its trading partners. The domestic inflation
itself is the outcome of interaction between the domestic goods and services market,
the labor market, and some function of domestic monetary and fiscal policies.
In the labor market, there was upward pressure on wages as the government
continued to enforce the increase of minimum wages (i.e. since 1991). There was
also an indication of a liquidity increase; the ratio of M2 to reserves which in the
1990–3 period was very close to five, rose to a little over six in the 1994–6 period.
The source of this liquidity increase was mostly short-term capital inflows that
were channeled to finance investment, mainly in non-traded goods sectors such
as property and infrastructure. The worsening of the current account deficit also
reflected the erosion of fiscal discipline that created excessive aggregate demand.
In the goods and services market, the concentration of market power in the hands
of a very few firms, particularly those producing essential commodities, resulted
in upward price adjustments as they exercised their market power.
The slowdown of export growth in the 1991–6 period seems to support the
assertion that Indonesia is losing competitiveness in its main manufactured
exports such as footwear and garments which exploit the relative abundance of
unskilled labor.8 As shown before, these industries recorded positive LP growth,
although apparently their productivity increase could not match the appreciation
of the real exchange rate. There was also evidence that successive increases in
minimum wages were not matched by increases in productivity (Kuncoro 1995).9
The export growth in 1993 and in 1994 slowed to 8.4 and 8.6 percent, respec-
tively, in contrast to an average of 15 per cent in the period 1986–91.
In the period 1991–6, the persistence of an interest rate differential between
Indonesia and the rest of the world attracted huge capital inflows, most of which
were sterilized by the central bank. Without such intervention, such inflows lead
to the nominal appreciation of the rupiah, which would eventually hurt exporters.
This would be in conflict with the central bank’s policy to depreciate the rupiah
at roughly 5 per cent per annum. Over the years, Indonesia has pursued a policy
to maintain the competitiveness of non-oil exports. In fact, given the inability
of the government to combat a high-cost economy resulting from bureaucratic
red tape, corruption and inefficient regulation, currency depreciation remains the
only workable alternative to maintain the competitiveness of the Indonesian econ-
omy. Substantial portions of the inflows were channeled directly and indirectly
through the banking system to finance investments, including those in non-
tradable sectors such as construction, real estate and financial services. As a
result, overall investment jumped from approximately 28 to 32 per cent of GDP.
The combination of export slowdown and investment boom resulted in the
deterioration of the current account, a deficit around 2 per cent of annual GDP
in 1993 and 1994 increasing to 3.7 per cent in 1995 and 4 per cent in 1996.
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The phenomena of real exchange rate appreciation and worsening current
account deficits were also observed before the 1994 Mexican crisis, although for
Indonesia these two factors do not sufficiently explain the spillover of the Thai
currency crisis to Indonesia. In the Indonesian case, currency appreciation was
also the result of capital inflows that were directed to finance excessive invest-
ment in non-traded good sectors such as property and infrastructure. The most
important factor was the huge amount of short-term foreign borrowing, which due
to the predictability of rupiah depreciation in the past was largely unhedged. The
movement of the exchange rate from 2,500 to 4,000 between July and September
was perhaps dictated by the amount of the current account deficit. Movement
beyond 4,000 however, probably reflected attempts by foreign investors to avoid
short-term capital losses and by domestic firms with large exposure to foreign
debt to buy foreign exchange to service their future debt repayment.
3. The financial environment and portfolio decisions of firms 
Financial characteristics: Winner and loser firms10
In this study, several variables are constructed to analyze the financial aspect of
manufacturing firms. First, to measure firms’ profitability or rates of return, we use
the ratio of gross operating surplus before interest payment in relation to capital,
which reflects the total returns to capital independent of financial structure. Second,
the degree of leverage is measured by the ratio of debts to capital. Finally, to meas-
ure the average cost of borrowing funds, we use the ratio of total interest payments
to total debt. The key summary statistics for manufacturing firms are given in
Tables 5.9 and 5.10. These tables provide information on all manufacturing firms
as well as on specific samples according to different categorization: (i) according
to firm size – large, medium and small establishments; (ii) according to ownership
status – MNC versus local firms; (iii) according to export orientation – exporter
versus non-exporter. The observations are taken between 1990 and 1995.
A general observation suggests that in the last period of analysis (i.e. 1995),
firms are more leveraged than in the first period (i.e. 1990). The ratio of total debt
to capital stock for winner industries (e.g. garments, footwear and wood products)
is higher in comparison to loser sectors (e.g. industrial chemicals and trans-
portation equipment).11 Interestingly, the domestically oriented cement industry
(363), which is controlled by conglomerates, had the highest leverage in 1995.
The data also shows that the average cost of borrowing (interest payment over the
stock of debt) was generally higher than in 1991. In this respect however, winner
industries generally paid lower interest rates.
High interest rates were the consequence of the tight monetary policy pursued
by the government. Initially, this policy was originally intended to stop large cap-
ital flight in response to the rumor of devaluation in 1991. In subsequent years, the
policy was maintained to sterilize large capital inflows in the form of commercial
loans and portfolio investment which were coming to Indonesia in response to a
booming domestic economy and more openness created by deregulation measures.
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In this case, instead of letting the exchange rate appreciate, the monetary author-
ity opted to sterilize the flows since an undervalued domestic currency was
needed to keep exports competitive.
High domestic interest rates in 1991 caused a substantial rise in the interest rate
burden (as illustrated in the 1995 figures) for all sizes of firms (Table 5.9). This
high interest rate environment appears to have had an impact: comparing the 1987
data across all categories shows lower leverage than in 1991. After 1991, the
interest rate falls slowly, although it has not yet come back to the 1990 level.12
Predictably, this new development had some impact on firms’ behavior; between
1991 and 1995 all categories show some increase in leverage. The environment
faced by small establishments, however, is characterized by higher average costs
of borrowing when compared to large and medium ones. In this period, we also
started to observe substitution between domestic credit and foreign credit.
Particularly in the category of large firms, there was indication of an increase in
the portion of foreign debt. It appears that the booming domestic economy and
easy access to offshore borrowing made it possible for firms to thrive in a high
interest rate environment.
According to Table 5.9, exporters tend to be more leveraged. The average cost
of borrowing is lower for exporters, not too surprising since exporters have better
access to foreign loans. The only exception was in 1991, when domestic interest
rates reached their highest level. Various deregulatory measures since the mid-
1980s have positively impacted exporters. This situation was documented in profit
142 A. Kuncoro
Table 5.9 Indonesia manufacturing sector: several financial indicators
INV-STOCK PROFIT LEVERAGE AVCOB FLOAN
1987
Large 0.3125 0.5313 0.4422 0.1070 0.0632
Medium 0.2250 0.3906 0.3534 0.1066 0.0161
Small 0.1187 0.1603 0.2884 0.0399 0.0025
1991
Large 0.1055 0.1222 0.2648 0.0489 0.0253
Medium 0.6869 0.3348 0.0460 0.0767 0.0565
Small 0.3360 0.3384 0.0129 0.2200 0.3300
Exporters 0.1231 0.1762 0.2459 0.0815 0.0336
Non-exp. 0.3340 0.1342 0.0828 0.1566 0.0578
1995
Large 0.2577 0.6703 0.3035 0.1554 0.0908
Medium 0.2837 0.4824 0.2810 0.1479 0.0738
Small 0.5210 0.4300 0.1124 0.3175 0.0603
Exporters 0.2954 0.6647 0.3159 0.1609 0.0997
Non-exp. 0.2670 0.5423 0.2256 0.1713 0.0169
Sources: Manufacturing Surveys, CBS.
INV-STOCK: ratio of investment to capital stock; PROFIT: ratio of gross operating surplus to
capital stock; LEVERAGE: ratio of debt to capital stock; AVCOB: average cost of borrowing;
FLOAN: ratio of foreign debt to total debt.
Table 5.10 Indonesian manufacturing sector: firm financial aspects at the sectoral level
ISIC Industry 1987 1990
INV-ST PROFIT LEVER AVCOB FLOAN INV-ST PROFIT LEVER AVCOB FLOAN
311 Food 0.2115 0.4821 0.1717 0.1472 0.0125 0.1574 0.6938 0.0144 0.2252 0.5523
321 Textiles 0.1436 0.3938 0.3844 0.1042 0.0464 0.1055 0.0225 0.0716 0.0478 0.0392
322 Garment 0.1016 0.2193 0.3069 0.0312 0.0007 0.6480 0.5459 0.0063 0.0926 0.2314
324 Footwear 0.0240 0.0760 0.1088 0.1680 0.0000 0.5405 0.8929 0.0369 0.1146 0.3832
351 Industrial chemical 0.6313 0.2738 0.5317 0.1023 0.1090 0.1755 0.3502 0.1015 0.0613 0.1983
352 Other chemical 0.6253 1.4179 0.3328 0.4049 0.1191 0.9244 1.3597 0.0106 0.1149 0.2303
362 Glass products 0.4218 1.5738 0.5548 0.0860 0.0000 0.2815 1.1398 0.0017 0.0479 0.1698
363 Cement 0.0467 0.3294 0.1807 0.0997 0.0000 0.1813 0.5415 0.0104 0.3314 0.1520
383 Electrical equipment 0.3351 0.6445 0.2393 0.2649 0.0107 0.0593 0.0115 0.0305 0.0437 0.0160
384 Transportation equipment 0.3958 0.3142 0.8030 0.0264 0.1474 0.9853 0.3617 0.0104 0.1314 0.2632
385 Professional equipment 0.3918 0.4525 0.2073 0.0867 0.0000 0.1572 0.6122 0.0722 0.0729 0.0000
390 Miscellaneous 0.4308 0.7027 0.3244 0.2221 0.0142 0.1875 0.8028 0.0023 0.5135 0.0000
1991 1995
311 Food 0.0451 0.0607 0.0316 0.1213 0.0061 0.1436 0.3881 0.2621 0.0885 0.0217
321 Textiles 0.1654 0.1228 0.4110 0.0531 0.0363 0.2666 0.3573 0.4595 0.1001 0.0650
322 Garment 0.1914 0.0701 0.0650 0.1369 0.0214 0.4885 0.9095 0.4242 0.1813 0.0368
324 Footwear 0.9498 0.6840 0.0722 0.9143 0.2231 0.2820 0.6289 0.3967 0.1088 0.1912
351 Industrial chemical 0.8172 0.4860 0.1079 0.7287 0.7177 0.1701 0.5066 0.2707 0.2356 0.0970
352 Other chemical 0.6526 0.3335 0.0171 0.1449 0.0810 0.2361 0.9573 0.2970 0.1722 0.0780
362 Glass products 0.2280 0.8572 0.1694 0.4076 0.0461 0.4504 0.6138 0.1027 0.8300 0.0001
363 Cement 0.5348 0.4614 0.0096 0.1417 0.1237 0.1133 0.3981 0.5883 0.0348 0.0640
383 Electrical equipment 1.4194 0.5348 0.0572 0.1207 0.6380 0.4369 1.1696 0.4460 0.1282 0.3118
384 Transportation equipment 0.1171 0.0999 0.0580 0.1387 0.0247 0.6559 1.0919 0.0691 0.8008 0.1559
385 Professional equipment 0.0777 0.4476 0.3930 0.0542 0.0000 0.4971 0.4678 0.3698 0.0663 0.0038
390 Miscellaneous 0.4431 0.7391 0.0117 0.7750 0.4600 0.1681 0.2940 0.3361 0.0912 0.0242
Sources: Manufacturing Surveys, CBS.
INV-ST: ratio of investment to capital stock; PROFIT: ratio of gross operating surplus to capital stock; LEVER: ratio of  total debt to capital stock; AVCOB:
average cost of borrowing.
figures, where the rates of return were consistently higher for exporters. The rates
of return gap between exporters and non-exporters was somewhat narrowed in
1995 in the context of a booming domestic economy. The profitability of non-
exporters increased substantially, although it was still lower than for exporters. 
Looking at the industry level, winning sectors (garments, footwear and wood
products) are more leveraged than others (Table 5.10). Interestingly, some domes-
tically oriented industries have higher leverage rates than winners, for example
cement (363). Cement, which is controlled by politically well-connected conglo-
merates, in fact is the most leveraged industry at the three-digit level. With their
political ties to the government, it is possible for conglomerates to have preferen-
tial access to credit from state banks at subsidized rates. This practice is a legacy
of the past, although it is still prevalent for industries with very strong connections
to the government. Conglomerates also have another advantage, namely their high
profiles, which have enabled them to get better access to offshore credit markets.
If one looks at the data classified by firm size, large enterprises tend to have
higher leverage than medium or small establishments. Also, large establishments
are more likely to use offshore borrowing as a source of capital. Better access to
foreign credit markets is also evident for export-oriented firms, particularly in
recent years. Interestingly, in the past (1990) domestically oriented firms have
been more likely to resort to foreign credit. This picture is rather difficult to inter-
pret since the domestic interest rates climbed sharply in 1991, but the portion of
foreign credit did not increase. 
After observing the financial aspects of establishments, it can be concluded that
the ability to obtain external funds in the domestic market differs among small and
large firms, and between exporters and non-exporters. The credit market usually
favors large firms, outward orientation and a good reputation. Firms not possess-
ing such characteristics may have to assume higher costs of borrowing. This situ-
ation is nonetheless much better than during times of financial repression when
credit is rationed and allocated according to a set of rules defined by the govern-
ment. A liberal foreign exchange regime also provides additional advantages for
certain firms to borrow funds from overseas markets. Unfortunately, there is a lack
of information on the ethnicity of the owner of firms in general. It is common
knowledge, however, that conglomerates and large Chinese firms with connections
to financial markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, foreign firms and exporters
all have better access to foreign loans. Also, even after the 1983 Banking
Deregulation, state bank credit at below market rates is still available for people
and large firms with strong political connections to the government. So, even after
deregulation, credit market segmentation remains. The only difference with the
past is that access is higher now for previously disadvantaged firms, albeit at a
higher rate.
Trade specialization, productivity and finance: Econometric evidence 
In this section we try to answer a fundamental question regarding the interactions
between financial factors, trade specialization and international competitiveness.
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The question asks what the important factors are in determining whether a firm
specializes in winning or losing sectors. Perhaps financial factors such as the avail-
ability of credit are very important in determining the pattern of specialization.
The pattern of specialization itself is very important in determining the country’s
competitiveness since a country might be locked into activities that contribute very
little to the sustainability of the current account. To be able to answer the above
question, we model the firm’s specialization decision, that is, to specialize in
one particular sector or another. After a firm chooses a sector, it will then choose
its market orientation (i.e. whether to concentrate on export market or domestic
market). Firms’ choices will ultimately determine the pattern of specialization and
current account sustainability. 
Consider a manufacturing firm making a decision to choose a sector or acti-
vities. A firm will choose a particular sector when it offers the highest profit.
Formally, from M activities firm t chooses sector k according to eqn (5.1):
(5.1)
For simplicity, let N2, so there are only two sectors in the economy: winning
sectors (textiles, garments, footwear and wood products) and losers (other sec-
tors). The observed variable tk is defined as tk1 if a firm chooses a winning
sector, and tk0 otherwise. The probability of specializing in the winning or los-
ing sectors is determined by several factors, including firm characteristics and
financial characteristics. Specifically, the profit function is specified as a func-
tion of output price ( p), input price (w) and ‘financial’ price ( f ) reflecting finan-
cial access or availability. This is illustrated in eqn (5.2):
(5.2)
where c represents various firm’s characteristics and a refers to a productivity
shock or productivity growth.
After examining the relationship between finance and patterns of specialization,
the next task is to investigate the consequences of finance and pattern of special-
ization on the current account. For this, we need to model a firm’s output decision.
In standard microeconomics textbooks, profit maximization will result in an output
supply function and input demand function. The firm’s net exports, or contribution
to the trade balance, are treated as the output supply function net of imported raw
materials. Therefore, following eqn (5.1), the firm’s exported output net of imported
raw materials or net exports (nx) is specified in eqn (5.3):
(5.3)
where px is the price of exported output. 
For the firm’s specialization function, probit regressions are performed on
eqn (5.1), while for the contribution to the trade balance we use ordinary least
square (OLS) estimation. For financial availability, we use two proxies: the ratio
nxtk  nx[px, w, f, a],
tk  [p, w, f, c, a],
tk
* max[t1, t2, ... ,tN],  N  1, 2, ... , n.
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of domestic credit to total capital and the ratio of overseas borrowing to total
capital. The ratio of value added to intermediate inputs is used as a proxy for out-
put price. This variable is also intended to capture the differences in effective rates
of protection among industries. The basic result of firm-level regression for the
entire 1991 and 1995 samples can be seen in Table 5.11. 
In the first exercise, we examine the determinants of a firm’s contribution to the
trade balance or exported output net of imported raw materials (numerical columns
1 and 2 of Table 5.11). For the complete sample of manufacturing establishments
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Table 5.11 Factors affecting contribution to trade balance and probability to specialize
in leading RCA sectors
Contribution to TB Leading RCA sector
Whole sample Whole sample
1991 1995 1991 1995
C 3.42E04 4.61E04 9.31E01 1.02E00
[0.051] [0.696E07] [9.487] [15.742]
PRICES 5.72E06 6.96E06 27.379 23.023
[2.312] [1.125] [70.53] [67.183]
WAGES 8.554 1.60E02 1.77E06 2.57E05
[0.606] [2.977] [1.121] [4.361]
LPG 5,591 17,621 0.021 0.046
[1.577] [1.472] [27.279] [36.898]
AGE 3,052.8 36,241 0.015 0.015
[0.399] [2.117] [12.363] [13.147]
DMNC 2.47E05 5.84E05 0.401 0.543
[0.547] [0.639] [6.278] [9.275]
DLARGE 1.58E06 9.87E06 7.28E01 5.51E01
[2.149] [8.148] [6.898] [7.333]
DMED 4.13E05 1.05E06 3.11E01 1.73E01
[0.603] [0.988] [3.103] [2.577]
DSMALL 81,965 1.20E05 0.171 1.49E01
[0.123] [0.120] [1.755] [2.325]
DMLOAN 0.004 0.081 8.06E08 1.36E10
[1.431] [4.264] [2.075] [0.114]
FRLOAN 0.038 0.162 9.74E11 1.67E09
[5.233] [7.471] [0.087] [0.960]




PRICES: price of exported output; LPG: labor productivity growth; DMNC: dummy for FDI
firms; DLARGE: dummy for large firms; DMED: dummy for medium-sized firms; DSMALL:
dummy for small firms; DMLOAN: domestic banks’ credit; FRLOAN: overseas credit.
in the 1995 sample, we find a significant negative relationship between wages
and contribution to the trade balance (TB) or net export. Thus in 1995, labor cost
is still an important factor in determining the ability to compete in export mar-
kets. The later economic deregulation measures seem to make this pattern stronger,
and thus confirm the result of the probit regressions.
We also find a negative relationship between TFP growth and contribution to
TB, which means firms in industries with high TFP growth tend to not be export
oriented. However, the coefficient is not significant at the 5 per cent confidence
level. In the case of the age variable, there is a suggestion that older firms tend
to generate surplus for the trade account. This result seems in conflict with the
probit regressions, although if we take into account the possibility that older firms
may have stronger linkages with domestic suppliers compared to younger ones,
this result is plausible.
The impact of differences in firm type on foreign exchange contributions also
present interesting results. In the 1991 sample, there is no significant difference
between large, medium and small firms with regard to contribution to the TB. In
the 1995 sample, however, large firms are more likely to contribute to the TB
compared to medium and small ones. In another categorization, we test the behav-
ior of MNC or FDI firms versus non-FDI firms. We find that in both samples,
there is no significant difference between FDI firms and local firms in terms of
contribution to the TB.
In the case of the impact of the availability of credit financing on contribution to
the TB, we observe the phenomenon of currency mismatch. The availability of for-
eign credit does not guarantee that firms will be sufficiently export oriented. This
is especially apparent in the 1995 sample, as more and more domestically oriented
firms with negative contributions to the TB use foreign credit to finance their
domestic activities. A booming domestic economy, an overvalued exchange rate and
high domestic interest rates have made borrowing from abroad an attractive option.
Obviously, this behavior puts pressure on the current account and is also one of the
many factors that contributed to the crisis. Interestingly, firms with a positive contri-
bution to the TB are more likely to use domestic credit as a source of finance.
In the second regression (numerical columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.11), the coef-
ficient of exported output price is positive as expected. Meanwhile the coefficient
of wages is negative as expected, although it is only significant in the 1995 sam-
ple. This means that low wages are still important in influencing Indonesia’s pat-
tern of specialization, which confirms an earlier assertion that Indonesia is still
specializing in low-end products which base their competitiveness on cheap labor.
The sign of the LP growth coefficient also supports this conclusion. The coeffi-
cients of LP growth are negative and significant in both samples. It becomes more
negative and significant in the later period. Indonesia is locked into the pattern of
specialization in the production of low-productivity goods with high dependency
on imported raw materials. There was some indication that the economic liberal-
ization that started in 1986 reinforced this pattern of specialization.
There is a sign that finance does affect the pattern of specialization, particularly
if we look at the coefficient of domestic credit in the 1991 sample. The coefficient
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of domestic credit is positive and significant, indicating the role of domestic
banking in financing activities in export-oriented sectors. The coefficient
becomes insignificant in the 1995 sample, so it is possible that the booming activ-
ity in the non-tradable sectors such as property, infrastructure and other less
export-oriented activities has shifted the banking sector’s attention away from the
tradable sector. 
All the dummy variables for capturing differences in a firm’s size are signifi-
cant in both samples. The most significant variable, and at the same time the
largest positive coefficient, is the dummy for large firms, followed by medium
and small establishments. Therefore, larger-size firms have a higher probability
of specializing in the leading RCA sectors. With regard to age difference, the
regression results also reveal that young firms tend to specialize in the leading
RCA sector. Perhaps young firms with newer technologies are more suited to
export markets. 
The MNC dummy variable capturing the differences between MNC and local
firms is negative and significant, meaning MNC firms do not tend to specialize
in the leading RCA sectors. The negative coefficient is stronger and more nega-
tive in the 1995 sample, which suggests that FDI firms in the later period tend to
see Indonesia as a potential market to be exploited, rather than as a base for export
expansion. This does not mean that the later deregulation policies seeking to open
up the economy are misplaced. Rather, inconsistency in the government’s trade
and industrial policies in the form of non-trade barriers makes the rates of returns
on domestically oriented economies artificially high, while at the same time
lower trade barriers in input markets and an overvalued currency make the cost of
imported inputs artificially cheaper.
Firms’ portfolio decisions
The Indonesian Manufacturing Surveys provide information regarding the
sources of capital. We use this information to address the question about firms’
portfolio decisions. An overview of the sources of firm finance is presented in
Table 5.12. In general, firms in winning sectors tend to have a higher proportion
148 A. Kuncoro
Table 5.12 Sources of finance
1991 1995
All Winner All Winner
Own capital 31.46 34.81 23.15 17.37
Retained earnings 12.89 10.19 10.68 9.02
Stock 8.89 11.52 11.04 8.52
Domestic credit 28.47 29.43 33.14 36.43
Foreign credit 5.79 10.87 14.54 18.62
Foreign placement 9.47 20.07 4.07 4.60
Government equity 4.03 1.11 3.38 5.44
Sources: Calculated from the Industrial Surveys database.
of foreign loans when compared to the average manufacturing firm. In 1991, for
example, the figure for foreign loans in the winning sectors was 10.87 per cent,
while the corresponding figure for all manufacturing firms was 5.79 per cent. In
1991, on average a winner’s other important financial sources were own capital
(34.81 per cent), domestic banking credit (29.43 per cent), retained earnings
(10.19 per cent), stocks (11.52 per cent) and foreign direct capital placements
(20.07 per cent). Thus, winners are more leveraged and more likely to obtain
foreign loans than average manufacturing firms.
In 1991, for winning sectors the portions of retained earnings, foreign direct cap-
ital placement and government equity participation were lower than the average
manufacturing firm. So it could be concluded that winning sectors tend to have
higher portions of domestic bank credits, foreign credits, their own capital and the
stock market as sources of finance. In 1995, some portfolio shifts took place; for
both winners and the average manufacturing firms a big decline of the share of
own capital could be observed. Thus, all firms tended to raise capital externally, in
particular in the domestic credit market and through overseas borrowing.
To model the portfolio decisions of firms, we employ a multinomial logit model
in which the choice of sources of finance is specified as a function of firm charac-
teristics including age, labor productivity growth, size differences, and MNC ver-
sus local firms. As in the above discussion, there are seven choices for financing:
own-capital injection, retained earnings, stock market, domestic banking, overseas
borrowing, foreign direct capital placement and government equity participation.
As required by the multinomial logit procedure, the parameters of one choice
need to be normalized to zero. In this case, we chose own-capital injection to be
normalized. The reason behind this choice is that we are more interested in other
sources of financing. The results of multinomial logit regressions are presented in
Table 5.13. First, we look at the 1991 sample. At first glance, it can be seen that one
variable which is always significant in all cases is labor productivity growth (LPG).
Thus, productivity growth is always important in all choices of source of finance.
Firm age has a negative coefficient in three choices: stock market, domestic bank
credit and foreign credit. This means older firms are less likely to use these three
sources of financing. For foreign direct capital placement, the sign of the coefficient
is positive and significant, indicating that older firms are more likely to choose this
source of finance. Another interesting variable is the dummy variable for large
firms. The sign of this variable indicates that large firms have a high probability of
using the stock market, bank credit, foreign borrowing and foreign direct capital
placement to raise capital. Medium firms, with foreign direct capital placement as
an exception, also showed similar preferences.
In the 1991 sample, the case of MNC firms is also interesting. The only posi-
tive and significant variable is foreign credit, indicating better access to overseas
credit markets. MNC firms are also less likely to use domestic bank credit as a
source of funds. Better access to overseas borrowing and higher domestic interest
rates make it unnecessary to secure domestic credit. In the case of winner firms,
retained earnings, foreign credit and foreign direct capital placement are chosen as
sources of finance. Interestingly, they avoid government equity participation. 
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Table 5.13 Factors affecting firm portfolio decisions (multinomial logic estimation)
Retained earnings Stock Domestic bank credit
1991 1995 1991 1995 1991 1995
C 1.30857 0.864072 2.44869 3.29912 0.861983 0.669374
(21.1683) (16.6740) (24.0431) (24.2278) (15.4582) (13.3598)
AGE 4.19E03 0.013078 0.14078 5.70E03 9.94E03 4.19E03
(1.67229) (5.01024) (3.03601) (0.873041) (3.94927) (1.54099)
PG 3.58E06 9.55E06 4.71E06 9.99E06 4.28E06 8.25E06
(4.97147) (4.67062) (6.54513) (4.00521) (6.15864) (4.07938)
DMNC 0.136403 0.798009 0.27653 0.604485 0.347212 0.50547
(0.918419) (3.94947) (1.46656) (1.90015) (2.40387) (2.63725)
DWIN 0.215943 0.151825 0.204891 0.074109 0.114795 0.205713
(3.08950) (2.18725) (1.82397) (0.506668) (1.84872) (3.34649)
DLARGE 0.61389 0.692944 1.26361 2.08893 0.707507 1.38599
(0.495102) (5.51038) (8.54642) (9.89206) (7.40571) (12.4313)
DMED 0.13216 0.327876 0.969101 1.64711 0.46621 0.873283
(1.77613) (4.21228) (8.91211) (10.8018) (7.19578) (12.7565)
Foreign credit Foreign direct capital Government equity
1991 1995 1991 1995 1991 1995
C 3.42145 4.36467 3.36586 4.74043 4.62034 4.74043
(21.5331) (20.6467) (26.0583) (17.1974) (13.9996) (17.1974)
AGE 0.024471 0.032728 0.022923 0.087641 9.86E03 0.087641
(3.39453) (2.97558) (5.94416) (5.36597) 0.7288226 (5.36597)
LPG 5.20E06 1.31E05 4.39E06 9.39E06 4.97E06 9.39E06
(6.77664) (5.92772) (5.53726) (3.38700) (4.13023) (3.38700)
DMNC 1.54151 3.57384 0.35744 5.76058 25.7244 5.76058
(8.55219) (15.4204) (1.04789) (18.6109) (0.799E04) (18.6109)
DWIN 0.551413 0.424417 0.416206 0.451513 1.54404 0.451513
(3.78128) (2.38965) (2.96919) (2.17890) (2.51481) (2.17890)
DLARGE 1.41212 2.40685 0.881273 1.28005 0.553575 1.28005
(7.36451) (9.34578) (4.85236) (4.28290) (0.878425) (4.28290)
DMED 0.769345 1.55227 0.46763 0.923312 0.438528 0.923312
(4.73044) (6.95577) (0.279974) (25.4382) (1.02922) (3.74099)
Note: All t-statistics significant at the 5 per cent level.
The results for the 1995 sample differ from the 1991 sample, with some
exceptions. Labor productivity is still important in all choices. With regard to age,
older firms tend to choose retained earnings. The positive and significant coeffi-
cient for government equity participation must come from the presence of the
substantial number of state-owned enterprises. Older firms are also less likely to
use foreign credit and foreign direct capital placement.
The size factor is still important in the 1995 sample, as indicated by the coef-
ficient of the dummy variable for large firms which is significant in all choices
of financing. The same picture also applies to medium firms. MNC firms show
different behavior. It is true that they still prefer to use foreign credit, and in 1995
also foreign direct capital placement. Unlike in the 1991 sample, MNC firms now
are more supportive of the use of retained earnings and domestic bank credit.
Winner firms also show a more favorable attitude towards the use of domestic
bank credit, although the choice of foreign credit is still in favor. There is a shift
in behavior, however, with regard to the use of retained earnings and foreign
direct capital placement as they are now less likely to use these sources. 
4. Conclusion
The structure of Indonesian exports in the 1970s and the early 1980s, with a
heavy dependence on oil/gas and natural resource products, made the current
account very vulnerable to international price fluctuations. The economic reforms
initiated in response to the plummeting of oil prices marked a change in trade and
industrial policy from import substitution, with its emphasis on the development
of capital-intensive manufacturing in the upstream and resource-based industries,
to labor-intensive export-oriented industries.
The impact of economic reforms after 1986 is very obvious in the structure
of Indonesian exports. Exports of manufactured goods like textiles, processed
woods, electronics and shoes started to rise. In 1991, the share of non-oil exports
in total exports exceeded oil and gas exports. Until the mid-1990s however,
Indonesia’s manufactured export base was still very narrow, and mainly consisted
of wood products, textiles, garments and footwear, industries exploiting low-cost
labor rather than productivity as a source of competitiveness. There was an indi-
cation that the economic liberalization of 1986 seemed to reinforce this pattern of
specialization. Indonesia is locked into a pattern of specialization that emphasizes
the production of low-productivity goods with high dependency on imported
raw materials. The emergence of unskilled labor-intensive industries as foreign
exchange earners creates a new problem for the current account. As these indus-
tries are very dependent on imported inputs, this makes them very vulnerable to
exchange rate fluctuations, as happened in the recent economic crisis.
There is an indication that finance does affect the pattern of specialization. In a
1991 sample, the domestic banking system had a very important role in financing
activities in export-oriented sectors. In later periods, however, the booming activity
of the non-tradable sectors (such as property, infrastructure and other less export-
oriented activities) shifted the attention of the banking sector away from tradable
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sectors. The influx of capital inflows is also responsible for the expansion of the
non-tradable sector during the 1991–5 period. As activities in non-tradables contin-
ued to expand, high growth was maintained until 1996, although the current account
deficit continued to soar. This eventually triggered a reversal in expectations.
Notes
01 In terms of development strategy, the oil boom also produced a shift in the strategy of
economic development. The availability of money and the expansion of domestic
aggregate demand persuaded the government to pursue an import substitution policy.
Many ambitious infrastructure and industrial projects were launched. The shift towards
more inward-looking policies was also reflected through more protectionist industrial
and trade policies. 
02 See Section 2 on contribution to the trade balance and sectoral competitiveness. 
03 Some (e.g. Iqbal 1995) argued that the reason behind the economic slowdown was a
slowdown in pace of deregulation. For example, although the nominal tariff showed a
decreasing trend in the pre-1991, it hardly changed during the 1991–4 period. The
same pattern could also be observed for products subject to import licensing.
04 Although some argued that the dismal performance of several economic indicators was
caused by the slowdown in the pace of economic deregulation, others suggested that this
downward trend was part of a global phenomenon. This latter argument was based on the
observation that other Asian tigers like Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea were also
exhibiting a similar trend. Another reason behind the slowdown of manufactured exports
was the nature of the products produced – basically destined for low end consumption
and relying on low-cost labor. With the successive increases of national minimum wages,
the competitiveness of Indonesian labor-intensive exports seemed to erode.
05 Unlike the previous investment boom in 1988–92 where textiles, garments and
footwear made the bulk of total investments, the second investment boom was more
diversified, ranging from electronic components, automotive parts, chemicals, to food
and beverages. Also, most of the projects in the latter boom were destined for the
Indonesian domestic market.
06 The reason for this is that an overvalued rupiah and high domestic interest rates made
borrowing from abroad cheaper.
07 It is worthwhile to highlight the Indonesian electronics industry since it might become
the great foreign exchange earner for the country in the future provided that the gov-
ernment alters the structure of protection. At present, the electronic industry has not
moved much beyond assembly operations. 
08 There are several explanations regarding Indonesia’s loss of competitiveness in its main
manufacturing exports. One explanation is that the competitiveness of Indonesia’s
labor-intensive industries had been eroded by the successive increases of minimum
wages. Other factors, such as the boom in the domestic market, might have played a role
as well. Finally, Indonesian producers also recently faced stiff competition from several
emerging markets such as China, Vietnam and India that produce products of compara-
ble quality at competitive prices.
09 A study by the World Bank (1996) found that productivity growth in Indonesia kept
pace with the large increases in minimum wages untill 1993. Thereafter, the minimum
wage became more binding.
10 Winners and losers have been defined from the point of view of international trade.
Based on the previous analyses, winner industries include garments, footwear and
wood products. All of these industries are characterized by a huge contribution to the
balance of trade. Meanwhile, loser industries include industrial chemicals and trans-
portation equipment.
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11 This phenomenon is not limited to the chosen winner and loser industries. In general,
industries with a net positive contribution to the trade account are more highly lever-
aged than industries with negative contributions.
12 Nominal interest rates in Indonesia are the highest among Southeast Asian countries,
though inflation in Indonesia is also the highest in the region. 
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6 Trade, competitiveness and finance 
in the Philippine manufacturing 
sector, 1980–951
Josef T. Yap
1. Introduction: The Philippine development experience
The East Asian miracle of the 1960s up to the mid-1990s and the East Asian
debacle in 1997 put in perspective two crucial factors that affect sustainable eco-
nomic growth and development. The first factor is outward orientation, which is a
necessary ingredient for increasing the competitiveness of an economy, and the sec-
ond is a sound financial structure that is required for efficient resource allocation and
macroeconomic stability. The primary objective of this chapter, is to analyse how
these two factors interact with each other, i.e. how the level of financial development
affected the evolution of the Philippine current account. Of particular concern is the
trade sector, with emphasis on the dynamics of competitiveness and the pattern of
exports in the Philippine manufacturing sector.
The Philippines was pointedly left out of the list of High Powered Asian
Economies (HPAEs) identified by the World Bank (1993) in its study of the East
Asian miracle. This is due primarily to her erratic economic performance that has
been characterized by boom-bust cycles. During the period 1970–97, for which data
is presented in Table 6.1, the Philippines experienced three balance-of-payments
(BOP) crises. The first and most acute was in 1983–5 following the onset of the
international debt crisis, the second was in 1990–2 in the aftermath of Gulf War;
and the last was in the second half of 1997 as the Philippines was drawn into the
financial crisis. Even when the economy’s performance was being considered
exceptional by the international community, the peak GDP growth rate was only
5.7 per cent, which was recorded in 1996. Not surprisingly, this growth was the
second lowest in Southeast Asia in that year.
The Orthodox view
The performance of the Philippine economy during the postwar period has been
directly linked to the fortunes of its industrial sector. The various studies on this
sector came up with the following major conclusions (Medalla et al. 1995):
1 That the more than three decades of protection had been very costly in terms
of its inherent penalty on exports, its serious adverse impact on resource allo-
cation, and dynamic efficiency losses arising from lack of competition.
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Table 6.1 The Philippines, selected economic indicators
1970–4 1975–9 1980–2 1983–5 1986–9 1990–2 1993–7
Income (growth rates)
Real GDP 5.4 6.2 4.1 4.3 5.2 0.9 4.4
Agriculture 2.8 4.5 2.8 2.1 3.3 0.2 2.5
Industry 8.0 7.9 4.0 8.9 5.8 0.5 5.3
Manufacturing 7.9 5.2 2.6 6.1 5.7 0.2 4.5
Services 5.0 5.4 4.9 1.1 5.6 1.8 4.7
Real GDP (% share)
Agriculture 27.4 24.5 23.3 23.2 23.9 22.6 21.6
Industry 35.3 39.6 40.7 38.0 35.2 34.9 35.2
Manufacturing 28.0 27.9 27.2 25.5 25.2 25.4 25.0
Services 37.4 35.9 36.0 38.8 40.9 42.5 43.2
External sector
Degree of openness 40.5 41.6 53.7 48.7 58.7 70.3 97.2
(% of GDP)a
Value of 1,583 3,209 5,510 5,008 6,364 8,950 17,615
exports (USD)
Share of 8.6 24.4 41.0 51.1 60.7 72.1 80.7
manufactured 
exports
Current balance/ 0.7 5.3 6.8 4.1 0.6 3.3 4.9
GDP (%)
BOP/GDP (%) 1.8 1.2 2.4 0.6 1.9 1.8 0.8




Public sector 8.4 13.6 5.4 3.9 2.9 0.6
deficit/GDPc
Monetary Sector
Money supply-M3 23.2 18.9 18.6 11.8 14.6 15.0 22.6
(growth rate)
M3/GNP 24.3 29.1 29.0 25.9 24.9 27.7 36.9
Labour Sector
Unemployment 5.6 7.5 8.9 11.2 10.4 9.5 9.1
rate (%)
Underemployment 13.4 11.6 26.3 30.8 24.6 21.8 21.2
rate (%)d





Agriculture 52 52.1 51.6 50.0 47.6 45.3 43.3
Industry 15.8 15.3 14.7 14.5 14.7 15.8 16.0
Services 32.2 32.5 33.8 35.5 37.7 39.2 40.6
Prices
Inflation rate (%) 18.8 9.9 13.4 26.8 5.9 13.1 9.4
2 That a reform toward a more liberal and neutral trade policy is necessary to
propel the economy to a higher level of industrialization.
This is the basic neoclassical view that revolves around the issue of comparative
advantage. Economic protection in the past meant that the resources of the coun-
try flowed into sectors where the Philippines did not possess a comparative
advantage. Hence, production, particularly in the industry sector, became highly
inefficient. Moreover, such policies prevented export-led industrialization from
taking root in the Philippine economy. Filipino entrepreneurs simply made
profits behind the protective cover of tariff walls and non-tariff barriers to trade
and did not aggressively seek to manufacture products where the Philippines
had a distinct comparative advantage in the world market.
That the Philippine economy is largely inefficient is without question. This trend
can be gleaned by comparing labour productivity across time and across countries
in East Asia. Table 6.2 shows that labour productivity in the Philippines largely
stagnated between the period 1975 and 1996. The overall labour productivity of
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand more than doubled in this period
while the index for the Philippines even declined by one point. The agriculture and
manufacturing sectors exhibited the same pattern.
Apart from reference to the neoclassical argument, the poor performance in
terms of labour productivity can also be attributed to the low saving and invest-
ment rates in the Philippines (Table 6.3). A low rate of capital accumulation leads
to a low marginal product of labour and low average labour productivity. The vari-
ance in the investment rate between the Philippines and the more developed
Southeast Asian economies can be explained partly by the ability to attract
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Table 6.1 Continued
1970–4 1975–9 1980–2 1983–5 1986–9 1990–2 1993–7
Internal terms 5.4 1.4 5.4 0.7 0.2 1.4 1.4
of trade (% change)
Population
Population growth 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.6 1.8
rate (%)
GNP per capita (USD) 336 587 723 547 700 831 1,070
Real pesos of 1985 10,507 11,642 12,762 11,641 10,885 11,559 11,923
Sources: NSO, National Income Accounts; NSO, Philippine Statistical Yearbook; Central Bank,
Annual Report.
Notes
a Defined as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and services to GDP; both terms
at constant prices.
b Trade-weighted real exchange rate.
c Includes general government, state-monitored corporations and the Central Bank.
d Defined as workers working less than 40 hours per week.
e Ratio of implicit GDP deflator of agriculture to that of non-agriculture.
foreign direct investment (FDI). In turn, both FDI and domestic investment are
largely affected by the degree of macroeconomic stability in an economy.
The financial sector and macroeconomic stability
The dismal record of the Philippines in terms of macroeconomic stability is
reflected in her higher inflation rate (Table 6.3). Econometric studies cite import
costs and the money supply as the explanatory variables with the highest impact
on Philippine inflation. Rapid monetary growth is usually related to a large
public deficit, but a closer analysis of the Philippine financial system will reveal
that the instability of the banking sector during the postwar period contributed
heavily to macroeconomic imbalances.
The development of the financial system of the Philippines does not provide an
exemplary case of smoothly operating financial markets fuelling investment and
growth. On the contrary, structural features of the process of financial intermedia-
tion have been at the root of the recurring liquidity and solvency crises in various
parts of the Philippine banking system and capital markets. Rather than providing
channels to alleviate financial constraints, the malfunctioning of the financial system
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Table 6.2 Indices of average labour productivity overall, agriculture and 
manufacturing
1975 1980 1985 1990 1996
China Overall 100 122 131 140 —
Indonesia Overall 100a 126 131 148 204b
(1993 prices) Agri 100a 104 121 114 160b
Mftg 100a 155 194 242 310b
Malaysia Overall 100 125 138 161 216
(1978 prices) Agri 100 133 158 201 281
Mftg 100 104 118 143 181
Philippines Overall 100 119 92 102 99
(1985 prices) Agri 100 117 100 109 108
Mftg 100 119 96 108 100
Singapore Overall 100 116 137 171 233
(1985 prices) Agri 100 114 194 177 288
Mftg 100 115 128 171 272
Thailand Overall 100 116 132 181 297
(1988 prices) Agri 100 101 113 118 234
Mftg 100 121 133 178 210
Sources: Intal and Basilio, ‘The International Economic Environment and the Philippine
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Table 6.3 Selected indicators, East Asian economies
1980 1985 1990 1995 1997
Indonesia
M2/GNP 13.7 24.8 45.5 52.8 61.1
Inflation 18.0 4.7 7.4 9.5 6.1
Savings/GNP 30.5 31.1 33.8 31.5 32.0
Investment/GNP 21.8 29.2 32.2 32.9 32.6
FDI (million USD) 746a 4,348 5,350
Malaysia
M2/GNP 53.4 67.9 69.3 95.1 111.8
Inflation 6.7 0.3 2.6 5.3 2.7
Savings/GNP 34.2 35.2 34.9 41.5 46.7
Investment/GNP 31.6 29.7 32.7 45.7 45.1
FDI (million USD) 1,605a 4,132 3,754
Philippines
M2/GNP 22.8 26.8 34.2 49.0 59.0
Inflation 18.3 23.2 14.1 8.1 5.0
Savings/GNP 26.8 19.5 18.8 14.2 14.8
Investment/GNP 29.3 14.9 24.3 21.6 23.9
FDI (million USD) 501a 1,459 1,253
Thailand
M2/GNP 38.5 59.6 70.7 80.6 92.7
Inflation 19.8 2.5 6.0 5.8 5.6
Savings/GNP 23.2 25.2 34.7 37.8 37.0
Investment/GNP 29.4 28.7 41.9 42.5 36.1
FDI (million USD) 1,325a 2,002 3,600
China
M2/GNP 37.4 58.5 78.9 104.0 120.8
Inflation 7.5 11.9 3.1 16.9 2.8
Savings/GNP 35.2 37.7 34.6 41.5
Investment/GNP 34.1 35.5 38.6 41.7
FDI (million USD) 3,105a 35,849 45,300
Korea
M2/GNP 34.1 36.6 38.5 44.1 48.9
Inflation 28.7 2.5 8.6 4.5 4.5
Savings/GNP 24.8 34.7 36.4 37.1 35.7
Investment/GNP 33.0 30.6 37.2 37.4 35.4
FDI (million USD) 863a 1,776 2,341
Singapore
M2/GNP 66.4 69.8 90.5 83.7 84.0
Inflation 8.5 4.1 3.5 1.7 2.0
Savings/GNP 40.2 39.2 45.3 49.9 48.7
Investment/GNP 48.1 41.0 35.7 33.4 36.4
FDI (million USD) 3,592a 8,210 10,000
Sources: International Finance Statistics, IMF, World Investment Report 1998
Note
a  Average of 1986–1991.
has been a source of macroeconomic problems. The structural problems relate to
the segmented nature of the Philippine financial markets, the lack of competition
among financial institutions, wide-ranging interlocking directorates and owner-
ship patterns across the banking industry and other economic sectors, the shal-
lowness of financial markets and the unresolved external debt overhang (Vos and
Yap 1996).
The structure of the financial sector, specifically the banking industry, reflects
the patrimonial nature of the Philippine state and the dominance of a predatory
oligarchy which leads to an ineffective and inefficient bureaucracy.2 Banks in the
Philippines are largely familial in nature wherein family conglomerates milked
the loan portfolios of their own banks, causing liquidity problems. The situation
was exacerbated by the inability of the Philippine Central Bank to regulate and
supervise banks effectively, creating instability in the banking system. The exis-
tence of a patrimonial oligarchic state (as opposed to a patrimonial administrative
state as in Thailand and Indonesia) could also explain why the protectionist poli-
cies in the Philippines deteriorated into rent-seeking activity while similar meas-
ures were a means of capital accumulation in other countries.
As a result, the Philippine financial system has had a strong dualistic nature, in
which an important informal financial market segment coexists with the formal
banking system. Informal moneylenders fund, at relatively high cost, small busi-
nesses and household firms which have little or no access to the formal banking
system. Large private corporations are the preferred borrowers of the highly con-
centrated formally banking system. The interlocking interests of banks and corpo-
rate enterprises strongly direct the allocation of funds, often overriding normal
financial risk assessment. Over-leveraged firms and bad loans have been systemic
problems which have required Central Bank (now known as the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas or BSP) and government intervention to bail out ailing financial institu-
tions, often with substantial macroeconomic costs. At the same time, financial
markets have remained rather thin. While financial deepening has proceeded at an
accelerated pace in neighbouring Asian countries, the mobilization of savings
through the financial system has stagnated in the Philippines. This is reflected in
a lower M2/GNP ratio up to the 1980s (Tables 6.3 and 6.1 for M3/GNP). 
Various attempts at financial reform and liberalization during the 1970s and
1980s succeeded in reducing some of the structural problems of the Philippine
financial system (cf. Intal and Llanto 1998). Adjustment policies in the early
1990s, particularly the liberalization of the capital account, sought to resolve the
economy’s fiscal and foreign exchange constraints. This included the rehabilita-
tion of the BSP wherein the national government took over its bad loans. The
M2/GNP ratio of the Philippines increased sharply after 1992 although this is
largely a result of the liberalization of the capital account. Some reforms, how-
ever, exacerbated weaknesses, such as the increased concentration of the banking
sector after the financial liberalization measures of 1981. Moreover, emphasis has
been placed on increasing competition in the financial sector – mainly by allow-
ing the entry of more foreign banks – rather than strengthening the supervisory
and regulatory role of the BSP.
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Framework and objective
An objective of this chapter is to examine the linkage between trade patterns and
competitiveness – or the lack thereof – in the Philippine manufacturing sector,
using data between 1980 and 1995. The most popular and influential standard for
competitiveness is related to unit labour costs whereby a country attempts to keep
wage increases in line with productivity changes. By keeping wage costs under
control, a country can make its exports competitive – a higher market share for
exports invariably reflects greater competitiveness. Recent evidence, however,
has shown that unit labour cost is a weak indicator of a country’s competitiveness
(Fagerberg 1988). A more reliable measure would be productivity performance
associated with technological development. Hence, competitiveness will be
directly associated with measures of productivity.
Even with improvements in the technological capability of an economy, how-
ever, its trade performance may not show a commensurate response, or else the
trade specialization of an economy diverges from the pattern dictated by its tech-
nological capability. If there is a weak relationship between these two variables,
the next step is to determine to what extent this can be explained by an unstable
macroeconomic environment, particularly in terms of exchange rate volatility and
inflation. These variables usually work their way through the investment rate.
Related to this is an inappropriate level of the real effective exchange rate which
reflects an overvalued currency. 
Meanwhile, a poorly functioning financial system can contribute to macroeco-
nomic instability or hamper the flow of resources to sectors with high productiv-
ity growth thus failing to take advantage of export opportunities. Another major
objective of this chapter is to determine how the level of financial development
has affected the trade pattern.
2. Productivity, competitiveness and trade patterns
Theoretical developments
International competitiveness in a macroeconomic sense is defined as the ‘ability
of a country to produce goods and services that meet the test of international mar-
kets and simultaneously to maintain and expand the real income of its citizens
(Haque 1995). The concern with international competitiveness stems primarily
from the view that the growth of the HPAEs was export oriented. While it is still
debated whether exports were the engine or merely a handmaiden of growth,
increasing the competitiveness of the economy is definitely associated with
greater efficiency and hence greater opportunities for economic growth.
Two advances in economic theory have brought non-price competitiveness –
referring mainly to technological capability – to the forefront. The development
of the New Trade Theory represents attempts to relax the restrictive assumptions
of the neoclassical framework which assumes the existence of competitive
markets, factor substitutability and mobility, and profit maximization. The new
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theory seeks to extend and develop the traditional framework by incorporating
in its analysis such issues as the treatment of economies of scale, externalities,
technical progress, product differentiation, and monopolistic and oligopolistic
situations (Haque 1995). In this framework, a link between international techno-
logical competition and international trade is established, showing that strategic
R&D rivalry between countries can be crucial for explaining the evolution of
trade flows (Magnier and Toujas-Bernate 1994).
A parallel development occurred in the theory of economic growth that likewise
stressed the importance of human resource development and technological accu-
mulation: the development of endogenous growth models which suggest the hypoth-
esis that investment (either in physical capital, human capital, or R&D activities)
generates externalities that offset the decreasing returns to inputs. The offshoot of
the new trade theory and endogenous growth theory was to shift the focus on tech-
nology capability as the primary determinant of an economy’s competitiveness.
Analytical framework: Determinants of export share
We use the framework of Fagerberg (1988) to show the interrelation among the
variables under consideration. Both technological competitiveness and price com-
petitiveness should play a key role in determining the export market share of an
economy. Even if a country is very competitive in terms of technology and prices
however, it is not always able to meet the demand for its products because of a
capacity constraint.
The market share of exports S(X ) is expressed in multiplicative form in eqn 6.1 as
(6.1)
where A, v, e and a are positive constants. T/Tw represents the technological com-
petitiveness of a country, P/Pw is its price competitiveness, and C is its capacity
to deliver. In this framework, export performance is affected by competitiveness
and is not an indicator of competitiveness per se. Competitiveness is associated
more with the concept of efficiency.
Fagerberg assumes that C depends on three factors: (a) the growth in techno-
logical capability and know-how that is made possible by the diffusion of tech-
nology from the countries on the world innovation frontier to the rest of the world
(Q); (b) the growth in physical production equipment, buildings, equipment and
infrastructure (K); and (c) the rate of growth of world demand (W). The latter
could actually influence S(X ) in both directions. Without a capacity constraint
growth in W would lead to an increase in S(X ). If demand outstrips the given level
of capacity, exports will remain constant, but the market share of exports will
decrease, because other countries will increase their exports.
Evolution of the Philippine manufacturing sector
The anti-protectionist neoclassical view became dominant among government tech-
nocrats starting in the late 1970s, and as a result a major trade reform programme
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was implemented in 1980. The objective was to make the Philippines more 
outwardly oriented by opening up its economy. After the trade reform process was
disrupted because of the external debt crisis in 1984–5, major import liberaliza-
tion programmes were implemented from 1986 to 1988. During this period,
imports for more than 1,400 items were liberalized, bringing down the percentage
of import-restricted items to less than 10 per cent.
This was followed by the second phase of the Tariff Reform Program that nar-
rowed down the tariff range to mostly within 30 per cent. This was implemented
by the Aquino administration under Executive Order (EO) 470 that covered
the period 1991–5. Tariff reform was accelerated during the third phase of the
programme this time under the Ramos administration. EO 264 called for a tariff
range from 3 to 10 per cent by the year 2000 and a uniform 5 per cent tariff by
the year 2004.
Partly because of the reforms in the trade sector, the overall efficiency of the
manufacturing sector as measured by the effective protection rate (EPR) and the
domestic resource cost (DRC) increased (Medalla 1998). In addition, total exports
and the share of manufactured exports increased sharply. From only 4.8 billion
USD in 1986, total exports surged to 20.5 billion USD in 1996. This represents 
an increase in the share of the Philippine exports in the world market from 0.24 
per cent in 1986 to 0.40 per cent, although it is lower than the share of the devel-
oping HPAEs. The share of manufactured exports increased from 55 to 83 per cent
(Table 6.1). Exports, however, are still concentrated in electronics and garments 
(at least up to 1993 for the latter), revealing a slow pace of change in the structure
of the trade sector.
A more detailed exposition of the trade sector will show the evolution of the 
current account and the nature of structural problems of the Philippine economy.
Table 6.4 presents data on revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for exports in
the manufacturing sector.3 During the period 1980–95, the economy lost compar-
ative advantage in tobacco manufactures, wood and cork products, and basic metal
industries. The Philippines gained comparative advantage in electrical machinery
during this same period, mainly through the semiconductor industry. It maintained
a comparative advantage in food manufactures, footwear and wearing apparel, and
furniture and fixtures. The RCA index for these industries, however, declined
between 1980 and 1995.
The index of a sector’s contribution to the trade balance (ICTB) is generally
consistent with the trend in RCA (Table 6.5). The value of the ICTB for tobacco
and basic metals fell during the period 1980–95. In the case of the food sector,
there was a sharp drop in its ICTB while the values of footwear, wearing apparel
and furniture remained fairly constant. The ICTB of electrical machinery turned
from negative to positive in this period.
The distribution of exports across the different categories using data from the
International Trade Statistics also reveals a disturbing trend (Table 6.6). Electrical
machinery and miscellaneous manufactures have been the sectors with the fastest
growing shares. Despite this development, gross value added of electrical
machinery was only 2 per cent of GDP in 1997. Meanwhile special transactions,
Trade, competitiveness and finance 163
Table 6.4 Revealed comparative advantage: Philippine share/world share per industry
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Food manufactures 4.74 4.52 5.36 3.97 4.05 3.80 3.48 3.05 2.91 2.79 2.64 2.50 2.41 2.23 1.66 1.40
Beverage industries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tobacco manufactures 1.39 2.05 1.88 1.58 1.34 1.29 1.07 0.72 0.62 0.57 1.14 1.41 0.60 0.42 0.31 0.25
Textile manufactures 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.14 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.27
Footwear and 2.80 3.33 3.11 3.16 2.11 2.42 2.08 1.67 1.70 2.12 2.42 5.41 2.22 1.96 1.84 1.77
wearing app.
Wood and cork prod. 6.11 6.60 6.38 6.98 5.72 5.27 4.89 3.69 3.21 2.67 1.84 2.09 1.26 0.81 0.81 0.73
Furniture and fixtures 2.67 3.09 2.87 3.30 3.28 3.35 2.89 2.67 2.98 3.24 2.80 2.33 2.07 2.01 1.97 1.79
Paper and paper prod. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.08
Publishing and printing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Leather and 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.52 0.47 0.50 0.76 0.91 1.06 0.85 0.70 0.79 0.93
leather prod.
Rubber products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chemical and 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.56 0.86 0.63 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.20
chemical prod.
Petroleum and 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.24
coal prod.
Non-metallic 0.36 0.28 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.17
mineral prod.
Basic metal 3.21 2.62 2.05 1.95 1.44 2.01 1.96 1.28 1.53 1.35 1.45 1.23 1.10 0.86 0.77 0.74
industries
Metal industries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.36 0.04 0.04
Machinery exc. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
electrical
Electrical machinery 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.51 0.79 0.63 0.73 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.92 2.07 1.17 1.55 1.25 1.24
Transport equipment 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.13
Misc. manufactures 3.63 4.74 5.77 5.44 6.21 6.07 5.13 4.71 4.43 4.51 4.53 0.70 4.69 4.92 5.27 5.51
Source of basic data: UN International Trade Statistics, 1980–8, 1990–5. Figures for 1989 were obtained by taking the average of 1988 and 1990.
Table 6.5 Contribution to trade balance, 1980–95
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Food 0.294 0.272 0.307 0.231 0.232 0.184 0.186 0.180 0.141 0.118 0.097 0.118 0.101 0.083 0.057 0.070
Tobacco 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.003
Textile 0.014 0.018 0.017 0.029 0.028 0.035 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.089 0.047 0.040 0.036 0.033
Wearing 0.048 0.061 0.055 0.063 0.046 0.057 0.060 0.066 0.063 0.074 0.085 0.226 0.088 0.073 0.069 0.062
apparel
Leather 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004
Footwear 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.009
Wood 0.082 0.072 0.062 0.078 0.062 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.051 0.037 0.021 0.025 0.012 0.006 0.009 0.006
Furniture 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.024 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.016
Paper 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.015
Printing 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Chemicals 0.077 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.079 0.080 0.088 0.083 0.082 0.069 0.062 0.064 0.057 0.054 0.050 0.050
Petroleum 0.299 0.319 0.276 0.268 0.265 0.289 0.171 0.184 0.124 0.132 0.130 0.131 0.117 0.097 0.079 0.079
Rubber 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Plastics 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.016 0.013 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.030 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.026
Non-metals 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000
Basic metals 0.142 0.109 0.042 0.055 0.046 0.082 0.056 0.014 0.022 0.018 0.009 0.017 0.021 0.034 0.031 0.043
Fabricated 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.016 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.006
Machinery 0.125 0.104 0.123 0.112 0.065 0.067 0.073 0.075 0.082 0.096 0.102 0.070 0.101 0.113 0.109 0.100
Electrical 0.032 0.035 0.034 0.014 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.024 0.041 0.035 0.086 0.061 0.052
Transport 0.061 0.051 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.039 0.048 0.062 0.055 0.058 0.084 0.074 0.067
Prof. 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009
Scientific
Miscellaneous 0.067 0.105 0.127 0.137 0.106 0.127 0.067 0.109 0.116 0.167 0.193 0.036 0.194 0.211 0.221 0.220
manufactures
Source of basic data: UN International Trade Statistics, 1980–8, 1990–5. Figures for 1989 were obtained by taking the average of 1988 and 1990.
Table 6.6 Share to total exports, 1980–95
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Food 34.78 33.23 41.96 29.16 29.30 25.64 25.24 22.73 21.10 19.07 17.32 16.90 15.94 14.40 10.65 12.14
Tobacco 0.50 0.84 0.93 0.67 0.53 0.52 0.43 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.60 0.79 0.34 0.23 0.17 0.12
Textile 1.30 1.22 1.24 0.84 0.98 0.85 0.97 1.11 0.95 0.67 0.43 0.78 0.74 0.65 0.87 0.82
Wearing apparel 4.68 5.90 5.89 6.14 4.36 5.39 5.68 6.21 5.92 6.93 8.32 21.25 8.59 7.50 6.66 6.06
Leather 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.53 0.62 0.54 0.47 0.56 0.63
Footwear 1.16 1.28 1.24 1.10 0.86 0.84 0.64 0.55 0.64 0.81 0.95 1.52 1.19 1.25 1.30 0.88
Wood 7.94 6.96 6.68 7.69 5.95 5.24 5.17 5.32 4.81 3.49 2.36 2.61 1.55 1.10 1.08 0.88
Furniture 1.33 1.53 1.43 1.67 1.64 1.81 1.85 2.28 2.60 2.45 2.31 2.02 1.84 1.79 1.78 1.58
Paper 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.23 0.19
Printing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chemicals 0.42 0.50 0.60 0.72 1.00 2.33 4.12 3.35 2.64 2.45 2.28 2.56 1.59 1.32 1.28 1.13
Petroleum 0.63 0.55 0.64 2.21 1.53 0.74 1.27 1.65 2.04 2.13 2.21 2.63 2.42 2.01 1.59 1.50
Rubber 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Plastics 0.19 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.63 0.57 0.67 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.62
Non-metals 0.65 0.41 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.32
Basic metals 20.99 15.37 11.87 10.80 7.82 10.99 10.13 7.32 10.18 9.04 8.06 6.72 5.37 4.03 3.63 3.82
Fabricated 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.43 0.05 0.04
Machinery 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 3.73 1.97 1.89 1.73 2.53
Electrical 0.92 1.44 1.83 3.90 6.85 5.62 7.30 8.38 8.39 8.89 10.08 22.41 13.35 20.29 17.42 17.39
Transport 0.52 0.57 0.38 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.63 0.99 0.20 0.23 0.59 0.31 0.55 0.85 1.23 1.20
Prof. Scientific 0.34 0.36 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Misc. 18.00 23.63 28.65 28.17 33.26 32.87 29.91 32.78 32.85 33.96 34.91 4.11 35.61 39.21 39.65 41.80
Manufactures
Source of basic data: UN International Trade Statistics, 1980–8, 1990–5.  Figures for 1989 were obtained by taking the average of 1988 and 1990.
Note: Breakdown of misc. manufactures: toys, sporting goods, etc.; gold, silver ware, jewelry; musical instruments, pts.; other manufactured goods; special transactions; gold, 
non-monetary nes.
consisting mainly of re-exports, are the main component of miscellaneous 
manufactures.
The deceptive export configuration explains why despite the increasing share
of manufactured exports, the share of value added of the manufacturing sector in
total output has remained stagnant for the past twenty years and is even lower than
the value in 1980 (Table 6.1). Estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) for the
Philippine manufacturing sector show a steady decline in the period 1956–75
which became sharper from 1975 to 1980 (Hooley 1985). The trend continued
into the 1980s up to 1992 (Cororaton et al. 1995). The year-on-year growth of
value added in the manufacturing sector in real terms has actually declined for
thirteen consecutive quarters – from 1995Q4 to 1998Q4.
Medalla (1998) attributes the conflicting trends – a rise in efficiency measures
in the manufacturing sector and continuing structural problems – to three factors:
(1) adjustment, often times painful, to a more open trade regime; (2) a persistently
overvalued currency; and (3) the switch in relative protection between agriculture
and manufacturing, this time in favour of the former. One could add to this list 
a relatively low investment rate in the Philippines and poor infrastructure.
An inevitable outcome of a more open trade regime is that inefficient local
firms are weeded out almost immediately because of the deluge of imports. 
It will take some time before the resources are reinvested in more efficient sec-
tors that are usually export oriented. The restructuring process is akin to the 
‘J-curve’ effect of a currency devaluation. In this case, the manufacturing sector
contracts because of the closure of non-competitive firms but it should start 
to grow rapidly once resources are used more efficiently. This explanation, 
however, conveniently ignores the fact that the bulk of trade liberalization took
place in the late 1980s but the marked slowdown of the manufacturing sector
occurred between 1995 and 1997 in spite of accelerated economic growth up 
to 1996.
The restructuring process would have been smoother if the currency had been
allowed to depreciate in real terms following the increase in demand for imports.
The lower value of the peso would have acted as a cover for import-competing
industries. Because of the overvaluation of the peso, import-competing firms
were hit with a double whammy: lower tariffs and an artificially strong peso, both
of which made imports cheap. An overvalued currency could also explain
why exports are heavily concentrated in commodities that are import depend-
ent. Because it is relatively cheap to import, exporters focus on products whose
inputs can be sourced from abroad, making labour the primary source of value
added.
Overall, the Philippines has taken great strides to enhance its outward orienta-
tion and is bordering on being a completely open economy by the year 2004. This
progression has dovetailed with the process of globalization. Despite the policy
reforms, however, manufacturing growth has not performed up to expectations.
Apart from the factors discussed in this section, the reasons may deal with the
structural aspects related to macroeconomic stability and weaknesses in financial
institutions.
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Empirical results
Based on the analytical framework, the following general functions were esti-
mated using data from 1980 to 1995:
(6.2)
(6.3)
The index i refers to a particular manufacturing sector while t is an index for
time.4
The RCA index for the various manufacturing sectors was computed and was
used as the measure of trade performance and an indicator of the trade pattern in
the Philippines. Competitiveness for each sector was determined using a produc-
tivity measure, . The simplest would be growth in labour productivity.5 A more
complicated procedure would be to estimate the TFP for each sector.
TFP is a concept of efficiency where the economy’s productive inputs like
labour and capital are jointly used in production. It can be measured in two ways:
(1) the deterministic approach, and (2) the stochastic approach. The deterministic
approach is further divided into two categories: (a) index number approach, and
(b) growth accounting approach. The latter two methodologies are simple and
TFP estimates can be easily computed. A weakness of these approaches, however,
is the residual treatment of TFP that could render biased estimates.
The stochastic approach, on the other hand, assumes the existence of an unob-
servable production frontier function and from this, the actual production frontier is
compared. In doing so, the residual treatment is eliminated and all factors con-
tributing to production are accounted for. This approach can be used both for time
series and cross-section data. Cororaton (1998) applied both the growth accounting
and stochastic approach to Philippine manufacturing sector data.
The implicit price index Pit for each sector i was used as an indicator of price
competitiveness since unit labour costs are not available for the given sectoral
breakdown. The price index was scaled by an import price index for non-fuel
products, P*, to get a measure of relative prices. The capability of an economy to
deliver or its capacity is related to existing capital stock, K.
Estimates of K for each sector were obtained by Cororaton using the perpetual
inventory method. These values of K, which were also used to obtain the produc-
tivity figures, were used for the econometric estimation.
Since K is generated by investment, it is through the latter variable that the link
between trade and financial development can be established. The investment rate
per sector (I/GVA), defined to be sectoral investment divided by sectoral gross
value added, is modelled to be determined by volatility in the real effective
exchange rate, , and the level of financial sector development which is captured
by the ratio of broad money M3 to GNP. The technique employed by Schwert
(1989) was used to estimate volatility of the real effective exchange rate.
I
GVAit







RCAit  1  2it  3
Pit
P*
 4Kit  it ,
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The amount of FDI scaled by GDP should also affect investment. The experi-
ence of the developing HPAEs shows that the entry of foreign investment spurred
an increase in domestic investment that was put in place to support the require-
ments of MNCs. The real effective exchange rate, e, is added to incorporate the
effects of an overvalued currency.
In the various estimates of the first equation (see Table 6.7), the coefficients for
the growth in labour productivity, TFP using the growth accounting approach and
TFP using the stochastic are all insignificant.6 As a matter of fact, the coefficient
of labour productivity growth is negative and significant at the 10 per cent level.
The results show unambiguously that there is no empirical support for a link
between the productivity measures and export performance. Changes in technol-
ogy and productivity in the domestic manufacturing sector did not influence the
pattern of Philippine exports during the period 1980–95.
The variable representing relative prices carries the correct negative sign but the
coefficient is not significant. What is troubling though is the consistent negative
sign of the coefficient for capital stock, which is significant at the 10 per cent level.
It seems that increased investment activity that augments the capital stock does not
contribute to better export performance and may even hamper it. This result, com-
bined with the earlier observation that technological competitiveness and export
performance are not related, is a clear indication that the export sector has its own
dynamics, independent of the developments in the local manufacturing sector. 
A dichotomy exists between the domestic manufacturing sector and the export 
sector.
Estimates on eqn (6.2) were also run with and FDI/GDP as explanatory vari-
ables. Real exchange rate volatility may affect export performance directly since
it affects the rate of return of exporters and hence their profit risk (Medhora
1998). FDI affects export performance in two ways. First, it relaxes the capacity
constraint by providing more capital inputs for production. And second, to the
extent that the FDI is export oriented, it directly contributes to the level of exports,
and hence a higher market share. The results, however, did not improve with the
inclusion of these two variables in eqn (6.2). Perhaps the results would differ if
FDI by sector were used. Unfortunately, such data is not readily available.
Trade, competitiveness and finance 169
Table 6.7 Estimation of eqn (6.1)
Estimation of eqn (6.1) using growth rate of labour productivity
Dependent variable: RCA?; Method: GLS (cross-section weights); Sample: 1981,
1995; Included observations: 15; Total panel (balanced) observations: 165; Cross
sections without valid observations dropped.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
C 0.169304 0.073901 2.290947 0.0233
GLP? 0.001219 0.000559 2.180934 0.0306
RELP? 3.826360 2.255614 1.696372 0.0918
K? 3.44E05 1.77E05 1.947312 0.0532
RCA?(1) 0.929035 0.016572 56.06052 0.0000
Table 6.7 Continued
Weighted statistics
R2: 0.909251; Mean dependent var.: 1.795564;
Adjusted R2: 0.906983; S.D. dependent var.: 1.396951;
S.E. of regression: 0.426053; Sum squared resid.: 29.04335;
Log likelihood: 83.07333; F-statistic: 400.7776;
Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.332512; Prob (F-statistic): 0.000000.
Estimation of eqn (6.1) using growth rate of TFP (growth accounting approach)
Dependent variable: RCA?; Method: GLS (cross-section weights); Sample: 1981, 1995;
Included observations: 15; Total panel (balanced) observations: 180.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
C 0.131304 0.084445 1.554896 0.1218
TG? 0.144839 0.095450 1.517425 0.1310
RELP? 2.746532 2.570912 1.068310 0.2869
K? 3.64E05 1.94E05 1.877880 0.0621
RCA?(1) 0.931458 0.015758 59.11175 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R2: 0.915674; Mean dependent var.: 1.541699;
Adjusted R2: 0.913746; S.D. dependent var.: 1.272487;
S.E. of regression: 0.373717; Sum squared resid.: 24.44122;
Log likelihood: 91.13248; F-statistic: 475.0681;
Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.308555; Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000.
Estimation of eqn (6.1) using growth rate of TFP (stochastic approach)
Dependent variable: RCA?; Method: GLS (cross-section weights); Date: 11/19/98;
Time: 11:36; Sample: 1981, 1995; Included observations: 15; Total panel (balanced)
observations: 180.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
C 0.060769 0.195637 0.310623 0.7565
TS? 20.13391 17.27408 1.165556 0.2454
RELP? 2.237510 2.451574 0.912683 0.3627
K? 3.31E05 1.79E05 1.844362 0.0668
RCA?(1) 0.927263 0.016447 56.38029 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R2: 0.903338; Mean dependent var.: 1.707719;
Adjusted R2: 0.901128; S.D. dependent var.: 1.330213;
S.E. of regression: 0.418271; Sum squared resid.: 30.61633;
Log likelihood: 107.3332; F-statistic 408.8559;
Durbin–Watson stat 2.285064; Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000.
Variable definitions: RCA?: revealed comparative advantage by sector (indexed by?); 
GLP?: growth rate of labour productivity by sector (indexed by?); TG?: growth rate of total 
factor productivity by sector (indexed by?) using growth accounting; TS?: growth rate of total 
factor productivity by sector (indexed by?) using stochastic approach; RELP?: relative price per sec-
tor; defined as Pi/P*, where Pi is the implicit price index of sector i and P* is the price index of non-
oil imports. P* is not available on a sectoral basis; K?: capital stock by sector.
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Table 6.8 Estimation of eqn (6.2)
Estimate of eqn (6.2) using REER volatility
Dependent variable: INVA; Method: GLS (cross-section weights); Date: 11/19/98;
Time: 12:48; Sample: 1981, 1995; Included observations: 15; 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
C 0.006326 0.003867 1.635895 0.1037
SIGMA 1.84E05 0.000693 0.026515 0.9789
M3GNP 0.000306 0.000121 2.524540 0.0125
FDIGDP 0.002243 0.000979 2.291524 0.0231
REER 0.000137 5.01E05 2.729968 0.0070
INVA?(1) 0.730557 0.053361 13.69080 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R2: 0.534363; Mean dependent var.: 0.016618;
Adjusted R2: 0.520983; S.D. dependent var.: 0.020799;
S.E. of regression: 0.014396; Sum squared resid.: 0.036058;
Log likelihood: 816.4368; F-statistic: 39.93638;
Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.509469 Prob(F-statistic): 0.000000.
Estimate of eqn (6.2) using inflation as volatility measure
Dependent variable: INVA?; Method: GLS (cross-section weights); Date: 04/29/99;
Time: 11:49; Sample: 1981, 1995; Included observations: 15; 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
C 0.007200 0.003515 2.048365 0.0420
INFL 3.76E05 3.63E05 1.034215 0.3025
M3GNP 0.000267 0.000126 2.120790 0.0354
FDIGDP 0.002290 0.000914 2.505885 0.0131
REER 0.000127 4.97E05 2.558213 0.0114
INVA?(1) 0.718011 0.054607 13.14881 0.0000
Weighted statistics
R2: 0.490294; Mean dependent var.: 0.016001;
Adjusted R2: 0.475647; S.D. dependent var.: 0.019529;
S.E. of regression: 0.014141; Sum squared resid.: 0.034796;
Log likelihood: 816.6738; F-statistic: 33.47463;
Durbin–Watson stat.: 2.512686; Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000.
Variable definitions: INVA?: investment per sector as a ratio to sectoral value added (indexed
by?); SIGMA: measure of exchange rate volatility; M3GNP: ratio of total domestic liquidity to
GNP; FDIGDP: ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP; REER: real effective exchange rate
(1980 100), an increase in REER implies an appreciation; INFL: inflation rate.
Estimates of eqn (6.3) (Table 6.8) show a significant positive relationship
between the investment rate and the measure of financial development. Because
of the adverse relationship between capital stock and RCA obtained in the first
equation, a conclusive statement on the impact of financial development on
export structure cannot be made. A different line of analysis will be adopted and
discussed in the latter part of the chapter.
172 J. T. Yap
Another variable that is significant is FDI although it carries a negative coeffi-
cient. Apparently the entry of FDI displaces some local investment or else it leads
to complacency among domestic entrepreneurs. This result, however, must be
studied more carefully. Certainly, it does not imply that policies discouraging FDI
should be implemented.
The measure of exchange rate volatility is not significant although the level of
REER carries a significant negative coefficient. A higher REER implies an
appreciating peso in real terms which hurts import-competing industries and
exporters. This would of course discourage investment in these two important
sectors. Other measures of exchange rate volatility could also be used to model
more closely the extent of macroeconomic instability. If the inflation rate is used
instead of exchange rate volatility, there is a minor improvement in the equation
but the variable for macroeconomic instability remains insignificant.
3. Competitiveness, finance and macroeconomic stability
Major hypothesis
The dichotomy between the domestic manufacturing sector and the export sector
is the reason why the share of manufacturing value added to GDP has been stag-
nant despite the dramatic rise in the share of manufactured exports. One possible
reason for the dichotomy is that the more efficient sectors are not allocated enough
credit. This section aims to provide empirical evidence to test this hypothesis.
In a world of perfect capital markets where the Modigliani and Miller and the
Fisher separation theorems would be valid, the performance of firms and eco-
nomic sectors could be explained without reference to the developments in the
financial sector. But at the onset, it is observed that the financial sector of the
Philippines is far from perfect. Apart from the usual problems of asymmetric
information in financial markets, the Philippine financial system has been ham-
pered by structural problems related mainly to the oligarchic banking system.
Access to credit, thus, is a key determinant of economic performance.
The role of export finance
Export finance is another area that may offer an explanation for the weak link
between productivity growth and export performance. A survey of exporters
revealed that only a minority were covered by the BSP’s rediscount window,
which was the most important export financing scheme in the Philippines, at least
in the 1980s. Only about 500 out of about 6,000 direct exporters had access to the
export loan discount scheme. As a result, export loans outstanding declined from
14 per cent of export value in 1982 to just 1 per cent in 1986–8 (Rhee et al. 1990).
Indirect exporters were not eligible for the CB’s pre-shipment export finance
window even though they are several times more numerous than direct exporters.
This failure to assure equal access to working capital financing for indirect
exporters hindered the development of backward linkages as well as the
Trade, competitiveness and finance 173
development of trading companies (Rhee et al. 1990). One mechanism suggested
to expand the coverage to indirect exporters is the introduction of the domestic 
letter of credit.
The underdevelopment of the export financial system was generally a product of
the underdevelopment of the entire financial system. For example, heavy collateral
requirements by commercial banks have been cited as the major impediment to
wider access to export financing. A pre-shipment export finance guarantee could
have been designed to overcome this constraint. Such a scheme existed in the
Philippines, but had only a limited role, at least in the 1980s. This could be
explained by a shallow financial base that prevented effective risk sharing among
the various parties involved.
Framework and empirical results
In the absence of robust financial data at the firm level, the methodology of Rajan
and Zingales (1998) will be adopted. In their study, the growth of a particular
industry is linked to the external financial dependence of that industry and the
degree of financial development of the economy. Their hypothesis is that indus-
tries that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in economies that
are more financially developed.
To test this hypothesis, Rajan and Zingales estimate the technological demand
for external finance that a firm operating in a specific industry would choose in
a perfect capital market. Since the US comes closest to the criteria for a well-
functioning capital market, the observed ratio of external finance (defined to be
the difference between investment and cash generated from operations) in the US
for a particular industry is used as a benchmark. 
To test the relationship between the level of financial development on the one
hand and competitiveness and trade pattern on the other, the EDR is compared
with the growth rate of productivity – the measure of competitiveness – and RCA.
In both cases, the sectors are ranked, first, by labour productivity growth and,
then, by RCA. A rank correlation coefficient using the EDR ranking as a basis for
comparison is then computed for both cases.
In the context of a financially underdeveloped economy like the Philippines,
there should be a negative correlation between the ranking obtained from EDR
and the ranking obtained from the growth rate of labour productivity. This implies
that inadequate access to credit prevents firms with a high EDR from reaching
their potential growth, leading to low productivity performance. A similar expla-
nation could be made in the case of the RCA measure. A negative correlation
would imply that the economy is unable to develop a comparative advantage in
particular sectors because of lack of access to credit.
The estimates of the rank correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6.9. There
is no general pattern for the sample period 1980–95 for both RCA and growth of
labour productivity. Moreover, the values are closer to zero than to one. It would
seem that access to credit plays no major role in determining competitiveness or
the trade pattern.
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Based on this evidence, the dichotomy between the export sector and the
domestic manufacturing sector could be attributed more directly to real factors
rather than financial constraints. What could be emphasized though is that the
financial sector was a major source of macroeconomic instability leading to high
inflation rates, an overvalued currency and a low investment rate.
4. Micro–macro and real–financial interactions
General analysis
The dichotomy between the export sector and domestic manufacturing sector
transcends the usual dualistic structure that exists between the traditional and
modern sectors. A possible explanation for this structure in the manufacturing
sector is provided by Dohner and Intal (1989). Philippine export promotion meas-
ures allowed producers to obtain imported inputs at world market prices, leading
to the development of export processing based on imported materials and the low
wages of Philippine labour. The retention and augmentation of the system of
protection for manufacturing firms producing for the domestic market meant that
value-added margins of these export producers would remain very thin; the
higher cost and lower quality of domestic materials precluded the growth of
domestic sourcing. The high degree of protection of the domestic markets
also tended to limit export products to industries where the transport cost of
materials was low and labour input requirements high. Garments and electronic
Table 6.9 Estimates of Spearman rank
coefficient
















EDR: external dependence ratio; RCA: revealed
comparative advantage; GLP: growth rate of
labour productivity.
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components, which have been the top two export categories since 1982, fit these
requirements perfectly. Dohner and Intal describe export growth as intensive
rather than extensive.
This explanation – citing the highly protectionist system as the main factor
behind the narrow export base – is largely consistent with the orthodox or neo-
classical economic view. The natural policy recommendation would be a more
open trade regime. A corollary to the orthodox position is the problem of an over-
valued currency. An artificially cheap peso encouraged exports that are import
intensive. Exporters offset the penalty of an uncompetitive exchange rate by rely-
ing heavily on higher quality imports of raw materials and intermediate goods
made relatively inexpensive by the overvalued peso. 
The experience of the developed HPAEs provides a striking contrast to the neo-
classical blueprint. Instead of working to get prices right, the economies of Japan,
Korea and Taiwan implemented policies to get the fundamentals right. Among the
major thrusts was to enhance their technology capability through the judicious
use of policy interventions (Lall 1995). The developed HPAEs relied heavily on
licensing agreements and reverse engineering and were selective with, even
sometimes hostile to, FDI (Lall 1994).
Meanwhile, developing HPAEs and Singapore sourced the technological devel-
opment of their export sector primarily from FDI. In this situation, the link
between productivity growth in the manufacturing sector and export performance
would depend on the level of FDI and degree of technology transfer. The evolu-
tion of the Philippine export sector since 1975, and its contrast to the experience
of the developing HPAEs, can largely be explained by the nature and extent of
FDI flows into the economy.
Table 6.3 shows that the Philippines was a laggard in terms of attracting FDI
mainly because of the adverse macroeconomic and political environment. The
pattern of export growth in the Philippines in the last two decades was simply 
a response to the trend towards the internationalization of the division of labour
where the industries which lost their comparative advantage in the more devel-
oped countries found their way into economies characterized by a relatively low
wage scale (Broad 1988). The inability of the export sector to effectively diver-
sify into other commodities indicates that the Philippines was simply riding on
the worldwide trend towards industry relocation rather than seriously implement-
ing an industrial policy, particularly an export programme. Unlike Singapore and
Malaysia, there was no coherent strategy implemented to ensure effective tech-
nology transfer.
A key finding of Cororaton et al. (1995) is that FDI has not generally been con-
tributing to the technical progress of the manufacturing sector. This conclusion is
consistent with the survey results of Lindsey (1989) from the manufacturing
sector where he finds that: (1) most of the equipment brought in by investors are
already in use in the Philippines; (2) R&D activities are limited to quality
control instead of basic research; (3) there is minimal diffusion of technology to
local firms; and (4) the processes used are very simple, leaving little room for
skills development.
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Implications for policy
To bring about a more integrated economy, economic managers in the Philippines
followed the standard response, adopting a programme akin to the Washington
consensus. Several analysts have cautioned against strict adherence to this frame-
work (Rodrik 1992; Guerrieri 1994; French-Davis 1994). Structural transforma-
tion has a major influence on the acquisition of comparative advantage and is a
cause of economic growth. Guerrieri argues that the economic metamorphosis
should not be considered as an automatic by-product of an outward-oriented strat-
egy and sound macroeconomic policies, as free trade orthodoxy regards it.
Neoliberal economics largely disregards the key role played by technology in
changing trade patterns and hence misses the structural dimension of a country’s
competitiveness.
Echoing this sentiment, Lall (1995) argues that the more important and perva-
sive source of market failure is likely to be learning processes in production rather
than scale economies or externalities. This fact is particularly important for devel-
oping countries, which are latecomers to industrialization and thus face estab-
lished competitors that have already undergone the learning process.
Depending on the extent of the learning costs involved, as well as the efficiency
of the relevant factor markets and supporting institutions, there may be a valid case
for selective and variable infant industry protection, and for the gradual exposure
of existing activities to import competition. Since protection itself reduces the
incentive to invest in capability building, however, it has to be carefully designed,
sparingly granted, strictly monitored, and offset by measures to force firms to aim
for world standards of efficiency. The most effective way to offset the disincentives
to develop capabilities that arise from protection seems to be strong pressures to
enter export markets, as a commitment to exporting disciplines not only firms but
also those who design and administer policy. In Lall’s view, the true contribution
of export orientation to industrialization is to provide the right framework for
selective interventions.
The emerging external environment, however, constrains the available policy
options. As Lall (1994) points out: ‘… the international scene, the GATT, and the
pressures exerted by the developed Western countries, are inimical to selective
intervention … Many instruments of industrial policy are increasingly constrained
in the name of liberalization.’ (p. 652) He correctly asserts, however, that if there
is a valid case for intervention, then a review of the international rules of the game
is warranted.
The recent performance of the Philippine manufacturing sector supports the
aforementioned concerns. Despite the reforms implemented in the late 1980s and
accelerated in the early 1990s, the manufacturing sector experienced a decelera-
tion even prior to the 1997 financial crisis.
Meanwhile, the liberalization of the financial system and the capital account in
order to spur financial development also has its downside, as painfully revealed
by the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. These twin liberalizations could fuel what
is termed ‘financierism’, characterized by the growing supremacy of financial
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activity over productive activity (French-Davis 1994). The adverse effects of
financierism could be attributed to the inadequate regulatory structure in place at
the time of liberalizing the financial system. Some analysts put the blame
squarely on the corrupt practices in some of the East Asian countries, citing
behest loans in Korea and crony capitalism in Indonesia.
What is certain is that the situation is more complicated than this. Many of the
East Asian economies that were buffeted by the crisis had relatively strong macro-
economic fundamentals and were dragged into crisis by the financial panic of for-
eign investors. Krugman (1999), for instance, does not agree that Asian economies
are being punished for crony capitalism since the ‘the scale of punishment seems
wholly disproportionate to the crime’ (p. 22). He has joined the bandwagon of
those calling for the reform of the international financial architecture.
The ideology of liberalization should not cloud the objective of policy reforms:
the improvement of the technological capability of the manufacturing sector, the
establishment of a dynamic link between the manufacturing and export sectors,
and the development of a stable financial system. Given that globalization is an
irreversible process, the Philippines must strive to attract FDI and achieve the suc-
cess of the developing HPAEs in this regard. Simultaneously, economic managers
must apply strategic interventions to facilitate the transfer of technology. These
would include:
1 Encourage the practice of ‘mirroring’ similar to the case of Korea. An expa-
triate engineer would be assigned a local counterpart whom he should train.
The local engineer would eventually assume the responsibility of the foreign
engineer.
2 Encourage multinational corporations to link up with a domestic firm and
develop the latter as a source of intermediate inputs. Such subcontracting was
practised extensively in Singapore and Malaysia.
3 The government must set clear strategies and policies on technology devel-
opment – whether adoption, modification, or generation – by industry.
4 Develop in parallel the human resource capital to cope with the requirements
of technology transfer.
These recommendations are consistent with the findings of a recent PIDS study
(Yap 1998) showing that the Philippines has many weak links at the microeconomic
level preventing the benefits from macroeconomic reforms from being realized.
This includes a low level of technological capability that hampers backward and
forward linkages in industries; a poor record in human resource development that
contributes to low labour productivity; extremely slow alleviation of poverty and
income inequality that gnaws at the basic fabric of social cohesion; and inadequate
infrastructure that discourages domestic and foreign investment. These shortcom-
ings are at the root of coordination failures that threaten macroeconomic stability. 
Policy recommendations for the financial sector have to be studied more care-
fully given the recent experience in East Asia. The study by Rhee et al. (1990)
recommended the establishment of a foreign currency loan scheme for exporters
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to take advantage of the lower international interest rates. Presumably, this need
was addressed when the capital market was liberalized. Unfortunately, the dollar-
denominated loans were not limited to exporters and borrowers without a natural
exchange rate hedge also availed of these loans. This situation was one of the pri-
mary causes of the downward economic spiral when the crisis struck.
There are, of course, the standardized proposals for reform of the banking 
sector. It has been recommended that prudential regulation and supervision be
strengthened by implementing comprehensive risk-based assessment and super-
vision instead of focusing primarily on credit risk. In addition, there is a need for
more stringent information disclosure requirements, adequate accounting and
auditing standards, as well as clearer rules and greater transparency in asset clas-
sification and provisioning (Intal and Llanto 1998).
These reforms, however, must take into consideration political and institutional
factors which are at the core of the problems in the banking sector. For example,
no matter how comprehensive the risk assessment that is required, it is ineffective
if bank supervisors fall prey to the pressures of special interests. While making
reforms more difficult to implement, these factors are fundamental in nature and,
if tackled, would definitely bring about a beneficial transformation of Philippine
society. 
Notes
1 Funding from IDRC and CEDES and the organizational support of the Policy and
Development Foundation, Inc. (PDFI) are gratefully acknowledged. This chapter would
not have been possible without the excellent research assistance of Ma. Teresa Dueñas-
Caparas. The author would also like to gratefully acknowledge the vast contribution
of Dr Caesar B. Cororaton to this chapter in terms of estimates of capital stock and
productivity. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 Hutchcroft (1998) provides an excellent description and analysis of the political
economy of the Philippine banking system and the overall Philippine development
experience.
3 The RCA index is the ratio of the share of single countries in world exports of a given
product group to the share of the same country in total world exports. An RCA greater
than one indicates RCA for that particular product group.
4 In the actual estimation, only twelve manufacturing sectors were included. These sectors
both had non-zero RCA and an available estimate of capital stock.
5 Labour productivity for a particular sector is simply value added in that sector divided
by employment in that sector.
6 Other specifications, which are not reported, include a variable to control for the growth
of world trade, which may affect RCA. This did not significantly change the results
shown in Table 6.7.
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7 Competitiveness, international 
trade and finance in a 
minerals-rich economy
The case of South Africa1
Trevor Bell, Greg Farrell and Rashad Cassim
1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider the relationship between competitiveness,
international trade and financial factors in the South African economy.
The term ‘competitiveness’ is used here in two closely related but distinct
senses. One of these refers to a country’s ability ‘to realise central 
economic policy goals, especially growth in income and employment, without
running into balance of payments difficulties’ (Fagerberg 1988: 355). This may
be thought of as competitiveness in the macroeconomic sense, or what we shall
refer to as macro-competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, may also be
defined as the ability of an economy, or sectors of it, to compete in world mar-
kets. Conventionally emphasised sources and indicators of competitiveness in this
sense are movements in real exchange rates, productivity and unit labour costs,
which are reflections of price competitiveness. As distinct from these, there are
various sources of the ability to compete in world markets, such as product 
differentiation and innovation, and (of particular interest in the context of the
present study) access to finance, which may be regarded as aspects of non-price
competitiveness. 
Section 2 considers the competitiveness of the South African economy in the
macroeconomic sense, by examining the historical relationship between GDP
growth and the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP. On this basis, it finds
that there has apparently been a significant deterioration in the competitiveness
of the South African economy.
The rest of the chapter is in effect an attempt to shed light on this problem. 
The rate of growth of exports is clearly one factor pertinent to South Africa’s
macro-competitiveness. One concern of the chapter, thus, is with explaining trade
performance in recent years. A long historical view, however, is seen as indispen-
sable for this purpose. The evolution of the growth and sectoral pattern of South
Africa’s exports in the period 1911–72 is therefore described briefly in Section 3.
Section 4, the longest in the chapter, discusses variations in the growth and 
sectoral pattern of South Africa’s trade in 1972–97, divided into two subperiods:
1972–83, which includes the great gold-led, commodity price boom of that
decade; and the period of adjustment from the onset of economic crisis in the
mid-1980s, through to 1997, which is the main focus of attention. The emphasis
is on changes in relative prices, in particular on real exchange rates, as the deter-
minant of variations in the growth rate and composition of South Africa’s exports,
though some consideration is also given to productivity and unit labour costs. 
The problem of sustaining rapid growth of exports, and hence of increasing
macro-competitiveness, is seen as lying in the sectoral pattern of South Africa’s
exports.
The effect of financial factors based on trade and competitiveness, one of the
particular concerns of the studies in this volume, is the subject of Section 5.
Matters considered there, in varying degrees of detail and in different subsec-
tions, are the effects of South Africa’s relatively advanced stage of financial
development; the availability of credit and economic instability as factors relevant
to the level of investment; differences in the severity of financial constraints
between groups of firms categorised according to trade orientation and trade 
performance, and hence relevant to competitiveness (in both senses stated above);
and the question of whether the ownership of banks by South Africa’s conglom-
erates has skewed the allocation of credit in suboptimal directions. Section 6 
consists of concluding remarks.
2. The relationship between economic growth and
the current account deficit 
This section considers the competitiveness of the South African economy in the
sense of its ability to grow without running into balance-of-payments difficulties
(Fagerberg 1988: 355). That is, it deals with what we shall refer to as the macro-
competitiveness of the South African economy.
Essential to this issue is the statement that:
[W]hat is assumed is that countries do not wish, or are not able, to continu-
ally increase debts or claims to the rest of the world, so that the balance-
of-payments, with the exception of short run fluctuations, will have to 
balance through its current account. This implies that, in the medium and
long run, actual growth has to adjust to the balance-of-trade equilibrium
growth rate, or the growth rate ‘warranted’ by the current account, to use a
Harrodian term. 
(Fagerberg 1988: 361)
Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between the two-year moving average rate of
growth of South Africa’s actual GDP, as conventionally measured, and the current
account/GDP ratio, in each year from 1960 to 1997.2 The trend line through these
points is shown in this figure. As indicated, and as would be expected, a higher
growth rate is associated with a higher current account/GDP ratio. For instance,
a current account deficit ratio of zero is associated with a growth rate of 2.5 
per cent, and a 6 per cent growth rate with a deficit ratio of 2.3 per cent.
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It is noteworthy that, as the growth rate increased in 1992–4, the current account
deficit increased gradually, close to the average for these growth rates in 1960–97.
In 1995, however, when the two-year moving average reached 2.9 per cent, the cur-
rent account deficit increased sharply to 2.1 per cent. As in earlier years, when the
deficit ratio rose sharply above the regression line, both the growth rate and the
deficit ratio were pulled back to more sustainable levels. The deficit ratio of
2.1 per cent in 1995, it should be noted, is one associated in the 1960s with a GDP
growth rate close to 6 per cent. This suggests an unfavourable change in the
relationship between the growth rate and the current account deficit ratio.
Figure 7.2 suggests even more strongly that there has been a substantial
unfavourable change in the relationship between the growth rate and the current
account deficit ratio. Following Ros (1995: 101–2), it shows the historical
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Figure 7.2 The relationship between the potential GDP growth rate and the current
account deficit/potential GDP ratio, 1960–98.
relationship between the current account deficit ratio and the two-year moving aver-
age rate of growth in potential GDP, rather than of GDP as conventionally measured.3
As Figure 7.2 shows, the potential GDP growth rate increased in every year
from 1994 to 1998. However, it remained negative in 1994 and 1995, and, though
positive in 1996, 1997 and 1998, was still very low, at 0.26 per cent, 0.43 per cent
and 0.6 per cent, respectively. Despite these low growth rates of potential output, 
the current account deficit ratio, as noted above, was 2.1 per cent in 1995, and 
1.4 per cent, 1.6 per cent and 2.2 per cent in 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively.
These are clearly current account deficit ratios such as would, on average, have
been historically associated with much higher potential GDP growth rates.
Figure 7.2 probably gives a better indication than Figure 7.1 of the implications
for the current account deficit ratio of some desired, higher average annual
growth rate of, say, 4 or 5 per cent, sustained over a period of, say, five years. 
As the differences between the actual GDP growth rates in 1994–7, shown in 
Figure 7.1, and the negative or very low potential output growth rates in those
years, shown in Figure 7.2, suggest, a large part of the growth in actual output in
recent years has been due to increases in capacity utilisation rather than to
increases in the stock of productive capital, and hence in output capacity.4 Once
capacity utilisation reaches a sufficiently high level, the rate of capital accumula-
tion required to achieve any particular GDP growth rate will tend to increase, with
probably adverse consequences for the current account. Even at the low potential
output growth rates of recent years, the investment to GDP ratio (I/Y) increased
considerably in 1993–7 (Figure 7.3).
As noted earlier, much of the rest of the chapter is in effect an attempt to shed
light on this apparently significant deterioration in the macro-competitiveness of
the South African economy. The rate of growth and sectoral pattern of South
Africa’s exports is clearly one factor that would be expected to be pertinent to 
this problem. Given our view that a long historical perspective is necessary for
understanding the problems of the South African economy today, we turn now to





































































Figure 7.3 GDFI to GDP ratio (both in 1990 prices) (%).
consider briefly, in Section 3, the evolution of South Africa’s export trade in 
earlier decades, from 1911 to 1972. 
3. The evolution of South Africa’s trade specialisation, 1911–72
1911/12–1956/7: The drive to industrialisation through import substitution
In 1911/12, minerals comprised 81.8 per cent of South Africa’s total exports (gold
and diamonds alone contributing 63.5 per cent and 15.1 per cent, respectively),
with agriculture’s 17.6 per cent accounting for virtually all of the rest (Frankel
1938: 108, table 16).
Thereafter, through to the Second World War, gold output and exports grew
slowly, and the drive to industrialisation began in earnest in the years between the
First and Second World Wars. Manufacturing value-added grew rapidly in these
interwar years, and through to the mid-1950s, largely on the basis of substantial
import substitution. The ratio of imports to domestic supply (that is, imports to
gross output plus imports) for manufacturing in the aggregate fell from 57.2 per
cent in 1926/7 to 28.7 per cent in 1956/7 (Bell and Farrell 1997: 596–600, 603,
table 3).
The forty-year period from 1916/17 to 1956/7 thus saw substantial diversifica-
tion of production in the economy as a whole, and, within manufacturing, a con-
siderable shift away from consumer non-durables (Bell and Farrell 1997: 598,
table 2).5 Exports also became more diversified. The export share of primary
products fell from 86.6 per cent in 1916/17 to 64.6 per cent in 1956/7, and that of
manufactures increased from 8.2 to 26.3 per cent.
There was also considerable diversification of manufactured exports. The share
of non-durable consumer goods in manufactured exports halved from 80.2 to 40.6
per cent between 1926/7 and 1956/7. Of particular interest here and throughout
the rest of the chapter, however, is the distinction between natural resource-based
manufactured exports and the exports of more downstream manufacturing sec-
tors, and variations in the export growth rates of each of these categories and their
shares in total manufactured exports. Here, and in subsequent tables, the natural
resource-based category includes the chemicals, iron and steel, non-ferrous basic
metals, and pulp and paper sectors; while downstream sectors are represented by
the fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical machinery, motor vehicles
and parts, and other transportation equipment sectors, which together we shall
refer to as the ‘metal products group of sectors’. 
Between 1926/7 and 1956/7, the share of the natural resource-based sectors in
manufactured exports increased from 16.2 to 26.2 per cent, and that of the more
downstream metal products group of industries rose even more sharply from 
2.0 to 18.9 per cent over the same period. As this implies, during these four
decades the exports of the more downstream sectors grew considerably faster
than those of the natural resource-based sectors. The rate of growth of manufac-
tured exports in the aggregate increased from each subperiod to the next, reach-
ing a rate of 10.1 per cent per year in 1946/7–1956/7. 
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1956–72: The resurgence and decline of gold, and the spectre of 
a foreign exchange constraint
With the opening of the Orange Free State gold fields, gold output increased
almost uninterruptedly from 358 thousand kilograms in 1951 to a peak of 
1 million kilograms in 1970, but at a declining rate (Figure 7.4). Given the fixed
gold price of 35 USD per fine ounce (which prevailed from 1933 to about 1970),
gold exports in current US dollars increased in a similarly uninterrupted fashion.
In constant US dollars, however, gold exports reached their peak in 1965 and
declined (at a rate of 0.9 per cent a year) in 1965–70, compared to an average
annual increase in 1960–5 of 6.9 per cent (Table 7.1). 
What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that the rate of growth of manu-
factured exports behaves in a contrary fashion. Having increased at 6.1 per cent
per annum in 1960–5, that is, slower than gold exports, the growth of manufac-
tured exports accelerated to 9.9 per cent in 1965–70, as gold exports declined in
absolute terms (Table 7.1). The result was that manufactured exports (as defined
in the Standard Industrial Classification) came to exceed gold exports for the first
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Table 7.1 Average annual exports growth rates in constant USD (%)
1960–5 1965–70 1960–70
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 3.9 1.4 1.2
Mining (excluding gold) 4.6 1.9 1.3
Manufacturing 6.1 9.9 8.0
Total exports (excluding gold) 5.3 4.9 5.1
Gold exports 6.9 0.9 3.0
Total exports (including gold) 6.0 2.6 4.3
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Figure 7.4 Gold output, exports and price.
time in 1967, and continued to do so right through to the eve of the first oil 
crisis and the commodity price boom of the 1970s (Figure 7.5). 
Despite the accelerated growth of manufactured exports, the average annual rate
of growth of South Africa’s total exports declined substantially, from 6.0 per cent
in 1960–5 to 2.6 per cent in 1965–70 (Table 7.1). This problem, of sustaining
export growth in the face of declining gold exports (which was to return with a
vengeance in the 1980s), was a matter of increasing concern in official circles. The
Reynders Commission was appointed in 1969 to inquire into South Africa’s export
trade. Its report, published in 1972, emphasised the need for diversification into
non-gold exports, and proposed the use of direct export promotion measures.6
For a moment, thus, there was the possibility of South Africa making the tran-
sition to export-oriented industrialisation. The ink had hardly dried on the
Reynders Commission report, however, when it was overtaken by events, and, for
the time being at least, rendered largely superfluous by the natural resource boom
of the 1970s.
4. The gold-led natural resource boom and its aftermath
1972–83: The natural resource boom and its effect on
South Africa’s exports
Though interrupted by declines in the mid-1970s, the price of gold increased dra-
matically from a yearly average of about 52 USD in 1972 to 613 USD in 1980,
before beginning its descent to 376 USD in 1982 (Figure 7.4). Commodity prices 
in general, which are shown in Figure 7.6 against the backdrop of downward and
upward phases in the South African business cycle, followed a roughly similar
pattern, with a large upswing from 1972 to 1980, interrupted by declines from
late 1974 through to 1976–7.






















Agriculture, forestry and fishing
Figure 7.5 Exports by main economic sector (constant 1990 USD), 1959–93.
As would be expected, the effect on the sectoral composition and growth of
South Africa’s exports was dramatic (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). Whereas total visible
exports, in constant US dollars, had increased at 2.6 per cent a year in 1965–70
(Table 7.1), the export growth rate in 1972–80 was 12.7 per cent per annum.
Exports of gold and ‘other mining’ (coal, diamonds, iron ore, etc.) grew at 18.3
and 12.0 per cent a year in 1972–80 (Table 7.3).
In this context of massive growth of total exports, it is striking, and significant,
that manufactured exports grew no faster, indeed slightly slower, in 1972–80 than
in 1960–70. This is especially noteworthy given that exports of natural resource-
based manufactures, which even in 1972, before the commodity price upswing,
contributed 26.4 per cent of manufactured exports (Table 7.4), increased at 15.9
per cent per annum (Table 7.5). By 1980, these sectors accounted for no less than
46.9 per cent of manufactured exports.
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Figure 7.6 Monthly commodity price indices.
Table 7.2 Shares in total exports excluding services (%)
1972 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993
Agriculture 9.7 8.5 5.9 2.9 2.7 3.9
Gold mining 34.7 41.1 51.1 43.3 29.9 27.7
Other mining 16.1 15.4 15.3 20.3 24.2 28.9
(coal, diamonds 
and other)
Manufacturing 39.6 35.1 27.8 33.5 43.1 39.5
Source: Calculated from IDC (1995) current price database.
As the above clearly implies, the exports of manufacturing sectors other than
those in the natural resource-based category grew very slowly. In particular, the
export growth rate of the downstream, metal products group of sectors was only
2.4 per cent per year in 1972–80 (Table 7.5) compared to an estimated 8.0 per
cent for these sectors in 1960–70. Their share in total manufactured exports
(which had been strongly on the increase before 1956 and held steady in the
1960s) fell from about 18.2 per cent in 1972 to 12.1 per cent in 1980.
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Table 7.3 Average annual export growth rates in constant USD (%)
1972–5 1975–80 1972–80 1980–5 1985–90 1990–3 1985–93
Agriculture 5.1 6.4 5.9 22.7 4.1 12.3 7.1
Gold mining 16.3 19.5 18.3 13.9 2.2 2.3 2.3
Other mining 8.3 14.3 12.0 5.8 9.1 6.4 8.0
(coal, diamonds 
and other)
Total manufacturing 5.6 9.2 7.8 7.7 10.8 2.6 5.6
Total exports 9.9 14.4 12.7 11.0 5.3 0.3 3.4
excluding services
Source: Calculated from IDC (1995) current price database.
Table 7.4 Shares in manufacturing exports (%)
ISIC Sector 1972 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993
351–4 Chemical products 11.7 14.1 19.7 18.8 16.3 14.7
371 Iron and steel basic 9.2 11.6 17.5 21.2 24.5 23.0
industries
372 Non-ferrous metal 2.8 2.2 7.4 11.3 8.6 8.4
basic industries
341 Paper and paper 2.7 1.9 2.4 4.2 4.4 6.5
products
Sub-total: natural 26.4 29.7 6.9 55.5 53.7 52.5
resource based
381 Fabricated metal 3.9 3.6 2.7 2.1 3.5 4.1
products
382 Machinery 7.4 5.3 4.5 4.2 5.7 5.8
383 Electrical 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.6
machinery
384 Motor vehicles 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.2 4.3 7.3
and parts
385 Other transport 2.5 2.1 1.6 1.2 1.7 2.8
equipment
Sub-total: metal  18.2 14.7 12.1 11.1 17.5 22.7
products group
Source: Calculated from IDC (1995) current price database.
Table 7.5 Average annual growth rates of natural resource based and downstream manufactured exports in constant 1990 USD (%)
ISIC Sector 1972–5 1975–80 1972–80 1980–5 1985–90 1990–3 1985–93
351–4 Chemical products 12.2 16.8 15.0 8.5 7.7 6.0 2.4
371 Iron and steel basic industries 13.7 18.7 16.8 4.0 14.0 4.7 6.6
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 2.2 39.1 21.9 0.6 4.8 3.4 1.6
341 Paper and paper products 5.6 13.9 6.2 3.6 11.7 11.6 11.6
Sub-total: natural resource based 9.8 19.6 15.9 4.5 10.1 3.3 4.8
381 Fabricated metal products 2.7 3.1 2.9 12.7 22.8 3.1 15.0
382 Machinery 5.7 5.8 1.3 9.1 17.9 1.6 10.1
383 Electrical machinery 6.5 6.9 1.7 8.3 21.0 2.2 13.6
384 Motor vehicles and parts 5.0 6.6 6.0 3.6 27.3 16.2 23.0
385 Other transport equipment 0.7 3.0 2.2 12.1 18.4 14.2 16.8
Sub-total: metal products group 1.8 5.0 2.4 9.2 21.3 6.3 15.5
Total Manufacturing 5.6 9.2 7.8 7.7 10.8 2.6 5.6
Source: Calculated from IDC (1995) current price database.
Relative prices and the competitiveness of manufactured exports
The variations in the rate of growth and in the sectoral pattern of South Africa’s
trade described above, seem to be largely explicable in terms of changes in 
relative prices. 
As is well known, the major relative price change which normally accompanies
a natural resource boom in a natural resource abundant country is an appreciation
in the real exchange rate. This represents a deterioration in the price competitive-
ness of domestic producers relative to foreign ones in international trade.
The most commonly used measure of such changes in price competitiveness is
the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate (REER), movements in which are
shown in Figure 7.7. In the case of South Africa, an increase in the REER repre-
sents a real appreciation of the rand, and signifies a loss of competitiveness.7 As
is generally the case in a natural resource abundant economy experiencing a sig-
nificant commodity price boom, there was a substantial increase in South Africa’s
REER in the 1970s. Relative to its level in 1970–2, the REER was 9.4 per cent
higher in 1974–8, 24.8 per cent higher in 1979–81 and 28.2 per cent higher in
1982–3. In terms of this standard indicator thus, there was a substantial deterio-
ration in the price competitiveness of South African producers, including produc-
ers of both exports and import-competing goods, between 1970–2 and 1982–3.
The REER, however, is an unsatisfactory indicator of competitiveness for 
various reasons. In the case of exports, which are the particular focus of our atten-
tion, exporters of agricultural products and minerals were clearly insulated from
any adverse effects of the increase in the REER on their competitiveness by 
rising world prices.8 The REER, thus, is not a good indicator of changes in 
competitiveness for such primary commodity exports. Furthermore, as we have
seen, a large proportion of South Africa’s manufactured exports consists of natu-
ral resource-based products like steel, non-ferrous basic metals, basic industrial
chemicals, and pulp and paper, whose prices are also subject to fluctuations in the
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Figure 7.7 Real exchange rates (1972 100).
commodity price cycle. For this reason alone, the REER is a poor indicator of
changes in competitiveness, even for manufactured exports, in the aggregate.
In an attempt to overcome this problem, and so to obtain a better indicator of
the effect of the commodity price boom of the 1970s on the competitiveness of
manufactured exports, two separate measures of the real exchange rate facing
exporters of manufactures have been calculated, one for natural resource-based
sectors, and another for the more downstream, non-commodity sectors in the
metal products group of industries. These real exchange rates are defined as 
the ratio of the domestic manufacturing component of the South African PPI to
the trade-weighted export unit values of the sectors in the natural resource-based
and metal products categories respectively.9 They are therefore estimates of the
ratio of the price of non-tradables to the price of tradables, and thus of the real
exchange rate facing exporters, in each of these categories of manufacturing
industries.
The real exchange rate for exporters in the metal products group of industries,
after rising sharply in 1973, falls through to 1975, but thereafter shows a tendency
to increase to levels higher in 1980–1 than in 1972. It is noteworthy too that, from
1975–82, there is an almost invariable tendency for the real exchange rate of this
group and the REER to rise and fall in unison, but the REER suggests a much
greater real appreciation than the real exchange rate applicable specifically to
exporters in the metal products category. There is evidently a general tendency for
the REER to overstate significantly in the short term the adverse impact of a nat-
ural resource boom on the competitiveness of the non-commodity exports of a
natural resource abundant economy (Warr 1986: 293–304). The REER thus is not
a good indicator of variations in competitiveness even for non-commodity
exports, as is evident in Figure 7.7. There was nevertheless a noticeable tendency
for the metal products group of sectors to lose competitiveness during the 1970s,
though to a lesser extent than suggested by the increase in the REER.
By contrast, the real exchange rate of South Africa’s natural resource-based
manufactured exports fell sharply during the initial burst of commodity price
increases, then levelled off, but declined further during the next strong commod-
ity price upswing of 1979–80. This is hardly surprising and is only to be expected
given that rising world prices of natural resource-based manufactured products
increase the denominator in the formula for calculating the real exchange rate for
such products.
There was, thus, a substantial decline in the competitiveness of the more down-
stream industries, relative to the natural resource-based manufacturing sectors,
between 1972 and 1981. What is particularly noteworthy, and perhaps significant,
is the relationship of the year-on-year movements in the real exchange rates of the
downstream and natural resource-based sectors to one another. From 1975 right
through to 1981, movements in the respective real exchange rates of these 
two categories invariably bear an adverse relationship to one another. When
the competitiveness of natural resource-based manufactured exports improves
(worsens), the competitiveness of non-commodity manufactured exports worsens
(improves).
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Considered together, these observations on the most striking features of 
Figure 7.7 suggest that the variations in the real exchange rates depicted con-
tributed significantly both to the slowdown in export growth of downstream man-
ufactured exports in the 1970s, compared to the 1960s, and to the substantial
decline in the growth rate of such exports relative to the exports of natural
resource-based manufactures. In particular, the inverse relationship between
movements in the respective real exchange rates of these categories of exporting
sectors, as noted above, seems to suggest strongly that, to some extent at least, the
absolute and relative decline in the export growth rate of the downstream manu-
facturing sectors was caused by the effects of higher world commodity prices
(including the prices of commodity-type manufactures) on the real exchange rates
applicable to exporters of downstream manufactures.
As suggested earlier, the natural resource boom of the 1970s put paid to the pos-
sibility, which began to emerge in the late 1960s, of a decisive shift from import
substituting to export-oriented industrialisation. The effect of the rise in commod-
ity prices, especially the price of gold, was to render this both unnecessary and,
because of its impact on the real exchange rate for exports of non-commodity 
manufactures, unsustainable.10
1983–97: The onset of economic crisis and the shift to export-oriented 
industrialisation
The exports of all the main sectors of the economy declined drastically in 1980–5
(Table 7.3). The rand began to depreciate in late 1983, and fell precipitously from
mid-1984 (Figure 7.7), culminating in the debt crisis of August 1985, and the
rescheduling of foreign debt. As in many other countries, which had been subjected
to such debt shocks in the early 1980s, the immediate effect was a sharp reduction
in gross domestic expenditure, particularly investment, which declined by 20 per
cent between 1984 and 1986. The most urgent requirement for recovery was accel-
erated growth of exports including, especially, manufactured exports, to compen-
sate for the decline of gold. The effect of these events was an abrupt, involuntary
shift to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI), in conditions of economic crisis.
A more deliberate, voluntary liberalisation had in fact begun before the debt
crisis, involving a substantial reduction in quantitative restrictions (QRs) in
1983–5. The real depreciation of the rand in this period, together with domestic
recession, however, were the decisive factors in the shift towards a system of
incentives more neutral as between production for the domestic market and for
export. Following the debt crisis, in 1985–90, QRs were relaxed further; systems
of duty free imports for exports were introduced in the motor vehicles, textiles
and clothing industries in 1989; and export subsidies in the form of the General
Export Incentive Scheme were introduced in April 1990. By the early 1990s only
tariff reductions had been neglected. Between 1990 and 1995, import surcharges,
which had been imposed earlier in response to the foreign exchange crisis, were
removed. Comprehensive tariff reductions began with the commencement of the
Uruguay Round implementation period in January 1995.11
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Adjustment, export performance and price competitiveness
During the first five years of adjustment following the debt crisis, the substantial
depreciation of the real exchange rate, depressed domestic economic conditions,
and an improvement in the world economy gave a strong stimulus to manufactured
exports. Whereas gold exports continued to decline in 1985–90, manufactured
exports, in constant US dollars, grew at 10.8 per cent, and ‘other mining’ exports
at 9.1 per cent, giving an overall export growth rate of 5.3 per cent (Table 7.3).
The sectoral pattern of the growth of manufactured exports, in 1985–90, is very
different from the 1970s. Whereas the export growth rate of the natural resource-
based manufacturing sectors together was 10.1 per cent per year in 1985–90, com-
pared to 15.9 per cent in 1972–80, the exports of non-commodity manufactures,
represented by the metal products group of industries, increased at 21.3 per cent a
year, compared to 2.4 per cent in 1972–80 (Table 7.5). The much faster growth of
non-commodity compared to natural resource-based manufactured exports in
1985–90 is particularly remarkable since this period included an upswing in the
commodity price cycle from about mid-1986 to late 1988 (Figure 7.6).12
The effect of these differences in growth rates was that the share in manufactured
exports of the downstream, metal products sectors increased from 11.1 per cent in
1985 to 17.5 per cent in 1990, i.e., close to the level of about 18 per cent which 
prevailed in 1972 (and indeed as far back as 1956/7), before the aberration from
long-term trends produced by the natural resource boom of the 1970s (Table 7.4).
As shown in Figure 7.7, the real exchange rate applicable to exporters in the
metal products group of industries declined substantially, and virtually without
interruption, between 1985 and 1990, whereas the real exchange rate for
exporters of natural resource-based products, having risen quite significantly in
1983–5, was at about the same level in 1990 as in 1985.13 These trends in relative
prices probably account to a significant extent for the much faster export growth
of the downstream, metal products sectors relative to the natural resource-based
sectors, in 1985–90.
The period from 1990 to 1993 was one of slow growth in the world economy
and a downswing in the commodity price cycle. Rather than increasing, the index
of industrial country imports showed a slight decline (Tsikata 1998: 15, table 1.2).
Unsurprisingly, therefore, there was virtually zero growth in South Africa’s total
exports in this period, and manufactured exports fell at 2.6 per cent per annum
(Table 7.3). This was, however, due mainly to the decline in the exports of natural
resource-based manufacturing sectors, with the only exception of significant size
being pulp and paper which continued to grow strongly. Apart from this sector, the
only other significant three-digit SIC sectors to achieve positive growth were four
of the five sectors comprising the metal products group of industries, two of which
had export growth rates of 14.2 per cent and 16.2 percent, respectively (Table 7.6).
Collectively, the export growth rate of this group of industries, 6.3 per cent per
annum, though much lower than in 1985–90, was outstandingly good in the con-
text of generalised export decline (Table 7.5). Their share of manufactured exports,
thus, increased from 17.5 per cent in 1990 to 22.7 per cent in 1993 (Table 7.4).14
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Table 7.6 Average annual growth rates of South African manufacturing exports in constant 1990 USD (%)
ISIC Sector 1972–5 1975–80 1980–5 1985–90 1990–3 1972–80 1985–93
311–2 Food 5.9 0.7 12.8 3.6 6.6 1.7 0.3
313 Beverages 0.2 9.5 6.5 19.3 4.4 5.7 9.8
314 Tobacco products 66.1 2.8 5.9 11.7 18.1 18.8 0.5
321 Textiles 3.3 5.1 9.2 14.4 10.2 1.9 4.5
322 Clothing 10.5 11.4 7.6 -3.5 4.9 11.1 4.1
323 Leather products 8.8 14.6 2.7 3.0 6.6 5.2 0.7
324 Footwear 6.9 20.1 7.0 3.9 26.7 15.0 8.8
331 Wood and wood products 16.8 34.8 9.4 13.1 3.5 27.7 6.6
332 Furniture 8.2 28.4 5.5 22.9 6.5 20.4 10.9
341 Pulp and paper products 5.6 13.9 3.6 11.7 11.6 6.2 11.6
342 Printing and publishing 25.7 14.2 8.7 6.3 15.0 1.0 2.2
351–4 Chemical products 13.8 16.9 11.8 2.0 1.1 15.0 0.8
355 Rubber products 7.8 10.4 8.1 22.3 5.1 3.2 11.2
356 Plastic products 19.3 11.8 1.4 30.5 2.3 1.1 19.1
361 Pottery china and earthenware 26.2 48.6 33.2 29.8 19.6 28.0 25.9
362 Glass and glass products 7.2 26.5 9.3 21.8 10.5 12.7 8.5
369 Non-metallic mineral products 21.2 1.8 27.0 30.4 0.8 8.7 18.4
371 Iron and steel basic industries 13.7 18.7 4.0 14.0 4.7 16.8 6.6
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 2.2 39.1 0.6 4.8 3.4 21.9 1.6
381 Metal products 2.7 3.1 12.7 22.8 3.1 2.9 15.0
382 Machinery 5.7 5.8 9.1 17.9 1.6 1.3 10.1
383 Electrical machinery 6.5 6.9 8.3 21.0 2.2 1.7 13.6
384 Motor vehicles and parts 5.0 6.6 3.6 27.3 16.2 6.0 23.0
385 Other transport equipment 0.7 3.0 12.1 18.4 14.2 2.2 16.8
386–90 Other manufacturing industries 8.8 4.0 13.0 1.0 12.6 5.8 4.4
Total manufacturing 5.6 9.2 7.7 10.8 2.6 7.8 5.6
Source: IDC (1995).
Table 7.7 Shares in manufacturing exports of SACU (%)
Sector 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Paper and paper products 6.2 5.4 5.8 5.9 7.1 8.9 5.3 4.7
Basic iron and steel products 29.3 25.3 24.8 24.2 23.8 21.0 19.6 18.2
Non-ferrous metal basic products 14.3 12.5 13.1 10.7 7.3 6.9 9.6 10.0
Chemicals 10.7 11.8 14.6 13.4 15.2 19.8 21.6 20.3
Sub-total: natural resource based 60.4 55.0 58.2 54.2 53.4 56.6 56.2 53.1
Metal products, excluding machinery 5.0 4.6 3.5 3.8 4.8 5.7 5.8 5.4
Machinery and equipment, 3.2 3.7 4.5 5.3 5.4 7.1 6.6 7.7
exc. electrical
Electrical machinery 1.6 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.6
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories 2.6 3.6 5.4 5.9 4.8 4.3 4.4 5.2
Transport equipment, exc. 1.3 0.6 1.5 1.6 2.4 0.7 0.9 2.5
motor vehicles, parts and accessories
Sub-total: metal products group 13.6 13.9 16.6 18.9 19.5 20.4 20.1 23.5
Source: Calculated from Industrial Development Corporation current price data.
In the period 1985–93 as a whole, thus, there was significant diversification of
South Africa’s manufactured exports, towards more downstream sectors. Data for
South Africa alone, such as those used above, are not available for the years since
1993. Data on the manufactured exports of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) as a whole (i.e. for South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland together), however, suggest that the trends in the sectoral pattern of
manufactured exports described above continued through to 1997.15
As in the case of South Africa alone (Table 7.4), the SACU data (Table 7.7)
show a decline in the share of the natural resource-based sectors in manufactured
exports, and an increase in the share of the metal products group of industries
over 1990–3. As also indicated for South Africa alone (Table 7.5), SACU’s 
natural resource-based exports in constant US dollars declined in absolute terms
(at 1.3 per cent per annum), while the exports of the metal products group of
industries increased strongly (at 14.2 per cent a year), giving a growth rate for
manufactured exports as a whole of 2.3 per cent (Table 7.8). 
After several years of stagnation, however, the industrial countries and their
demands for imports grew rapidly in 1993–5, in the context of a commodity price
upswing.16 The average annual rate of growth of SACU’s total manufactured
exports increased sharply to 21.1 per cent in 1993–5, with a particularly marked
increase in the case of natural resource-based manufactures to 23.8 per cent.
Nevertheless, despite the commodity price upswing, and a return to positive GDP
growth in South Africa, the export growth rate of the downstream, metal product
sectors (25.6 per cent per year) continued to exceed that of the natural resource-
based sectors (Table 7.8). Even in 1995–7, as the commodity price upswing
petered out, and the average annual rates of growth of total manufactured exports
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Table 7.8 Average annual growth rates of manufactured exports of SACU, constant 
1990 USD (%)
Sector 1990–3 1993–5 1993–7 1990–7
Paper and paper products 0.3 49.4 6.5 3.8
Basic iron and steel products 3.9 12.9 4.6 0.9
Non-ferrous metal basic products 7.1 2.8 10.5 2.6
Chemicals 10.4 46.8 24.5 18.3
Sub-total: natural resource based 1.3 23.8 11.8 6.0
Metal products, excluding machinery 6.6 47.2 22.8 9.2
Machinery and equipment, exc. electrical 21.7 40.4 23.5 22.7
Electrical machinery 16.8 25.9 16.0 16.3
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories 34.4 3.8 9.2 19.3
Transport equipment, exc. motor vehicles, 10.0 17.4 25.6 18.6
parts and accessories
Sub-total: metal products group 14.2 25.6 18.7 16.7
Total manufacturing 2.3 21.1 12.4 8.0
Source: Calculated from Industrial Development Corporation current price data.
and of the natural resource-based sectors fell sharply (to 4.3 per cent and 
1.1 per cent, respectively), the exports of the downstream sectors grew at a lower
but still respectable, rate of 12.2 per cent per annum.
In the adjustment period, 1985–97, thus, there was a return to the tendency evi-
dent in earlier decades, but interrupted by the natural resource boom of the 1970s,
for manufactured exports to diversify increasingly towards more downstream
manufacturing sectors. Exports of the downstream manufacturing sectors grew
faster than natural resource-based manufactured exports in every subperiod
throughout 1985–97, irrespective of the phase of the commodity price cycle. As
this, and trends in real exchange rates since 1985 shown in Figure 7.7 suggest,
since 1985 there has been a substantial, persistent increase in the competitiveness
of downstream manufactured exports. Diversification towards more downstream
exports is now apparently beginning to include exports of high technology prod-
ucts (Hodge 1997). Despite some claims to the contrary (Tsikata 1998: 17), it is
questionable whether import liberalisation through tariff cuts has been a signifi-
cant cause of the increased competitiveness of manufactured exports.
Productivity, unit labour costs and trade performance
It has been suggested above that variations in the rate of growth, and in the sec-
toral pattern of South Africa’s manufactured exports are largely explicable in
terms of two variables conventionally regarded as key determinants of trade per-
formance: real exchange rates, as indicators of price competitiveness, and world
demand. Other possibly relevant determinants of price competitiveness, and
hence trade performance, which must be considered, however, are productivity
growth and movements in unit labour costs.
Figure 7.8 shows real average earnings per worker, labour productivity
(defined as value-added per worker) and, from these two measures, unit labour
costs, for manufacturing industry in the aggregate. Unit labour costs decline in
the 1970s, particularly from 1976 to 1980, and, as we have seen, manufactured
exports in the aggregate grew strongly in the 1970s, especially in 1975–80.
Similarly, in the 1980s, the levelling off and then decline of unit labour costs,
from 1983 to 1989 was also accompanied by rapid growth of manufactured
exports. In neither case, however, does it seem plausible to attribute the rapid
growth of manufactured exports to declining unit labour costs.
In the 1970s, it was the rapid export growth of natural resource-based manu-
factures that produced the rapid growth of manufactured exports in the aggregate.
This clearly was due predominantly to the commodity price boom, beside which
the effect of any decrease in unit labour costs would have been completely
insignificant. Non-commodity manufactures might perhaps be expected to have
been more sensitive to the apparent tendency for unit labour costs to decline, but
as we have seen, exports of non-commodity manufacturers grew very slowly in
this period, both relative to the 1960s, and to natural resource-based products. 
It seems more likely that the increase in productivity, which produced the decline
in unit labour costs, was due to the increase in capacity utilisation, which was a
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feature of the latter half of the 1970s, and so was a consequence rather than a
cause of the export boom.
The movement in unit labour costs in the 1980s, described above, resulted from
the combination of zero productivity growth and a tendency for real wage rates to
fall. These in turn were probably mainly due to the decline in capacity utilisation
and in the price of non-tradable goods and services (of which labour services are
an important case), which characterised the period.17 Thus, rather than the decline
in unit labour costs and export growth being causally related directly, both were
probably caused by a third set of forces (namely, the external shocks described
earlier), which reduced the level of capacity utilisation and the real exchange rate.
Furthermore, for the period 1985–93, regressions were run across the twenty-
five three-digit SIC sectors, of labour productivity growth and the rate of increase
in unit labour costs, respectively, on export growth rates and changes in sectoral
contributions to the trade balance (CTBs). In each case it was found that the pro-
ductivity and unit labour cost variables were statistically insignificant, so that
there was no apparent explanatory relationship between them and either export
growth or change in CTB.18
In the case of South Africa, there are a number of reasons why productivity
growth and unit labour costs are not likely to be significant determinants of trade
performance across manufacturing subsectors. The bulk of manufactured exports
are natural resource-based, capital-intensive products, which are relatively insensi-
tive to variations in productivity and unit labour costs, and depend mainly on fluc-
tuations in world commodity prices.19 Non-commodity manufactured exports are
mainly of only intermediate capital-intensity, and relatively high tech. They prob-
ably depend to a relatively large extent on product differentiation and innovation.
Unlike more labour abundant developing countries, South Africa has never had a
comparative advantage in very labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, clothing


















Figure 7.8 Labour productivity, real wages and unit labour costs (1972 100).
and footwear, where labour productivity and unit labour costs are more likely to be
important determinants of trade performance. 
Conclusion
The discussion above in this section suggests various ways in which the sectoral
mix of South Africa’s trade specialisation has affected the country’s macroeco-
nomic performance. These macroeconomic effects, in turn, have had significant
sectoral, or micro-level, consequences. Indeed, there is constant interaction
between micro-level and macroeconomic forces, which to a large extent occur
concurrently.
As the discussion suggests, one way in which South Africa’s trade pattern affects
its macroeconomic performance is through the Dutch disease effects of a natural
resource boom. The natural resource boom of 1972–81 produced a massive foreign
exchange and fiscal windfall and high levels of investment. As is well known,
however, the essence of the Dutch disease effects is that ‘there are some adversely
affected sectors and some relative price changes which accompany the boom’
(Corden 1975: 324). One of the expected sectoral effects of a temporary natural
resource boom, as in the case of a minerals-rich economy like South Africa, is a
reduction in the rate of growth of non-mining GDP (Gelb 1986: 79–80).
Whether strictly attributable to such expected Dutch disease effects or not, it is
noteworthy that despite the massive foreign exchange and fiscal windfalls, South
Africa’s non-mining GDP growth rate fell from 5.9 per cent in 1967–72 to 4.4 per
cent in 1972–81; and the growth rate of GDP as a whole fell from 4.8 per cent to
3.7 per cent. This was significantly larger than the proportionate decline in the
GDP growth rate of middle income, oil-importing countries in general, from 5.8
to 5.1 per cent (Gelb 1986: 78–80). Though the connection is not conclusively
established, this is consistent with the expected effects of the Dutch disease.20 The
other, closely related, feature of the period at a sectoral level, the slow growth of
non-commodity manufactured exports noted above, was clearly due to the change
in relative prices, produced by the natural resource boom.
As we have seen, the collapse of the boom brought a substantial absolute decline
in exports, and a precipitous real depreciation of the rand, which culminated in the
debt crisis of August 1985, and the rescheduling of foreign debt. Though many
other developing countries experienced similar foreign exchange and debt crises in
the first half of the 1980s, in the case of South Africa, these crises, and the conse-
quent fall of the rand, were intimately related to the sectoral pattern of its trade,
and the sharp decline in commodity prices, especially the price of gold.21 As noted
above, these external shocks plunged the economy into deep recession, and created
an urgent need for accelerated export growth. 
South Africa, however, has evidently had great difficulty sustaining rapid
export growth. As the discussion above indicates, this has largely been due to the
preponderance of primary commodities and natural resource-based manufactures
in South Africa’s exports, which have either been declining (as in the case of gold)
or growing slowly. 
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As Table 7.9 shows, since 1950–70 there has been a tendency for the rate of
growth of total exports to decline. With the exception of 1980–5 when exports
collapsed, the export growth rate of 1.3 per cent per annum in 1990–8 was lower
than in any other subperiod before 1990 shown in Table 7.9, including 1965–70,
when gold exports first began to fall. A major (but not only) part of the problem
in 1990–8 was the decline in gold exports at 5.7 per cent per annum.
The rate of growth of manufactured exports in particular has also been
impeded by a preponderance of natural resource-based products and their rela-
tively poor export performance. Despite the high average annual export growth
rate of the downstream metal products sectors (15.5 per cent), because of the slow
export growth of natural resource-based sectors (4.8 per cent), manufactured
exports in the aggregate grew at only 5.6 per cent a year in 1985–93 (Table 7.5).22
Similarly, in 1990–7, as noted earlier, the average annual percentage export
growth rates of the metal products and natural resource-based sectors, and of
manufactures in the aggregate were 16.7, 6.0 and 8.0, respectively.23
Contrary to widely held views, the growth of South Africa’s exports has not
been limited primarily by the lack of an ‘export culture’, or the ‘anti-export bias’
created by protection, or by an inherently uncompetitive manufacturing sector.
Since the mid-1980s the price competitiveness of non-commodity manufactures
as indicated by real exchange rates has increased, and the export growth rate
of such products has been high both relative to the past, especially relative to
natural resource-based manufactures. This may augur well for the future, but at
Competitiveness, international trade and finance 201
Table 7.9 Average annual growth rates of South Africa’s exports and imports
in constant 1990 USD, 1950–98 (%)
Merchandise Net gold Total Merchandise
exports exports exports imports
1950–5 9.4 2.9 6.9 8.1
1955–60 2.9 6.2 4.0 1.5
1960–5 2.8 7.5 4.6 9.5
1965–70 3.8 1.1 1.8 4.7
1970–5 9.6 13.1 11.0 9.6
1975–80 9.9 19.8 14.3 5.4
1980–5 8.9 14.2 11.5 13.1
1985–90 10.6 2.1 5.7 7.4
1990–5 5.0 3.8 2.7 8.6
1990–3 0.8 1.5 0.1 2.2
1993–5 11.7 7.2 6.7 18.8
1995–8 1.1 8.9 -0.9 0.1
1950–70 4.7 3.8 4.3 5.9
1970–98 4.5 0.6 3.5 2.8
1985–98 6.2 4.4 3.0 6.0
1990–8 3.5 5.7 1.3 5.2
Sources: SARB Quarterly Bulletin (various).
Note: Excluding non-factor services.
present natural resource-based products still account for over 50 per cent of South
Africa’s manufactured exports, and these are exercising a significant braking
effect on the growth of manufactured exports in the aggregate.
The case of South Africa, thus, provides a striking illustration of the fact that
the sectoral mix of trade specialisation, through its effects on export expansion,
can have a significant impact on a country’s current account deficit at any partic-
ular growth rate, and hence on its macro-competitiveness.
It also seems to exemplify Chenery and Syrquin’s (1975: 90) finding that 
primary orientation of exports makes for slow export growth and impedes the trans-
formation of production; and to suggest one possible reason for Sachs and Warner’s
finding that natural resource abundant economies, reflected in a ‘high ratio of nat-
ural resource exports to GDP in 1971, tended to have low growth rates … in
1971–89’ (1995: 1). Orientation to natural resource exports clearly does not neces-
sarily make for slow export growth. Numerous countries with such an orientation,
including South Africa, have achieved relatively rapid export and GDP growth over
extended periods of time. Eventually, however, in world market conditions such as
those in the early 1980s, it will give rise to difficulty in sustaining rapid export
growth, and hence in avoiding a deterioration in macro-competitiveness.
It is arguable that what has happened, in essence, is that the weighted average
income elasticity of demand for South Africa’s exports has declined, and that, in
accordance with the thesis of Thirlwall (1979), this has contributed to a deterio-
ration in the ability of the South African economy to grow without running into
balance of payments difficulties.24 Furthermore, for reasons also related to dif-
ferences in income elasticities of demand, Spraos (1991) argues that success in
the expansion of visible exports, in adjusting to the external shocks of the early
1980s, depended crucially on the division between commodities and manufac-
tures. Individual countries and regions heavily dependent on natural resource
exports tended to experience greater difficulty in adjusting. The sectoral pattern
of South Africa’s exports, thus, was probably a significant obstacle to an improve-
ment in macro-competitiveness.
So far as trade performance is concerned, the discussion above emphasises the
inability to sustain export growth as a reason for the evident deterioration in the
macro-competitiveness of the South African economy. Developments affecting
the import side of the trade account (which can only be touched on briefly here)
may also have contributed to this.
One striking difference between earlier and more recent decades is a signifi-
cant decline in the rate of import substitution (Bell and Farrell 1997: 595–9).25 In
earlier decades, the effect of GDP growth on import growth was contained in
some measure by rapid import replacement.26 Since the early 1980s, it seems that
there has rather been a tendency towards import de-substitution, as indicated 
by increases in import penetration ratios.27 Trade liberalisation may well have
contributed to this in recent years.28
Another factor which might have increased the income elasticity of demand for
imports, and so impacted adversely on the macro-competitiveness of the South
African economy, is that the output/capital (Y/K) ratio for the economy as a whole
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was more than one-third higher in 1960–5 than in 1995–7. Given the comple-
mentarity between domestic resources and imported capital goods in gross
domestic fixed investment (GDFI), this seems to imply that the increase in capi-
tal goods imports as a proportion of GDP required to support a 1 percentage point
increase in potential output, was about one-third smaller in the 1960s than it is
today.29 In terms of the ability to increase capacity output, it appears that a
GDFI/GDP ratio of about 30 per cent today would be equivalent to the ratio of
22.8 per cent which prevailed in 1964 (Figure 7.3). A GDFI/GDF ratio of 30 per
cent however, would involve a substantial increase in imports, which would
impact adversely on the current account and render unattainable potential output
growth rates such as those of the mid-1960s.
5. Finance, trade and competitiveness
Introduction
This section considers whether financial factors have had an effect on the 
competitiveness of the South African economy in the sense of its ability to grow
without running into balance of payments difficulties.
In terms of some of the standard macroeconomic measures, South Africa 
evidently has a well-developed financial system, compared to other middle-
income countries, and indeed even compared to a number of advanced industrial
countries (Rajan and Zingales 1998: 570–1, table 7.2). One reason for this may
be South Africa’s historical connection with Great Britain and its effect on the
country’s financial and legal system, which may have made, inter alia, for a
sophisticated accounting system (see La Porta et al. (1996), as reported by Rajan
and Zingales 1998: 576). Whether due to this or not, it seems that South Africa’s
legal system does facilitate the extension of bank credit to private borrowers. For
instance, a World Bank study notes that ‘[r]elative to other developing countries,
South Africa’s banking system is unusually flexible as to what it accepts as 
collateral’, and states that this ‘reflects the high level of development of South
Africa’s legal institutions’ (Levy 1996: 12).
South Africa’s relatively well-developed financial system may also be related
to the importance of mining. By contrast with countries which have developed
initially mainly on the basis of agriculture, investment in mining, especially
deep-level gold mining, necessitated the raising of capital for large-scale private
sector projects. It is clear, for instance, that major developments in South Africa’s
money and capital markets in the 1950s, particularly the development of mer-
chant banking, were directly related to investment in the newly opened Orange
Free State gold fields (Fine and Rustomjee 1996: 154–6). It is noteworthy that in
their comparison of Australia and Argentina, Duncan and Fogarty say of
Australia: ‘Gold – provided the foundations for a sophisticated banking and
financial system with close connections in London’ (1984: 10).
As is well known, a number of studies, of which Levine and Zervos (1998) 
is a notable recent example, find a significant positive link between financial
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development and economic growth. There are a number of arguments against
attributing causality to financial development in such studies. Nonetheless, such
studies, as well as Rajan and Zingales (1998) who use an entirely different
methodology, suggest that the relatively advanced stage of South Africa’s finan-
cial development would have tended to be conducive to economic growth or, at
least, would not have impeded it. It would be surprising, therefore, to find that
South Africa’s financial system, as such, accounted for the evident deterioration
in the competitiveness of the South African economy, as defined and described in
Section 2 above.
We must nevertheless consider the effect that financial factors may have had
on the competitiveness of the South African economy. The next subsection sub-
titled ‘Investment, finance and economic instability’ touches on the problem of
isolating the effects of variations in the availability of credit in the economy as a
whole, on the aggregate level of investment. It considers, in particular, changes in
the stability of the South African economy as one possibly significant influence
on investment. The main part of the discussion follows this subsection. Here, we
test for differences in the severity of financial constraints among firms and sec-
tors categorised on various trade-related bases seemingly relevant to the compet-
itiveness of the South African economy, through the estimation of an investment
function, along the lines of Fazzari et al. (1998). The final subsection considers,
more briefly, the argument that the oligopolistic position of South Africa’s 
conglomerates in the financial system has skewed the allocation of financial
resources in an economically suboptimal direction.
Investment, finance and economic instability
Investment is clearly an important source of economic growth, and the sharp
decline in the investment rate since the early 1980s may well be a significant cause
of the deterioration in South Africa’s growth performance, as it apparently has
been in Latin America (Agosin 1995: 173).30 This raises the question, however, of
the determinants of the level of investment and of its allocation amongst sectors.
The availability of finance is one factor that might be expected to play a signif-
icant role in explaining variations in the level and sectoral pattern of investment,
as is implied for instance, by the credit-rationing literature. In contrast with factors
such as real exchange rates and unit labour costs, discussed in Section 4, access to
credit may perhaps be seen as a non-price determinant of competitiveness.
Isolating the effect of the availability of credit, as such, on investment at the
aggregate level is no easy matter, however. Though we shall not present any data
here to show this, the period 1972–81 was one of low (indeed negative) interest
rates, and a general increase in the availability of credit, whereas the period from
about 1983 was characterised by severely restrictive monetary and credit condi-
tions. It would clearly be misleading, however, to regard the decline in investment
levels in the 1980s, compared to the 1970s, as due to the change in the cost or avail-
ability of credit as such. The fundamental causes were real forces: the natural
resource boom of the 1970s; and the ensuing external shocks of the early to 
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mid-1980s. Investment in the 1980s declined because of foreign exchange scarcity,
which reduced South Africa’s capacity to import capital goods essential for domes-
tic investment. Similarly, the more recent positive shocks of renewed capital
inflows from 1993 to 1994 and the upswing in the commodity cycle which coin-
cided with these probably contributed to the noticeable increase in the investment
rate in 1993–8 (Figure 7.3) largely by alleviating the foreign exchange con-
straint.31 Other real forces at work in the 1990s in South Africa are import liberal-
isation and the dismantling of export incentives, which, as in Latin America
(Agosin 1995: 159), may have discouraged investment in tradable goods, and in
this way, and through their direct effects on the balance of trade, contributed to the
evident deterioration in the macro-competitiveness of the South African economy.
As the above indicates, separating financial factors, in particular the availabil-
ity of credit as such, from other possible determinants of the aggregate level of
investment is exceedingly difficult.32 One macroeconomic factor, however, which
does seem to be separable, which is generally regarded as having a significant
negative effect on the level of investment, and which in some respects may be
seen as a financial factor, is economic instability.
On the grounds that macroeconomic instability is associated with instability in
relative prices, the volatility of the real exchange rate is sometimes taken as a proxy
for economic instability in general (see, for instance, Agosin 1995: 168). In addi-
tion to its effect on investment in its role as a proxy for economic instability in gen-
eral, exchange rate volatility may also have a direct effect on a country’s foreign
trade. Though the general empirical literature on the connection between exchange
rate volatility and the volume of trade is inconclusive, it may well be, as some
contend, that there is a link between the volatility of the REER and trade.
Recently, the family of autoregressive conditional heteroschedastic (ARCH)
models have been used to estimate the conditional variance as a proxy for exchange
rate volatility. Based on this approach, Figure 7.9 shows that 1980–6 was a period
of relatively significant economic instability, whereas the 1970s and the nine years
from early 1987 through to early 1996 were periods of relatively little instability.33
These variations in the volatility of the REER from one subperiod to another
may well be found in a thorough econometric analysis to have affected the
investment rate and trade in each subperiod. Given the other powerful real forces
mentioned above however, the effect of economic instability on the investment
rate is likely to have been relatively insignificant; and in the case of trade it is the
level of the real exchange rates emphasised in Section 4, rather than their short-
term volatility which has doubtless been the predominant influence.
Nevertheless, one question which does arise, and which is of particular inter-
est in the context of our consideration of the effect of financial factors, is whether
South Africa’s liberalisation of the capital account in March 1995 has contributed
to the significant increase in the volatility of the exchange rate in recent years,
evident in Figure 7.9.34
Clearly there has been an increase in the volatility of real exchange rates in
emerging markets in general since the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, and the increase
in the volatility of South Africa’s REER therefore cannot be attributed simply to
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the liberalisation of its capital account. Though a link has not been established
econometrically, it is quite possible that the liberalisation of the capital account,
by increasing the mobility of capital and the effect of capital flows on the 
balance of payments has contributed to the increased exchange rate volatility 
in recent years. This particular financial factor, thus, may well have impacted in
some measure on South Africa’s economic performance since 1985.
Financial constraints and competitiveness
For the reasons stated above, isolation of the effects of availability of credit on the
aggregate level of investment is problematic. It may nevertheless be possible to
establish differences in the severity of financial constraints, which are applicable
to different categories of firms or sectors, resulting from capital market imper-
fections. In keeping with the approach adopted by other studies in this volume,
this involves the estimation of investment functions, along the lines set out in
Fazzari et al. (1988).
The investment model of choice is rooted in the sales accelerator theory, where
the firm’s investment decision is determined primarily by changes in sales. In
addition, cash flow and the level of debt are included in the model as variables,
which capture financing constraints of the firm. The specification to be tested
(Harris et al. 1994: 38) is stated in eqn (7.1):
, (7.1)
where I is investment, K is capital stock, S is sales, CF is cash flow, D is debt, 
 is the error term, i is the firm subscript and t is the time subscript. The coeffi-
cient 2 is expected to be positive. The coefficient 3 captures the firm’s ability
to raise finance internally and, if significant and positive, indicates that the firm
is credit constrained. The 4 coefficient reflects the premium above the safe rate
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Figure 7.9 Monthly conditional variance of the REER.
that must be paid as the debt-to-capital ratio increases and is expected to differ
across firms and between periods.
The capital stock variable was estimated using the perpetual inventory method
as described by Hall et al. (1998) and stated in eqn (7.2):
(7.2)
where  is the rate of depreciation (8 per cent), Pt is the equipment goods
price deflator, and the base year capital stock is proxied by net fixed assets of the
firm. All the variables have been deflated into constant 1995 rand. S, CF and D
were deflated by sectoral production price indices, while Pt, the equipment goods
deflator, is common to all sectors.
Financial data was provided by the Bureau for Financial Analysis (BFA),
University of Pretoria, for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
Yearly data were obtained from this source for companies whose main business
was apparently in manufacturing, for the period 1985–98, but was incomplete for
a large number of firms. Therefore, in order to increase the number of observa-
tions and include a greater number of firms, the sample period chosen was
1990–7. Twenty-eight manufacturing firms were included in the sample.
A crucial step in the analysis is the categorisation of firms on an a priori basis,
according to whether they would be expected to be subject to high or low infor-
mation costs in the raising of external funds in the capital market. In the general
literature, criteria commonly used in this process have been size of dividend pay-
out, firm size and the age of firms. In the context of the present study, however,
we are concerned with categories relevant to the competitiveness of the South
African economy as defined above. Clearly categories related to trade perform-
ance are crucial for this purpose. Furthermore, if the various parts of the chapter
are to be properly integrated, the discussion of finance must be related to the other
major aspects of the study, trade and competitiveness.
Each firm in our sample has been categorised on each of three trade-related
bases as follows:
1 Trade orientation. Export-oriented and domestically oriented firms. Export-
oriented sectors were those whose percentage of production sold in world
markets was above the sample median.35
2 The rate of growth of exports. This was based on export data for the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) for the period 1990–7. High export growth
firms were those belonging to sectors with export growth rates above the
median growth rate for sectors in the sample.
3 The change in the contribution to trade balance (CTB). Sectors with high
rates of change in CTB were those with changes in CTB above the median
for sectors in the sample, based on SACU export and import data for the
period 1990–7.
The assumption made is that firms successful in international trade, in terms of
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and thus less subject to financial constraints. We leave aside the question whether
a convincing case can be made for this assumption on a priori grounds.
We test for the significance of financial constraints in one category relative to
the other, in each of the three cases listed above, in two different ways. Table 7.10
presents the results of the full sample regressions, which include dummy vari-
ables for export orientation, high export growth and change in CTB. The invest-
ment equation is estimated using dummy variables for both intercept and slope
coefficients, which are attached to the cash flow and debt variables, in order to
account for the differences in trade-related characteristics.
The first column in Table 7.10 shows that the dummy is positive, indicating that
investment is affected positively by export orientation. The cash flow slope dummy
is negative and significant, indicating that export-oriented sectors are less finan-
cially constrained than domestically oriented sectors, as would perhaps be expected.
The second column shows that the export growth dummy is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that the level of investment is negatively impacted by high
export growth. The cash flow dummy is positive and significant, indicating that
high export growth firms are more financially constrained than low export
growth firms, contrary to our assumption.
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Table 7.10 Empirical results of investment function, 1990–7; all firms
with dummy variables
Exporters Export growth 	CTB
Constant 0.666 0.157 0.360
(10.138) (4.546) (29.439)
S/Kt1 0.0272 0.071 0.017
(2.642) (5.834) (2.010)
CF/Kt1 0.560 0.185 0.233
(8.926) (3.846) (15.727)
D/Kt1 0.371 0.184 0.413
(8.322) (4.684) (25.314)
AR(1) 0.527 0.372 0.618
(14.322) (9.909) (30.162)
Dummy 0.356 0.444 0.125
(5.198) (6.570) (0.757)
(CF/Kt1)*Dummy 0.419 0.247 0.008
(5.998) (3.629) (0.375)
(D/Kt1)*Dummy 0.060 0.234 0.120
(1.121) (4.652) (2.662)
Method GLS GLS GLS
R2 0.780 0.798 0.697
No. of observations 196 196 196
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Dummy variables differ in each of the three
regressions that include dummies for sectors that are export oriented, sectors
with high growth in exports, sectors with high change in CTB. Classifications of
the export growth and change in CTB dummies are based on SACU trade data
for the period of 1990–7, while the export orientation dummy was based on data
from the IDC from the period of 1985–93.
The final column shows that the change in CTB dummy is negative but
insignificant, suggesting that CTB performance has no significant effect on
investment. The cash flow dummy is positive but insignificant, indicating, in
accordance with our assumption, that high CTB-change firms are less financially
constrained than low CTB-change firms.
Equation (7.1) was also estimated using divided samples. The divided samples
are based on the same classifications used for the dummy variables, that is, on
export orientation, growth of exports and change in CTB. The results of these
regressions, presented in Table 7.11, offer support for those found in the previous
regressions presented above.
As the first two columns in Table 7.11 show, for both the export-oriented and
domestically oriented samples, the cash flow variable is positive and statistically
significant. The cash flow coefficient is larger for the domestic sectors however,
indicating that they are more financially constrained.
The third and fourth columns show that for both the high and low export growth
samples, all the variables are positive and statistically significant. Therefore, both
categories are financially constrained, but the cash flow coefficient is larger for the
high export growth sectors, indicating that they are more financially constrained.
The fifth and sixth columns show that for the high CTB-change sample, all the
explanatory variables are positive and statistically significant. For the low CTB-
change sample, the sales variable is negative and insignificant while the cash flow
and debt variables are positive and statistically significant. The results suggest
that while both high and low CTB-change sectors are financially constrained, low
CTB-change sectors are more financially constrained, as indicated by the larger
cash flow coefficient.
What are the implications of these findings for the competitiveness of South
African manufacturing? The finding on the effect of trade orientation suggests that
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Table 7.11 Empirical results of investment function, 1990–7; using sectoral classifications
Domestic Exporting High export Low export High CTB Low CTB 
growth growth change change
Constant 0.656 0.381 0.574 0.160 0.149 0.401
(7.764) (9.460) (8.216) (3.968) (2.028) (13.634)
S/Kt1 0.029 0.021 0.043 0.112 0.189 0.009
(1.807) (1.432) (2.714) (6.609) (24.022) (0.420)
CF/Kt1 0.545 0.146 0.393 0.200 0.154 0.258
(7.020) (3.123) (7.032) (3.989) (2.462) (6.016)
D/Kt1 0.368 0.533 0.427 0.167 0.167 0.466
(6.902) (13.318) (9.837) (4.113) (7.678) (9.837)
AR(1) 0.509 0.665 0.371 0.418 0.052 0.695
(7.837) (15.555 (7.270) (7.130) (0.964) (17.749)
Method GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
R2 0.881 0.687 0.781 0.799 0.831 0.693
No. of obs. 49 147 77 119 98 98
the financial system is at least not unfavourable to export-oriented firms, in accor-
dance with what might be expected, and may thus have been conducive to export
and GDP growth. In fact, however, as we have seen, high export growth firms were
found to be more financially constrained than low export growth firms.
The difference between the results based on trade orientation, and those based
on export growth rates, suggests that firms which exhibited rapid export growth
in 1990–7 tended to be those which in 1985–93 were more oriented to production
for the domestic market. There was, in fact, a negative correlation across sectors
between the export/gross output ratio and the export growth rate of 0.4 in 1990–7.
(The presence of such a tendency in 1985–90, and the reasons for it, are discussed
in Bell 1993a: 108–10). Thus, while rapid export growth in 1990–7 may, on its
own, have been favourable for access to credit, this may have been outweighed by
the relatively severe financial constraints associated with an initially low degree
of export orientation.
The fact that the results on trade performance are mixed (with high export growth
firms more financially constrained than low export growth firms; but high CTB-
change firms less financially constrained than low CTB-change firms), seems to
limit our ability to draw inferences on the effects of capital market imperfections on
trade performance, and hence on competitiveness, in general. Nevertheless, the
question remains whether the findings on export growth mean that financial con-
straints have been an obstacle to yet faster export growth in the high export growth
sectors, and hence to competitiveness, in both senses described above.
Despite the evident financial constraints, the high export growth sectors were
by definition those that exhibited superior export performance. One reason for
this is the fact that the availability of finance is not the only, or, indeed, may not
even be the most important, determinant of investment. Furthermore, in condi-
tions of significant excess productive capacity, such as have prevailed for much
of the period since 1985, significant investment is not necessary for sustained,
rapid export expansion over an extended period of time.36 The very fact that low
export growth firms were less financially constrained than high export growth
firms seems to suggest that financial constraints due to capital market imperfec-
tions were a relatively unimportant determinant of export growth, and hence via
this channel, of the competitiveness of the South African economy.
Furthermore, the performance of high export growth firms in terms of certain
other indicators also creates uncertainty about the significance of the finding
above that high export growth firms were relatively more severely financially
constrained than low export growth firms. In general, it is not unusual for firms
subject to more severe financial constraints, as indicated by the sensitivity of
investment to the cash flow variable, to outperform in some respect or other, less
severely financially constrained firms. For instance, Fazzari et al. (1988: 159)
find that though their ‘class 1’ (low dividend payout) firms were the most finan-
cially constrained; they ‘experienced much more rapid growth in fixed capital
stock than the mature firms in class 3’. Similarly, we find for South Africa that
though domestically oriented and high export growth firms were more financially
constrained, they exhibited faster growth of both fixed assets and net assets in
1990–7 than export-oriented and low export growth firms. An apparently more
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severe financial constraint thus did not prevent high export growth firms out-
performing low export growth firms in these terms too.
Also contributing to uncertainty about the significance of the result on the
export growth variable reported above, is the finding of Fazzari et al. (1988: 161)
that their financially constrained ‘class 1 and 2’ (low and medium dividend pay-
out) firms have higher debt-to-capital ratios than their ‘class 3’ firms. This find-
ing, they say, is ‘consistent with a financing hierarchy’ and supports ‘the idea that
constrained firms borrow up to their debt capacity’. Apparently thus, Fazzari et al.
expect that relatively more financially constrained firms would have higher
debt–capacity ratios. This seems to hold for our financially constrained domesti-
cally oriented and low CTB-change firms, but not for our financially constrained
high export growth firms. Assuming that the reasoning of Fazzari et al. is sound,
and that a relatively low debt-to-capital ratio is indicative of a relatively less severe
financial constraint, our finding that high export growth firms had a smaller debt-
to-capital ratio than low export growth firms, seems to suggest that it is not clear
after all that high export growth firms were relatively more constrained financially.
A further implication of the above, it might be noted, is that none of the vari-
ables discussed in the preceding two paragraphs seem to provide a reliable indi-
cator for deciding a priori which category of firms, classified on the basis of trade
orientation, export growth or change in CTB, will be more financially constrained.
The argument of Rajan and Zingales (1988) referred to earlier may perhaps be
interpreted as implying that sectors with higher dependence on external finance
would be subject to more severe financial constraints.37 However, using Rajan and
Zingales’ (1998: 566–7, table 1) estimated external dependence ratios (EDRs) for
the sectors included in our sample, and once again using eqn (7.1), we find for
both our full and split samples that high EDR sectors are less credit constrained
than low EDR sectors.
As noted earlier, though, Rajan and Zingales’ argument implies that high EDR
sectors will tend to grow faster relative to low EDR sectors, the more developed a
country’s financial system. This clearly does not necessarily mean that high EDR
sectors will grow faster than low EDR sectors within a relatively financially devel-
oped economy, even controlling for other determinants of sectoral growth. It is
nevertheless noteworthy that, of Rajan and Zingales’ (1998: 566–7, table 1) thirty-
six sectors, there are nine which fall in what we have called the metal products
group of industries. These nine sectors are all amongst the seventeen sectors most
dependent on external finance in Rajan and Zingales’ table, and as we saw earlier,
they were consistently the sectors with high export growth rates in 1985–97.
It seems that South Africa’s relatively advanced financial system may have tended
to reinforce the effects of real exchange rates in making for relatively rapid export
growth in the downstream metal products group of industries.38
South Africa’s conglomerates and the financial system
The evidence considered above seems to give no reason to think that the financial
system as such has had a detrimental effect on the competitiveness of the South
African economy. If anything, South Africa’s relatively advanced financial system
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might be expected to have had a favourable effect. It is held that capital market
imperfections related to problems of asymmetric information, which underlie
much of the discussion above, are ‘marginal’. What is really damaging, however,
is the oligopolistic power of the conglomerates in South Africa’s financial mar-
kets (Fine 1996: 26–39).
This argument clearly cannot be dismissed out of hand, and it calls for serious
attention. To date, however, no proper evidence has been adduced in support 
of the contention that the ownership by conglomerates of commercial banks, as
such, has made for a suboptimal allocation of credit. Apparently, as evidence for
this view, Fine (1996: 33) states that the ‘core businesses [of the conglomerates]
remain in and around mining and energy’, and that they have failed to diversify
to the extent warranted by opportunities for ‘vertical and horizontal integration’.
There has been a tendency to understate the extent to which the South African
economy has been diversified, and this probably applies to the conglomerates in
particular.39 Furthermore, insofar as natural resource-based activities have been
and remain important, it obviously does not follow that this is due to the finan-
cial system. Indeed, as the present study suggests, it seems to be largely explica-
ble in terms of South Africa’s natural resource endowment. In any event, there is
no evidence that the ownership by conglomerates of commercial banks has been
a significant determinant of the growth and structure of South Africa’s production
and trade.
Such evidence as there is suggests that it has had little effect. A World Bank
study of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) states: 
Lack of access to finance scores strikingly low – as a constraint on enterprise
expansion. This result is surprising in light of the common view that, since
South Africa’s dominant banks [are] owned by the country’s major business
groups, they skew their activities to large enterprises within their own busi-
ness stable and neglect small firms …. Banks (appropriately) evaluate loan
requests in relation to their riskiness and transaction costs. 
(Levy 1996: 11)
It is found that the results on access to finance according to the size and age of
firms simply follow ‘the expected pattern for a well-functioning banking system’.
For instance, the relative importance of financial constraints declines with firm
age and size; and both collateral required as a proportion of loan value, and immov-
able assets required as a proportion of total collateral, fall with firm size. Perhaps
contrary to expectations, younger firms, Levy (1996: 12) finds, ‘were at least as
likely to be able to use moveables as collateral as were their other counterparts’.
Only ‘once ethnic variables are incorporated’ do they find that the performance of
the financial system ‘seems more problematic’. The study finds that collateral
requirements were more of an obstacle to borrowing by Africans, but there ‘was no
evidence of discriminatory ethnic variations in the type of collateral required, with
moveables widely accepted regardless of their ethnic origin’ (Levy 1996: 13).
The investment levels of the conglomerates themselves may well be found to
be relatively unconstrained by access to finance. This would be hardly surprising,
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given their size and maturity. It would not signify that their relationship with the
commercial banks is not one at arm’s-length. Our clear impression from extensive
discussions with South African financial institutions is that it is an arm’s-length
relationship. The relationship is quite unlike that in Japan, as described, for
instance, by Hubbard (1998: 205).
6. Conclusion
The principal aim of the chapter has been to shed some light on the apparently
significant deterioration in the ability of the South African economy to grow
without running into balance-of-payments difficulties.
One obviously relevant, and significant, factor is the rate of growth of South
Africa’s exports. It is argued that given South Africa’s natural resource endow-
ment, which largely accounts for the sectoral mix of its trade specialisation, 
variations in the pattern and rate of growth of South Africa’s exports have been
determined to a major extent by cyclical and longer-term trends in the world
prices of the country’s primary commodity and natural resource-based manufac-
tured exports, and the variations in real exchange rates which they have produced.
The natural resource boom of the 1970s, which resulted in a substantial real
appreciation of the rand, had major adverse effects on the price competitiveness,
and hence on the export growth rate of non-commodity manufactures. It pro-
duced an aberration from longer-term manufacturing export growth trends and
put paid temporarily to the possibility, which was emerging in the latter half of
the 1960s, of a shift to export-oriented industrialisation.
In the period since the collapse of the natural resource boom and other ensuing
external shocks, which resulted in the real depreciation of the rand in the mid-
1980s, the price competitiveness of non-commodity manufactures, especially of
the downstream metal products group of industries, has increased significantly.
Exports of these downstream manufacturing sectors have grown rapidly, indeed
considerably faster than natural resource-based manufactured exports throughout
the period 1985–97.
Nevertheless, the rate of growth of South Africa’s total exports, which has
shown a long-term tendency to decline, was lower in 1990–8 than in any other
subperiod before 1990 shown in Figure 7.9, excepting only 1980–5 at the end of
the commodity boom, when exports collapsed. This evident decline in the export
growth rate has probably contributed significantly to the deterioration in the
macro-competitiveness of the South African economy. It has been largely due to
the preponderance of primary commodities and natural resource-based manufac-
tures in South Africa’s exports, which have either been declining (as in the case
of gold) or growing slowly, rather than to any inherent lack of competitiveness.
The case of South Africa thus provides a striking illustration of the fact that the
sectoral mix of trade specialisation can have significant effects on a country’s
macroeconomic performance, including in particular on its ability to grow 
without running into balance-of-payments difficulties. 
Competitiveness, international trade and finance 213
Other trade-related factors relevant to the decline in macro-competitiveness
concern developments on the import side of the trade account, including the
decline in the rate of import substitution and in the output/capital ratio.
The other main focus of the chapter is on the effects of financial factors on the
macro-competitiveness of the South African economy. By contrast with its nega-
tive effect on the export growth rate in recent years, the country’s natural resource
endowment, in particular its specialisation in gold mining, probably accounts to
a significant extent for South Africa’s relatively advanced stage of financial
development. This would be expected to have had a positive effect on the macro-
competitiveness of the South African economy.
By estimating the coefficient on the cash flow variable in an investment func-
tion, it is found that in the period 1990–7, export-oriented firms were subject to
a less severe financial constraint than domestically oriented firms. This suggests
that the financial system is at least not unfavourable to exporters, and may thus
have been conducive to macro-competitiveness. However, the results on trade
performance are mixed (with high export growth firms more financially con-
strained than low export growth firms, but high CTB-change firms less finan-
cially constrained than low CTB-change firms). This seems to prevent clear-cut
conclusions on the effect of the financial system on trade performance, but it is
argued that, in any event, the interpretation of the findings on the export growth
variable is subject to considerable uncertainty.
This uncertainty arises from doubts about the significance of differences in
access to finance as a determinant of investment, and about the necessity of
investment for rapid export growth. Also pertinent to this is that, though high
export growth firms were relatively more financially constrained, they exhibited
faster growth of both fixed assets and net assets, and had lower debt-to-capital
ratios (associated by Fazzari et al. (1988) with a less severe financial constraint),
than low export growth firms. Furthermore, the analysis of Rajan and Zingales
(1998) seems to suggest that South Africa’s financial system may have reinforced
the effects of real exchange rates in making for relatively rapid export growth in
the downstream metal products industries, and so enhanced the competitiveness
of the South African economy.
In attempting above to shed light on the apparent deterioration in the macro-
competitiveness of the South African economy, only the effects of certain trade-
related and financial factors have been considered, in keeping with the subject of
this volume. A more comprehensive analysis of the problem would need to take
into account various other possibilities as well. Some of these, including inade-
quate levels of educational and skills attainment in South Africa’s population at
large, may also be related to some extent to the country’s natural resource abun-
dance.40 South Africa’s natural resource endowment has clearly had a major deter-
mining influence on the country’s path of development. Without its mineral
wealth, South Africa would probably have remained a relatively poor, industrially
backward country. However, in the past few decades, South Africa’s natural
resource abundance has apparently not been an unmixed blessing. 
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Notes
1 We benefitted greatly from the discussions with the other participants in this project and
from access to the earlier drafts of their papers. Valuable assistance was provided by the
Industrial Development Corporation, including access to its database. Professor Leon
Brümmer of the Bureau for Financial Analysis, University of Pretoria, kindly provided
the data for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for analysis in
Section V, under ‘Investment, finance and economic instability’. Senior members of
ABSA Bank, First National Bank, Nedbank and Standard Bank gave generously of their
time to discuss some of the financial aspects of the paper. Troy Elyea, who provided out-
standing research assistance, produced Figure 7.8, performed the regression analysis for
Section V, ‘Investment, finance and economic instability’, and gave considerable help in
the final stages of the production of the chapter. A major part of the research expenses
incurred by Trevor Bell was funded by a research grant from the Liberty Life
Foundation for a project that includes the subject of this chapter. To all of the above,
none of whom bears any responsibility for the views expressed in this chapter, we are
most grateful. Greg Farrel hasa contributed to the study in his personal capacity and the
views expressed are not necessarily those of the South African Reserve Bank.
2 In Figure 7.1, the growth rate for 1975, for instance, is the average GDP growth rate
for 1974 and 1975.
3 The method used there in estimating potential or capacity output is an adaptation of
Panic (1978), as described by Christiano (1981: 151–4). Capacity output is obtained by
multiplying the estimated output/capital ratio (Y/K) (derived from a shifted regression
of Y/K), for each year, by the actual capital stock in that year. The capital stock data used
in the estimation of capacity GDP are from the South African Reserve Bank. The two-
year moving average is calculated in the same way as for Figure 7.1 described above.
4 The index of capacity utilisation (the ratio of actual to potential GDP, calculated as
described above, with 1969 100) increased substantially from 86.5 in 1993 to 95.1 in
1997, that is, at a rate of 2.4 per cent a year. Capacity output grew at an average annual
rate of only 0.17 per cent. The greater part of the 2.55 per cent per annum increase in
actual output in 1993–7, thus was apparently accounted for by increased capacity utilisa-
tion. In 1998, however, the increase in actual GDP was lower than the increase in poten-
tial output, due to a decline in capacity utilisation as the economy went into recession.
5 Measured in constant (1956/7) rands, the GDP share of mining declined from 24.0 per
cent in 1916/17 to 11.1 per cent in 1956/7, while that of manufacturing increased from
6.2 per cent to 19.4 per cent. These figures, as well as export shares and growth rates
in the period 1916/17–1956/7 have been calculated from data in constant (1956/7)
rands from T. A. du Plessis (1965).
6 See also the prescient study by J. C. du Plessis (1965), at the time an economist at the
South African Reserve Bank.
7 South Africa’s REER is defined as equal to eP/P*, where e is the trade-weighted nom-
inal exchange rate, expressed as the number of units of foreign currency per rand, P is
the South African producer price index (PPI), and P* is a trade-weighted measure of
the PPIs of South Africa’s trading partners.
8 That is, the increase in e was offset, indeed more than offset, by the increase in P*,
defined now as the foreign currency price of such products, so that the real exchange
rate applicable to them fell.
9 The export unit values are calculated from the IDC (1995) Sectoral Data series. The
weights in these cases are the shares of the constituent subsectors of each category in
the total exports of the category. Data availability does not allow calculation of these
real exchange rates for years after 1993.
10 In keeping with the views of the Reynders Commission (1972), a new export incentive
scheme was introduced in 1972. Also, under pressure from GATT and the IMF, quanti-
tative restrictions were gradually relaxed in the period 1972–6. This was accompanied
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by some compensating increases in tariffs but the net effect was a reduction in levels of
protection in this period. Though there was a nominal depreciation of the rand in 1975,
the increase in the real exchange rate effectively ended this attempt at trade liberalisa-
tion in about 1976.
11 For more detail on South Africa’s trade policy reforms, see Bell (1993a, 1997).
12 Even in 1985–8, before the downswing in the commodity price cycle, the exports 
of the metal products group of industries grew at an average annual rate of 27.7 
per cent, and natural resource-based manufactures at 17.8 per cent. In 1988–90, natu-
ral resource-based manufactured exports grew at only 0.5 per cent a year, whereas the
export growth rate of the metal products group, 12.4 per cent, remained relatively high.
13 It is indeed noteworthy too that, by contrast with 1975–82, there was no tendency in
1985–90 for the REER and the real exchange rate for the metal products group of
industries to rise and fall in unison. They had apparently become de-linked, and there
was a persistent tendency for the competitiveness of the metal products sectors to
improve, whether the REER was rising or falling.
14 The description above of variations in the growth rates of manufactured exports is
based on exports valued in constant (1990) USD. In estimating export demand func-
tions, including the effect of variations in real exchange rates, however, the dependent
variable is generally the physical volume of exports. It is noteworthy, therefore, as
comparison of Tables 7.5 and 7.12 shows, that the growth rates of exports measured in
constant rands (which gives a better indication of changes in export volumes) and in
constant USD, respectively, move up and down in unison. The constant rand growth
rate also varies significantly, so that the variations in export growth rates are not due
simply to changes in world prices. The discussion above, thus, would not have been
significantly different had the export growth rates reported been based on constant
rand, rather than constant US dollar values.
15 Though the sectoral shares of the manufactured exports of South Africa and SACU dif-
fer, as comparison of Tables 7.4 and 7.7 show, the data on SACU manufactured
exports, which are dominated by South Africa, may reasonably be taken to reflect
trends in the sectoral composition and growth rates of the manufactured exports of
South Africa alone in the period 1990–97. 
16 The index of industrial country imports increased at 15.6 per cent per year in 1993–5,
but by only 3.3 per cent in 1996 (Tsikata 1998: 15, table 1.2).
17 See Wright (1993: 58–60) on the significance of capacity utilisation as a determinant
of total factor productivity growth in the 1980s.
18 A simple bivariate analysis such as this, however, is clearly in this case both statisti-
cally and theoretically unsatisfactory and there is no apparent reason to expect signif-
icant results. To establish whether productivity growth or changes in unit labour costs
are significant influences on trade performance, a much more sophisticated analysis is
required.
19 According to Wright (1993: 17, table 1.3), in 1981–90, industrial chemicals, iron and
steel and non-ferrous basic metals, the three natural resource-based manufacturing 
sectors with relatively low export growth rates, had higher TFP growth rates than any
other manufacturing sectors, and were three of only eight sectors (out of 26) with 
positive TFP growth rates in this period. Despite this, as we have seen, these sectors
had relatively slow export growth.
20 It should be noted that South Africa’s GDP growth rate was declining even before
1972.
21 See Bell (1993b: 2–5) for a fuller discussion of the causes of South Africa’s debt crisis
and the role played in it by the price of gold.
22 This was despite the fact that 1985–90 was a special period of export recovery follow-
ing several years of absolute decline.
23 This included an exceptional discontinuous increase in 1993–5.
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Table 7.12 Average annual export growth rates in constant 1993 rands (%)
ISIC Sector 1972–5 1975–80 1972–80 1980–5 1985–90 1990–3 1985–93
341 Pulp and paper products 6.36 13.71 5.72 9.96 1.22 13.74 4.14
351–4 Chemical products 4.79 4.41 4.55 1.07 12.05 3.52 5.94
371 Iron and steel basic industries 0.16 20.55 12.32 4.35 10.46 1.49 5.82
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 4.26 34.79 18.56 6.32 1.94 4.41 0.39
Sub-total: natural resource based 1.18 14.52 9.32 3.69 7.40 0.11 4.61
381 Metal products 0.15 4.88 2.96 11.22 10.53 0.63 6.20
382 Machinery 7.62 0.71 2.49 7.67 10.42 3.86 7.91
383 Electrical machinery 7.72 9.32 2.59 2.17 18.58 5.86 13.64
384 Motor vehicles and parts 0.16 11.26 6.83 2.54 21.15 19.45 20.51
385 Other transport equipment 3.19 2.98 3.06 7.14 17.65 16.00 17.03
Sub-total: metal products group 3.83 4.22 1.13 7.18 14.60 9.20 12.54
Total manufacturing 3.50 7.23 5.81 1.20 6.64 1.80 4.80
Source: IDC (1995).
24 The combined export share of ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’, ‘other mining’ and
the four natural resource-based manufacturing sectors, for which world demand would
be expected to be relatively income inelastic, increased from 31.7 per cent in 1970–1,
before the commodity price boom, to 53.5 per cent in 1993. Furthermore, gold, whose
export share in 1993 was 27.7 per cent, no longer faces a perfectly elastic export
demand at a fixed price. 
25 The exceptions in the 1970s, in the context of the natural resource boom, were import
substitution in the natural resource-based iron and steel and chemical industries, and
the motor vehicle industry.
26 See Krugman (1995: 47) on the possible beneficial effects of growth which is biased
towards import-competing production.
27 See Bell (1993: 97–8) and Bell and Cattaneo (1997: 14, table 11).
28 Simulations by the IDC in 1994 of the effects of the reforms scheduled for 1995–9
implied a larger percentage increase in imports than exports, and that the largest
increases in imports occur in consumer goods industries (Bell and Cattaneo 1997:
21–3). Also the S. A. Reserve Bank (1996: 21–3) argues that the increase in the ratio
of imports to gross domestic expenditure has partly been due to ‘the reform initiated –
to open up the economy more to international competition’.
29 It is estimated that the ratio of imported capital goods to gross domestic fixed invest-
ment in South Africa in 1975–90 averaged about 20 per cent.
30 As Rodrik (1995: 94) states, ‘the causal relationship between investment and growth
should be one of the least controversial in economics’; and Rodrik (1997: 13), in argu-
ing for the importance of capital accumulation, as distinct from productivity growth,
states that the best single predictor of the growth of any economy remains its invest-
ment rate: hence ‘capital accumulation is the proximate source of growth’.
31 Indeed, as in Latin America (Agosin 1995: 159), credit conditions have remained 
relatively tight, partly because of the ever-present danger of the capital flows going into
reverse.
32 It does not seem to us that Agosin’s (1995: 166) use of bank credit to the private sec-
tor as a proportion of GDP, as a proxy for the availability of finance, overcomes these 
difficulties. 
33 Initially, various ARCH-type specifications of the return-generating process were 
estimated over this sample period. Of the valid models, an ARCH(2) specification was
selected on the basis of information criteria (the restriction that the sum of the coeffi-
cients of the lagged values in the conditional variance equation not exceed unity was
not met in the case of the benchmark generalised ARCH or GARCH(1,1) model).
34 The abolition of South Africa’s dual exchange rate (financial rand) system in March
1995 effectively removed exchange controls on non-residents. There has also been con-
siderable relaxation of exchange controls on permanent residents of South Africa.
35 As no data were available for this purpose for years since 1993, trade orientation was
based on IDC data for 1985–93.
36 See Bell (1993a: 108–9) on South African export expansion in 1985–90; and 
Rodrik (1995: 66–7) with reference to the case of Turkey from the early 1980s.
37 Whether this is an implication of their argument, however, is questionable. In their
model, dependence on external finance is technologically determined, rather than
being related to constraints on access to credit due to capital market imperfections and
associated high information costs. Financial development, it seems, has its beneficial
effect on sectors with high external dependence, not by alleviating capital market
imperfections, but by increasing the supply of external finance. 
38 In general however, we do not find a significant relationship between export growth
rates and EDRs, in a regression involving all thirty-six of Rajan and Zingales, sectors.
Also, Rajan and Zingales’ (1998: 568–9) base their findings on real value-added
growth rates rather than export growth rates.
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39 See Bell and Farrell (1997: 600–9). Also, Fine’s (1996: 33) remark that the conglomer-
ates ‘are responsible for the ownership of the vast majority of South African manufactur-
ing’ seems to conflict with the notion that the conglomerates are inadequately diversified. 
40 See, for instance, Crafts and Thomas (1986: 643) on ‘a favourable endowment of nat-
ural resources’ as the source of Britain’s industrial leadership in the nineteenth century,
and Britain’s consequent difficulty because of a scarcity of human capital ‘in adjusting
to the technologically progressive product cycle industries that dominated the Second
Industrial Revolution’.
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8 Trade, finance and competitiveness 
in Tunisia1
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1. Growth and current account sustainability: an overview
Tunisia’s total GDP growth of 5.1 per cent per year during 1965–97 was significantly
higher than the average of 3.9 per cent for low- and middle-income countries (World
Bank 1999, table 1.4). Its performance in terms of average annual GNP per capita
growth of 2.7 per cent per year ranked seventh among non-industrial and non-East
Asian countries (World Bank 1998, figure 1.4a). In this chapter, we focus on the expe-
rience since the early 1970s, when a major switch and reversal in policy occurred
towards a more open and liberal economy. We analyze the factors explaining this
experience of a sustained relatively high growth (5.1 per cent per year also during
1972–97) and a large current account deficit averaging 6 per cent of GDP (Table 8.1).
GDP growth fluctuated widely, however, with major swings in the current
account balance (Figure 8.1). Agricultural production fluctuations, due to vari-
ability in rainfall and terms of trade changes, account for a major part of GDP
growth fluctuations, with their effect declining with increased diversification of
the economy. Different patterns in growth and the current account are discernable
over the periods 1972–80, 1981–6, 1987–9 and 1990–7 (Table 8.1). After a surge
in the 1970s, growth declined and the current account deficit increased. A major
episode was the balance-of-payments crisis in 1985–6 which followed a period of
large current account deficit (8.4 per cent of GDP during 1981–6), a significant
decline in terms of trade because of the sharp decline in oil prices and poor 
productivity growth.
Tunisia mobilized significant external finance for its development. The growth
performance and ‘creditworthiness’ of the country helped sustain this high level
of capital inflows. Medium- and long-term gross debt inflows, mainly from offi-
cial sources, averaged about 8 per cent of GDP and were quite stable (Table 8.1).
It was only in the mid-1980s, and more recently in the mid-1990s, that private
debt flows were significant. Equity flows, mainly foreign direct investment, were
also an important source of external finance. Short-term and portfolio flows were
tightly controlled and were not of any importance in external finance, and Tunisia
did not experience significant effects from the volatility of private capital inflows.
Long-term growth performance and current account sustainability, or long-
term competitiveness, have been associated with increased openness and strong
export performance.2 Export volume growth averaged 6.3 per cent during
1973–97 (Table 8.2), and led to an increase in the export to GDP ratio from 
34 per cent in 1972 to 44 per cent in 1997.3 Tunisia’s exports structure underwent 
a dramatic shift: it changed from being dominated by natural resource-based
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Table 8.1 Growth and the current account (% growth, or % of GDP)
1972–80 1981–6 1987–9 1990–7 1972–97
Real GDP growth 7.1 3.3 3.5 4.9 5.1
Investment rate 26.3 29.7 20.1 23.6 25.5
Saving rate 22.5 20.4 19.3 20.0 20.8
Financial saving 2.3 2.1 5.4 4.6 3.3
Fiscal deficit (net) 2.8 2.5 3.5 3.6 3.1
Fiscal deficit (primary) 1.6 0.6 1.2 0.1 0.9
Inflation 6.1 8.9 7.7 5.3 6.7
Terms of trade 2.4 2.6 0.3 0.8 0.1
(average annual rate of change)
Trade balance 5.1 8.8 1.5 6.1 5.9
Current account balance 5.6 8.4 1.1 6.6 6.0
Capital inflows 10.1 12.0 9.8 11.3 10.9
Equity 2.0 3.5 1.4 2.6 2.5
Medium and long-term debt 7.0 8.2 7.8 8.2 7.6
Capital outflows 3.5 4.3 6.7 5.6 4.7
Capital account balance 6.5 7.7 3.1 5.7 6.1












































































GDP growth (left-hand scale) Current account deficit (right-hand scale)
Figure 8.1 GDP growth and current account deficit.
products with large oil export revenues in the 1970s to being more diversified in
manufacturing and services exports as the country became a net importer of
energy products in the 1990s.
In Section 2 we provide a detailed analysis of the trade specialization pattern
and its change over time, and the resulting export diversification and improved
market shares. The following sections explore factors explaining competitiveness,
focusing more specifically on the macro–micro linkages or interactions between
financial and macroeconomic factors and competitiveness. In Section 3, we
investigate the role of price factors in determining long-term competitiveness
including trade policy incentives, the real exchange rate and the links between
export orientation and productivity growth. In Section 4 we consider the role of
financial factors as determinant of competitiveness. These factors may affect
trade specialization and competitiveness through price effects and productivity
growth. But non-price effects may be even more important through increased
capital accumulation, flexibility in reallocating resources, development and
expansion of new activities and products for which there is comparative advan-
tage, research and development inducing changes in comparative advantage and
entrepreneurship development. Section 5 summarizes the results of the chapter
about micro–macro and trade–finance interactions and competitiveness.
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Table 8.2 Foreign trade indicators (%)
1972 1980 1986 1989 1997
Exports (X)/GDP 34.2 37.8 33.9 44.2 44.2
Imports (M)/GDP 36.2 50.4 41.7 48.4 47.8
(X M)/GDP 70.4 88.1 75.6 92.6 92.0
Export shares
Agr., fishing, foods 22.7 5.9 8.0 6.7 7.1
Manufacturing 8.4 20.7 28.1 32.7 40.6
(excl. foods and 
chemicals)
Non-manuf. industry 38.5 37.1 31.3 26.0 15.0
(incl. chemicals)
Services 30.4 36.3 32.7 34.5 37.3
1973–97 1973–80 1981–6 1987–9 1990–7
Import growth 5.8 10.3 0.8 9.1 3.8
Export growth 6.3 7.4 3.0 13.2 5.0
Agr., fishing, foods 4.7 7.2 9.9 7.4 11.8
Manufacturing 13.6 20.7 8.8 19.0 7.9
(excl. foods and 
chemical)
Non-manuf. Industry 2.5 6.8 0.5 6.6 1.7
(incl. chemical)
Services 7.8 9.9 1.3 17.8 6.9
Source: Ministère du Développement Economique (Budget Economique).
Note: Calculations are based on trade volume data (constant 1990 prices).
2. Shifts in trade specialization and competitiveness
Tunisia’s pattern of specialization shifted dramatically with an increase in manu-
facturing’s share in total exports of goods and services (when we exclude foodstuffs
and chemicals, which are mainly fertilizers based on rock phosphates) from 8.4 per
cent in 1972 to 41 per cent in 1997 (Table 8.2). Similarly, services’ (including
tourism) share increased from 30 to 37 per cent over the same time period.4 The
share of non-food manufacturing and tourism in GDP increased from 8.6 to 19.5
per cent. It has been a major feature of the country’s competitiveness performance.
Trade specialization
The evolution of the broad patterns of trade specialization is also evident from
an analysis based on categories of tradables. Using a sixty-product classification,
net imports to domestic demand ratio t is computed for each product
t (m x)/(y m x), where y, m and x are production, imports and exports of the
product, respectively. Products are classified into four categories: (a) exportable if
t is negative and greater than 2 per cent in absolute value; (b) import competing if
t is positive, greater than 2 per cent and smaller than 75 per cent; (c) non-tradable
if t is smaller than 2 per cent in absolute value; and (d) non-import competing for
other values of t.5
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Table 8.3 Exportables (net export products, %)
Products 1984 1990 1995
Tourism 329.9 279.2 557.4
Clothing 104.7 268.0 332.0
Fertilizers 50.3 81.3 73.9
Oil and gas 40.8 10.4
Hosiery 34.2 77.9 67.0
Canned foods 30.2 81.1 27.5
Transportation 27.7 26.1 29.5
Carpets 27.2 22.3 8.8
Minerals 25.1 7.9 37.0
Fruits 7.6 10.8 10.4
Fish products 6.9 22.7 4.3
Leather and shoes 3.5 15.3 25.0
Services to firms 22.9
Cement and products 19.2 14.0
Vegetable oils and fats 9.2 42.1
Telecommunications 8.0 5.9
Drinks 3.4
Ceramic products 2.9 1.7
Transformation of grains 2.4 3.5
Animal products 0.9
Financial services 0.3
Source: Data from INS. Computations by El Abbassi et al. (1999).
Note: Ratio of net exports to domestic demand t (m x)/(y m x).
A first group of exportables includes traditional and natural resource-based
exports: fertilizers, oil and gas, minerals, vegetable oils and fats (olive oil) and
fruits (oranges, dates) (Table 8.3). Oil and gas products have become, however, a
net import category during the 1990s. The second group includes new product
exports already significant during the 1980s: tourism (and transportation), cloth-
ing, hosiery, leather and shoes, and fish and products.6
Products classified as exportables constitute the bulk of exports, their share
averaging 85 per cent during the 1980s (Table 8.4). By 1995 however, the share
of exportables declined to 74 per cent and that of import-competing products
increased from 12 to 24 per cent. This resulted from both increased exports by a
number of import-competing activities, and the contraction of the list of exporta-
bles in favor of the import-competing group following trade liberalization. The
indicator of contribution to trade balance gives the same result, with a smaller
contribution of exportables to trade balance in 1995.
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Table 8.4 Categories of tradables and specialization
Share in Contribution to Intra-industry 
exports (%) trade balance (%) trade index
Exportables
1984 85.5 63.6 49.1
1990 84.6 60.2 49.7
1995 73.5 57.8 37.6
Exportables – natural 
resource based
1984 42.4 29.6 56.0
1990 24.9 15.2 61.8
1995 12.0 9.7 34.7
Exportables – non-natural 
resource based
1984 43.1 34.0 41.5
1990 59.7 45.0 44.0
1995 61.5 48.1 38.1
Import competing
1984 11.4 41.3 26.8
1990 11.7 39.7 32.7
1995 23.5 43.2 49.0
Non-import competing
1984 2.4 22.5 12.7
1990 2.8 20.4 18.5
1995 1.8 14.8 17.9
Sources: Données INS et Calculs effectués par El Abbassi et al. (1999).
Notes: Contribution of product category i to trade balance: CTBi[(Xi Mi) (X M)*
(XiMi)/(X M)]/[(X M)/2], where Mi and Xi are imports and exports of category i and M
and X are total imports and exports. The intra-industry trade index is the Grubel–Lloyd index:
GLi[(XiMi) abs(XiMi)]/(XiMi).
Calculations for the index of comparative advantage (based on European
import data) also broadly give the same results, in terms of the characterization
of Tunisia’s pattern of specialization (Table 8.5). Some products however, that are
important net exports (Table 8.3), do not show a high index of comparative advan-
tage, because they are mainly exported to neighboring countries and do not
appear in European trade (animal products, transformation of grains and canned
foods). Also some products, which are significant net exports, have low index of
revealed comparative advantage: hosiery, drinks, minerals and ceramic products.
Export diversification
The share of natural resource-based exports fell from 42 per cent in 1984 to about
12 per cent in 1997 (Table 8.4). But, the share of non-resource-based exports
increased from 43 per cent in 1984 to 62 per cent in 1997. Their contribution to
the trade balance increased from 34 to 48 per cent. The expanding exports are
light manufacturing, mainly clothing and hosiery, and tourism services. This 
category of new exports broadened since the mid-1980s with the addition of a
number of other products: leather and shoes, cement products, ceramic products,
transformation of grains and a number of services (Table 8.3).
The index of intra-industry trade for exportables declined, however, in the
1990s (reflecting import liberalization of these products), and increased for
import-competing products. The latter means that for many of these products
there is a significant increase of exports. It is also noteworthy that a number 
of products, classified in the import-competing category, such as electrical and
electronic products, metal products, and rubber products, are emerging in the
1990s as significant exports. All these products, however, do not yet show a
revealed comparative advantage (Table 8.5), and Tunisia has not diversified into
higher value-added and more technology-intensive sectors (Guerrieri 1998).
Export shares and competitiveness
The results for export performance and competitiveness are confirmed using con-
stant market share analysis for the period after the crisis in the mid-1980s.
Between 1988 (beginning year 0) and 1996 (end year t), the change in Tunisia’s
exports to its main trading partner, the European Union (EU), is decomposed into
three components as shown in eqn (8.1).
, (8.1)
where X is the change in total exports of Tunisia to the EU over the period, M
is the change in total imports of the EU, Mi is imports of product i by the EU at
the end of period, s0X0/M0 is the share of Tunisia’s total exports to the EU in
total EU imports at the beginning of period, and siXi/Mi is the share of Tunisia’s
exports of product i in total imports of the EU of product at the end of period.
X  s0M  ni  1si0Mi  s0M ni  1siMi
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The first component is the standard growth effect, which measures the increase
in Tunisian exports under the assumption of maintained total constant share in the
EU market. The second component measures the change in exports due to
changes in EU demand structure for various products, if Tunisia maintained its
initial share in the various EU product markets. The last term captures the ‘com-
petitiveness’ effect, or increase in exports due to gains in market shares.
Tunisia’s exports to the EU increased 11.8 per cent per year over the period
1989–96, while total EU imports increased by 7 per cent. The decomposition of
this export growth to the EU during this period shows that the product structure
effect is negligible (0.2 per cent): changes in EU import demand structure had
a neutral effect on Tunisia’s export growth. The standard growth effect accounts
for 55 per cent of the increase in exports. There are also significant gains in
export shares and competitiveness effects during this period, which account for 45
per cent of the change in exports to the EU. The share of Tunisia in EU imports
increased from 0.16 to 0.23 per cent, with the most significant gains in clothing
and leather (0.78 to 1.7 per cent).
3. Productivity growth and the price determinants
of competitiveness
Export performance and productivity growth have interacted in a virtuous cycle,
enhancing competitiveness in Tunisia. In this section we show that trade policy,
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Table 8.5 Revealed comparative advantage
Products 1988 1992 1996
Fruits 0.27 0.28 0.12
Animal products 0.08 0.02 0.00
Fish and products 7.22 3.05 2.32
Transformation of  grains 0.01 0.04 0.07
Vegetable oils and fats 10.46 12.61 7.75
Canned foods 0.21 0.06 0.09
Drinks 0.54 0.24 0.14
Cement and products 2.91 0.76 1.04
Ceramic products 0.40 0.42 0.57
Electrical products 0.74 0.95 0.80
Fertilizers 22.05 13.62 14.92
Carpets 2.20 1.57 1.01
Hosiery 1.02 0.47 0.18
Clothing 11.31 12.17 14.01
Leather and products 1.42 2.19 3.25
Minerals 0.39 0.16 0.78
Oil and gas 2.02 1.46 1.40
Source: Data from Eurostat. Computations by El Abbassi et al. (1999).
Notes: (a) Index of revealed comparative advantage: (x/X )/(m/M ) based
on European Union imports from Tunisia (x, X ) and total (m, M ) imports,
(b) The products listed are those with an index higher than 1 and a few
other products which are listed in Table 8.3.
the real exchange rate and unit labor costs have been major price determinants of
export performance.
Productivity growth and export performance
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth contributed about 25 per cent to the 
5.1 per cent GDP growth in Tunisia over 1972–96 (Table 8.6), but varied consid-
erably over time. Changes in TFP can be partly explained by exogenous shocks,
such as rainfall and terms of trade, but policy also played a significant role.
Moussa (1995) argues also that Tunisia had lower productivity growth than East
Asian countries which started with similar conditions because of protectionist
trade and industrial policies and limited competition, even despite some liberal-
ization since the early 1970s and the reversal of the socialist experiment.
There is a large amount of evidence pointing to a positive link between export per-
formance or trade openness and productivity growth.7 But, there is little agreement
on the direction of causality (Edwards 1993; Fagerberg 1996). The Tunisian expe-
rience shows such a link between export performance and productivity growth.8
The total factor productivity growth surge in the 1970s and in the 1990s followed
significant increases in trade openness (Table 8.2). During the 1972–80 period,
TFP grew at 2.1 per cent on average, then declined significantly and was negative
during the period and the run-up to the balance-of-payments crisis. With the
implementation of the structural adjustment program, productivity growth 
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Table 8.6 GDP and TFP growth (annual growth rates in %)
1972–80 1981–6 1987–9 1990–6 1972–96
VA TFP VA TFP VA TFP VA TFP VA TFP
Agr. and fishing 4.6 2.3 2.8 0.5 0.1 1.2 7.0 5.9 4.3 2.4
Manufacturing 11.3 2.4 6.5 1.0 5.6 2.7 6.0 3.3 8.0 2.3
Foods 6.9 5.3 5.5 1.7 0.0 2.4 5.0 1.8 5.2 2.4
Construction 20.4 3.7 7.1 2.0 6.7 4.2 3.9 1.5 10.9 2.8
materials
Mech. and electr. 13.1 4.1 7.9 1.7 3.7 0.7 4.6 1.1 8.3 2.0
Chemicals 10.8 1.6 7.8 1.3 8.3 6.3 5.4 3.5 8.3 2.5
Textiles and 14.3 7.2 5.1 1.2 9.7 4.8 8.2 4.5 9.8 4.7
cloth.
Miscellaneous 11.1 4.0 9.4 2.9 5.9 2.2 6.3 2.4 8.8 2.9
Non-manuf. 8.2 2.3 0.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.8 3.7 0.6
Industry
Prod. services 7.9 2.0 3.6 1.2 7.1 2.7 5.3 0.1 6.1 0.7
Transp. and 9.4 2.2 2.8 1.3 7.1 5.3 6.0 2.1 6.6 1.6
telecom.
Tourism 10.0 2.2 1.4 4.8 15.4 10.6 6.0 1.0 7.5 0.7
Total 7.1 2.1 3.3 0.7 3.5 1.0 4.9 1.9 5.1 1.3
Source: Ministère du Développement Economique.
VA: Value-added growth; TFP: total factor productivity growth.
recovered during 1987–9 in most sectors, except agriculture and foods, because
of drought years. This recovery accelerated after 1990, and TFP growth averaged
1.9 per cent.
That TFP growth and export performance interacted in a virtuous cycle is 
also evident from comparing their evolution at the sectoral level. Non-traditional
manufacturing has been the most dynamic export sector with 14 per cent annual
growth over 1973–97. Growth was fastest during the 1970s and end of the 1980s,
but slowed down somewhat in the 1990s (Table 8.2). TFP growth was also high-
est for manufacturing activities (excluding foods), with the most dynamic export
activities, such as textiles and clothing, showing the largest rate of productivity
growth. Even during the 1981–6 period when total export volume growth 
was weakest (non-food non-chemicals), manufacturing exports increased by 
9 per cent per year and TFP grew at high rates in non-food manufacturing activ-
ities, ranging from 1.6 to 7.2 per cent per year.
The lagging sectors, in terms of productivity growth, were traditional exports
of foods and agricultural products and non-manufacturing industries including oil
and minerals. Their export performance was also the weakest. The performance
of service exports was mixed. Export growth, led by tourism, was strong despite
a setback in the early 1980s and slowdown in the 1990s, but productivity growth
remained weak despite strong recovery in 1987–9.
Trade policy and export performance
Trade policy has been suggested as a main factor explaining the link between
export performance and productivity growth. Recent empirical evidence has pro-
vided support for a positive effect of more open trade policy on productivity
growth (Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Edwards 1998), but the findings
remain controversial due to measurement and conceptual problems (Edwards
1993; Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999).9
In the early 1960s, Tunisia developed one of the most restrictive foreign trade
regimes in the developing world.10 Almost all imports required some kind of
licensing and/or administrative approval with varying degrees of restrictiveness
according to type of product. Exports were generally free, with some products
restricted and all subject to foreign exchange control. It was a standard and exces-
sive import-substitution policy with high nominal and effective protection rates.
The 1970s witnessed a reversal of the most controversial aspects of the previous
policy orientation. This decade was also strongly influenced by the development of
oil production, as well as the large increases in oil and other minerals (phosphates
and derived fertilizer products, a main export) prices. Despite several attempts,
especially in 1976, to simplify and make the import trade regime more flexible or
more liberalized, it remained very restrictive, with a high level and dispersion of
rates of protection, a high degree of complexity and a plethora of exemptions and
product specific regimes. The import substitution strategy initiated in the 1960s
was deepened, with the public sector continuing to expand rapidly. Government
controls remained pervasive in all areas: prices, investment, credit, foreign trade
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and exchange. There was, however, the emergence of a private sector as well as a
non-traditional exports sector, based on export processing zones.11 Manufacturing
exports increased 21 per cent per year during the period.
During the early 1980s, an expansionary macroeconomic policy was pursued
in the context of improving terms of trade. But in the face of a sharp deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade since 1984 (a decline of about 20 per cent over 1984–6),
there was a decline in the volume of oil exports, which were still a significant
component of exports, and fiscal policy was not adjusted, even becoming expan-
sionary in 1985–6. By early 1986, the situation had clearly become unsustainable.
A major stabilization-cum-structural adjustment program was initiated in 1986,
and was strongly deepened following a change in political regime at the end of
1987. It included a large currency devaluation as well as wide-ranging structural
reform programs. The stabilization program that was implemented rapidly was
successful and resulted, over a relatively short time, in a restoration of macro-
balances by the early 1990s. A strong export surge helped achieve these gains
with the main export sectors leading in terms of productivity gains.
Trade reform initiated during this period led to a reduction of nominal tariffs
from a range of 10 per cent to 236 per cent to 15 per cent to 43 per cent, and the
average nominal rate of protection declined from 41 per cent in 1986 to 29 per
cent in 1988.12 The average effective rate of protection declined from 70 per cent
to 42 per cent, but remained high for most manufacturing activities, averaging 
78 per cent.13 Quantitative restrictions on imports were lifted gradually, as shown
in Table 8.7.
The process of liberalization of the economy continued during the 1990–7
period.14 The reforms affected all aspects of the domestic policy: investment,
credit and the financial sector and prices. A major fiscal reform was implemented
resulting in a simplification of the tax system, and a reduction in direct income
taxes. A privatization program was initiated aiming at reducing the direct role of
the state in economic activity. The trade regime was liberalized, and current
account convertibility achieved in 1993. The opening of the trade regime led to
Tunisia becoming a member of GATT in 1990, and later of the World Trade
Organization. Further liberalization has been taking place since 1996 in the 
context of the Free Trade Area Agreement signed with the European Union.
Complete implementation of the Agreement would lead to free trade in industrial
products by 2010. Agricultural products and services are to be the subject of 
further negotiation for liberalization.
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Table 8.7 Indicators of liberalization
Indicator (%) 1987 1990 1995
Tariff lines 20 48 87
Value of imports 32 46 93
Import-competing N/A 10 89
domestic production
The ‘normal’ trade regime remained highly protectionist throughout the period,
with a strong import substitution bias not supportive of exports. This did not
contribute to enhancing competitiveness. In order to allow exporters to overcome
the import restrictive regime and compensate for the incentive bias in favor of
import-competing activities however, a new ‘export processing zones’ regime was
introduced in the early 1970s.15 According to this system, enterprises that exclu-
sively specialize in production for export get a number of significant incentives.
They have free access to intermediate inputs and capital goods, and ‘suspension’
of tariffs and duties on these imported products. They also benefit from an unlim-
ited tax holiday on corporate taxes (for other enterprises, these had been reduced
in 1994 to ten years with taxation on a reduced rate, i.e. by over a half). A num-
ber of other tax incentives were also provided.
This ‘off-shore’ production system is not limited to any specific geographical
location, but is applied to any firm that meets the requirements and is subject to
a special customs control system. It attracted a significant amount of entrepre-
neurial activity both domestic and foreign, and was the main channel of the 
manufacturing export drive. The export performance reflects the performance
mainly of this ‘warehouse production’ system, especially for clothing products. In
1996, 64 per cent of total exports were made by these activities, especially in 
non-traditional non-natural resource-based activities (Table 8.8).
The ‘off-shore’ export regime and its tax incentives, as well as additional
export incentives in the form of subsidies and export promotion, helped correct
(at least partially) the import substitution bias and were effective in supporting the
export performance of Tunisia. It also resulted in the development of a ‘dual’
economy, one for production for the domestic market and the other for exports
only. Production linkages between the two remained weak or non-existent, which
may constitute the biggest challenge to Tunisia’s competitiveness in the future.
The real exchange rate
The ‘off-shore’ export regime is not sufficient to explain the export performance
in the context of highly protectionist import-substitution biased trade regime.
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Table 8.8 Share of ‘off-shore’ in total exports (%)
Export sector 1994 1996
Energy, mining and 0.0 0.0
derived products
Foodstuffs 11.5 21.8
Textiles, clothing, leather 95.3 96.2
Mechanical and electrical 76.3 84.2
Other manufacturing 37.5 40.4
Total 59.6 64.2
Source: Institut National de la Statistique.
Exchange rate policy and movements in the real exchange rate (RER) are a fac-
tor explaining the sustainability of the current account. RER changes have only
short- to medium-term effects on competitiveness (Dornbusch 1996). But RER
misalignments can also have long-term implications if hysteresis is present in an
economy (Boltho 1996). Temporary overvaluations may cause permanent or
long-lasting losses in market shares and shortfalls in the capital stock in the 
tradables sector.
In Tunisia, the RER has been depreciating throughout the 1972–97 period,
with two major declines: 15 per cent in 1977–9 and 27 per cent in 1987–9
(Figure 8.2).16 The medium- and long-term movements of the real exchange rate
did not have negative effects on competitiveness. The movements in the RER,
however, have not always been consistent with changes in the ‘equilibrium
exchange rate’. Sekkat and Varoudakis (1998) compute a measure of RER ‘mis-
alignment’ from ‘fundamentals’ using a model-based approach suggested by
Edwards (1988). They estimate an empirical model of the ‘equilibrium exchange
rate’, which accounts for a number of fundamentals: terms of trade, sustainable
capital inflows and domestic credit expansion, and trade policy orientation.17
They find significant real exchange ‘misalignment’ of the order of 30–5 per cent
in 1970–3, which was quickly corrected with the improved terms of trade in
1974–5 (increasing the equilibrium RER) and depreciation of the observed RER.
The most significant episodes of RER ‘misalignment’ are the 1977–9 and 1984–6
period. The first period started from a situation of a 15 per cent overvaluation of
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Figure 8.2 Terms of trade, real exchange rate and current account deficit.
RER and a large negative shock in terms of trade in 1976. A depreciation of the
RER by 10 per cent in 1976–8, even after a reversal in terms of trade with a large
positive shock, led to an adjustment in the current deficit from an unsustainable
level of about 10 per cent in 1976–8 to 5 per cent in 1979–80. But, during the sec-
ond period, the failure of the RER to depreciate despite the sharp decline in terms
of trade (by about 20 per cent) led to significant misalignment over the period
1984–6 and the balance of payments crisis of 1986.18 Even though manufacturing
exports continued to increase significantly over this period, it was not sufficient to
compensate for the low (even negative) volume growth of other exports and the
decline in terms of trade. The devaluation of the currency and the sharp RER
depreciation in 1986–7 along with a stabilization program, led to a sharp adjust-
ment in the current account balance, to a more sustainable level in the 1990s, even
achieving a surplus in 1988.
Unit labor costs and manufacturing exports
The non-traditional (non-food non-chemicals) manufacturing exports increase
since 1985 followed a significant decline in unit labor costs since 1983 (Figure 8.3).
The fall in unit labor costs is especially important when measured in terms of export
prices (ULC2).19 While labor productivity stagnated, the decline in real wages, after
large increases in the previous years, induced strong export growth and restored
competitiveness. The decline in unit labor costs since 1992 reflects, however,
increased productivity while real wages were increasing.
4. Finance and competitiveness
Trade performance and competitiveness depend also on a number of non-price
factors such as technological innovation which affects quality and diversity of














Figure 8.3 Manufacturing exports and unit labor costs.
products, responsiveness to customer’s needs, delivery time, marketing and 
distribution networks and quality of physical infrastructure, public services and
human capital. One factor that has not received much attention is the role of
finance in determining trade specialization and competitiveness. In this section,
we explore a number of such financial channels: overall financial development,
development of long-term credit, sectoral allocation of credit and patterns of
finance, and imperfections in the financial markets (and policies and institutions
to deal with them). These factors influence competitiveness through improved
efficiency, higher productivity and reduced costs. But non-price effects may 
be even more important through increased capital accumulation, flexibility in 
reallocating resources, development and expansion of new activities and products
for which there is comparative advantage, research and development inducing
changes in comparative advantage and entrepreneurship development.
Financial sector development
Despite a policy of financial repression from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s,
there was a significant process of financial deepening in Tunisia comparable to
that of the most advanced of the developing countries (Table 8.9).20 The overall
stability of the macroeconomic environment and economic growth were likely the
main contributing factors.
The financial sector has developed under the close ‘management’ and supervi-
sion of the Central Bank, and barriers to entry made it very difficult to create new
banks.21 Competition has been restricted. Development banks created with 
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Table 8.9 Financial sector development
Indicator 1972 1980 1986 1989 1997
M2/GDP (%) 32.7 40.7 46.6 51.2 45.4
Financial sector 63.8 73.9 104.4 125.5 118.7
assets/GDP (%)
Average interest 1971–80 1981–6 1987–9 1990–7
rates (%)
Nominal (first row), 
real (second row)
Money market 6.6 9.0 9.5 9.6
0.4 0.1 1.8 5.1
Loan rate 7.2 8.7 11.9 12.5
1.1 3.2 4.8 7.2
Time deposit rate 3.4 4.9 7.9 7.6
3.3 4.0 0.2 2.6
Inflation rate 6.2 8.9 7.7 5.3
Source: Bechri (1999).
Notes: Financial sector assets include banking sector assets (Central Bank, domestic
commercial and development banks, ‘off-shore’ banks) and leasing companies assets.
foreign parties in the early 1980s were not supposed to be a threat, since they were
public in nature and offered medium- and long-term financing as opposed to
short-term financing of commercial banks. Foreign entry was strictly limited. 
A number of ‘off-shore’ banks were created since the 1980s, but they are not a
threat to the system since they do not directly compete with local banks.22
Financial development accelerated after financial liberalization, which was
part of the structural adjustment program since 1987. Regulations on administra-
tive allocation of credit were lifted and interest rates were liberalized, although
with a cap on the margin between the money market rate and loan rates. Real time
deposit rates remained negative until 1987–8, but real loan rates, which remained
negative or close to zero during financial repression, became significantly posi-
tive since 1985. Also, the money market rate remained under tight Central Bank
control. Interest rates margins were liberalized in 1994, but competition remains
limited in the credit market. The ratio of financial saving to GDP more than dou-
bled from 2.1 per cent in 1981–6 to 5.4 per cent during 1987–9 (Table 8.1), and
the financial sector assets/GDP ratio, which was already fairly high, increased
more than 20 per cent during 1986–9.23
Real loan rates became very high during the 1990s, exceeding 7 per cent on aver-
age. High interest rates for loans, combined with low deposit rates, reflected a large
increase in bank margins, which were kept low during the financial repression. 
The predominance of public banks and limited competition resulted in significant
inefficiency of the banking system, and an assessment by the business community,
according to a recent survey, that banks are the third most important obstacle they
face. Five out of the twelve commercial banks are public and they represent 68 per
cent of total loans. According to a recent study, Tunisia’s public commercial banks
have lower return on assets, lower profitability and higher borrowing costs due to
poor resource mobilization, compared to privately owned banks (World Bank
1995). The higher cost–income ratios demonstrate lower productivity, lower fee
income as a percentage of total assets, and much lower quality of portfolio, which
has been recently improving at a slower rate than in private banks. For example, in
1993 non-performing loans were approximately 14–25 per cent of total assets and
off-balance sheet items for some private banks, compared to 36 and 72 per cent for
the two main public banks. Similar weaknesses are also observed for development
banks, especially in terms of low profitability and quality of portfolio. All of the
eight development banks are public in character. Indeed, development banks seem
to be withdrawing from the market with their commitments decreasing.
While in existence since 1969, the Tunis Stock Exchange remained completely
marginal until the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The stock market
capitalization to GDP ratio increased dramatically from 4 per cent in 1990 to 
23 per cent in 1995, but declined to 13 per cent in 1997 after the burst of the
1994–5 price bubble.
Overall financial development and competitiveness
While causality remains controversial, a number of recent studies have found a
significant positive link between financial development and growth (Levine
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1997; Levine and Zervos 1998). Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide additional
evidence for a significant impact of financial development on investment and
growth, and argue for the existence of causality. By reducing the cost of external
finance, and allowing for the rise of new firms and enhancing innovation, finan-
cial development supports economic growth. Levine et al. (1999) use country
cross-sectional and panel data and present evidence that causality runs from
financial development to growth.
The evidence about this link for Tunisia is mixed. The initial, relatively high
level of financial intermediation in the early 1970s, and the strong process of
financial deepening, have surely contributed to TFP growth over the long run. 
But limitations on the protection of creditor rights, accounting standards and
enforcement of contracts may have limited the efficiency and performance of the
financial system.24 Table 8.10 shows no clear association between changes in
level of financial development and TFP growth and export performance over the
different periods. The strong TFP and export growth during the 1970s took place
at the same time as financial development indicators increased. During the first
half of the 1980s, the weak or negative performance, both in terms of competi-
tiveness, with negative TFP, and total export growth (but high manufacturing
export growth), have also occurred in the context of strong financial deepening.
In the 1990s, while TFP growth was strong there was a negative change in the
financial development indicators. The change in these indicators, however, does
not reflect a reversal of financial deepening but rather, the development of capi-
tal markets and a switch of assets away from the banking system.
Long-term debt
The theoretical arguments about the effects of long-term debt on economic 
performance are inconclusive. Long-term debt may be less efficient because it
allows less managerial discipline and provides opportunity for owners and man-
agers to benefit from projects at the expense of external investors. It also allows
management to delay taking decisions in the face of deteriorating conditions.
On the other hand, lack of long-term finance may cause profitable projects with
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Table 8.10 Competitiveness and overall financial development (%)
1972–80 1981–6 1987–9 1990–7
TFP growth 2.1 0.7 1.0 1.9a
Change in exports/GDP ratio 3.6 2.9 10.3 0.0
Total export volume growth 7.4 3.0 13.2 5.0
Manuf. (non-food, non-chemicals) 20.7 8.8 19.0 7.9
export volume growth
Change in M2/GDP ratio 8.0 5.9 4.6 5.8
Change in financial sector 10.1 30.5 21.1 6.8
assets/GDP ratio
Source: From various tables in this chapter.
Note
a For period 1990–6.
long-term returns not to be undertaken, and innovative technologies not to be
introduced. Firms with long-term asset structure need to have a long-term
maturity debt structure.
Empirical evidence, however, from developed and developing country experi-
ence has shown that long-term finance contributes to increased efficiency and
growth but that it is scarce in developing countries compared to industrial countries
(Caprio and Demirguç-Kunt 1998). Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996a) use
data for thirty industrialized and developing countries and conclude that large firms
in industrialized countries use much more long-term debt compared to total assets
than large firms in the developing countries. For example, a German firm finances
35 per cent of its total assets using long-term debt while a firm from Brazil or
Zimbabwe finances less than 10 per cent of its assets using long-term debt.
In Table 8.11, we investigate the financial structure and behavior of firms at the
micro-level in Tunisia based on a sample of 163 manufacturing firms over the
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Table 8.11 Long-term debt
1984–6 1987–9 1990–2 1993–4
Total sample
DT/A 0.524 0.457 0.421 0.392
DLT/K 0.200 0.156 0.157 0.142
DLT/A 0.191 0.138 0.138 0.132
DLT/DT 0.349 0.302 0.303 0.316
Public sector
DT/A 0.638 0.555 0.494 0.547
DLT/K 0.364 0.322 0.273 0.306
DLT/A 0.294 0.227 0.258 0.313
DLT/DT 0.470 0.477 0.460 0.484
Private sector
DT/A 0.512 0.447 0.414 0.377
DLT/K 0.183 0.139 0.145 0.125
DLT/A 0.181 0.129 0.126 0.113
DLT/DT 0.337 0.284 0.287 0.299
Growth firms
DT/A 0.500 0.484 0.436 0.399
DLT/K 0.186 0.201 0.257 0.234
DLT/A 0.178 0.154 0.184 0.177
DLT/DT 0.316 0.299 0.381 0.414
Non-growth firms
DT/A 0.519 0.428 0.403 0.365
DLT/K 0.182 0.106 0.086 0.067
DLT/A 0.182 0.115 0.096 0.079
DLT/DT 0.348 0.276 0.237 0.238
Source: Bahlous (1999).
DT/A: total debt (DT) to net worth (A) ratio; DLT/K: long-term debt (DLT) to capital stock
(K ) ratio; DLT/A: long-term debt (DLT) to net worth (A) ratio; DLT/DT: long-term debt
(DLT) to total debt (DT) ratio.
period 1984–94.25 The results show that the ratio of long-term debt to assets is in
the upper range of the developing countries, as found by Demirguç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1996a), but in the lower range of developed countries. It averaged 19
per cent during 1984–6, then declined to around 13–14 per cent after liberalization.
This ratio on average was twice as large for public sector firms than for the private
sector (27 per cent compared to 14 per cent on average over 1984–94). It has been
declining for the private sector over the period 1984–94.26 The long-term debt to
capital stock ratio and share of long-term to total debt ratios show similar results.
In Tunisia, long-term finance has developed with financial deepening. The
share of medium- and long-term loans in total loans of the banking system
increased significantly from less than 30 per cent in the 1970s to 41–42 per cent
in the early 1980s. It remained at this level, despite some decline at the end of the
1980s and early 1990s. Macroeconomic stability and financial and institutional
development have clearly allowed the growth of long-term finance. Nevertheless,
the government also played a significant role.
The government used five instruments to enhance long-term finance. One, is a
requirement of commercial banks to allocate a minimum of 10 per cent of
deposits to medium- and long-term credit for priority activities. Second, there is
provision of subsidized credit through lower interest rate or/and direct subsidies
to some activities with long-term maturity of assets such as tourism and agricul-
ture. A number of publicly financed development banks were used to channel
such credits, some of which were specialized by sector (housing, tourism, agri-
culture). By the mid-1980s, development banks accounted for 20–5 per cent of
total bank credit. A third instrument is the use of external lines of credit from
bilateral or multilateral sources to finance priority activities such as agriculture,
tourism and mining, these credits being guaranteed by the government. Finally,
direct government direction of credit either through state-owned banks or Central
Bank approval procedures is another instrument. Financial liberalization led to
reduced intervention by the government with abandonment of the first two instru-
ments, and lesser direct government intervention. But, development banks remain
active, although their share of total bank credit has been declining.
While government intervention may have increased availability of long-term
finance, it may also have reduced its efficiency. Demirguç-Kunt and Maksomovic
(1996b) found that subsidizing long-term credit, for instance through public
development banks, may reduce the efficiency gains from long-term finance. Our
results from a sample of manufacturing firms show that allocation of credit
tended to favor state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which have ratios of long-term
debt to capital stock at least twice as large as private firms (Table 8.11). To the
extent that public enterprises are less efficient and their expansion does not only
reflect efficiency criteria, there may have been a general loss of efficiency. The
reduction of long-term credit to some activities dominated by SOEs, as well as
the general relative decline of long-term finance during the adjustment period
1987–9 and the beginning of the financial liberalization, supports this conclusion.
Access to long-term debt was associated with growth within the private sector.
For the subsample of ‘growth firms’, which includes firms with assets growing
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by more than 15 per cent per year, the ratio of long-term debt to capital stock
increased from 19 per cent before liberalization to 23–5 per cent in the 1990s,
while it declined sharply for the ‘non-growth’ group (Table 8.11). Also for the
growth group, the share of long-term to total debt increased significantly from 
31 per cent in 1984–6 to 41 per cent in 1993–4. While overall leverage declined,
long-term finance is strengthened. The financial and economic performance 
indicators worsen for the non-growth group throughout the period compared to
the growth group, possibly indicating the capacity of the banking sector to screen
better performing projects and firms (Bahlous 1999).
The development of long-term finance allowed firms to match the maturity of
their assets and debts, contributing to increased efficiency and better performance.
For instance, tourism, with assets of very long-term maturity, has a relatively larger
share of long-term credit compared to total investment and is classified as a winner
in credit allocation (see below, and Table 8.12). Manufacturing also had a share of
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Table 8.12 Winners and losers in the credit market
Activity 1981–6 1981–6 1987–9 1990–6
Winner , ratio 
2
Mining X X
Foods X X X
Electrical and mechanical X X X
Chemicals and rubber X X X 
Textiles, clothing, leather X X
Wood and paper X X
Construction  materials X
Tourism X X X X
Winner, ratio: 1.0–2.0
Construction X X 
Construction materials X X
Foods X
Textiles, clothing, leather X X
Wood and paper X
Electrical and mechanical X
Agriculture X





Loser , ratio 0.5
Electricity–water, X X X X 
Transport and telecom. X X X X
Construction materials X
Chemicals and rubber X
Agriculture X
Source: Bechri (1999).
Note: ‘Ratio’ indicates the ratio of shares in credit (total, medium and long term and short
term) to relevant share in economic activity (investment, value-added).
medium- and long-term credit twice as large as its share in investment, with rela-
tively larger ratios for construction materials, mechanical industries and wood and
paper all classified as winners. On the other hand, textiles and clothing had a lower
ratio that is consistent with shorter maturity of assets in an activity dominated by
apparel. Large adjustments took place in 1987–9 with long-term credit curtailed
significantly for many activities which had benefited largely from long-term debt
(construction materials, chemicals, mining), while clothing’s share increased.27
Sectoral credit allocation: winners and losers in the credit market
Until the start of structural adjustment reforms, the allocation of credit was closely
controlled by the authorities with a major role played by the Central Bank. The first
general mechanism used was that of the compulsory allocation credit ratios. In 
addition to the minimum requirement for holding government paper (20 per cent of
deposits), and housing bonds (5 per cent), banks are required to allocate 18 per cent
of deposits to the private sector. Within the latter ratio, 10 per cent of deposits had to
be allocated to medium- and long-term credit ‘priority activities’: agriculture, export
activities, small- and medium-sized enterprises and energy saving industries. While
effective allocation was not always in line with regulations, particularly depending
on the requirements of budget financing, the system was generally enforced. The
second mechanism was that of prior authorization by the Central Bank for short-
term, as well as medium- and long-term credit, exceeding some minimum value. The
third was that of preferential interest rates on credit for some activities. But all of
these mechanisms of control were gradually lifted in 1987, and by the early 1990s
the allocation mechanism for credit was almost completely liberalized.
In order to evaluate the ‘success’ of economic activities in obtaining bank credit,
we calculate the ‘ratio’ of their share in medium- to long-term credit to their share in
total investment, and the ‘ratios’ of the shares in short-term credit and total credit to
their share in total value-added. The three calculated ‘ratios’are used to obtain a qual-
itative classification of activities into five categories going from highly successful or
‘winner’ to great ‘loser’ in the allocation of credit. The results show a slight pro-trad-
ables bias in the allocation of credit throughout the period (Table 8.12).28 This bias
was even quite strong during 1987–9. Most of the export activities identified above,
for which Tunisia had a comparative advantage, were at the top of the list of ‘win-
ners’ in the credit allocation process. This includes in particular the manufacturing
activities, tourism and mining. Agriculture was a ‘loser’ in most periods, particularly
for short-term credit, despite priority and success in obtaining medium- to long-term
credit. Most non-tradable activities were ‘losers’, in particular the utilities and trans-
portation and telecommunications. This result has to be interpreted with caution
however, since these were mainly state-owned and operated activities, which either
relied on the budget for finance or on government guaranteed foreign direct credit.
A number of specific activities are interesting to look into more carefully, in view
of their situation in terms of credit allocation as compared to comparative advan-
tage. Mechanical–electrical–electronics and wood–paper activities were very 
‘successful’ in their access to credit, while they did not appear as successful export
Trade, finance and competitiveness in Tunisia 241
activities. The performance of ‘chemicals and rubber’ is influenced by the inclusion
of the traditional fertilizers activity (a public sector operated activity) which went
through a strong restructuring during the late 1980s to early 1990s. So, its share of
credit collapsed during 1987–9. This applies to mining also with the related rock
phosphate (which is also the main primary product for fertilizers) extraction being
the main activity. Tourism received high priority in the allocation of medium- and
long-term credit and had high allocation ratios, but fared low for short-term credit.
Financial structure and market imperfections
The sectoral allocation of credit was significantly affected, but not completely
determined, by government direct intervention during the period of financial
repression. It was also a result of the internal functioning of financial markets and
their inherent imperfections. In this subsection, we investigate the financial
behavior of firms at the micro-level and the effects of financial markets imper-
fections on competitiveness using our sample of manufacturing firms. The 
balanced panel data sample of 163 firms also allows an analysis of the effects 
of financial liberalization on firm finance and performance.
Financial structure of firms
The financial structure of firms and its change after financial liberalization is
described in Table 8.13. The results provide a fairly good picture of firm finance
in Tunisia, and the effects of financial liberalization. A first distinction is accord-
ing to ownership. The sample includes fifteen public sector firms, some of which
are fully SOEs, while the rest have more than 34 per cent government share of
capital. The private sector comprises a few firms with partial foreign ownership,
but most are domestically owned firms. Public sector firms have better ‘access’
to bank credit than the private sector, with debt ratios significantly higher and cost
of credit lower. During the period 1984–6, the cost of credit for the private sector
was on average twice (16.6 per cent) as large as for the public sector (8 per cent).
Comparing the periods before (1984–6) and after financial liberalization and 
stabilization (1990–2), debt ratios (DT/K or DT/A) declined significantly for
all categories of firms, but generally remained higher for the public sector.
In contrast, while interest rate charges increased for all firms, the interest charges
gap between public and private sector increased from about 8 percentage
points to 10–11 percentage points. The public sector has also better access to
long-term credit, with the share of short-term credit much higher for the private
sector.
The performance indicators for the public sector, however, are much worse
than for the private sector. The gross returns on capital (EBE/K ) and productivity
of capital (VA/K ) indicators are higher for the private sector across periods. In
addition, while the private sector maintains its efficiency indicators after liberal-
ization, the performance of the public sector deteriorates significantly as the rate
of capital accumulation increases.29
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Table 8.13 Financial structure and liberalization
Firms Period I/K EBE/K VA/K EBG/AB DT/K DT/A R DCT/DT
Total (163) 1984–6 0.059 0.246 0.563 0.111 0.641 0.524 0.158 0.651
1990–2 0.078 0.237 0.504 0.096 0.510 0.421 0.215 0.697
Public sector
SOEs (8) 1984–6 0.060 0.210 0.469 0.096 0.759 0.604 0.077 0.557
1990–2 0.119 0.169 0.403 0.083 0.530 0.442 0.116 0.519
Mixed 1984–6 0.077 0.202 0.480 0.117 0.831 0.676 0.083 0.499
public–private (7) 1990–2 0.094 0.175 0.418 0.086 0.527 0.553 0.133 0.565
Exporting (4) 1984–6 0.034 0.120 0.347 0.049 1.224 0.814 0.048 0.312
1990–2 0.084 0.123 0.270 0.051 1.079 0.825 0.046 0.392
Non-exporting (11) 1984–6 0.080 0.238 0.521 0.126 0.636 0.573 0.092 0.609
1990–2 0.116 0.190 0.461 0.097 0.328 0.374 0.152 0.594
Private sector
Private-domestic  (142) 1984–6 0.057 0.247 0.566 0.111 0.624 0.509 0.166 0.665
1990–2 0.074 0.244 0.514 0.097 0.512 0.414 0.223 0.714
Private with 1984–6 0.079 0.311 0.722 0.127 0.663 0.585 0.172 0.631
foreign partner (6) 1990–2 0.088 0.227 0.515 0.096 0.415 0.412 0.244 0.696
Large-size  1984–6 0.096 0.215 0.374 0.121 0.615 0.559 0.105 0.591
domestic (13) 1990–2 0.075 0.189 0.312 0.097 0.449 0.500 0.155 0.527
Medium-size  domestic (48) 1984–6 0.042 0.244 0.475 0.116 0.532 0.512 0.175 0.656
1990–2 0.069 0.215 0.401 0.089 0.477 0.403 0.213 0.690
Small-size  domestic (83) 1984–6 0.060 0.254 0.647 0.106 0.677 0.500 0.171 0.681
1990–2 0.077 0.269 0.608 0.101 0.542 0.407 0.239 0.757
Table 8.13 Continued
Firms Period I/K EBE/K VA/K EBG/AB DT/K DT/A R DCT/DT
Exporting (18) 1984–6 0.060 0.308 0.688 0.139 0.670 0.527 0.171 0.684
1990–2 0.058 0.200 0.474 0.071 0.673 0.529 0.182 0.612
Non-exporting (134) 1984–6 0.058 0.242 0.556 0.108 0.620 0.510 0.165 0.660
1990–2 0.077 0.250 0.519 0.100 0.486 0.398 0.230 0.727
Source: Bahlous (1999).
I/K: ratio of gross fixed investment expenditures (I, which includes replacement and expansion for construction, equipment, furniture, land) to stock of capital
(K, gross value at acquisition prices); EBE/K: gross rate of return on capital assets, EBE is gross income; VA/K: value-added to capital ratio; EBG/AB: ratio of total
income net of interest and financial costs (EBG) to gross assets (AB); DT/K: total debt (DT) to capital stock ratio; DT/A: total debt to net worth (A) ratio;
R: average financial cost of debt, or ratio of total interest and financial charges to total debt (at mid year); DCT/DT: ratio of short-term debt (DCT) to total debt.
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Within the domestic private sector there are significant differences according to
size of firm. Three categories of firms are considered according to size: small firms
include those with total assets of less than 1 million dinars in 1984, medium-sized
firms include those with assets with between 1 and 5 million dinars and large firms
have assets greater than 5 million dinars.30 The cost of credit is significantly lower
for large-sized firms than for small- and medium-sized firms. The differential in
cost of credit increased somewhat for the smaller sized firms after liberalization,
but declined afterwards. Debt ratios declined for all firms after liberalization. But,
it is interesting to note that the debt to capital stock ratio (DT/K) is larger for the
smaller than the medium-sized firms. Indicators of economic and financial per-
formance are negatively correlated with size. The smaller-sized firms show higher
rates of return on capital as well as a higher productivity of capital.
Another distinction is according to export orientation: firms are classified as
exporters if (over the period) the average ratio of exports to total sales is greater
than 10 per cent. The sample includes only a limited number of exporting firms.
The largest share of exports in Tunisia is by ‘off-shore’ export processing regime
firms, which are not included in the sample. The limited information, reflected
in Table 8.13, shows better access of exporting firms to credit, at lower rates,
particularly for the public sector. A surprising result is the declining economic
and financial performance of the exporting firms since 1984–6. One possible
explanation is that these firms, which were initially import competing, had to face
increased competition from imports after trade liberalization.31 It is the loss of
domestic market share and profitability, which induced them to become
exporters.
Taking the 1990–2 period we observe also that the cost of credit (R) is posi-
tively correlated with the rate of return on capital EBE/K (Table 8.14). Assuming
Table 8.14 Debt allocation and efficiency, 1990–2
R EBE/K DT/A Share Share Share in 
in total in value- total
debt added investment
In total (%)
Public sector 0.124 0.172 0.494 55.2 41.9 47.5
SOE 0.116 0.169 0.442 33.8 26.9 31.2
Mixed 0.133 0.175 0.553 21.4 15.0 16.3
Exporting 0.046 0.123 0.825 46.7 23.0 26.0
Private sector 0.224 0.244 0.414 44.8 60.0 52.5
Exporting 0.182 0.200 0.529 20.3 20.5 22.9
Private domestic 0.223 0.244 0.414 28.5 40.3 35.8
In private domestic (%)
Large 0.155 0.189 0.500 33.7 32.3 38.1
Medium 0.213 0.215 0.403 46.6 45.6 44.2
Small 0.239 0.269 0.407 19.7 22.1 17.7
Source: Bahlous (1999).
246 M. K. Nabli et al.
that higher rates of return are associated with greater risk, this may be interpreted
as charging higher interest when projects are more risky. The higher cost of
financing would lead managers to choose those projects with an internal rate 
of return higher than the cost of financing, which of course will improve the rate
of return before interest charges of the firm. But, the ratio of debt to net assets
(DT/A) is also negatively correlated with rates of return on capital. We observe
also that the share of total debt allocated to the public sector is much larger than
its share in value-added or investment. The public exporting sector captures twice
as much debt as its share in value-added and investment. This may indicate that
the banking system is not allocating credit only on efficiency grounds, and that
other constraints and considerations are involved.
Investment decisions of firms
The preceding analysis shows that three main factors appear to determine access
to credit and financial structure, i.e. state ownership, size of firm and market ori-
entation. We conclude also that the banking system is not allocating credit only
on efficiency grounds. The first explanation of the inefficient credit allocation is
the lack of skill and experience in identifying those managers with the most
promising projects. Problems of asymmetric information may also lead to ineffi-
cient credit allocation. Both of these reasons explain why possessing collateral is
an important determinant of the firm’s ability to raise new financing. In addition,
government intervention was important in credit allocation.
Since the Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) irrelevance theorem of financial
structure, asymmetries of information (Akerlof 1970), the signaling content of
financial structure (Myers and Majluf 1984) and agency costs (Jensen and
Meckling 1976) have been used to understand departures from the perfect world
described by the Modigliani and Miller theorem. The choice of corporate finan-
cial structure should be considered as a result of these financial market imperfec-
tions, in addition to the general financial environment and public credit allocation
policies.
One approach to investigate the role of financial market imperfections in the
determination of financial structure is to test for the presence and importance of
financing constraints using an investment function (Hubbard 1998). One method-
ology proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (FHP 1988), using data on US
firms, compares cash flow sensitivities of different groups of firms and interprets
the higher sensitivity as evidence of facing more financial constraints. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) recently questioned the underlying assumption of a monoto-
nic increase of cash flow sensitivity with the degree of financing constraints.
They argue that ‘there is no strong theoretical reason to expect a monotonic
relationship’ and show for example that, some of the firms classified by FHP as
financially constrained firms are healthy firms and ‘could have increased their
investment without tapping external sources of capital’ (Kaplan and Zingales
1997: 170, 184). Keeping this possible caveat in mind, we follow the FHP
approach and broaden it to focus on the significance of structural change in the
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cash flow sensitivities before and after the liberalization process for different
groups of firms. This methodology was also used by Harris et al. (1994), Hermes
(1996) and Gelos and Werner (1999) for Indonesian, Chilean and Mexican firms,
respectively.
The following model is tested in eqn (8.1):
,
(8.1)
where Ii,t/Ki,t 1 is the ratio of investment to capital stock at the beginning 
of period (or rate of growth of the capital stock), Yi, t 1/Ki, t 1 is the change
in sales to capital stock ratio, CFi, t 1/Ki, t 1 is the cash flow variable (net of tax
profits depreciation allowances provisions), which represents the internal
finance possibilities of the firm, and GAi, t/Ki, t 1 is the ratio of value of land
and construction (real estate) to capital stock which is a measure of guarantees or
collateral the firm can provide to banks.
The results using panel data for 195 private sector firms for the period 1985–94
are presented in Table 8.15, where EX is a dummy for exporting firms.32 We also
test for the effects of financial liberalization using a multiplicative dummy vari-
able (DU) for the period 1990–4 on the cash flow and collateral variables. The
results confirm that the determinants of investment differ significantly according
to size and trade orientation, supporting the existence of significant market
imperfections.33
Whether a firm is exporting is clearly a significant factor for investment. The
investment equation is different for this group from the non-exporting firms, and
the coefficient of the dummy for exporting firms (EX) in the equations by size of
firms is significant for the small- and medium-sized firms. Informational advan-
tages of export firms include the fact that they have less scope for concealment
Ii, t/Ki, t  1  1(Yi, t 1/Ki, t1)  2 (CFi, t 1/Ki, t1)  3 (GAi, t/Ki, t1)
Table 8.15 Firm characteristics and investment determinants
Firms/group ∆Y/K CF/K DU CF/K GA/K DU GA/K EX
Whole 0.006** 0.064** 0.053** 0.245** 0.050** 0.030**
(195) (6.89) (9.47) (2.70) (19.44) (3.58) (19.02)
Exporting 0.015** 0.080 0.134 0.590** 0.300
(44) (7.92) (0.84) (0.83) (3.44) (1.75)
Non 0.002** 0.036** 0.011 0.138** 0.050**
(151) (2.37) (7.77) (1.38) (18.76) (5.30)
Small size 0.005** 0.024** 0.081** 0.250** 0.070** 0.030**
(120) (4.96) (3.16) (3.57) (13.68) (3.52) (20.76)
Medium size 0.012** 0.146** 0.009 0.171** 0.028 0.022**
(57) (6.96) (10.01) (0.34) (10.69) (1.50) (5.33)
Large size 0.007 0.118 0.123 0.260* 0.060 0.018
(18) (0.40) (1.07) (0.99) (2.55) (0.66) (1.64)
Notes: Estimation using Feasible GLS, providing White heteroskedasticity consistent estimates.
t ratios in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 5 per cent, and ** at 1 per cent.
of sales, because export receipts are mostly through their banks. In addition, they
have benefited from preferential policies which induced access to credit.
The accelerator variable is expected to have a positive coefficient, and is signif-
icant in all equations. The cash flow variable represents the internal finance possi-
bilities of the firms, and signals the willingness of the firm to risk its resources. 
It is expected to exert a more significant positive effect on investment the tighter
are credit constraints.34 The medium-sized firms appear to be the most finance
constrained with the largest cash flow coefficient. As expected, for the large size
and exporting firms, the coefficient of the cash flow variable is insignificant.
These firms have informational advantages, which make them less subject to
credit constraints. The coefficient for the small-sized firms is significant, but 
contrary to expectation it is very low and much smaller than for medium-size
firms. This is consistent with our earlier finding that small-sized firms are highly
leveraged and appear not to be constrained. This may be due to government inter-
vention, which has supported credit allocation to smaller firms by banks as well
as by direct government finance.
After liberalization the cash flow variable coefficient changes significantly
only for the small-sized firms, making them more constrained. Since these firms
have probably grown into medium-sized firms by this time (compared to the
beginning of the period when classification into size groups is made), they
became subject to the same constraints as the medium-sized group. Based on the
cash flow variable, the overall conclusion is that financial liberalization does not
seem to have significantly affected credit constraints.
The coefficient of the collateral variable depends on how valuable collateral is
for credit decisions. For instance, collateral may be irrelevant and its effect on the
debt ratio low, either because the collateral is not enforceable due to difficulties
and high costs to foreclose, or because the firm has other characteristics of cred-
itworthiness which compensate the need for collateral. The collateral variable has
a highly significant effect on investment for all groups of firms, again supporting
the significance of informational problems in financial markets. A smaller coef-
ficient indicates a lower ability to leverage more (and invest more) for a given col-
lateral, indicating enforceability may be too costly and problematic. Exporting
firms have the largest coefficient on collateral due to better creditworthiness and
less moral hazard. For medium-sized firms, on the other hand, collateral has a
lower coefficient than larger-sized firms, indicating higher costs of enforcement
and lower value of collateral.
The effect of collateral for small-sized firms is, however, similar to that of the
large-sized firms, but decreases after liberalization. This is also consistent with
the change of the cash flow variable coefficient, reflecting more difficult access
to credit by the small-sized firms.
Firm characteristics and competitiveness
Our preceding analysis identified three main firm characteristics, which influ-
ence financial structure, and may have implications for trade: trade orientation,
state ownership and firm size.
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Trade orientation
Government intervention has favored export activities, but exporting firms may
have also been able to better access domestic credit because of the informational
advantages they have, given that their banks can better monitor their activities.
Exporting also provides a signal about the efficiency of the firm and allows eas-
ier access to credit. Exporting public firms also had access to preferential credit.
After liberalization, private sector exporting firms increased the share of long-
term debt in total debt and increased their leverage. The tradables sector had a
share of total credit greater than value-added throughout.
More importantly, manufacturing exports have been mainly by the ‘off-shore’
sector or the so-called ‘bonded factories’. These firms are often affiliates of for-
eign firms or owned by foreigners, and have ‘non-resident’ status. The ‘resident’
firms are often subcontracting to some main foreign customer. These firms may
be less constrained in the credit market, because they may be seen as less risky
and more transparent. Since these firms are exempt from taxes, they do not have
incentives to distort their accounts, and banks may have better information to
assess risks and capacity to reimburse debt. They are also partially financed by
their suppliers/customers. For instance, there is some evidence that apparel man-
ufacturers have up to two-thirds of their working capital financed by the foreign
firms for which they are outsourcing.35 There is also an ‘off-shore’ financial sec-
tor in Tunisia, which mainly caters to these exporting firms. This gives improved
services and financing opportunities to this exporting sector.
State ownership
State-owned firms had preferential access to credit through direct government
intervention as well as implicit government guarantees, particularly to state-
owned banks. A number of activities where state-owned firms are dominant had
such preferential access: mining, fertilizers, metallurgy and construction materi-
als. But, the weight of state-owned enterprises is also important in almost all other
activities.
Exporting by public enterprises, mostly monopolies, was almost completely in
natural resources: mining, oil and gas, fertilizers and cement. Public enterprises
are not to be found exporting in activities with comparative advantage. Tourism
is a notable exception where public enterprises played a significant role, at the
initial stages, but were later privatized.
The preferential access of public enterprises to resources from the state and to
credit may have helped develop some activities where the private sector would not
have ventured, at least initially, because of the risks involved and the long-term
maturity or size of investments. But, the extent of the involvement of the public
sector in economic activity and its persistence may have contributed to lower effi-
ciency. In fact, the financial crisis of 1985–6 may be seen as the result of loss of
competitiveness, in part due to the weak performance of the expanding public
enterprise sector. We actually find that the performance indicators of public enter-
prises are much worse than for private firms. The former also contributed little to
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the diversification and expansion of exports, which are associated with produc-
tivity growth, and may have diverted resources from other activities with com-
parative advantage.
Size of firm
Asymmetric information considerations and financial market imperfections make
firm size a factor determining the ability of firms to obtain external finance, par-
ticularly long-term finance. We find that the financial structure of firms varies
considerably according to size. There are a number of ways this may affect trade
specialization and competitiveness. First, if the country has a comparative advan-
tage in light manufactures, such as clothing or other activities, the development of
such activities may be hampered by lack of external finance. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) actually find that financial development has a particularly beneficial role
in the rise of new firms. If the optimal scale of such firms is small, this limits the
ability of the country to develop such export activities. Second, if some of these
activities exhibit significant economies of scale, small firms with little access to
external finance may be unable to develop and reap the benefits. Our findings sug-
gest, however, that small-sized firms were not less able to increase their indebted-
ness. While they had to pay higher interest charges, their leverage ratios were not
lower than the larger-sized firms. Nonetheless, their debt is of more short-term
maturity, the long-term debt to asset ratio is much lower for the smaller-sized
firms. This, however, may only reflect the nature of the maturity of their assets.
Export activity in the most dynamic sectors with revealed comparative advan-
tage, such as clothing, is by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The
‘off-shore’ nature of these firms may have contributed to offset their asymmetric
information costs disadvantages. Banks may also have compensated for these
costs by charging higher interest, particularly since financial liberalization.
Higher rates of return are associated with higher interest costs.
Government intervention has also contributed to the development of the SMEs.
In addition to the inclusion of these firms in the required ratio of medium- and
long-term credit to the private sector, the government has also provided govern-
ment resources (through the banking system) to finance new SMEs, including
cash subsidies and long-term credit at subsidized, very low interest rates and
guaranties.36 Government intervention may have helped SMEs access external
finance, but adverse selection as to the choice of firms benefiting may also have
limited its effectiveness.
5. Stylized facts on micro–macro and trade–finance interactions
The analysis in this chapter underlined a number of micro–macro and
trade–finance interactions with significant implications for competitiveness.
Macroeconomic factors contributed to enhancing Tunisian long-run competitive-
ness. A stable macroeconomic environment with low level and variability of
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inflation, and policies which avoided major overvaluations of the real exchange
rate provided a favorable environment for high saving and investment rates and
improved productivity. They helped avoid severe Dutch disease effects of the oil
windfall and commodity booms in the 1970s. Foreign capital inflows did not 
constitute a source of volatility and uncertainty. The current account deficit was
financed mainly with medium-to-long-term official capital inflows and equity.
Short-term debt and portfolio flows remained subject to restrictions. The signifi-
cant overall financial deepening and development of long-term finance helped
develop activities with long-term maturity of assets such as tourism, and allowed
the reallocation of resources towards those with comparative advantage and
helped achieve diversification of the economy and of exports.
A number of microeconomic factors have contributed also, on the other hand,
to growth and current account sustainability. They supported consolidation of
macroeconomic stability. The changes in the specialization pattern in Tunisia,
with a significant shift from natural-resource-based exports to manufactures and
services exports have contributed to an improved export performance and sus-
tainability of the current account. The very active role of the government in trade
and industrial policy and in the financial sector helped achieve these results. But,
because of these interventions, the effects of microeconomic factors did not
always enhance competitiveness. The distortions and inefficiencies reduced pro-
ductivity growth since the early 1980s and resulted in lower growth in Tunisia
than in countries such as in East Asia, which had similar rates of investment and
macroeconomic environments. The much higher growth rate achieved during the
1970s was not sustained, and GDP growth averaged only 3.3 per cent during
1981–9, with a higher current account deficit of 6 per cent. The progressive elim-
ination of these distortions since the end of the 1980s led to improved productiv-
ity growth and a higher average growth rate of GDP of 5 per cent in the 1990s.
Trade and industrial policy under the import substitution regime, with high levels
of protection and active involvement of government in investment and credit allo-
cation, supported the diversification of the economy and the development of a num-
ber of new activities including tourism, irrigated agriculture and manufacturing. But
such interventions often created inefficiencies, and resulted in lower or even nega-
tive productivity growth. Despite the bias of the trade regime towards import sub-
stitution, significant export growth and diversification occurred in the context of a
parallel ‘off-shore’ exports regime. The strong system of incentives provided export
activities helped correct the bias and led to strong export growth mostly by the pri-
vate sector. The development of this ‘dual’ economy of import-competing and
exports sectors contributed to current account sustainability, but probably at the cost
of significant distortions and negative long-term implications for future diversifica-
tion and upgrading of exports into more technology intensive activities.
This chapter investigated at some length the role of non-price micro-financial
effects on competitiveness. While it is not possible to quantify their relative impor-
tance, the analysis identified a number of channels. The well-developed financial
structure and various government interventions to deal with market imperfections
supported the diversification of economic activities. Winning sectors were able to
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obtain credit and expand. Banks were generally effective in selecting projects and
pricing risk. Exporting firms have been able to better access domestic credit
because of their informational advantages. Small-sized firms were not less able to
increase their indebtedness than larger-sized firms, even though they had to pay a
higher cost. Their debt was more short-term maturity, but this may be more of 
a reflection of the nature of the maturity of their assets. Entrepreneurs with limited
own-resources were able to finance their projects and expand in existing and new
activities, contributing to flexibility in reallocating resources and innovation in
export activities. Financial liberalization since 1987 enhanced the capability of
the financial system in all these dimensions. Long-term credit was available for
firms to match their assets and liabilities. Medium-sized firms were most subject
to financial constraints and limitations to access external finance. But evidence
on the better access to credit on the growth of firms suggests that this effect is not
likely to have restrained internal growth of medium-sized firms.
But government intervention in the financial sector may have also hampered
performance. It directed credit to the state-owned sector, which was much more
highly leveraged and benefited from lower cost of credit, despite lower perform-
ance. The financial crisis of 1985–6 may be seen as a result of loss of competi-
tiveness, in part due to the weak performance of the expanding public enterprise
sector. The public sector contributed little to the diversification and expansion of
exports, which are associated with productivity growth. It may have diverted
resources from other activities with better comparative advantage. Even for activ-
ities with comparative advantage, such as tourism, extensive government subsi-
dies and priority allocation of credit may have resulted in weaker performance
and low productivity growth. The direct financing from government resources of
SMEs, even though screened by banks, was not always effective in selecting the
most efficient projects or activities.
Notes
1 Financial support by the IDRC is gratefully acknowledged. We are also grateful to the
Institut National de la Statistique (INS) for help in obtaining some of the statistical
information.
2 In this chapter, our focus is on long-term competitiveness, as contrasted with short-term
competitiveness as usually measured by the real exchange rate. For a discussion of the
concept of competitiveness and controversy surrounding it, see Boltho (1996) and
Krugman (1996).
3 Figures are based on trade volumes. The increase in the export ratio is even greater if
expressed in current prices, and went from 25 per cent in 1972 to 43 per cent in 1997,
but the oil price decline in the mid-1980s induced a decline from 40 per cent in 1980 to
31 per cent in 1986.
4 These numbers which measure gross values of exports overstate, however, the role of
manufactures which are to a large extent based on processing imported inputs and low
value-added.
5 A more detailed analysis and presentation of results discussed in this section is in 
El Abbassi et al. (1999).
6 A similar analysis of trade specialization in Tunisia for the 1970s is in Nabli (1981).
07 See for instance Balassa (1982, 1985) and Edwards (1993).
08 The following regression for the period 1972–96 shows that export orientation has 
significantly positive effect on productivity growth in Tunisia where EP and IS meas-
ure the contribution of exports and of import substitution, respectively, to growth:
.
(0.51) (3.29) (2.09)
While the estimated coefficients may be biased, because the causality runs in both
directions, this estimation shows a strong relation between productivity growth and
export orientation.
09 The links from trade policy to productivity growth are still not well understood.
Wacziarg (1998) identifies and empirically investigates six channels of impact of trade
policy on growth: improved macroeconomic policy, size of government, more efficient
allocation of resources, factor accumulation, technological transmission and foreign
direct investment. He finds that the most important linkages are increased capital accu-
mulation, foreign direct investment and improved macro-policies.
10 During the 1960s there was implementation of socialist experiment with heavy state
intervention. GDP growth averaged 5 per cent although TFP growth was negative
(Morrisson and Talbi 1996). A description of the trade regime during the 1960s and
1970s is in Nabli (1981).
11 See below for more details.
12 The collected tariff rate declined from 13.5 per cent in 1987 to 10.2 per cent in 1990.
13 Effective rate of protection is based on nominal tariff rates.
14 The current account deficit peaked at over 9 per cent and 11 per cent of GDP in 1992
and 1993, respectively, with the realization of two major foreign direct investment ‘off-
shore’ energy: the Algeria–Italy gas pipeline and the Miskar project of gas extraction.
15 This is the so-called ‘Law 72-38 of April 1972’ or ‘off-shore’ regime.
16 The REER is computed using the IMF method and trade weights, and is based on 
consumer price indices.
17 The empirical model is similar to Cottani et al. (1990), Elbadawi (1994) and Devarajan
(1997).
18 The exchange rate misalignment is also reflected by the black market premium on the
official exchange rate which reached over 8 per cent in 1980–4, compared to 5 per cent
in the preceding and ensuing periods (Sekkat and Varoudakis 1998).
19 The two indicators of unit labor costs are: ULC1 (W/(Y/L))/PC and ULC2 
(W/(Y/L))/PX, where Y, L, W and PX are indices for real output, labor, nominal wages
and export prices in the non-food non-chemicals manufacturing sector, and PC is the
consumer price index.
20 A detailed description of the evolution of the financial system is in Bechri (1999).
21 Central Bank regulations and collusion facilitated by the banks’ professional associa-
tion also play a crucial role in protecting the sector. The success of the Tunisian banks
in collective action has been analyzed in Bechri (1989). In 1987, when interest rates
were liberalized and a cap was placed on margins, a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ prevented
competition, with interest rates collectively set under the aegis of their association, the
Association Professionnelle des Banques.
22 By 1986, the financial sector was well diversified comprising eleven commercial
banks, eight development banks, one leasing company and seven off-shore banks. The
commercial banking system, however, remained the backbone of the system.
23 From 1986 to 1996, the financial system was enriched mainly by the development of
leasing finance (six companies) and of the capital market. Only one commercial bank
has been created since 1986. The decline in the M2/GDP and financial assets/GDP ratios
since 1989 is due mainly to substitution within the private sector’s portfolio from bank
deposits to bond and treasury bills assets, which developed considerably over this period.
TFP 0.004  1.11 EP  0.60 IS  R2  0.34
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24 See Levine et al. (1999).
25 A complete description of the sample and results are in Bahlous (1999). Data are from
the industrial survey by the Institut National de la Statistique. From an initial sample
of 229 firms, 163 were selected after checks on quality of data and availability for all
years. The sample firms’ value-added was about 14.5 per cent of the total manufactur-
ing sector value-added in 1984.
26 This decline corresponds also to that of the share of medium- and long-term credit in
total bank credit from 1985 to 1993 (from 42 to 33 per cent). But this ratio recovered
since 1994. See more discussion below.
27 More detailed analysis is in Bechri (1999).
28 Detailed calculations are found in Bechri (1999).
29 Even though rates of return on equity deteriorate somewhat, due to the increase in
interest rate charges.
30 One Tunisian dinar was 1.3 USD in 1984 and 1.0 USD in 1994.
31 The criterion for classification being based on the average for the period 1984–94,
most firms had low rates of exports during the first period, and higher ones for 1990–2.
32 The sample includes an unbalanced panel of 195 private firms, more than the 
148 firms of the balanced panel of private firms. In the econometric estimation,
exporting firms considered are, those with an average ratio of exports to total sales
greater than 5 per cent during 1984–94, which is different from the 10 per cent crite-
rion used above.
33 F ratios for testing differences between groups of firms are: F 120.58 for export and
non-export firms, and F 6.52 for firm size groups.
34 A basic problem with the methodology is that it assumes that changes in cash flows are
not related to investment opportunities. If other relevant variables accounting for
investment opportunities (such as Tobin’s q) are not included and/or if the cash flow
variable reflects such opportunities, the coefficient of CF may not measure the extent
of financial constraints.
35 From preliminary results of a survey of exporting firms.
36 Over 1976–90, the program in question (FOPRODI) financed 1,353 projects.
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This chapter analyzes the relationship between trade openness, the industrialization
process and economic development. An evolutionist-structuralist approach, based
on the more prominent and recent theoretical and empirical studies on the role of
technology in international trade and economic growth, is used here. It stresses the
importance of dynamic efficiency, technical infrastructure and the generation and
diffusion of technology to achieving long-term growth. In this framework techno-
logical change and capability are considered key factors driving countries’ trade
specializations and economic performances.
Section 2 of the chapter surveys the most significant developments in the 
economic literature on trade openness and growth performances both at the 
theoretical and empirical levels. Section 3 analyzes the development experiences
of three groups of countries in Latin America, East Asia and Mediterranean. Even
though very different one to another, they have all been characterized by trade 
liberalization processes over the past two decades. A highly disaggregated analy-
sis of trade specialization patterns of each individual economy is carried out in
this section, emphasizing industrial changes and the main inter-industry linkages
at each country level. Section 4 provides some interpretation of the main linkages
between trade openness, industrialization and economic growth performance,
drawing out some policy implications of our findings. A final section summarizes
the main conclusions.
2. A survey of the literature on trade and growth performance
The economic literature on the influence of trade openness and liberalization 
on the industrialization and development process has been recently enriched by
many contributions. Significant relationships between key variables, such as trade
performance, international specialization and long-run growth, have been defined
and/or redefined and new policy implications have also been offered. A few of
them are outlined here.
As is well known, in the standard neoclassical model trade openness and 
liberalization produce substantial benefits in terms of a more efficient static
resource allocation. Trade specialization, as long as markets are open and relative
prices can freely change, does not represent a problem for a country because there
is always something it can profitably produce and trade according to its compar-
ative advantages based on its ‘factor endowments’.
It follows that a country’s positive economic adjustment requires measures 
to liberalize trade, minimize government intervention in the domestic economy,
and getting prices right. Furthermore, a sound macroeconomic policy is consid-
ered an important corollary to trade openness. So, in the standard approach
macroeconomic stability and trade liberalization are the two fundamental ingre-
dients of a good economic performance. Once the government dealt with these
issues, private markets would allocate resources efficiently and generate robust
growth.
This linkage between trade openness and growth performance, however, has
been challenged – even recently – on theoretical and empirical grounds. First, it
has been outlined that gains from trade, as in the standard approach, can be only
obtained now and then due to the reallocation of resources that trade openness is
able to guarantee. Second, with regards to long-run growth, the standard model
does not assign any significant role to international trade. In other words, trade
openness and liberalization could affect the level and composition of output 
and welfare, but is not able to accelerate economy’s long-run growth path.
Furthermore, the predicted size of static gains from trade is usually very small.
Empirical data do confirm, on this front, the small impact of trade openness upon
aggregate income (Baldwin 1992).
In general terms, critics have emphasized that the standard model is based on
very restrictive assumptions, and therefore largely neglects the key role played by
important variables such as economies of scale (external or internal), learning by
doing or technological differences across countries (Dosi et al. 1990).
In this regard, many contributions from the new trade and growth models have
shown that in the presence of imperfect competition, economies of scale, techno-
logical spillovers and external economies, countries’ trade performance and com-
petitiveness is much less dependent on factor endowments and static comparative
advantages. On the contrary, it is based upon dynamic gains, technology transfer,
intangible capital, and complex trade and industrial strategies at the level of firms
and nations (Verspagen 1992).
So, attempts have been made to relax the most restrictive assumptions either
remaining within the neoclassical traditional approach or using other alternative
conceptual frameworks.
First, a significant linkage between international trade and growth can be found
at the macroeconomic level on the demand side of an open economy, given that
export demand could represent an important source for countries’ economic
growth (Beckerman 1962; Kaldor 1970). The determinants of the rate of growth
of exports could also significantly affect countries’ economic growth. In this per-
spective, a country’s balance of payments is an important constraint to economic
growth, given that to sustain the growth path import requirement there should be
an adequate flow of exports.
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The relation between growth competitiveness and the balance of payments has
been also studied in a long-run perspective. Conditions have been derived
(Johnson 1958; Thirlwall 1979) that set the maximum rate of growth of an econ-
omy consistent with balance of trade equilibrium. Such conditions relate the equi-
librium rate of growth to income elasticites of exports and imports (Krugman
1992) or, in other specifications, with income and price elasticities of trade 
volumes (Johnson 1958).
In this area, Thirlwall (1979) made an important contribution by showing that
the rate of growth of an open economy depends on trade increase, on changes in
relative prices, in other words on price competitiveness, and on the ratio of
income elasticities of export and imports. Ceteris paribus, higher (lower) rates
of growth correspond to higher ratios (lower) of these elasticities.
The problem with such contributions is that it is difficult to interpret satisfac-
torily the meaning of income elasticities. Some authors have suggested that these
elasticities reflect the so-called non-price factors, while others (Krugman 1992)
outlined that they reflect the influence, if any, of increasing returns in world trade.
The problem is how to measure these non-price factors since their values could
change, and do change, over time. In this regard, they can be considered only a
useful first approximation to the concept of ‘structural competitiveness’, defined
as a country’s ability to maximize its real growth in the international economic
environment. It remains difficult, however, to obtain useful information on the
concept of structural competitiveness with such limited information.
To move forward, income elasticities of a country have been considered vari-
ables and not exogenously given parameters in other contributions. In this per-
spective, a promising approach (Fagerberg 1988) linked economic growth to
a more detailed specification of international competitiveness. The latter is deter-
mined by three main factors: (a) price competitiveness, measured in terms of 
relative labor costs; (b) technological competitiveness, represented by both inno-
vation capability and imitation potential of technological change from other coun-
tries; and (c) capacity growth, measured by a proxy that is the gross investment
in physical capital stock. Within this approach each of these factors can be given
a highly detailed specification and embedded in a more general framework that
links growth to balance-of-payments behavior.
This represents an improvement towards understanding the relationship
between growth, trade liberalization and the structure of the economy. Different
factors affecting competitiveness may reflect the relative weight of different sec-
tors and activities of the economy. Fagerberg’s model has been estimated empiri-
cally with encouraging results that have generally confirmed the significance of
the growth of production and technological capabilities to enhance competitive-
ness. In contrast, the impact of factor cost turned out to be rather marginal.
One should add immediately that the fact that accumulation processes and 
differences in technological capabilities represent important determining factors
of countries’ trade and growth performances is far from a novelty. It has been,
however, supported recently by new contributions at both the theoretical and
empirical levels (Dowrick 1997).
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First, it has been done in the area of the so-called ‘new growth models’ or 
‘theory of endogenous growth’, which stresses the importance of human resources
development and technological accumulation (for a survey, see Verspagen 1992).
Two groups of contributions from this area are useful to quote here. The first
group emphasizes the role of trade in favoring countries’ specialization, since the
latter leads to increases in productivity through learning by doing effect and/or
R&D investments. Economic growth is thus enhanced by the opportunities to spe-
cialize that trade gives to a country. Specialization is important per se, irrespec-
tive of the kind of economic activities chosen by each country to be specialized.
In this perspective an interesting contribution stems from the models that empha-
size the role of R&D and its fallouts upon international trade and economic
growth (Grossman and Helpman 1991). The results of these models, however, are
very much dependent on the geographical diffusion of fallouts. If they have only
national impact, one could have a lock-in situation, in which original differences
in trade specializations, even marginal ones, are able to lead towards very differ-
ent specialization and growth patterns across countries. Under these conditions
international trade is able to favorably support countries’ economic growth (Coe
and Helpman 1995; Young 1991).
The second class of models emphasizes the role of trade in favoring countries’
specializations in specific activities and sectors. Those countries specializing in
activities characterized by higher rates of productivity growth tended to grow
faster than countries locked into more traditional lower value-added activities. To
give an example, the classical contribution of Lucas (1988) assumes significant
differences in terms of technological change (learning) across sectoral activities.
Therefore, those countries that are able to specialize in technologically advanced
(high-tech) industrial sectors can achieve faster growth rates than others locked
into traditional (low-tech) specialization. Furthermore, because of the cumulative
nature of technological progress, current specialization patterns tend to be rein-
forced over time. Market forces could thus strengthen specialization trends in
both directions, contributing to raising (lowering) countries’ growth potentials. In
this case, a country could find it convenient to change its specialization pattern
through different interventionist policies (Lucas 1988).
Although all these contributions confirm a significant relation between trade
specialization, technology and economic performance, the causation linkage
between international trade and economic growth is still an ambiguous one
(Edwards 1993; Dowrick 1997). Empirical literature in this field has not been
able to disentangle it. At the empirical level over the last decade or so, a wide
range of studies have indicated a positive correlation between trade openness and
growth (Edwards 1998). Non-price factors appear to have had a major impact on
countries trade performance, and within these factors technology plays a very
important role. There is however little consistent evidence as yet on the mecha-
nism by which trade stimulates growth. Many contributions show that there is no
simple mechanical translation from trade to growth (Fagerberg 1996; Rodriguez
and Rodrik 1999). There are many countries with a strong outward orientation
which have nevertheless experienced relatively slow rates of economic growth.
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There are also many examples of developing economies that have grown 
significantly despite temporary trade restrictions.
To sum up, the broad conclusions that emerge from these theoretical and
empirical contributions can be listed in the following way:
1 Trade liberalization can indeed be expected to stimulate growth at world
level, but it is not true that every country must benefit.
2 Benefits at country level are variable and depend on a set of heterogeneous
endogenous factors (absorption capability).
3 The pattern of specialization could play an important role, since countries
can experience Kaldorian vicious (virtuous) circles and be locked into a 
pattern of specialization in low(high)-skill, low(high)-growth activities 
characterized by tight (loose) external constraints.
4 To avoid the low growth trap, it is important to provide macroeconomic sta-
bility and trade liberalization, but it requires more than just low inflation and
getting price right; it requires technological up-grading and policies to facil-
itate industrialization and structural change, to cite some fundamental issues
neglected by the traditional approach.
3. Trade openness, industrialization and structural change in 
Latin American, South-East Asian and Mediterranean NICs
In this section, the long-term trade performances of three groups of countries in
Latin America, East Asia and Mediterranean area are analyzed. The aim is to pro-
vide empirical evidence for the underlying long-term linkage between trade open-
ness and trade performance-specialization of the three groups of countries. The
analysis relies upon an original trade data base (SIE World Trade) comprising UN
and OECD statistical sources (400 product classes, 98 sectors and 25 commodity
groups) for more than 80 countries (OECDs, NICs, ex-CMEA and LDCs).
To take into account the industrialization process and structural transforma-
tions in the development path followed by each group of countries, a specific 
sectoral taxonomy is used here following the work of the OECD (1992), Pavitt
(1984, 1988) and Guerrieri (1992, 1993). This taxonomy highlights the relation
between technological capability and international trade performance at the level
of individual countries and is consistent with recent theoretical literature on 
technological change and trade specialization (see above).
In this taxonomy, the linkages between different industrial sectors assume great
importance (Rosenberg 1982; Pavitt 1988), i.e. in terms of innovation and user–
producer relationships (Scherer 1982; Lundvall 1988). In other words, the industrial
system could be viewed as national networks of inter-firm, intra-industry and inter-
industry linkages that affect the ability of nations to transform opportunities for
innovation into actual technological change (Lundvall 1988; Von Hippel 1988).
These innovation linkages occur within and between industries and to a large extent
they constitute externalities which increase the opportunity for technological
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spillovers across firms and sectors, generating a cycle of positive feedback and self-
reinforcing growth (Arthur 1990; Kaldor 1981). The competitive advantages of
individual countries are commonly concentrated in these clusters of sectors 
connected through vertical and horizontal relationships at the technological and
production levels (Porter 1990; OECD 1992; Guerrieri and Tylecote 1997).
Five types of industries are identified, primarily through a combination of tech-
nology sources, technology user requirements and means of technology appro-
priation: natural-resource-intensive, supplier-dominated or traditional sectors,
science-based, scale-intensive and specialized supplier. In the first two cate-
gories, factor endowments have a major influence on the generation of compara-
tive advantage, since technology is easily accessible and firms’ competitiveness
is notably sensitive to price factors. In the last three categories (science-based,
scale-intensive, specialized suppliers), comparative and absolute advantages 
are dominated by technological change and capability, as shown by various
empirical studies (Soete 1987; Fagerberg 1988; Amendola et al. 1992). All other
non-industrial goods are grouped into three remaining categories, namely 
agricultural products, fuels and other raw materials.
Trade and technological patterns of the Latin American NICs
The three Latin American NICs (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) (LAN) together
account for more than 80 per cent of the Latin American exports and have domi-
nated the region’s trade flows over the past two decades.
Three main phases characterized the trade patterns of the LAN over the past
three decades: in the first period – from the early 1970s to 1982 – rapid growth
and industrialization supported by either import-substitution or export promotion
policies were the distinctive features; the second period, up to the late 1980s, was
dominated by the debt crisis, gradual trade liberalization and high adjustment
costs to serve the foreign debt; and the third phase covered all the first half in the
1990s and comprised increasing trade openness and anti-inflationary strategies.
The share of world exports of Latin American NICs as a group was relatively
stable in the first two periods, from the early 1970s to the late l980s, and
increased significantly in the more recent phase (i.e. 39 per cent). This increase
was entirely due, however, to the progress of Mexican exports (Table 9.1). The
Latin American trade balances (standardized) showed no unequivocal trends but
only cyclical ups and downs: decreasing deficits throughout the 1970s and sig-
nificant surpluses during the adjustment period in the 1980s, with alternating
trade deficits and surpluses over the first half of the 1990s (Table 9.2).
To evaluate patterns of trade specialization of the LAN, the indicator used here
takes into consideration both exports and imports of a country by measuring the
relative contribution to the trade balance of the various product groups. Note that
positive values indicate countries’ comparative (competitive) advantage in a given
product group, whereas a negative value represents a comparative (competitive)
disadvantage. This index is calculated with respect to the product categories
included in the taxonomy presented above.
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First, to take a glance at the world trade patterns over the past two decades 
one should note that the weight of manufactured products increased substantially
in total trade and the share of agricultural products and raw materials symmetri-
cally decreased (Table 9.3).Within the manufactured exports, the shares of scale-
intensive and specialized suppliers held stable values, while that of science-based
export increased more than twice, from 9.5 percentage points by 1970 to more
than 21 percentage points by 1995. Since science-based goods embody relatively
intensive R&D inputs, either directly or indirectly through the intermediate goods
that are used in their production, this increased the importance of those industrial
sectors with a higher technological content (Scherer 1992).
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Table 9.1 Shares in world exports of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Argentina
Agricultural prod. 2.87 2.74 1.25 2.03 2.23
Fuels 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.68
Other raw materials 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07
Food industries 3.32 2.58 2.13 1.86 2.16
Traditional ind. 0.20 0.38 0.19 0.15 0.26
Resource-intensive ind. 0.04 0.10 0.27 0.38 0.32
Scale-intensive ind. 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.27
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.10
Science-based ind. 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09
Total trade 0.62 0.51 0.33 0.33 0.42
Mexico
Agricultural prod. 1.10 1.28 1.31 1.28 2.01
Fuels 0.04 1.69 4.15 3.21 3.11
Other raw materials 1.14 1.12 1.59 1.16 1.18
Food industries 0.96 0.45 0.51 0.43 0.65
Traditional ind. 0.33 0.26 0.37 0.35 1.20
Resource-intensive ind. 0.47 0.17 0.66 0.61 0.80
Scale-intensive ind. 0.24 0.27 0.64 0.81 2.06
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.04 0.12 0.34 0.32 1.81
Science-based ind. 0.20 0.10 0.56 0.46 1.53
Total trade 0.42 0.58 0.80 0.74 1.58
Brazil
Agricultural prod. 1.87 1.19 2.41 1.84 1.93
Fuels 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Other raw materials 0.04 1.69 4.15 3.21 3.11
Food industries 2.35 4.11 3.48 2.76 3.29
Traditional ind. 0.49 0.89 0.81 0.78 0.74
Resource-intensive ind. 0.10 0.47 1.68 1.60 1.54
Scale-intensive ind. 0.22 0.66 1.23 1.06 0.90
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.18 0.54 0.69 0.57 0.60
Science-based ind. 0.11 0.46 0.54 0.37 0.29
Total trade 0.95 1.00 1.18 0.98 0.93
In the course of the 1970s and the first part of the 1980s, the trade specialization
patterns of the LAN, as a whole, revealed intersectoral shifts towards manufactured
goods due to an industrialization process led by traditional, scale-intensive and
resource-intensive goods, although with different roles.1 But during the second part
of the 1980s, constrained by the high adjustment costs of servicing the foreign debt,
the LAN experienced an industrial restructuring in quite the opposite direction
(Table 9.4). As shown by trade patterns of the LAN in this period, all primary com-
modities, food products and, especially raw material processing industries increased
their role. In all non-manufactured products, Latin American NICs maintained high
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Table 9.2 Standarized trade balances of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
East Asian NICs
Agricultural prod. 1.982 3.367 4.200 4.444 4.900
Fuels 0.732 2.292 6.120 7.757 8.857
Other raw materials 0.297 1.341 5.758 6.637 6.032
Food industries 1.046 1.088 1.709 2.376 2.680
Traditional ind. 2.337 7.257 10.025 7.750 5.090
Resource-intensive ind. 0.397 0.012 1.842 3.026 4.326
Scale-intensive ind. 1.646 0.707 0.199 0.014 0.218
Specialized suppliers ind. 2.870 3.742 3.490 3.390 2.703
Science-based ind. 2.279 2.107 0.827 0.943 1.851
Total trade 0.886 0.290 0.649 0.007 0.286
Mediterranean NICs
Agricultural prod. 2.965 0.793 0.391 0.157 1.003
Fuels 0.585 1.073 2.106 2.047 2.415
Other raw materials 2.608 3.262 1.980 0.617 0.824
Food industries 0.354 0.508 1.270 0.700 0.615
Traditional ind. 0.276 0.140 0.728 0.647 0.629
Resource-intensive ind. 0.832 0.547 0.416 0.664 0.755
Scale-intensive ind. 1.931 1.871 1.197 1.367 1.320
Specialized suppliers ind. 2.214 2.406 1.842 2.110 1.781
Science-based ind. 1.675 1.093 1.003 1.195 0.993
Total trade 0.684 0.872 0.729 0.888 0.869
Latin American NICs
Agricultural prod. 3.924 2.911 3.619 3.676 4.413
Fuels 2.224 2.142 1.362 0.809 1.486
Other raw materials 4.608 5.762 8.514 10.313 10.070
Food industries 5.584 6.070 4.549 2.958 3.895
Traditional ind. 0.345 0.574 0.522 0.197 0.286
Resource-intensive ind. 1.394 0.340 2.585 1.669 1.282
Scale-intensive ind. 2.641 1.998 0.386 1.064 0.227
Specialized suppliers ind. 4.680 3.826 1.639 3.213 2.279
Science-based ind. 4.023 2.362 0.477 1.316 1.134
Total trade 0.339 0.471 0.804 0.271 0.002
Table 9.3 Weights of the sectoral groups in world exportsa
1970 1973 1979 1985 1988 1991 1993 1995 70–95
Food items 9.8 10.5 8.0 6.6 6.2 5.2 4.6 4.6 5.30
Fuels 6.5 7.8 14.8 13.1 5.8 6.8 6.0 4.7 1.73
Other raw materials 2.9 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 2.01
Food industries 7.2 7.6 6.2 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.5 1.70
Resource intensive 10.1 8.6 9.2 9.4 7.8 7.2 6.4 6.6 3.48
Agricultural products 36.5 36.5 40.0 36.0 26.6 25.8 23.4 22.2 14.22
and raw materials
Traditional 14.9 16.0 14.5 14.0 16.5 16.9 17.4 16.8 1.89
Scale intensive 24.7 24.9 23.0 24.6 26.2 25.2 25.0 25.0 0.35
Specialized suppliers 10.9 10.2 9.2 8.6 10.0 10.4 10.1 10.5 0.43
Science based 9.5 9.4 10.9 14.4 17.5 18.9 19.9 21.5 12.07
Manufactures 60.0 60.5 57.6 61.6 70.1 71.4 72.4 73.8 13.88
Others 3.6 3.0 2.4 2.4 3.2 2.8 4.1 3.7 0.09
Source: SIE-World Trade Data Base.
Note
a Average value in each subperiod (in percentage).
market shares, trade surpluses and comparative advantages, such as in raw materi-
als, agricultural primary resources and food products.
Only recently, the industrial exports of the LAN seem to have partially regained
their strength. In many industrial groups, both imports and exports have been rap-
idly increasing, leading towards a parallel and significant increase in the index of
intra-industry trade of the LAN. Although the latter could be interpreted as the
first sign of a shift of trade composition towards more technologically intensive
goods, LAN trade patterns do not yet show any significant changes in this direc-
tion. In fact, during the first part of the 1990s despecialization trends and signif-
icant trade deficits have continued to be a feature of all main industrial product
groups, apart from resource-intensive products, of the LAN (Tables 9.4 and 9.5).
This overall evolution in Latin America’s trade performance, however, has been
sharply differentiated according to country.
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Table 9.4 Trade specialization patterns of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
East Asian NICs
Agricultural prod. 2.28 5.53 3.29 2.31 1.96
Fuels 0.91 7.31 4.76 5.17 3.86
Other raw materials 0.59 0.51 0.88 0.61 0.45
Food industries 0.57 1.24 1.40 1.45 1.28
Traditional ind. 21.41 25.99 18.26 14.16 8.29
Resource-intensive ind. 0.91 0.49 2.26 2.10 2.49
Scale-intensive ind. 9.28 2.50 0.96 0.05 0.02
Specialized suppliers ind. 8.36 7.39 4.90 3.66 2.33
Science-based ind. 5.34 4.26 0.09 1.87 4.46
Mediterranean NICs
Agricultural prod. 36.09 15.29 7.93 6.49 2.92
Fuels 0.94 2.95 5.41 4.20 4.78
Other raw materials 8.17 7.58 3.19 1.40 1.45
Food industries 2.35 2.76 0.37 2.61 3.12
Traditional ind. 2.77 11.54 20.70 22.36 22.72
Resource-intensive ind. 3.42 2.10 1.40 0.60 0.67
Scale-intensive ind. 24.35 19.15 9.66 10.12 8.90
Specialized suppliers ind. 13.84 11.38 9.44 9.42 7.96
Science-based ind. 8.97 5.79 8.74 9.96 9.37
Latin American NICs
Agricultural prod. 16.90 11.14 5.86 8.40 6.19
Fuels 5.18 9.32 0.22 2.95 2.23
Other raw materials 5.64 4.68 3.00 4.04 2.61
Food industries 16.94 16.17 7.43 8.13 6.66
Traditional ind. 1.05 4.52 0.63 0.25 1.48
Resource-intensive ind. 7.11 2.75 5.33 5.49 2.65
Scale-intensive ind. 22.70 14.15 3.89 8.09 1.76
Specialized suppliers ind. 18.28 11.75 10.75 12.32 7.38
Science-based ind. 13.54 8.42 8.04 8.93 7.49
By the mid-1990s, Argentina’s trade specialization was mostly based on agri-
cultural products and food industry (Table 9.6). Trade composition, however, has
been changing substantially over the past three decades, thanks to a larger role of
industrial sectors and a related increased weight of industrial products in total
Argentinean exports.
These changes in trade patterns, however, featured very differently in each of the
three periods considered here (Tables 9.1, 9.6 and 9.7). Over the 1970s, resource-
intensive, scale-intensive (such as automobiles, electrical equipment) and, to a
lesser extent, specialized supplier (machine tools) categories contributed as a
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Table 9.5 Standardized trade balances of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
East Asian NICs
Agricultural prod. 1.982 3.367 4.200 4.444 4.900
Fuels 0.732 2.292 6.120 7.757 8.857
Other raw materials 0.297 1.341 5.758 6.637 6.032
Food industries 1.046 1.088 1.709 2.376 2.680
Traditional ind. 2.337 7.257 10.025 7.750 5.090
Resource-intensive ind. 0.397 0.012 1.842 3.026 4.326
Scale-intensive ind. 1.646 0.707 0.199 0.014 0.218
Specialized suppliers ind. 2.870 3.742 3.490 3.390 2.703
Science-based ind. 2.279 2.107 0.827 0.943 1.851
Total trade 0.886 0.290 0.649 0.007 0.286
Mediterranean NICs
Agricultural prod. 2.965 0.793 0.391 0.157 1.003
Fuels 0.585 1.073 2.106 2.047 2.415
Other raw materials 2.608 3.262 1.980 0.617 0.824
Food industries 0.354 0.508 1.270 0.700 0.615
Traditional ind. 0.276 0.140 0.728 0.647 0.629
Resource-intensive ind. 0.832 0.547 0.416 0.664 0.755
Scale-intensive ind. 1.931 1.871 1.197 1.367 1.320
Specialized suppliers ind. 2.214 2.406 1.842 2.110 1.781
Science-based ind. 1.675 1.093 1.003 1.195 0.993
Total trade 0.684 0.872 0.729 0.888 0.869
Latin American NICs
Agricultural prod. 3.924 2.911 3.619 3.676 4.413
Fuels 2.224 2.142 1.362 0.809 1.486
Other raw materials 4.608 5.762 8.514 10.313 10.070
Food industries 5.584 6.070 4.549 2.958 3.895
Traditional ind. 0.345 0.574 0.522 0.197 0.286
Resource-intensive ind. 1.394 0.340 2.585 1.669 1.282
Scale-intensive ind. 2.641 1.998 0.386 1.064 0.227
Specialized suppliers ind. 4.680 3.826 1.639 3.213 2.279
Science-based ind. 4.023 2.362 0.477 1.316 1.134
Total trade 0.339 0.471 0.804 0.271 0.002
group to a deep restructuring of Argentina’s industry which seemed able to provide
a more articulated industrial base for comparative advantages in Argentina. In the
course of the 1980s, the debt crisis put a halt to this phase and, together with the
recessionary adjustment policies, produced a deep impact on Argentina’s industrial
and trade structure (Bisang and Kosakoff 1995). Manufactured products continued
to increase their share in total export, mostly thanks to natural-resource-intensive
industries (e.g. pulp and paper, non-ferrous metal products) and a few scale- and
capital-intensive industries (e.g. iron and steel, and basic chemicals) favored by
generous fiscal incentive policies. So did, even to a lesser extent, the traditional
sectors (such as clothing, textiles and shoes). On the other hand, specialized sup-
plier (machine tools and agricultural equipment) and science-based products
showed increasing comparative disadvantages.
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Table 9.6 Trade specialization patterns of selected countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Argentina
Agricultural prod. 41.27 38.95 15.01 27.74 21.79
Fuels 3.04 9.64 5.42 1.82 6.63
Other raw materials 2.04 2.09 5.41 1.42 1.34
Food industries 37.01 27.29 29.49 27.95 24.82
Traditional ind. 5.72 1.47 4.22 4.78 1.50
Resource-intensive ind. 12.74 10.47 0.35 1.81 2.09
Scale-intensive ind. 26.53 18.76 14.95 25.16 17.61
Specialized suppliers ind. 17.79 12.38 10.46 11.51 13.80
Science-based ind. 8.60 12.84 11.85 16.04 16.31
Mexico
Agricultural prod. 16.75 8.93 0.28 2.48 1.87
Fuels 0.60 41.05 31.37 24.76 9.00
Other raw materials 5.32 1.55 0.75 0.73 0.01
Food industries 11.88 2.10 5.35 3.14 1.15
Traditional ind. 3.07 0.55 3.89 3.49 3.91
Resource-intensive ind. 3.37 3.88 1.75 0.52 2.02
Scale-intensive ind. 14.38 23.66 3.89 5.01 9.59
Specialized suppliers ind. 18.40 18.68 13.75 12.60 4.17
Science-based ind. 12.48 11.41 3.42 3.35 2.78
Brazil
Agricultural prod. 11.04 1.65 6.11 4.67 4.67
Fuels 10.55 35.10 18.75 18.43 7.13
Other raw materials 8.89 7.69 3.91 4.82 4.81
Food industries 14.29 22.32 8.97 9.55 12.05
Traditional ind. 3.00 10.24 5.40 8.47 3.89
Resource-intensive ind. 9.68 2.55 2.85 2.64 2.09
Scale-intensive ind. 20.83 3.39 4.92 6.05 5.04
Specialized suppliers ind. 16.14 6.98 5.31 9.10 7.10
Science-based ind. 14.90 4.99 8.91 9.49 10.23
This trend has been only partially mitigated in more recent years with the intro-
duction of economic reforms and greater trade openness. It should have been 
followed by higher rates of growth of exports, together with a parallel increase in
imports. Both trade composition and specialization, however, have not shown any
substantial change yet with respect to its industrial content. On the contrary, only
fuel products have significantly increased their contribution to trade balance and
their share in total Argentina’s exports during the first half of the 1990s.
Among the LAN, Brazil experienced the deepest industrialization restructuring
over the past two decades. In the early 1970s, Brazil’s comparative advantages
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Table 9.7 Standardized trade balances of selected countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Argentina
Agricultural prod. 2.605 2.550 1.146 1.842 2.009
Fuels 0.276 0.288 0.136 0.018 0.574
Other raw materials 0.416 0.503 0.735 0.669 0.637
Food industries 3.187 2.335 2.105 1.551 1.881
Traditional ind. 0.217 0.099 0.148 0.144 0.025
Resource-intensive ind. 0.743 0.492 0.145 0.031 0.112
Scale-intensive ind. 0.626 0.336 0.032 0.433 0.272
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.953 0.569 0.129 0.471 0.523
Science-based ind. 0.529 0.511 0.072 0.355 0.302
Total trade 0.029 0.074 0.185 0.071 0.017
Mexico
Agricultural prod. 0.510 0.408 0.091 0.272 0.746
Fuels 0.130 1.646 4.063 3.031 2.947
Other raw materials 0.617 0.253 0.545 0.278 0.071
Food industries 0.606 0.100 0.714 1.082 0.261
Traditional ind. 0.147 0.081 0.160 0.548 0.263
Resource-intensive ind. 0.163 0.436 0.140 0.573 0.389
Scale-intensive ind. 0.821 0.998 0.090 0.892 0.710
Specialized suppliers ind. 1.676 1.784 1.034 1.958 0.461
Science-based ind. 1.483 0.942 0.125 0.597 0.086
Total trade 0.437 0.248 0.033 0.561 0.109
Brazil
Agricultural prod. 1.039 0.078 1.824 1.278 0.804
Fuels 1.616 3.130 2.192 1.906 1.581
Other raw materials 2.949 4.086 5.740 6.561 5.074
Food industries 1.879 3.584 2.695 2.065 1.825
Traditional ind. 0.181 0.669 0.587 0.597 0.136
Resource-intensive ind. 0.957 0.507 0.999 0.835 0.096
Scale-intensive ind. 0.846 0.389 0.680 0.533 0.357
Specialized suppliers ind. 1.470 1.158 0.075 0.377 0.821
Science-based ind. 1.564 0.744 0.124 0.196 0.560
Total trade 0.037 0.296 0.522 0.3491 0.144
were mostly concentrated in primary commodities, such as agricultural products,
food industry and other raw materials; a few traditional industrial sectors (such as
textile and leather products) were the only exceptions. Over the course of the
1970s and until the early 1980s, manufactured output and export growth was very
high. An import substitution strategy together with export incentives led to strong
diversification of Brazil’s industrial base and trade structure in the same period
(Fritsch and Franco 1991). A confirmation of this is the huge increase in the share
of manufactures in total Brazilian exports in this period, from 20 per cent in the
early 1970s to 63 per cent in the late 1980s.
In the course of the 1980s, the debt crisis and growing macroeconomic imbal-
ances to a rather different pattern. The Brazilian economy, forced to generate huge
trade surpluses, greatly increased the level of industrial protection. The Brazilian
industry’s competitive position also significantly deteriorated, with a sectoral trade
composition shifting towards natural-resource-intensive and scale-intensive prod-
uct goods. Most of Brazil’s comparative advantages were concentrated in these two
categories (basic chemicals, steel manufacturing, non-metallic minerals sectors,
electrical machinery and autoparts).2
In the third period – covering the first half of the 1990s – a liberalization process
was implemented in order to reduce the average level of protection of the Brazilian
economy. Furthermore, the anti-inflationary strategy of 1994–5 increased the
implementation of tariff reductions, although the Mexican crisis and the more
recent Asian crisis led to a partial reversal of this liberalization trend.
In the course of this period, trade industrial diversification slowed down and
was partially reversed. The share of industrial goods on overall exports did not
increase for the first time in three decades, and Brazil’s world export share and
trade balance deteriorated in the same period. If we take the sum of the share of
scale-intensive, specialized supplier and science-based sectors in total Brazilian
exports (as a proxy for the overall technological content of the trade pattern), it
increased significantly during the 1970s and up to the late 1980s, whereas in the
second half of the 1990s it did not change at all. Clearly all this suggests that, due
also to a real exchange rate appreciation, Brazilian industrialization process paid
high adjustment costs in recent years. One should also note, however, that the
index in intra-industry trade increased in the same period, suggesting that the pro-
duction integration of the Brazilian firms into the international markets has been
also gradually increasing.
Mexico distinguishes its position from the other two Latin American countries
by its peculiar specialization patterns over the period considered. It was dominated
by external shocks and events which led to different phases of domestic adjust-
ments with regard to trade and industrial restructuring (Tables 9.1, 9.6 and 9.7).
Up to the early 1980s the trade pattern of Mexico was dominated by oil events.
Since the first oil shock, fuels rapidly became the dominant item of Mexico’s
exports and specialization; as a consequence, the weight of manufactured goods
in Mexican exports drastically decreased. A sort of ‘Dutch disease’, in terms of
an advanced deindustrialization pattern, thus characterized the Mexican economy
in this phase. From 1982 up to the early 1990s, a second major change took place
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in Mexico’s trade pattern with its first openness initiative. In this second phase,
the debt crisis forced Mexico to increase its exports rapidly, so that raw materials
and natural-resource-intensive products achieved a greater role in overall export.
In this respect, agricultural products also increased its share in Mexico’s exports
and specialization. This second period culminated with the signature of the
NAFTA agreement and the financial crisis of the mid-1990s.
In very recent years, industrial exports have rapidly regained strength while
fuel exports decreased their importance. There is no doubt that in this period
Mexico has started a deep industrial restructuring process, driven by a consistent
inflow of FDI and increasing opportunities stemming from NAFTA. The ICTB
indicators in scale-intensive, specialized suppliers and science-based sectors
showed significant improvements. The rapid increase in Mexican imports in those
product groups that experienced the positive export performances emphasizes the
intra-industry vertical type of new trade flows, mostly related to the maquiladora
industries. As is well known, the industrial local impact and spillover effects of
this type of industries are far from being assured. As a matter of fact, in the mid-
1990s, Mexico’s specialization pattern seemed still characterized by comparative
advantages in primary commodities (fuels).
Trade and technological patterns of the East Asian NICs
In the past two and half decades, trade and technological patterns of East Asian
NICs (EAN) seem to have been characterized, to a certain extent, by quite oppo-
site features with respect to Latin American economies.
First, it is important to note the positive trade performances of South-East Asian
countries – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – over the entire
period considered here (1970–95), in terms of rapidly increasing market shares
(Table 9.8).3 Although the financial crises in East Asia have attracted much atten-
tion recently, we should not forget the amazing achievements of the EAN in the
past three decades.
Sound evidence of the positive trade performance of East Asia can be drawn
from the competitive patterns in single product groups related to the taxonomy
previously adopted (Table 9.9). Indicators show a sharp strengthening of the
Asian NIC competitive positions on international markets in all the main indus-
trial categories in terms of a rapidly rising share in world exports and positive
trade balances. This is especially true in traditional industries up to the second
half of the 1980s, and in science-based goods over the past decade. Within the lat-
ter group, the significant achievements of the EAN in many electronics sectors is
emblematic (Guerrieri 1995). Finally, in specialized supplier sectors, and partic-
ularly in mechanical engineering, EAN have been able to register rising export
shares in recent years.
The EAN experienced the highest rates of growth and accumulation among 
the three groups of economies here considered in the past two decades and a 
half. Such remarkable performance may be connected with the common 
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export-oriented growth strategies followed by East Asian countries since the late
1960s, after a relatively short period with import-substitution policies in the 1950s.
A massive reallocation of productive resources in those industrial sectors 
with highest export potential was the main goal of these strategies. To pursue this
goal either state interventions or incentive and subsidy policies, as well known,
were used on a large scale and in very different forms (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990).
The industrial development of the EAN was initially supported by the produc-
tion and export of consumer goods requiring large amounts of unskilled labor, 
for which they benefited by the highest comparative (and absolute) advantages
(Table 9.4). After increasing significantly up to the mid-1980s, however, the
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Table 9.8 Shares in world exports of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Singapore
Agricultural prod. 1.67 1.62 1.17 0.96 0.99
Fuels 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06
Other raw materials 0.16 0.38 0.20 0.25 0.26
Food industries 0.72 0.91 1.14 1.22 1.20
Traditional ind. 0.47 0.79 0.94 0.91 0.93
Resource-intensive ind. 1.32 2.61 3.60 3.92 3.27
Scale-intensive ind. 0.17 0.53 1.10 1.26 1.52
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.26 0.59 1.24 1.27 1.81
Science-based ind. 0.16 1.34 3.01 3.66 5.78
Total trade 0.54 0.94 1.54 1.72 2.35
Taiwan
Agricultural prod. 0.39 0.42 0.72 0.77 0.88
Fuels 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Other raw materials 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.21
Food industries 0.76 0.80 1.03 1.00 0.99
Traditional ind. 1.06 2.66 4.20 3.07 3.80
Resource-intensive ind. 0.04 0.12 0.23 0.18 1.09
Scale-intensive ind. 0.28 0.68 1.26 0.88 1.39
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.12 0.44 1.36 1.11 2.56
Science-based ind. 0.14 0.80 2.33 2.51 4.27
Total trade 0.36 0.79 1.74 1.50 2.38
South Korea
Agricultural Prod. 0.29 0.81 1.07 0.88 0.77
Fuels 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Other raw materials 0.48 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.20
Food industries 0.07 0.36 0.54 0.42 0.52
Traditional ind. 1.09 3.34 4.87 3.67 3.12
Resource-intensive ind. 0.04 0.12 0.72 1.13 1.30
Scale-intensive ind. 0.08 1.14 2.61 2.71 3.19
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.04 0.28 0.87 1.03 2.37
Science-based ind. 0.17 0.94 2.28 2.45 3.31
Total trade 0.29 0.99 2.15 2.08 2.49
contribution of traditional goods to the trade balance decreased throughout the
past decade. A diversification of manufacturing output and radical changes in
trade patterns of the EAN have been taking place in the period considered here,
although in very different forms. Actually, this overall trend masks sharp differ-
ences within East Asian countries. They are so huge that it is very difficult to
define a common ‘East Asian Pattern’ (Tables 9.8, 9.10 and 9.11).
First of all, Singapore and Taiwan achieved the best results within the East
Asian group, in terms of increasing market shares and upgrading their trade 
specialization towards science-based goods, especially electronic activities. This
was due to deep structural changes in the two countries’ trade patterns since the
early 1970s, when comparative advantages were concentrated in traditional goods
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Table 9.9 Shares in world exports of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
East Asian NICs
Agricultural prod. 3.22 3.71 4.66 4.56 4.11
Fuels 0.71 1.03 0.96 1.08 0.98
Other raw materials 1.03 1.10 1.40 1.30 1.37
Food industries 2.08 2.59 4.07 4.41 4.33
Traditional ind. 6.53 11.56 18.53 18.01 16.45
Resource-intensive ind. 1.85 3.30 5.66 7.13 7.47
Scale-intensive ind. 1.05 3.16 6.67 7.45 8.59
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.87 1.92 5.66 6.83 8.76
Science-based ind. 1.07 4.94 11.56 13.41 17.75
Total trade 2.36 4.21 8.63 9.57 10.84
Mediterranean NICs
Agricultural prod. 4.62 2.49 2.83 2.76 2.42
Fuels 0.45 0.62 0.65 0.75 0.48
Other raw materials 3.19 4.12 3.90 2.90 2.77
Food industries 1.25 1.20 1.52 1.77 1.84
Traditional ind. 0.81 1.20 2.02 2.16 2.20
Resource-intensive ind. 0.33 0.87 0.98 0.93 1.01
Scale-intensive ind. 0.29 0.26 0.66 0.60 0.64
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.25 0.28
Science-based ind. 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13
Total trade 0.93 0.77 0.97 0.97 0.92
Latin American NICs
Agricultural prod. 5.98 5.50 5.62 6.14 7.23
Fuels 0.05 1.70 4.18 3.38 3.82
Other raw materials 6.05 8.40 12.45 13.73 14.20
Food industries 6.76 7.45 6.68 5.65 6.79
Traditional ind. 1.06 1.61 1.46 1.37 2.30
Resource-intensive ind. 4.04 2.63 4.34 4.14 4.58
Scale-intensive ind. 0.64 1.16 2.16 2.08 3.30
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.33 0.85 1.12 0.98 2.53
Science-based ind. 0.43 0.68 1.19 0.90 1.92
Total trade 2.42 2.38 2.59 2.32 3.24
and the food industry in the case of Taiwan, and in agricultural products and
resource-intensive industries in the case of Singapore (Guerrieri 1995).
Taiwan adopted an industrial development strategy based initially on some
competitive clusters comprising labor-intensive consumer goods. From the sec-
ond part of the 1980s up to the mid-1990s, Taiwan gradually carried out a process
of diversification and upgrading of industrial structure toward a strengthening of
technology-intensive products, such as science-based goods (e.g. electronics
components and investment goods). This is confirmed by the decreasing contri-
bution to trade balance of traditional goods and the recent increasing contribution
of science-based goods (Table 9.11).
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Table 9.10 Standardized trade balances of selected countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Singapore
Agricultural prod. 0.303 0.217 0.082 0.240 0.156
Fuels 0.712 1.677 2.590 2.669 2.595
Other raw materials 0.006 0.059 0.196 0.290 0.207
Food industries 0.332 0.245 0.169 0.153 0.163
Traditional ind. 0.602 0.149 0.183 0.294 0.427
Resource-intensive ind. 0.408 1.889 1.584 1.271 0.682
Scale-intensive ind. 0.410 0.274 0.194 0.211 0.271
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.731 0.663 0.650 0.901 0.872
Science-based ind. 0.454 0.508 0.172 0.375 0.839
Total trade 0.316 0.224 0.173 0.236 0.124
Taiwan
Agricultural prod. 0.211 0.487 0.611 0.545 1.027
Fuels 0.005 0.009 0.283 0.220 0.748
Other raw materials 0.035 0.147 0.575 0.706 0.923
Food industries 0.644 0.608 0.365 0.354 0.018
Traditional ind. 0.799 2.406 3.687 2.477 2.752
Resource-intensive ind. 0.178 0.280 1.003 1.264 1.104
Scale-intensive ind. 0.314 0.141 0.183 0.554 0.273
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.647 0.628 0.616 0.920 0.408
Science-based ind. 0.521 0.348 0.649 0.696 1.522
Total trade 0.071 0.202 0.518 0.220 0.578
South Korea
Agricultural prod. 0.924 1.808 2.515 2.452 2.699
Fuels 0.643 1.532 3.798 5.242 6.137
Other raw materials 0.108 1.133 4.472 5.128 4.918
Food industries 0.302 0.295 0.394 0.656 0.820
Traditional ind. 0.657 2.767 3.792 2.507 1.625
Resource-intensive ind. 0.240 0.707 1.400 1.726 2.643
Scale-intensive ind. 0.615 0.018 0.912 1.262 1.190
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.906 1.914 2.342 2.090 1.510
Science-based ind. 0.566 0.855 0.282 0.168 0.376
Total trade 0.400 0.346 0.032 0.140 0.200
This process of diversification has been accompanied by a selective industrial
policy comprising of a variety of measures like import protection, directed credit,
technological support and strong export promotion. This support played a signif-
icant role, especially in helping those Taiwanese SME firms that dominate the
domestic industrial structure to upgrade and diversify their technological bases.
Whereas FDI played a secondary role in the case of Taiwan, Singapore has
relied heavily on FDI and MNCs (Urata 1993). As shown by specialization pat-
tern, Singapore started with resource-intensive industries (ship servicing and
petroleum refining) and moved into export-oriented industrialization, based on
light industrial activity in the late 1970s. But it was in the course of the 1980s,
after heavy interventions of Singapore’s government, that trade specialization
shifted heavily towards science-based goods (especially electronics industries),
guided by higher openness, MNC foreign investments and global structure of
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Table 9.11 Trade specialization patterns of selected countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Singapore
Agricultural prod. 13.96 4.12 0.16 0.27 0.19
Fuels 5.07 21.09 9.25 8.62 5.08
Other raw materials 0.27 0.23 0.12 0.11 0.07
Food industries 0.71 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.22
Traditional ind. 5.43 0.48 0.76 1.51 2.54
Resource-intensive ind. 13.11 19.61 9.21 6.08 2.31
Scale-intensive ind. 8.51 2.88 1.05 0.49 1.92
Specialized suppliers ind. 7.00 4.09 2.97 3.81 3.28
Science-based ind. 3.80 1.73 5.21 8.53 9.86
Taiwan
Agricultural prod. 3.06 7.93 3.79 2.54 3.08
Fuels 0.07 0.23 1.38 1.09 1.99
Other raw materials 0.17 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.45
Food industries 13.16 4.14 0.26 0.93 0.79
Traditional ind. 34.52 41.76 32.70 27.54 16.65
Resource-intensive ind. 3.96 4.73 6.79 6.63 5.01
Scale-intensive ind. 14.70 12.07 11.29 13.57 8.31
Specialized suppliers ind. 15.71 11.39 8.12 8.67 1.23
Science-based ind. 10.79 9.99 0.63 4.87 5.62
South Korea
Agricultural prod. 6.29 8.93 6.90 5.34 4.45
Other raw materials 4.79 16.60 11.01 15.02 11.07
Fuels 2.64 1.36 2.52 2.02 1.53
Food industries 1.74 0.76 1.05 1.65 1.60
Traditional ind. 38.60 41.82 29.64 21.69 11.63
Resource-intensive ind. 2.28 4.47 5.30 4.91 6.31
Scale-intensive ind. 15.02 6.40 10.47 16.63 13.39
Specialized suppliers ind. 11.31 12.26 11.10 9.38 5.13
Science-based ind. 3.87 4.19 2.62 0.03 5.09
their operations. A clear confirmation of this is the huge increase in the share of
science-based goods in total Singapore exports in this period (from 14 per cent in
the early 1980s to 52 per cent in the mid-1990s).
The electronics sector was the central pillar of Singapore’s industrial and tech-
nological development in the past decade, as well as of many other East Asian coun-
tries’ recent industrialization stories (Borrus 1993). As well known, electronics
products are complex systems based on a number of critical components and there-
fore are particularly favorable to a network firm organization spread across coun-
tries (Ernst 1994). As many studies have shown, FDI and production networks
based on strong intra-regional interdependencies as regards inputs and sales and
often part of global production strategies of US and Japanese medium–large firms,
have played a very important role in East Asia’s overall competitiveness and intra-
regional trade (see Doherty et al. 1997). Part of East Asian FDI, as shown in the
‘product cycle’ model, has aimed at taking advantage of local natural resources,
skills and relatively low wage cost. But interest in the region has not been motivated
only by the search for new low-wage localization costs. The same multinational
companies that set up as ‘footloose’ industries pursued a more lasting involvement
in the region (Guerrieri 1995). Therefore, other important inputs related to both eco-
nomics and technology have played a dominant role in the network firm organiza-
tion, such as the expansion of East Asian FDI, subcontracting and outsourcing
(Borrus 1993). The increasing importance of intra-industry trade in the region, as
shown in the cases of Singapore and Taiwan, could be also attributable to an
increasing division of labor within multinational companies.
Thus, very often, foreign direct investment in the East Asian region has gener-
ated trade and trade opportunities and, in turn, has attracted new foreign invest-
ment (Ernst and Guerrieri 1998). Such specialization, however, seem to have, in
many cases, greatly reduced the need for domestic technological efforts and con-
tributed to keeping technological levels of the affiliates of MNCs relatively low
in many countries.
South Korea exhibited a very different pattern from the other two Asian NICs.
Korean industrial development relied primarily on labor-intensive traditional
goods and raw materials. As shown by the trade specialization pattern, between 
the mid-1970s and late 1980s, Korea diversified its exports mainly toward scale-
intensive, heavy industry by promoting giant private conglomerates (chaebol). 
In the few years between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, there was a 
huge increase in the share of scale-intensive goods in total Korean exports (from
7 per cent in the early 1970s to 36 per cent in the mid-1980s). The trade special-
ization pattern also showed this dramatic increase of the contribution to the
Korean trade balance from scale-intensive industries in the same period.
For this purpose, Korea adopted far more interventionist strategies on trade
and domestic resource allocation than Taiwan and Singapore. The chaebol were
heavily subsidized and MNCs’ entry into domestic markets severely restricted,
pushing domestic enterprises to set up local technological capabilities and
capital-intensive activities geared to export markets. To access technology, it
relied primarily on capital-goods imports, technology licensing and other tech-
nology agreements.
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In the course of the past decade, along with a gradual process of trade and 
capital liberalization, Korea tried to firmly upgrade their industrial structure, this
time towards science-based activities. But this attempt was only a partial success.
Science-based goods actually increased their share in total exports and their 
contribution to the trade balance, but at the price of a much higher technological
dependence of Korean industry from external sources, especially from Japan’s
technology. As a consequence, Korea’s trade balance severely deteriorated in the
past three years, paving the way to the recent dramatic crisis.
Trade and technological patterns of the Mediterranean NICs
The Mediterranean NICs (MeN) experienced a peculiar pattern of trade, growth
and openness in these years in comparison to the other two groups of countries
previously considered (Tables 9.2, 9.4 and 9.9).
By the early 1970s, trade performance and specialization of the three
Mediterranean NICs were still largely based on agricultural products and raw
materials, and were geographically concentrated into European markets. But in the
course of the 1980s, the Mediterranean specialization has been shifting towards
industrial goods, especially traditional consumer goods, so that by the late 1980s
industrial goods comprised about 67 per cent of exports, while non-industrial
products comprised 30 per cent. These structural changes have been favoured, on
the one hand, by a trade liberalization process implemented gradually and low
labor costs in labor-intensive sectors, mostly textile-apparel, on the other. Trade
liberalization, however, was combined, in the same period, with very intense sup-
port measures for export activities.
In the course of the 1990s, trade performance of the MeN has significantly
deteriorated. Their modest share in world exports decreased further; their high
trade deficit in industrial products did not improve; and their trade specialization
remained locked into traditional and raw material sectors. Furthermore, the MeN
intra-industry trade index, already very low in comparison to those of Latin
American and Asian NICs, held stable values even in the more recent period.
Besides these common features, however, the MeN show very distinct individual
patterns of export growth, technological capability, industrial changes, reliance
on FDI and policy interventions. Let us review three of them, amongst the most
significant ones, that is Turkey, Tunisia and Greece.
Turkey has showed two distinctive trade patterns over the period considered
(Tables 9.12, 9.13, 9.14 and 9.15). In the period from the late 1970s up to the sec-
ond part of the 1980s, the Turkish share of world exports increased substantially,
i.e. by around 100 per cent, whereas in the more recent phase the competitive posi-
tion of Turkey did not show any improvement (1990–5). The trade balance pattern
was very similar: small deficits in the course of the 1980s and a deteriorating
external position, combined with a rapidly increasing total external debt, over the
first half of the 1990s.
The positive trade performance in the 1980s followed the gradual opening 
up of the Turkish economy, after a prolonged period of protectionist import-
substitution policy and heavy state intervention.
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The various rounds of import liberalization, combined with a variety of export
supports to Turkish firms, led to a massive export boom and decreasing import
penetration in some sectors due to increasing domestic production. The major
gains were achieved in the traditional labor-intensive industries (especially textile
and clothing). Exports of raw materials and scale-intensive products (basic 
metals) also registered significant gains.
In the first half of the 1990s, the trade liberalization process progressed even
further with the dismantling of most forms of export support policies. But export
flows slowed down this time, barely keeping pace with world export growth.
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Table 9.12 Shares in world exports of selected groups of countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Greece
Agricultural prod. 0.88 0.59 0.81 0.90 0.73
Fuels 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
Other raw materials 0.54 0.81 0.74 0.62 0.56
Food industries 0.37 0.58 0.73 0.84 0.71
Traditional ind. 0.19 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.38
Resource-intensive ind. 0.18 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.43
Scale-intensive ind. 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
Science-based ind. 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05
Total trade 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.22
Tunisia
Agricultural prod. 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09
Fuels 0.24 0.36 0.30 0.22 0.16
Other raw materials 0.33 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.16
Food industries 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.12
Traditional ind. 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.36
Resource-intensive ind. 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04
Scale-intensive ind. 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05
Science-based ind. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Total trade 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11
Turkey
Agricultural prod. 1.57 1.10 1.27 1.21 0.97
Fuels 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Other raw materials 0.44 0.47 1.27 0.85 0.98
Food industries 0.19 0.16 0.48 0.59 0.77
Traditional ind. 0.09 0.24 0.94 1.04 1.20
Resource-intensive ind. 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.19 0.22
Scale-intensive ind. 0.02 0.03 0.35 0.31 0.37
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.15
Science-based ind. 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05
Total trade 0.21 0.15 0.40 0.40 0.43
At the same time, imports increased dramatically, especially of consumption and
intermediate goods.
Macroeconomic instability can account for a great part of this disappointing pat-
tern. It is sufficient to point out the existence of chronic fiscal deficits, punitive high
interest rates and appreciating real exchange rates in the first part of the 1990s.
Long-term structural factors, however, also seem to have significantly contributed
to this performance, as shown by the Turkey’s trade specialization pattern over the
past two decades. In the 1980s, the trade specialization pattern of Turkey displayed
significant changes by showing rapid industrialization and deep restructuring over
time. Traditional labor-intensive goods, especially textile and clothing, greatly
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Table 9.13 Standarized trade balances of selected countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Greece
Agricultural prod. 0.556 0.068 0.342 0.389 0.187
Fuels 0.438 0.819 0.434 0.736 0.547
Other raw materials 0.209 0.628 0.522 0.446 0.399
Food industries 0.409 0.047 0.563 0.413 0.416
Traditional ind. 0.260 0.149 0.079 0.123 0.173
Resource-intensive ind. 0.265 0.149 0.068 0.117 0.141
Scale-intensive ind. 0.969 0.877 0.562 0.702 0.552
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.885 0.750 0.546 0.525 0.366
Science-based ind. 0.581 0.338 0.290 0.306 0.218
Total trade 0.459 0.381 0.296 0.368 0.298
Tunisia
Agricultural prod. 0.111 0.135 0.153 0.068 0.210
Fuels 0.203 0.261 0.204 0.138 0.024
Other raw materials 0.248 0.016 0.350 0.294 0.177
Food industries 0.005 0.040 0.105 0.029 0.026
Traditional ind. 0.097 0.057 0.013 0.028 0.079
Resource-intensive ind. 0.010 0.184 0.138 0.153 0.113
Scale-intensive ind. 0.047 0.114 0.023 0.075 0.054
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.141 0.293 0.167 0.200 0.132
Science-based ind. 0.083 0.131 0.055 0.099 0.063
Total trade 0.043 0.069 0.050 0.065 0.048
Turkey
Agricultural prod. 1.264 1.056 0.642 0.550 0.160
Fuels 0.263 0.469 1.677 1.462 1.720
Other raw materials 0.396 0.247 0.749 0.344 0.410
Food industries 0.178 0.080 0.083 0.188 0.328
Traditional ind. 0.016 0.176 0.775 0.761 0.770
Resource-intensive ind. 0.181 0.598 0.208 0.283 0.430
Scale-intensive ind. 0.412 0.365 0.297 0.365 0.452
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.621 0.628 0.603 0.838 0.830
Science-based ind. 0.468 0.264 0.392 0.531 0.511
Total trade 0.105 0.177 0.144 0.221 0.281
increased their contribution to the trade balance. In contrast, agricultural products,
the leading export sector in the 1970s, dramatically reduced its role, both in terms
of specialization and share in total exports. The trade performance and specializa-
tion of scale-intensive goods (especially the basic metal and automotive sectors)
also improved sharply during the 1980s.4 High comparative disadvantages and
trade deficits characterized the specialized supplier and science-based sectors over
both decades, although slight improvements occurred in the former.
In more recent periods, the disappointing Turkish trade performance has 
been accompanied by a relatively stable trade specialization pattern, locked into
traditional goods and sectors. If we take the sum of the shares of scale-intensive,
specialized supplier and science-based sectors in total Turkish exports (as a proxy
for the overall technological content of the trade pattern), it increased significantly
during the late 1970s to the second half of the 1980s (7.3 per cent in 1979 to 27.6
per cent in 1987). Thereafter, it has remained almost stable, suggesting that tech-
nological capability of Turkey has not improved significantly in the last period.
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Table 9.14 Trade specialization patterns of selected countries
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Greece
Agricultural prod. 25.32 9.82 11.36 10.60 8.71
Fuels 3.09 15.57 3.89 5.84 4.02
Other raw materials 4.12 4.29 2.54 1.50 1.59
Food industries 2.77 6.48 2.26 5.75 5.02
Traditional ind. 2.22 17.21 13.25 13.79 9.52
Resource-intensive ind. 1.24 10.38 4.51 4.08 4.91
Scale-intensive ind. 16.54 20.89 17.23 19.01 17.23
Specialized suppliers ind. 10.36 8.04 7.76 6.04 4.72
Science-based ind. 5.28 3.57 7.08 6.25 5.23
Tunisia
Agricultural prod. 4.84 3.89 3.76 0.41 4.81
Fuels 20.79 35.37 13.78 9.28 2.78
Other raw materials 11.81 0.88 2.07 1.02 0.55
Food industries 6.88 1.85 2.38 1.27 0.99
Traditional ind. 11.00 3.14 13.24 19.59 24.56
Resource-intensive ind. 2.33 6.86 6.05 4.42 3.91
Scale-intensive ind. 4.56 9.40 3.18 4.96 3.82
Specialized suppliers ind. 13.57 13.48 9.99 9.51 7.10
Science-based ind. 6.84 6.78 4.85 8.83 6.97
Turkey
Agricultural prod. 62.88 49.91 11.39 9.27 2.83
Fuels 5.09 18.32 18.46 14.25 11.03
Other raw materials 5.50 3.88 2.57 1.10 1.16
Food industries 6.14 4.38 2.52 4.62 6.08
Traditional ind. 1.44 17.55 33.75 35.97 34.29
Resource-intensive ind. 5.13 14.19 1.74 1.78 2.53
Scale-intensive ind. 30.52 20.20 7.74 7.48 6.87
Specialized suppliers ind. 20.91 15.17 10.37 12.24 10.17
Science-based ind. 13.67 7.48 11.76 14.81 13.49
One should note, however, that in the cases of traditional goods (such as textile
and clothing) and scale-intensive goods (basic metals), there was an upgrading 
of Turkish exports, through the increase of their average unitary values. This
upgrading, however, should not be overemphasized, since by the mid-1990s the
average unit values of the Turkish exports were still well below those of many
developing economies in Europe and Asia (Landesmann and Burgstaller 1997).
In the case of Tunisia, trade patterns have also been characterized by signifi-
cant changes over the period considered. By the early 1970s, Tunisia’s trade 
specialization was still largely based on primary commodities and agricultural
products. In particular, fuel products and the agro-industrial system represented
strong comparative advantages. Aside from resource-intensive goods, all other
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Table 9.15 Intra-industry trade: index of Gruber Lloyd
1970 1979 1989 1992 1995
Greece
Agricultural prod. 0.54 0.94 0.73 0.72 0.85
Fuels 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.09
Other raw materials 0.76 0.37 0.45 0.44 0.45
Food industries 0.65 0.96 0.72 0.80 0.77
Traditional ind. 0.60 0.83 0.93 0.89 0.82
Resource-intensive ind. 0.58 0.82 0.92 0.88 0.86
Scale-intensive ind. 0.26 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.25
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.26
Science-based ind. 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.31
Total 0.36 0.45 0.56 0.53 0.55
Tunisia
Agricultural prod. 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.73 0.45
Fuels 0.27 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.92
Other raw materials 0.39 0.96 0.48 0.48 0.64
Food industries 0.98 0.89 0.60 0.89 0.90
Traditional ind. 0.28 0.86 0.97 0.95 0.88
Resource-intensive ind. 0.91 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.41
Scale-intensive ind. 0.62 0.50 0.88 0.64 0.71
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.34 0.43
Science-based ind. 0.04 0.17 0.47 0.32 0.41
Total 0.51 0.52 0.69 0.68 0.71
Turkey
Agricultural prod. 0.33 0.08 0.66 0.70 0.92
Fuels 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other raw materials 0.18 0.65 0.58 0.75 0.73
Food industries 0.14 0.67 0.90 0.81 0.73
Traditional ind. 0.92 0.40 0.30 0.42 0.53
Resource-intensive ind. 0.26 0.03 0.70 0.58 0.51
Scale-intensive ind. 0.10 0.13 0.70 0.63 0.62
Specialized suppliers ind. 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.22 0.26
Science-based ind. 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.15 0.17
Total 0.22 0.12 0.46 0.44 0.49
industrial groups registered negative values (comparative disadvantages) in the
indicator of contribution to trade balance (ICTB).
In the course of the 1980s, Tunisia changed significantly with its integration
into international markets. Facing an increasingly restrictive external constraint,
Tunisia adopted an outwardly oriented strategy by generously supporting its
exports and gradually liberalizing imports. The correction of the real exchange
rates so as to guarantee more competitive values also played an important role in
this external adjustment process.
The resulting trade performance was very positive indeed. Tunisia’s trade spe-
cialization shifted towards industrial goods, especially traditional consumer
goods, so that by the early 1990s they covered nearly 75 per cent of total exports.
The trade deficit in industrial goods also diminished significantly. This rapid
expansion of industrial exports was attributable mainly to the exploitation of
lower labor cost advantages in labor-intensive products, mainly textile-apparel
and orientation towards privileged access European markets. This positive adjust-
ment, however, has been slowing down over the course of the 1990s. Tunisia’s
share in world exports has remained roughly the same, and the trade deficit in
industrial goods did not improve either in recent years.
Certainly, macroeconomic factors such as the appreciation/stability of the real
exchange rate can be used to explain the negative trade performance of Tunisia
over the first part of the 1990s. But, the contribution of long-run structural fac-
tors has been also important. Like Turkey, the intense industrial restructuring in
Tunisia encountered some major obstacles in the more recent years. Tunisia’s
trade specialization has remained locked into those industrial sectors that com-
prize low-skill labor-intensive assembly activities, mainly textile-apparel, and
unable to diversify into higher value-added and more technologically sophisti-
cated sectors. Besides their sectoral concentration, Tunisia’s exports have also
been strongly concentrated geographically in European markets, where they have
privileged access.
Greece shows very distinctive trade patterns from Turkey and Tunisia (Tables
9.12, 9.13, 9.14 and 9.15). Greece has been characterized by sharp cycles since the
early 1970s, with relatively low average growth rates, a few expansionary phases
and recurrent slumps mainly due to domestic instability. The external 
constraint has always been very tight, and Greece has had serious problems to 
covering its trade deficits because of very weak export performance. All major
industrial product groups reflect these unfavorable trends, with the exception of the
agricultural products and food industries that had relatively better results, especially
in the first part of the 1990s. Over the entire period, Greece had a stagnant market
share in world exports. By the mid-1990s, the Greek share was almost the same as
in the early 1970s (0.22), equal to half the Turkish share in the same years.
This weak trade performance has been accompanied by a relatively stable trade
specialization pattern over time. Greece had an initial phase of structural change
up to the first half of the 1970s, based on small-scale industrial restructuring. This
favored the upgrading of some dynamic labor-intensive industries, such as textile,
clothing and light manufacturing. But, industrial restructuring in general has been
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quite modest, so that, since the early 1980s, after Greece entered into the
European Community’s space, a prolonged period of relative industrial decline
took place. This is reflected in Greece’s trade composition: almost half of overall
exports consists of agricultural and other raw materials, while the share of export
of industrial products has remained almost the same over the past fifteen years.
The import share of industrial goods did not change significantly either, reveal-
ing stagnation in industrial transformation process.
The fact that the trade specialization pattern did not display significant changes
suggests that Greek comparative advantages vis-à-vis the market economies 
are still based on traditional labor-intensive industries and resource-intensive
products. By the mid-1990s, Greek specialization was still dominated by non-
industrial products. Food industries made a positive contribution to the trade 
balance over the period. On the other hand, specialized suppliers (industrial
machinery) and science-based goods remained highly negative.
The overall share of scale-intensive, specialized supplier and science-based
sectors in Greek exports (a proxy for the technological content of trade pattern)
has been extremely low in the past. In the early 1970s, it was around 15 per cent,
and remained relatively stagnant over the entire period, up to the first half of the
1990s (almost 15.5 per cent). Even more so, the index of intra-industry trade does
not show any significant improvement. This confirms the persistent low techno-
logical capability of the Greek economy, both in terms of product and process
innovation potential.
4. Trade specialization, technological change and
economic performance: A few stylized facts
Given the very different patterns followed by the three groups of economies 
considered in the previous section, it is not easy to provide an overall evaluation
of their evolutions. In what follows, let us try to depict some stylized facts derived
from the patterns observed, and relate them to the thematic issues discussed in
Section 2 of the paper.
First, we need to sum up first the main features of the performances of the three
groups of countries. South-East Asian NICs had a very successful growth and
trade performances up to the first half of the 1990s, combined with changing and
upgrading their trade composition in the course of the 1980s towards higher
value-added and increased technological intensity of goods and sectors. After a
short experience of import substitution in the 1950s, all the countries in this group
shifted towards trade openness accompanied by various industrial and technolog-
ical policies. Within this common context, however, there were different patterns
for each Asian NIC and the recent crisis also affected each one very differently.
As a result, each economy had an individual pattern of export growth, industrial-
ization, technological progress, reliance on FDI and policy interventions.
The second group of countries, the Mediterranean NICs, more specifically
Turkey and Tunisia, experienced significant changes in terms of trade specializa-
tion and composition in the course of the 1980s in relation with a process of trade
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openness. Their trade specialization shifted from raw materials and agricultural
products towards industrial products, mostly ‘traditional’ labor-intensive exports.
In more recent years however, they registered a much less favorable trade per-
formance and their trade specialization remained locked into less dynamic
medium–high technology intensive exports where competitiveness rests primarily
on relatively cheap labor costs.
Latin American NICs have performed differently from the other two groups, 
particularly in relation to structural change and technological upgrading of their pro-
duction structure. Its trade specialization is, at present, still based on relatively abun-
dant natural resources, such as exports of raw materials and resource-intensive
goods. Also, Latin American NICs had very different patterns one to another.
Furthermore, in more recent years they had stronger trade performances, especially
in the case of Mexico where more trade openness has been accompanied by progress
in medium–high technology intensive exports and higher intra-industry trade.
There is no doubt that if we define countries’ long-run competitiveness as 
positive performance in the world market combined with a capacity to sustain
economic growth through balance-of-payment equilibrium over a long period of
time, wide differences characterize the three groups of countries in their ability 
to compete in the world economy. These differences can be attributed not only 
to their different factor endowments, but also to their different accumulated
industrial and technological capabilities.
In this regard, one should emphasize that a country’s industrial and technologi-
cal deepening could assume three different forms, such as: (i) a technological
upgrading of product and processes within the same industry; (ii) greater local
content through an increase of local inputs and linkages; and (iii) entry into pro-
gressively more technologically complex new activities (Justman and Teubal 1991;
Lall 1995). In other words, countries can exploit their existing strengths in terms
of static comparative–competitive advantages and/or can search for new areas of
competence in relation to their dynamic advantages. The composite mix of a
country’s industrialization process is very important since there are systematic dif-
ferences in productivity and value-added across industrial sectors. Industrial activ-
ities also differ between one another by implying distinct ‘learning costs’ that rise
with the degree of technological sophistication, the spread of production linkages
and increases in the level of technological capability. The taxonomy adopted here
tries to reflect these differences in terms of different technological opportunities,
sources and appropriate conditions across industrial sectors (Pavitt 1984; Dosi 
et al. 1990; Guerrieri 1992; Guerrieri and Tylecote 1997).
All this implies that the evolution of industrial structure and the consequent
trade specialization do matter to countries’ economic growth. The progressive
industrial and technological deepening is a crucial part of economic development
and is an evolutionary cumulative process that is country specific. Industrial tech-
nological modernization therefore is not inevitable. In effect, the tacit, specific
and cumulative nature of industrial and technological change can lead – and has
historically led to – different divergent accumulation rates, technological capabil-
ity changes and development paths across countries. The three groups of countries
in our sample seem to fully confirm this. Although characterized by common trade
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openness, countries in our sample have followed very distinct industrialization
experiences and trade specialization patterns. Their industrialization paths were
characterized by a different mix and sequence of structural changes that in very
different ways have upgraded and diversified their production structures.
They also show that trade openness is certainly important, but is not at all a suf-
ficient condition for this progressive industrial and technological deepening. The
most successful countries are those that have been able to better exploit trade
opportunities over the past two decades. The Asian NICs in particular had very
high growth rates combined with strong export growth. But it is an open question
as to how the two outcomes were combined and what the direction of causality
between the two really is.
In standard neoclassical frameworks, a country’s industrial and technological
deepening is a market driven result, stemming from trade openness and outward-
oriented growth. In these models, the more efficient resource allocation over time
is entirely driven by market incentives (relative prices) according to changing fac-
tor endowments and evolving country comparative advantages (domestic versus
world prices). A specific country’s trade specialization is not an issue in this
approach, as long as markets are open and efficient, and factor prices change to
reflect changing factor endowments. Nor do technological characteristics of dif-
ferent activities matter as technology is freely available and it is freely and
instantly absorbed. All that does matter is that returns are equalized across coun-
tries. The appeal of opening up to international markets is thus based on the
strong promise that international economic integration will promote efficient
structural change and improve economic performance. The problem is that there
is no sound evidence that openness produces these results given the more articu-
lated linkages between industrialization and economic development.
In a different perspective, such as an ‘evolutionary approach’, the patterns and
impact of trade openness differ greatly across countries, especially according to
the different policies these countries can adopt (Nelson 1993; Lall 1995). In this
framework, the generation of comparative advantages is a more articulated
process in which the accumulation of physical capital interacts with the develop-
ment of skill and technological capability (Dosi et al. 1990; Bell and Pavitt 1995).
Within this context, progressive industrial and technological deepening requires a
set of conditions, and includes interactive roles and strategies by firms, govern-
ments and institutions of individual countries.
One could reconcile, however, the two explanations by assuming, first, that
trade openness is able to provide a set of efficient incentives (price structure) for
industrial deepening. So, for most developing economies in our sample, trade 
liberalization reforms were very helpful to restructure their production systems.
But, the ability to respond to these incentives crucially depends on the skills and
knowledge of the firms concerned, on the measures to overcome the market 
failures affecting structural change in developing economies, and on the rate of
generation diffusion of technology that is not freely accessible.
As shown by the three groups of countries considered, many factors can con-
tribute to explain the different capabilities of individual countries to cope with the
needed requirements of positive industrial technological deepening. First of all,
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macroeconomics has played an important role. There is nothing inherently prone to
stability and balance-of-payment equilibrium in an open trade regime, as the pay-
ments crisis suffered by many export-oriented countries in our sample fully con-
firm. Therefore, sound macroeconomic policies should be considered fundamental
ingredients in order to avoid instability and foreign exchange crises, and also to
maintain factor costs in line with those of other competitors. But, macroeconomic
stability, in terms of trade balance and a favorable competitiveness pattern, is not
only the result of good macroeconomic policy combined with trade openness as in
the standard model. A growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has
emphasized the important microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic stability.
This literature emphasizes the importance of investment and capital accumula-
tion. Many empirical studies have shown that investment is key to economic
growth. Cross-country regression analyses have proved that physical investment is
one of the strongest determinants of growth (Levine and Renelt 1992). Also in our
sample the most successful countries in terms of economic growth were those that
in the period considered had very high rates of capital accumulation. Certainly
there is no single way of raising the rate of accumulation. Anyway, one should rec-
ognize that the financial system, in collecting and allocating resources from savers
to firms who can make productive use of them, plays a very important role. A third
important factor to strengthen the relationship between trade openness and eco-
nomic growth is technology and technological change. As already noted, dynamic
efficiency does not follow automatically from capital accumulation, but depends
heavily on domestic capabilities for generating and managing technical change in
production activities. Technological capability therefore is not an automatic 
by-product of investment and production. Technological change is accumulated
through conscious and continuous investment by firms in specialized, change-
generating activities (Bell and Pavitt 1995). To create these endogenous sources of
technological accumulation, a ‘supply-side’ upgrading clearly has a vital role to
play in countries’ industrial development. It depends on firm-specific variable, on
the one hand, but also on the effectiveness of specialized support institutions in
providing technological knowledge and training incentives.
In this regard, market mechanisms alone are unlikely to be sufficient. Left to
itself, the market underprovides technology. Investment in technology is consider-
ably riskier than other types of investment, and there are much larger asymmetries
of information that can impede the effective workings of the market. So without
industrial and technological policies, there will be too little investment in the pro-
duction and adoption of new technology. Policy interventions should not be directed
to pick up the winners in advance, but to overcome market failures in resource allo-
cation and create favorable conditions for firm restructuring and upgrading.
To this technological ‘upgrading’, another important contribution could come
from closer integration and links of local firms and sectors with major enterprises
of advanced countries within the context of global network. In our sample of 
countries, various channels were used to strengthen these connections. Emerging
countries, in particular in Asia and to a certain extent in Latin America, have per-
formed positively in terms of FDI inflows. In contrast, other countries like the
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Mediterranean NICs (i.e. Greece and Turkey) have not seen a large influx of FDI,
despite the favorable legislation introduced to attract FDI. On the other hand, 
in many sectors, especially in traditional goods (mostly textile-clothing and leather-
footwear), non-equity-based linkages such as subcontracting activities and outward
processing (OPT) of firms had significantly contributed to the rapid expansion of
the trade, as in the case of Tunisia and Turkey (Hoekman and Djankov 1996).
Both FDI and non-equity linkages can produce advantages for the local
economies by developing ‘backward linkages’ and integrating local firms into
networks of large foreign firms, by contributing to improve local levels of mana-
gerial, organizational and technical skills, and by favoring the development of
new comparative advantages. But in order to benefit from these opportunities,
countries must upgrade their domestic skills, firm organization and infrastruc-
tures. Again, the potential benefits are neither incorporated in, nor automatically
derived from, FDI and the entry of foreign firms.
5. Concluding remarks
The long-term trade performances and specialization of three groups of countries in
Latin America, East Asia and Mediterranean region were analyzed in this chapter.
The three groups have been all characterized by significant trade openness over the
past two decades, although to different extents and in different periods. Each had a
different pattern of export performance, trade specialization and economic growth.
Southeast Asian NICs had a very successful growth and trade record up to the
first half of the 1990s, combined with changes and upgrades of their trade 
composition in the course of the 1980s. The recent crisis in East Asia cannot be a
refutation of its remarkable results in the past. Nonetheless, each Asian NIC has
followed different patterns, and the recent crisis also affected each very differently.
The second group of countries, the Mediterranean NICs, and more specifically
Turkey and Tunisia, experienced significant changes in terms of their trade 
composition, but in more recent years they registered a much less favorable trade
performance and structural change. Latin American NICs performed differently
from the other two groups, particularly with regard to their technological upgrad-
ing of production activities. Mediterranean and Latin American NICs had very 
distinct development patterns and performances.
The effects of trade openness and liberalization on countries’ economic 
performances therefore appear to be, to a large extent, indeterminate in our case
studies. In our sample, the countries that experienced positive economic per-
formances have all succeeded with their own specific economic policies. The set
of complementary policies adopted by countries at the micro-level were crucial in
determining a positive result from trade liberalization. In this regard, essential
ingredients are represented by macroeconomic stability, domestic investment and
technological changes.
The point here is not to deny the role of trade openness for economic develop-
ment. It can be a source of many economic benefits. There is also evidence of a
positive relationship between trade openness and growth in some cases in our
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sample. But, one should not overemphasize what openness can accomplish. It is
important to outline the various and indirect mechanisms by which trade open-
ness is linked with, and can stimulate, economic growth. In this perspective, trade
can be considered a facilitator of growth, but it does not do so automatically.
Making trade openness work depends on the country’s ability to create strong
domestic competitive environments and implement effective economic policies.
All this seems to suggest that to investigate the connections between trade
openness and economic development needs a more pragmatic approach. We must
rely on the lessons and the guidance that come from a careful consideration of
cross-country experiences. This is an area of research that needs to be pursued
further in the near future.
Notes
1 Especially in the group of raw materials, the market shares in world exports of Latin
American NICs showed a significant increase in the period from the mid-1980s up to
the mid-1990s, nearly doubling also Latin American trade surpluses (standardized) (see
Tables 9.9 and 9.2).
2 One should add that only in these two industrial categories was Brazil able to signifi-
cantly increase its share in world industrial exports in the 1980s.
3 By the early 1970s the Asian NICs market shares accounted for a little more than 
2.4 percentage points of world exports. By the late 1980s this figure had more than
tripled, and throughout the first half of the 1990s has increased so significantly that by
the mid-1990s, it was around 10.8 per cent of the world export (see Table 9.8).
4 The increasing role of traditional sectors in the 1980s could be attributed both to privi-
leged access to European markets for textiles and garments, and to a massive increase
in subcontracting (OPT), licenses and joint ventures by Western European firms, while
production was mainly in the hands of local firms. FDI had a marginal role in manu-
facturing, aside from the automotive industry. In this regard, Turkey had a low intra-
industry trade intensity in comparison with the other NICs.
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The central question addressed in this chapter is how the pattern of trade
specialization can affect long-term economic growth performance. This issue has
received little attention in theoretical analysis and empirical studies. Standard
trade theory has been interested on the question of how growth – through the
changing composition of factor endowment – affects comparative advantages and
thus the trade pattern. It has had little to say, however, on the causal links we are
interested here, i.e. those running from trade specialization to growth. Neither has
modern growth theory paid much attention to this issue. Neoclassical growth the-
ory focuses on the role of factor accumulation, i.e. investment rates in physical
and human capital as well as labor force growth. Moreover, its assumption of a
constant returns to scale technology leaves little room for economic structure to
affect the growth rate. Recent endogenous growth models have brought increas-
ing returns into growth theory but the level of aggregation assumed in these mod-
els has led them to focus on factors other than the pattern of specialization.
Growth empirics, inspired by these two brands of growth theory, has at most
looked (without much success) at how trade openness, rather than trade special-
ization, may affect differences in growth rates among countries. There is thus a
theoretical as well as an empirical gap to fill in this important area.
All this is not to say that there has been complete neglect. In the old literature
on trade and in new trade theory, there is a significant list of contributions that are
all relevant to our topic – on infant industry protection, the Prebisch–Singer thesis
on the terms of trade of primary products, immiserizing growth, and multi-sector
growth models with different rates of learning in new trade theory. In looking at
how the pattern of specialization can affect growth, a common feature of these
contributions is that the pattern of specialization of an economy, as determined by
comparative advantages associated with the current factor endowment or locked in
by historical accident, may be different from the pattern of specialization that
yields the largest long-term economic benefits. This may occur because the econ-
omy’s static comparative advantage does not coincide with its dynamic compara-
tive advantage in the presence of, for example, technological externalities due to
learning by doing, or because the evolution of the terms of trade is such that the
economy would benefit from departing from specialization according to compar-
ative advantage. The basic insights from these contributions are well known and
we shall largely ignore them except in the empirical part of the chapter.2
The main motivation of the chapter comes from another way through which the
pattern of specialization can affect the long-term growth rate. This is when a
given factor endowment does not determine a unique pattern of specialization and
the different patterns of specialization consistent with the same resource endow-
ment have different dynamic implications. This may be due to learning by doing
externalities associated to one or the other of the different patterns or to the dif-
ferent linkages with the non-traded sectors associated with these patterns. In any
case, there is no conflict here between static and dynamic comparative advantage
that can in principle be satisfactorily resolved by a perfect capital market. The
source of the problem, when the economy specializes in the less dynamic pattern,
is a coordination failure. Recent models following this approach are Rodrik
(1994), Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996), Skott and Ros
(1997) and Ros (1998, chapter 9).
Along with these direct links between trade specialization and growth, there
are other, more indirect links that deserve attention.3 One operates through cur-
rent account instability to the extent that different patterns of specialization are
more or less vulnerable to external shocks. The other operates through current
account sustainability, given that different patterns of specialization and growth
may be subject to more or less recurrent foreign exchange constraints. These links
are presented in Figure 10.1, along with the determinants of growth emphasized


















Figure 10.1 Determinants of growth and macro-linkages between trade
specialization and growth.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of the
pattern of specialization in a standard neoclassical model and in an extended
model with increasing returns to scale. This is followed in Section 3 by a discus-
sion of the micro-linkages between trade specialization and growth. The theoreti-
cal discussion there is complemented in Section 4 with an empirical analysis of a
cross section of developing countries, which includes most of the countries for
which case studies were undertaken in the context of the trade and competitiveness
project. Section 5, on the macro-linkages between trade specialization and growth,
presents an empirical analysis of the links between current account volatility and
borrowing constraints, trade specialization and growth performance. A concluding
section summarizes the main points and findings of the chapter.
2. International trade theory and the pattern of specialization
In textbook neoclassical theory, the pattern of specialization is uniquely deter-
mined by factor endowments in the sense that, independent of initial conditions,
the economy converges to a pattern of specialization that can be fully explained
by the economy’s factor endowments. At the other extreme of the theoretical spec-
trum, some new trade theory models treat productivity growth as the result of
learning by doing and assume away factor endowments as a determinant of com-
parative advantage (see e.g. Krugman 1987). The pattern of specialization cannot
be determined independent of initial conditions and history. Accidents, i.e. real
shocks like a temporary resource boom or monetary shocks like a temporary cur-
rency overvaluation, are then all important in its influence on the pattern of trade
specialization. Industrial policy also becomes crucial in acquiring new compara-
tive advantages independently of factor endowment. This section discusses the
assumptions under which these different possibilities can arise. It is useful to
begin with a standard neoclassical model.
The pattern of specialization in a small open economy
with two tradable goods
Consider an economy that produces two tradable goods (A and B), for which the
economy is a price taker in international markets. Technology in these sectors fea-
tures constant returns to scale and is assumed, for simplicity, to be Cobb–Douglas
as in eqns (10.1a,b):
, (10.1a)
, (10.1b)
where A and B are the quantities produced of the two goods, KA and KB are the
capital input in each sector, LB is the input of labor in sector B and I is the input
of a non-traded good into sector A. The non-traded good (I) is produced with
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Competitive conditions are assumed in all three sectors. Given the assumptions
about technology and market structure, we can think of sectors A and I as a verti-
cally integrated sector using capital (invested in sector A) and labor (employed in
sector I). We shall refer, in this section, to this integrated sector as sector A. As
shown in the Appendix, employment in sectors A and B is a log-linear negative
function of the product wage and a positive function of the capital stock in sectors
A and B, respectively. The profit rates in sectors A and B are log-linear negative
functions of the product wage in the respective sectors. Because by assumption A
is the capital good, the profit rate in sector B is also a function of the terms of trade
(pB/pA). The output elasticity of capital is assumed to be higher in sector A than in
sector B (ab). This implies that for the same of the product wage, sector A is
always more capital intensive than sector B.
Labor market equilibrium
Equilibrium in the labor market implies a uniform wage and the full employment
of the labor force. Consider what happens to the equilibrium wage when, keeping
the overall stock of capital constant, capital is reallocated from sector B to sector
A. At any given initial wage, the reduction of the capital stock in sector B causes
a fall in labor demand in this sector, while the higher capital stock in sector A
causes an increase in employment in sector I.
Holding the wage constant and using the labor demand functions for LI and LB
(see Appendix), the reduction in employment in sector B and the increase in
employment in sector I are given by eqns (10.2a,b):
, (10.2a)
, (10.2b)
with dKBdKA, since by assumption the reallocation leaves the aggregate cap-
ital stock intact. Whether the change creates excess supply or demand for labor
depends of course on whether the reduction of employment in sector B is more or
less than the increase in employment in sector I (i.e. on the size of dLB com-
pared to dLI). The answer depends on the technological parameters a and b as well
as the terms of trade (pB/pA). More precisely, unless high terms of trade for
sector A make this sector less capital intensive than sector B, the effect of the
technological parameters (ab) implies that the fall in labor demand in the labor-
intensive sector B is larger than the increase in labor demand in sector I. A real-
location of capital from sector B to sector A tends to create excess supply of labor
and this requires a fall in the wage in order to clear the labor market. We assume
in what follows this to be the case. The reader may check that the analysis of
the opposite case (when the reallocation creates excess demand for labor) is
symmetrical.
Figure 10.2 illustrates how the market equilibrium wage behaves as capital is
reallocated to sector A. Formally, this schedule of labor market equilibrium 
dLI  [(1  a) pA/w]
1/a dKA
dLB  [(1  b) pB/w]
1/b(dKB)
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is obtained by substituting from the labor demand functions into the full employ-
ment condition. The schedule slopes downwards in (w, KA) space since an
increase in KA (and a fall in KB) creates excess supply of labor, under the condi-
tions assumed, and this requires a fall in the wage to clear the labor market. Along
the schedule the overall stock of capital is held constant. A change in the overall
capital stock thus shifts the position of the schedule. For example, an increase in
the capital stock, holding the overall labor force constant, shifts the locus
upwards: intuitively, a higher overall capital–labor ratio raises the market-clear-
ing value of the wage for each given allocation of the capital stock.
Capital market equilibrium
Capital is mobile between sectors A and B. Capital market equilibrium requires
the full employment of the aggregate capital stock and a uniform profit rate in the
two capital-using sectors. Just as we did for the schedule of labor market equilib-
rium, we can derive a schedule of capital market equilibrium by substituting from
the profit rate functions into the condition for profit rate equalization. In (w, KA)
space, this schedule shows, at each given value of the wage, the value of KA, and
the corresponding allocation of the capital stock, that yields the same profit rate
in sectors A and B. Under our present assumptions, there is a unique value of the
wage, independent of the capital stock in sector A, that satisfies the condition for
profit rate equalization. This value depends on technological parameters and the
terms of trade but not on factor endowments. A shift in the terms of trade in favor
of the labor-intensive sector (sector B) increases the value of the wage required
for profit rate equalization.
What happens when the economy is off the locus of capital market equilib-
rium? The profit rates in the two sectors clearly cannot be equal. If the wage is
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Figure 10.2 The pattern of specialization in a neoclassical trade model.
higher than its value on the schedule of capital market equilibrium, the profit rate
in the capital-intensive sector is higher than in the labor-intensive sector (intu-
itively, the higher wage reduces the profit rate of the labor-intensive sector to a
larger extent than in the capital-intensive one). Capital will thus flow towards the
capital-intensive sector (A). Below the schedule, the low wage implies that the
profitability of the labor-intensive sector is higher and capital thus flows towards
sector B. With labor market equilibrium obtaining at all times, and given the neg-
ative slope of this schedule, the allocation at the intersection of the two loci is
then stable (Figure 10.2).
The structure of this economy, and the associated pattern of specialization,
depend on technology and the terms of trade as well as on factor endowments: the
overall capital stock and the total labor force, both of which affect the position of
the schedule of labor market equilibrium. Thus, as the capital stock increases, the
labor market equilibrium schedule shifts up and more capital and labor are allocated
to the capital-intensive sector (see Figure 10.2b). The overall capital–labor ratio
increases and as a result the economy allocates more resources to its capital-inten-
sive sector. With no technical progress – so that the capital market equilibrium
schedule does not shift – the wage remains constant throughout this process as long
as the economy remains incompletely specialized.4 The reason is that with constant
returns to scale in sector B, employment in this sector provides an elastic labor sup-
ply to sector A. It is only when the economy has fully specialized in sector A that
the wage will tend to increase as a result of the excess demand for labor generated
by capital accumulation.
The pattern of specialization in an extended model with increasing returns
The model just discussed has a clear-cut answer to the question of what deter-
mines the pattern of specialization. Given the technology, the terms of trade and
the endowment of factors, there is a unique allocation of resources that satisfies
the conditions of equilibrium in the labor and capital markets. This section
extends the model in the previous section to show that, under slightly more gen-
eral assumptions, the analysis of the pattern of specialization suffers from a
fundamental indeterminacy that opens the door to the role of other determinants,
including institutional factors and policies. This extension can be seen as an
amended neoclassical model which allows for the presence of increasing returns
in the production of non-traded inputs or, alternatively, as a new trade theory
model – such as Krugman’s (1987) analysis of the ‘competitive consequences of
Mrs Thatcher’ – which abandons the assumption of a Ricardian technology and
allows for the presence of non-traded goods.
The only change with respect to the assumptions made in the previous section
refers to sector I. The output of this sector (I) represents now a set of differenti-
ated intermediate goods. Production of these intermediate inputs is subject to
internal economies of scale and undertaken by firms operating under conditions
of monopolistic competition and facing downward-sloping demand curves. As
shown in the Appendix, this change has two consequences. First, employment in
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sector I depends, along with the capital stock and the wage in sector I measured
in terms of A-goods, on the number of producers and the extent to which returns
increase, both of which affect the efficiency with which the I-goods are produced.
Second, the profit rate in sector A is now not only an inverse function of the prod-
uct wage but, given this wage, a positive function of the capital stock invested in
this sector. This positive effect of the capital stock is due to the presence of
increasing returns in sector I. Indeed, a higher capital stock in sector A raises the
demand and output for I-goods; the higher scale of output implies an increase in
productivity which, given the wage, reduces the relative price of intermediate
goods (in terms of A-goods) and thus increases the profit rate in sector A.
Labor market equilibrium
As before, equilibrium in the labor market implies a uniform wage and full
employment of the labor force. Consider now what happens to the equilibrium
wage as capital is reallocated from sector B to sector A. The fall in labor demand
in sector B is the same as before. Using the demand function for LI (see the
Appendix), the increase in employment in sector I at the initial wage is now given
by 10.3:
. (10.3)
Whether the change creates excess supply or demand for labor (the size of dLB
compared to dLI) depends now on the level of KA,
5 i.e. on the initial allocation of
the capital stock. When the capital stock invested in sector A is small, sector I is
also small and produces at high costs, given the presence of economies of scale
in this sector. The relative price of intermediate inputs (pI/pA) being very high,
demand for I-goods is low and the capital intensity in sector A (given by the ratio
KA/I) is very high despite KA being small in absolute value. With a high capital
intensity, an increase in the capital stock in sector A has small indirect employ-
ment effects in sector I. The fall in labor demand in sector B is then larger than
the increase in labor demand in sector I. A reallocation of capital from sector B
to sector A thus tends to create excess supply of labor and this requires a fall in
the wage to clear the labor market.
In contrast, when the capital stock invested in sector A is large, the indirect
employment effects of the expansion of sector A can offset the fall in labor demand
in sector B. The scale of output in sector I is now large and this has the effect of
making this sector more productive. This higher productivity reduces the relative
price of intermediate goods and, as a result, the capital intensity in sector A is
smaller. With a low KA/I ratio, the expansion of sector A at the expense of sector B
can then have the effect of generating excess demand for labor and increasing the
market clearing wage.
The schedule of labor market equilibrium in (log w, log KA) is now U-shaped.
The slope of the schedule is negative, tending to zero, at low levels of KA and
becomes positive, tending to ‘a’, at high levels of KA (provided that such high 
dLI  1n1  fG pAw1/fafKAaf 
1
dKA
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values exist given the size of the overall capital stock). The equilibrium value of
the wage first falls as KA increases, and eventually rises, becoming an increasing
function of KA (Figure 10.3).
Capital market equilibrium
The condition for profit rate equalization yields, as before, the schedule of capital
market equilibrium by substitution from the profit rate functions. The new feature
is that the value of the wage required for profit rate equalization is no longer 
independent of the allocation of the capital stock. We now have a locus of (w, KA)
combinations, rather than a unique value of the wage, along which the condition
of profit rate equalization is fulfilled. The shape of the schedule depends on how
the composition of the capital stock has to change, in order to maintain capital
market equilibrium, in the face of an increase in the wage rate. Intuitively, the
answer to this question depends on which of the two sectors is more labor inten-
sive, as the higher wage will tend to reduce the profit rate of the labor-intensive
sector to a larger extent. The required reallocation would then depend on the
effects of KA on relative profit rates.
6 The problem now is that it is not clear which
of the two sectors is more labor intensive directly and indirectly. Even though sec-
tor A is more capital intensive than sector B (in the sense that a b), the increas-
ing returns parameter () may be large enough to make the ‘indirect’ labor share
of sector A larger than the labor share of sector B. This is due to the presence of
increasing returns in sector I, which makes the sum of the capital and labor shares
in the integrated A/I sector larger than unity.
We shall carry the analysis on the assumption that the indirect labor share of
sector A is less than in sector B.7 On this assumption, the slope of the schedule of
capital market equilibrium is negative (see Figure 10.3): An increase in the wage
(given KA) reduces the profit rate in sector B more than it does in sector A. This
requires a fall in KA (which reduces rA) to restore the equality of profit rates. The






Figure 10.3 Multiple equilibria in a model with increasing returns.
is one in which sector A is more profitable than sector B. This is because it is a
region where the capital stock invested in sector A is relatively large and, given
the wage, KA has a positive effect on the relative profitability of sector A through
its effect on the productivity of sector I. In this region, capital will be flowing
towards sector A and thus KA/KB will increase. In contrast, to the left of the sched-
ule the profit rate in sector A is lower than in sector B and capital is flowing
towards sector B. It then follows that the capital allocation at the intersection of
the two loci is now an unstable equilibrium. As shown in Figure 10.3, a capital
allocation with more capital in sector A than at the intersection generates a profit
rate in sector A higher than in sector B. Capital then moves towards sector A and
further depresses the relative profitability of sector B. Analogous mechanisms, in
reverse, operate for capital allocations below the intersection.
We can also verify that when the two schedules intersect, this intersection is
unique (see the Appendix). It follows then that if an intersection exists, there will
be two stable equilibrium allocations in which the whole capital stock is invested
in one of the two sectors. In one equilibrium, the economy fully specializes in the
production of good B. Since no I sector will exist, not only the capital stock, but
the whole labor force is also employed in sector B. We shall refer to this capital
and labor allocation as the B-specialization. In the other equilibrium, the economy
specializes in the production and export of good A and, since there will be no sec-
tor B, the whole labor force is employed in sector I. We call this allocation the
A-specialization.
In this economy, a B-specialization always exists whether there are multiple
equilibria or not.8 It follows that the existence of an A-specialization guarantees
the existence of an intersection and, therefore, ensures the presence of multiple
stable equilibria. As shown in the Appendix, the existence of multiple equilibria
depends on the capital–labor endowment and terms of trade. The aggregate capi-
tal stock must be sufficiently large so that, when the whole of it is allocated to
sector A, the price of intermediate goods, produced under economies of scale, is
low enough to make sector A viable. The threshold value of the aggregate capital
stock is smaller, the more favorable the terms of trade for sector A, since a higher
relative price of A-goods increases the profitability of sector A.9
When an A-specialization does not exist because, say, the aggregate capital
stock is too small, and thus a unique B-specialization exists, the economy clearly
has a comparative advantage in good B and market incentives will lead the econ-
omy to specialize in sector B. However, when an A-specialization exists, the exis-
tence of multiple patterns of specialization consistent with the same factor
endowment makes the notion of comparative advantage equivocal. This indeter-
minacy opens the door to the role of other factors – related to history, exogenous
shocks or institutions and policies – in the determination of the pattern of 
specialization.
Indeed, initial conditions matter now in a way that was absent in the standard
neoclassical model, since depending on the initial allocation of resources the econ-
omy will move to one or another of the two patterns of trade specialization and
remain locked in that pattern. Temporary shocks brought about by history can also
Trade specialization and economic growth 299
be decisive. Consider, for example, an economy specialized in sector A and suppose
that a terms-of-trade shock favorable to sector B makes the A-specialization disap-
pear. The economy specializes in sector B. Then, even if the terms of trade return to
their initial level, the economy will remain locked in the B-specialization since this
pattern of specialization continues to exist and is a stable equilibrium. The reader will
recognize here the concerns with the ‘Dutch disease’ if we interpret sector B as a
resource-intensive sector and sector A as a manufacturing sector. Industrial policy
and more generally sector-specific policies can also make a difference even if they
are only transitory since by providing sufficient incentives for the reallocation of
capital the change in the pattern of specialization will not reverse itself when the 
policy is dismantled.
3. Direct links between trade specialization and growth
When multiple equilibria exist, does it make a difference to the growth rate of an
economy whether it adopts one or the other of the two possible patterns of trade
specialization? This is the question addressed in this section. As we shall see, the
pattern of specialization, for the same factor endowments, can affect growth in
two ways: (1) through its effect on the investment share and, thus, the rate of cap-
ital accumulation; (2) through the dynamic implications that different allocations
of investment may have on the rate of growth. It is worth noting that this second
influence is related to the one traditionally addressed by the older literature
emphasizing conflicts between static and dynamic comparative advantages and
the implications that different resource endowments can have for growth. In
this sense, our analysis encompasses and generalizes those more traditional
cases.
Two patterns of specialization compared
Suppose that the condition for multiple equilibria is fulfilled and consider two
economies, identical in all respects – including capital endowment, size of the
labor force, savings rate, rate of depreciation of the capital stock and access to
technology – except for their pattern of specialization. For simplicity, assume that
there is no growth of the labor force and exogenous technical progress. One econ-
omy is specialized in the production and export of good B, the other in the
production of goods A and I. Does the fact that the pattern of specialization is 
different make any difference to their growth rates?
Consider, first, the profit and wage rates in these two economies. As shown in
the Appendix, the existence of multiple equilibria ensures that the aggregate cap-
ital stock is large enough for the economy with the A-specialization to have an 
I sector so productive that the rate of profit in this economy is higher than in the
economy with the B-specialization. If, in addition, the capital stock is larger than
a certain threshold value, the wage rate in the A-specialization is higher than in
the B-specialization.
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Suppose that this last condition is fulfilled, i.e. the aggregate capital stock is
large enough for the wage rate in the A-specialization to be higher than in the 
B-specialization. As already mentioned, this ensures the existence of multiple
equilibria. Since it has a higher wage rate and a higher profit rate (with the same
capital endowment), the economy which specializes in the production of A- and
I-goods has a higher income per capita than the economy specializing in good B.
With identical same savings rates (as well as population growth rates), it would
appear according to standard neoclassical growth theory, that the economy with
the lower income per capita (the B-specialization) should grow at a faster rate: the
parameters determining the steady-state value of income (savings and labor force
growth) are the same as in the A-specialization and, since per capita income is
lower, the economy would appear to be further away from the steady state than
that with the A-specialization. Yet, it is clear that this last economy is the one that
grows at the faster rate: with a higher income and the same capital stock and sav-
ings rate, its rate of capital accumulation must be higher than in the economy with
the B-specialization.
This higher growth rate is the result of the pattern of specialization: it is the
associated allocation of the capital stock that raises the rate of capital accumula-
tion for a given investment share (given that for the same capital stock its income
level is higher). Moreover, in the presence of international capital mobility this
growth advantage is likely to be enhanced since capital will be flowing to the
economy with the highest returns to capital and, as we have seen, the existence of
multiple equilibria ensures by itself that the profit rate in the A-specialization is
higher than in the B-specialization. With a higher profit and capital mobility, the
investment share itself is likely to be higher in the A-specialization.
The fact that the higher income per worker does not prevent the second economy
from growing faster can be seen from a slightly different perspective. The economy
specializing in A- and I-goods is converging to a steady state different from that of
the B economy (even leaving aside the fact that the investment share under capital
mobility is likely to be higher in the first economy). In this steady state, the capi-
tal–output ratio is the same as in the B economy since, by assumption, savings rates
and depreciation of the capital stock are the same in both economies. Total output,
however, is larger in the economy specializing in sector A. The difference is pro-
portional to the difference in output–capital elasticities in sectors A and B.10 This
steady-state income gap is the result of their different patterns of specialization
which appears here thus as an additional determinant of the steady-state level of
income.
Further extensions
Our discussion so far has assumed, for simplicity, that the technology available
for the production of B-goods does not use intermediate I-goods. How do the
properties and conclusions of the model change, when we relax this assumption?
Suppose sector B uses intermediate goods (I), although less intensively than 
sector A. Demand for I-goods will no longer depend exclusively on the capital
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stock of sector A. The capital invested in sector B will now also affect the demand
for I goods and the relative price pI/pA of these inputs. The profit rate in sector A
will depend not only on KA and the product wage, but also on KB and, therefore,
on the aggregate capital stock. There will then generally be a sufficiently large
capital stock, so that when the whole of it is allocated to sector B, the profit rate
in this sector is lower than the profit rate in sector A, evaluated at the market-
clearing values of the wage and the relative price of intermediate inputs. At this
value of the capital stock, the B-specialization is no longer an equilibrium since
sector A is more profitable than sector B, even when KB is equal to the aggregate
capital stock. This implies that, unlike the previous model, it is no longer the case
that a B-equilibrium always exists no matter how large the aggregate capital stock.
We have now three configurations. First, over a range of low values of the
aggregate capital stock, a unique equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium the econ-
omy specializes in trade in the production of good B. A small sector I now coex-
ists with sector B since the technology used requires intermediate inputs.
Specialization in this case must be in B, and not in A-goods, because sector B uses
intermediate goods less intensively and is thus the only one able to survive under
the high costs of production with which the small I sector operates.
Then, over a range of intermediate values of the capital stock, two stable equi-
libria exist, with specialization in B- and A-goods, respectively. The size of the
capital stock is large enough to generate a productive I sector and make sector A
viable, but only if capital is invested in sector A. If allocated to sector B, the mar-
ket for I-goods is insufficient to make it profitable to invest in sector A. In a
related model, Rodriguez-Clare (1996) shows that in the A-equilibrium, the profit
rate is higher than in the B-equilibrium and the wage rate at least as high. The
A-specialization is then unambiguously Pareto superior to the B-specialization, not
only for a value of the capital stock above a threshold as in the previous model, but
over the whole range values of the capital stock for which multiple equilibria
exist.11 With the same savings rate, the rate of capital accumulation and growth in
the A-specialization is also unambiguously higher than in the B-specialization.
Finally, for high values of the capital stock we again have a unique equilibrium.
The size of the capital stock is sufficient not only to make sector A viable but to
make the B-specialization disappear. The low prices of intermediate goods and
high wages make it worthwhile for an individual investor to move away from sec-
tor B and start production in sector A. By doing so, intermediate good prices and
wages move to reinforce the relative profitability of sector A with eventually all
the capital moving away from sector B. This sector is no longer viable at the high
wages associated with the large capital–labor ratio in the economy.
Another extension of the model would be to introduce skilled labor and con-
sider differences among sectors in the intensity with which they use skilled labor.
This has been done by Rodrik (1994). In Rodrik’s model, the sector producing
non-tradable inputs under economies of scale is intensive in skilled labor. The
level of skills of the work force then plays a role in the existence of multiple equi-
libria, along with the size of the capital stock. A higher level of skills can partly
compensate for the high costs arising from a small market for I-goods and thus
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reduce the size of the capital stock required for the existence of an A-equilibrium.
Similar results follow, if sector A, rather than sector I, is intensive in skilled labor.
For example, while the high prices of intermediate goods tend to depress the
relative profitability of sector A, when the market for I-goods is small, an abun-
dance of skilled labor tends to raise it, and sector A may be viable depending on
the allocation of the capital stock. In any case, multiple equilibria can arise from
various combinations of skill levels and capital stocks, rather than simply from an
intermediate value of the capital stock.
Policy implications
We are now prepared to address our main concern: the question of whether, and
under what conditions, policy-induced changes in the pattern of specialization can
effectively increase income per capita and enhance the rate of capital accumulation.
As it is well known, many developing countries have adopted industrial poli-
cies in an attempt to accelerate the rate of industrialization and economic growth.
The results have been mixed, if we are to judge from the variety of growth per-
formance under similar policies. This explains why the effectiveness of these
policies is controversial and why widely different views coexist on whether they
made a difference and, if so, whether this was positive or negative. This is the case
even though observers and policy makers alike have amply documented the role
of industrial policy in fostering a fast rate of industrialization in East Asia (see,
on the subject, Amsden 1989; Wade 1989). An important reason for this state of
affairs seems to be that consensus is lacking on precisely the key issue of how and
under what conditions industrial policy can significantly alter the rate of capital
accumulation and growth. The analytical framework developed here helps in clar-
ifying this question.
Industrial policy, the capital stock and the level of skills
It is worth noting, first, that in the more general models discussed above, the 
economy has a clear comparative advantage in the labor-intensive good B and the
capital-intensive good A at low and high levels of the aggregate capital stock,
respectively. In both cases a unique equilibrium exists and market incentives lead
the economy to specialize in the production of those traded goods in which it 
has a comparative advantage. This means that when a unique A-equilibrium
exists, industrial policy is not needed in order to move the economy towards this
pattern of specialization. It also means that when the economy has a unique 
B-equilibrium, industrial policy can hardly improve on the market outcome.
Consider, for instance, a policy attempting to reallocate resources towards sector
A in an economy that has a unique B-equilibrium. Suppose that policy succeeds
in reallocating the whole of the capital stock towards sector A. Because the 
A-specialization is not an equilibrium, the wage in this economy would fall com-
pared to that in the B-specialization. The profit rate is also likely to fall, especially
if the aggregate capital stock is small and the costs of intermediate goods are
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high, as a result. With a profit rate in sector A lower than in sector B – evaluated
at market wages and prices of intermediate goods – the policy-induced changes
in relative prices required to make sector A viable would imply a further reduc-
tion of the wage. The A-specialization, in this case, will not feature a growth rate
higher than that in the B-specialization. Ultimately, again, this is due to the fact
that an A-equilibrium does not exist.
The scope for policy intervention is very different over that range of intermedi-
ate levels of the aggregate capital stock that are large enough to make a coordinated
development of the A and I industries viable, yet insufficient for any individual firm
to be profitable in isolation in sector A. Over this range, the economy is in a transi-
tion between different patterns of trade specialization: a transition in which old
comparative advantages are being eroded, while the new ones are only slowly
emerging. In this transition, as long as the low-level equilibrium exists, market
incentives are unlikely to move the economy to the high growth path associated
with the superior equilibrium.
The successful policy interventions geared to accelerate this transition are the
basis for Rodrik’s interpretation of how ‘Korea and Taiwan grew rich’ (Rodrik
1994). Rodrik argues that, more than their export orientation, the distinguishing
feature of these growth experiences was the sharp and sustained increase in their
investment rates in the early 1960s. Through an array of government interven-
tions, by subsidizing and coordinating investment decisions, government policy
was successful in reallocating resources towards modern capital-intensive indus-
tries. With increasing returns in these activities, this reallocation raised the rate of
return on capital and pushed the economy into a high growth path. Outward
orientation followed, because the higher investment rates increased demand for
imported capital goods. The relatively high level of skills of the labor force in
both countries was a condition for the success of industrial policy.
The role of the terms of trade
The size of the capital stock and the level of skills are not the only factors affect-
ing the existence of multiple patterns of specialization. As already noted, the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria also depends on the terms of trade between A- and
B-goods. To illustrate the role of the terms of trade, consider an economy spe-
cialized in labor-intensive goods and suppose that, over time, the entry of new
low-cost producers in the international market tends to reduce the relative price
of B-goods. This has the effect of generating an A-equilibrium without necessar-
ily, at the same time, making the economy move towards this high-level equilib-
rium. The economy is, in a sense, losing its competitiveness in B-goods, without
at the same time acquiring a comparative advantage in A-goods. This may describe
the situation of a number of semi-industrialized ‘sandwich economies’ facing stiff
competition from new low-wage producers of labor-intensive goods while still
being unable to compete with the more efficient producers of capital-intensive
goods in the more industrialized economies. If good B is a primary good, the tran-
sition can be interpreted as describing the balance-of-payments problems and,
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eventually, the beginning of industrialization in resource-abundant countries
facing declining terms of trade for their primary exports.
In any of these interpretations, the economy in transition with declining 
terms of trade is likely to remain largely specialized in the production of the labor-
intensive B-goods until it eventually achieves the high levels of the capital stock
that make sector A clearly profitable from the point of view of individual investors
(or unless the fall in the price of B-goods is large enough to eliminate the B-
equilibrium). This is so simply because the B-specialization is a locally stable equi-
librium: no individual investor in isolation will find the investment opportunities
in sector A more attractive than those existing in sector B. In the transition, the
economy will suffer a slowdown of its rate of growth, as a result of the decline in
the relative price of B-goods. As shown by eqns (2) and (11) in the Appendix, the
profit rate in this economy is an inverse function of the relative price of A-goods.
Insofar as the rate of accumulation depends on profitability, the decline in the rel-
ative price of B-goods will adversely affect capital accumulation and growth. The
reduced rate of capital accumulation will in turn prolong the transition towards the
capital stock necessary to make A-goods spontaneously profitable. Under this
‘slow-growth trap’, policy intervention can make a substantial difference to the
growth rate in the medium term.
4. Trade, investment and growth: An empirical analysis
Trade specialization and growth
The analysis in previous sections suggests two channels through which the pattern
of specialization can affect the rate of capital accumulation and growth. First, trade
specialization is likely to affect the investment share given that, other things being
equal, the rate of return on capital is higher in economies specialized in increasing
return industries. Second, at the same level of income per worker, specialization in
increasing returns industries is associated with a higher output–capital ratio. The
implication is that, for the same investment share, the rate of capital accumulation
and growth will be higher when an economy specializes in industries subject to
increasing returns. We now turn to an empirical analysis of these relationships.
An important practical question is how to measure the pattern of specialization.
As a country’s income level increases over time, the trade pattern changes. The
economy typically moves from being a net importer of manufactures to being a
net exporter of manufactures while manufacturing trade increasingly dominates
overall trade. Because the level of income is likely to affect the growth rate in
ways independent from the pattern of specialization, we would like to have an
indicator of trade specialization, which isolates the effects of resource endowment
and policies and adjusts for the influence of income level on the trade pattern.
Such an indicator is available from Chenery and Syrquin (1986). This is their
index of trade orientation (TO) which measures the pro-manufacturing bias in
the composition of commodity exports after adjusting for the country’s income
and size.12 It measures thus the degree to which the economy specializes in
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Table 10.1 Trade orientation, investment and growth (twenty-two countries,
average values for country groups)
Manufacturing Primary export bias
bias
Moderate Strong
Trade orientation index (1975) 0.45 1.0 0.45
Investment share 24.8 19.1 19.5
Growth rate 4.1 2.8 1.5
Trade share 84.8 48.5 39.2
Trade intensity (Leamer 1) 0.08 0.04 0.5
Intra-industry trade ratio 0.56 0.30 0.17
Number of countries 10 6 6
Notes: Growth rate: growth rate of real GDP per worker 1960–90 (Penn World Table
Mark 5.6); Trade share: (exportsimports)/nominal GDP, average of 1970–80 (Penn
World Table Mark 5.6); Trade intensity: adjusted trade intensity ratio 1982 (Leamer 1, in
Leamer 1988); intra-industry: Intra-industry trade ratio 1982 (Leamer, 1988).
manufactures, as influenced by factors other than size and income (i.e. resource
endowment and policies). The TO index is available for 1975 and thirty-four
countries, most of which were semi-industrialized in the 1970s, and which
include most of those considered in the competitiveness project.12 We also con-
sider a smaller sample of twenty-two countries for which the TO index as well as
Leamer’s ratio of intra-industry trade and other trade characteristics are available.
These twenty-two countries were aggregated, according to their TO index, into the
following groups:
1 Countries with positive manufacturing export bias: Egypt, Greece, Hong
Kong, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Yugoslavia,
i.e. largely a group of some East Asian and Southern European countries.
2 Countries with a moderate primary export bias: Colombia, Costa Rica,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, i.e. some Latin American and
East Asian countries.
3 Countries with a strong primary export bias: Argentina, Brazil, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Ivory Coast and Peru; largely a group of Latin American
countries.
Table 10.1 summarizes the information available for the small sample and Table
10.2 presents the cross-country correlations for this group of countries. Table 10.3
presents cross-country correlations for the large sample.
A positive relationship between manufacturing bias in trade and the investment
share is apparent in Table 10.1, for the small sample. For the large sample, as
shown in Table 10.3, the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.35.
This is exactly the implication of the models in previous sections, which suggest
that specialization in increasing returns industries (a manufacturing bias) should
have a positive effect on the investment share.
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A second implication of those models refers, as already mentioned, to the
effects of the pattern of specialization on the rate of capital accumulation for a
given investment share. As shown in Table 10.2, the correlation between manu-
facturing trade orientation and growth is, interestingly, very high (0.73), which is
higher than that between the trade orientation index and the investment share.
Also worth noting is the highly significant coefficient of trade orientation in a
cross-country regression including investment share and the initial level of output
per worker, as shown in eqn (10. 4):
, (10.4)
(3.73) (4.02) (4.39) (4.42)
where g is growth rate of output per worker in 1960–90, I/Y is real investment
share (1970–80), TO is Chenery–Syrquin trade orientation index 1975, Y/L60 is
real GDP per worker in 1960 and t-statistics are in parentheses.
R2  0.75g  2.02  0.09 I/Y  1.47 TO  0.0002 Y/L60
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Table 10.2 Cross-country correlations (twenty-two countries)
TO1975 Intra- Trade Trade
industry intensity share
TO1975 1.00 0.69 0.42 0.35
Intra-industry 1.00 0.73 0.71
Trade intensity 1.00 0.85
Trade share 1.00
Notes: TO1975: trade orientation index 1975 (Chenery and Syrquin
1986); Intra-industry: intra-industry trade ratio 1982 (Leamer 1988);
Trade intensity: adjusted trade intensity ratio 1982 (Leamer 1, in
Leamer 1988); Trade share: (exports  imports)/ nominal GDP, average
of 1970–80 (Penn World Table Mark 5.6).
Table 10.3 Cross-country correlations (thirty-two countries)
TO1975 I/Y70–80 Trade Growth
share
TO1975 1.00 0.35 0.33 0.73
I/Y70–80 1.00 0.30 0.54
Trade share 1.00 0.39
Growth 1.00
Notes: TO1975: Trade orientation index 1975 (Chenery and Syrquin
1986); I/Y70–80: real investment share of GDP, Average for the period
1970–80 (Penn World Table Mark 5.6); Trade share:
(exportsimports)/nominal GDP, average of 1970–80 (Penn World
Table Mark 5.6); Growth: growth rate of real GDP per worker
1960–90 (Penn World Table Mark 5.6).
Equation (10.4) indicates that, holding initial income and the investment share
constant, countries specializing in manufacturing exports grew at a faster rate
than those exporting primary products. If we think of sector B in the model of
Sections 1 and 2 as a resource-intensive sector with few linkages to increasing
returns activities, then the equation illustrates the model’s basic insight on the
growth effects of investment allocation. The initial level of output per worker also
has a highly significant (and negative) coefficient in the regression. This suggests
that across this group of thirty-four semi-industrial countries there was some
degree of convergence: other things being equal, countries with a lower initial
level of income tended to grow faster. As implied by the models discussed earlier
however, convergence was conditioned by the pattern of specialization: countries
specializing in manufactures were converging towards high income levels at a
faster rate than those specializing in primary products. They were in fact con-
verging towards higher steady-state income levels as suggested by our previous
discussion.
It is worth noting that this last result is consistent with other recent findings on
the effects of primary export orientation on growth. In Sachs and Warner (1995,
1997) the ratio of resource-intensive exports to GDP has a negative impact on
growth, an influence that the authors largely attribute to Dutch disease effects. In
Sala-i-Martin (1997), the fraction of primary products in total exports is one of
the few economic variables that systematically appear to be correlated with
growth (with a negative sign).
Trade openness, investment and growth
In their ‘sensitivity analysis’ of cross-country growth regressions, Levine and
Renelt (1992) examined the robustness of the empirical relationships between
long-run growth rates and a variety of economic, political and institutional indi-
cators. Their assessment reached pessimistic conclusions. While there are many
econometric specifications in which a number of indicators are significantly cor-
related with per capita growth rates, almost all of these are fragile in the sense that
‘small alterations in the “other” explanatory variables overturn past results’. Only
two relationships pass their test of robustness. One is a positive correlation
between growth and the share of investment in GDP. The second is a positive cor-
relation between the ratio of trade to output and the investment share. Table 10.3
shows for our large sample of thirty-four countries results supporting these find-
ings: the positive correlation between growth and investment share (0.54) and that
between trade share and investment share (0.30).
The first result is reassuring as it conforms to standard economic theory. The
second is very puzzling. First, it is important to emphasize that the robust rela-
tionship found by Levine and Renelt is not between investment share and trade
barriers but between investment share and trade share. The relationships between
the investment share, or alternatively the growth rate, and a number of indicators
of trade barriers or trade policy distortions – Dollar’s (1992) ‘real exchange rate
distortion’, average black market exchange rate premium, and Syrquin and
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Chenery’s index of outward orientation – are not robust. Therefore, the robust
relationship does not seem to reflect the effects of trade policy. Moreover, when
controlling for the investment share, there is no robust relationship between trade
share and growth (this is so, incidentally, whether the trade indicator is the export
share, the import share or total trade). The fact that the robust correlation is
between trade and investment shares suggests that if trade affects growth, it is not
through the conventional theoretical channels involving resource allocation, but
rather through less conventional effects involving enhanced capital accumulation.
What these less conventional effects may be is unclear in most of the existing lit-
erature. Romer (1990a, 1990b) suggested that openness has a positive effect on
research and development expenditures and, by increasing the rate of technological
change, affects investment share and growth. Other views emphasize the positive
effects of openness on technology transfer.14 Whatever the merits of these views,
they can hardly provide a convincing explanation of the Levine–Renelt finding.
One reason is that openness in these models does not refer to trade shares and,
therefore, in terms of providing an explanation of the statistical relationship
between the trade share and investment, they face an old objection recently restated
by De Long and Summers (1991). Trade shares pick up differences in national size
and proximity to trading partners. If Belgium and Holland merged, it is hard to see
how the combined rate of technical progress would fall (or rise) as a result of this
new entity being less ‘open’ than each of the two countries separately.14
Even if the objection to viewing trade shares as a measure of openness was not
decisive, the puzzle remains: why is it that the robust correlation is only between
investment and the trade share and not between investment and other (more
appropriate) measures of openness? The analysis in this and previous sections
suggests a number of channels that can provide a convincing explanation of the
positive relationship between trade and investment shares.16 Our argument will be
that the explanation of the trade–investment nexus may run through the pattern of
trade specialization as determined by policy and factor endowment, including the
natural resource endowment. Cross-country growth studies have missed these
links because, with few recent exceptions, they have neglected the role of these
two factors (policy and resource endowment) through their effects on trade
orientation.17
Our main point is that the positive correlation between trade share and invest-
ment share is mediated by trade orientation, i.e. the explanation of the positive
relationship between trade and investment is that trade share and investment share
are both positively affected by a pro-manufacturing bias in trade orientation. We
have already discussed and illustrated the effects of trade orientation on the
investment share. Consider now the effects of trade orientation on the trade share.
A positive relationship between these two variables is apparent in Table 10.1.
Tables 10.2 and 10.3 show positive correlation coefficients of 0.35 and 0.33.
Why should a manufacturing bias in trade orientation positively affect the trade
share? One reason involves the positive effect that specialization in increasing
returns activities can have on trade creation. Increasing returns favor the expansion
of intra-industry trade – two-way flows of trade in similar goods, subject to 
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economies of specialization. Countries with a stronger bias towards manufactur-
ing in the export bundle typically show higher indices of intra-industry trade. The
correlation coefficient, as shown in Table 10.2, between the two indices is 0.69.
A second mechanism may be the presence of Dutch disease effects of primary
exports. The implication of Dutch disease models is that countries exporting pri-
mary goods tend to be less open, other things being equal, since in the long-run
equilibrium they have larger sectors producing non-tradable goods (see Ros 1998,
chapter 8). In this respect, it is noteworthy that trade orientation shows a positive
relationship with Leamer’s openness index (Tables 10.1 and 10.2). The Leamer
index is an adjusted trade–intensity ratio that represents the difference between the
actual level of trade (as opposed to the pattern of trade) and the level predicted by
the Heckscher–Ohlin trade model, including factor endowment and distance to
markets. The positive relationship with trade orientation indicates that the more the
trade pattern is biased towards exports of primary products, the lower the adjusted
trade–intensity ratio tends to be, probably as a result of larger non-tradable goods
sectors, together with less intra-industry trade.
5. Macro-linkages: Trade specialization and current
account volatility
We turn now to explore macroeconomic aspects of trade specialization and their
effects on growth. Conventional wisdom asserts that primary exporting countries
are more vulnerable to the vagaries of the international market and, thus, face a
greater degree of current account instability, which in turn is likely to affect growth
adversely. There are two propositions involved here. One links trade orientation to
current account volatility to the extent that world prices of primary commodities are
more sensitive to the international business cycle. The other involves causal rela-
tionships running from current account instability to the rate of economic growth.
Consider the first link. Table 10.4 presents data sorted by the trade orientation
index for the twenty-nine countries for which we have information on the TO
index, current account volatility and output volatility. The volatility measures
were estimated as standard deviations of the first differences of the current
account (as percentage of GDP) and of the natural logarithm of GDP (so that in
this case the measure reflects the volatility of the GDP growth rate).18 The real
exchange rate refers to the ratio of the US CPI to domestic CPI; real exchange
rate volatility was obtained by dividing the real exchange rate series by the mean
and then estimating the standard deviation.
No clear relationship emerges from the table: Countries with a strong primary
export bias have the highest current account volatility but at the same time coun-
tries with a moderate primary bias show less current account volatility than those
with a pro-manufacturing bias. Moreover, the scatter diagram in Figure 10.4 sug-
gests that any negative relationship between current account volatility and growth
(which is positively correlated with manufacturing bias) is at best tenuous.
Does this mean that trade specialization and growth are related only through
the microeconomic links discussed in the previous two sections? It would be too
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soon to reach this conclusion. The relationship between current account instabil-
ity and growth is far more complex than conventional wisdom asserts. To the
extent that current account volatility captures the effects of negative external
shocks that were transmitted to domestic output, we would indeed expect a nega-
tive relationship between current account volatility and growth. In this case,
current account volatility is truly an indicator of external vulnerability. Also, to
the extent that current account instability generates a large volatility of the real
exchange rate, it is likely to affect growth adversely: a large variance of the real
exchange rate runs against long-run investment decisions at the firm level.
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Table 10.4 Trade orientation, current account volatility and output volatility
Country TO1975 Current Output Real GDP Time
account volatility exchange growth perioda
volatility rate
volatility
Iran 1.03 6.6 11.5 86.7 2.3 77–96
Brazil 0.67 1.6 5.3 25.1 0.6 76–97
Ecuador 0.6 3.9 3.2 31.0 0.8 76–97
Venezuela 0.59 9.4 4.5 29.5 0.2 71–97
Spain 0.48 1.5 1.8 20.7 1.9 76–97
Argentina 0.47 2.0 5.6 42.7 0.7 77–97
Chile 0.4 3.8 5.4 25.6 4.1 76–97
Dominican 0.35 3.3 4.1 29.0 2.5 68–96
Republic
Mexico 0.35 3.1 3.8 19.0 0.6 80–97
Peru 0.34 3.5 7.0 48.9 0.1 78–97
Tunisia 0.23 2.9 14.9 5.1 3.4 77–97
Turkey 0.19 2.7 4.5 11.3 2.4 88–97
Guatemala 0.13 2.6 3.1 21.8 0.0 78–97
Philippines 0.13 2.6 4.1 13.0 0.3 78–97
Colombia 0.12 2.8 3.0 10.0 5.8 76–97
Thailand 0.12 2.8 3.0 10.0 5.8 76–97
Uruguay 0.09 1.8 4.8 28.9 1.9 79–97
Malaysia 0.03 4.9 2.9 15.2 4.2 75–97
Costa Rica 0.01 3.3 4.6 17.5 0.6 78–97
Japan 0.07 1.0 1.5 22.8 2.8 78–97
Morocco 0.07 3.7 5.4 20.4 1.5 76–97
Greece 0.18 2.0 2.0 17.4 1.2 77–94
Singapore 0.2 3.6 3.2 16.4 0.6 77–97
South Africa 0.2 3.6 3.2 16.4 0.6 77–97
Egypt 0.31 2.8 2.2 34.4 3.0 83–97
Israel 0.77 4.1 10.6 12.3 4.0 69–97
Portugal 0.79 4.5 2.3 21.2 3.0 76–97
Korea 0.97 2.7 3.0 11.4 6.7 77–97
Syria 1.18 3.8 5.8 32.4 1.5 78–97
Source: International Financial Statistics.
Note
a A time period over which GDP growth, capital account and real exchange rate voltatilities 
calculated.
Yet, under some circumstances, current account volatility may reflect the
absence of borrowing constraints, i.e. a country’s ability to absorb the effects of
external shocks without affecting the growth path of domestic output. In this case,
current account volatility does not lead to a high instability of domestic output and
reflects the resilience, rather than the vulnerability, of an economy to external
shocks. The economy is able to accommodate the external shock through borrow-
ing (or lending) and as a result the increases and reductions in the current account
deficit will not be reflected in a large variance of output and the real exchange rate.
This discussion suggests a number of testable hypotheses. First, the relation-
ship between current account volatility and growth should be mediated by output
volatility. Table 10.5 aggregates the twenty-nine countries of our sample accord-
ing to the volatility of their current account and domestic output. This classifica-
tion yields four groups (low and high are defined in such a way as to have half of
the countries in each category):
1 low current account and output volatility: Japan, Spain, Greece, Guatemala,
South Korea, Colombia, Egypt and Thailand;
2 high current account and low output volatility: Singapore, Malaysia,
Portugal, Ecuador, South Africa and Mexico;
3 high current account and output volatility: Venezuela, Iran, Israel, Syria,
Chile, Morocco, Peru, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic; and
4 low current account and high output volatility: Tunisia, Turkey, the
Philippines, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil.
A first remarkable feature of this aggregation is that it shows the absence of a




















Figure 10.4 Growth and current account volatility.
‘boxes’ that combine high current account and low output volatility and vice versa
are far from empty: over 40 per cent of the total number of countries fall in those
two groups.
What can we expect, based on our previous discussion, about the growth per-
formance of each of these groups? The low output volatility in groups 1 and 2
suggests the absence of borrowing constraints in these countries to the extent that
they were able to accommodate internal and external shocks without affecting the
growth path of domestic output. In the case of group 1, the low current account
volatility may also be reflecting the relative absence of internal and external
shocks during the period. It is interesting to note in this respect that this group
includes the relatively more developed economies in the sample (Japan, Spain
and Greece), two East Asian economies that did not suffer from the debt crisis of
the 1980s, and the Latin American economy (Colombia) that was among the least
affected by the debt crisis given its relatively low debt burden. Other things being
equal (i.e. holding constant other factors that affect growth) we should expect to
find in these two groups the highest growth rates during the period.
The high output volatility in groups 3 and 4 suggests the presence of borrowing
constraints and, as a result, the inability of these countries to prevent the external
(or internal) shocks from affecting the path of output growth. Borrowing con-
straints, contrary to what may appear at first sight, were probably more severe in
group 4. The low current account volatility should not be interpreted as indicating
the absence of shocks. If this was the case, output volatility should also, as in
group 1, have been low. Rather, the low current account volatility is likely in this
case to indicate the severity of borrowing constraints, i.e. that these countries were
unable to borrow in order to finance an increase in their current account deficit and
thus had to adjust (to a larger extent than groups 2 and 3) through output changes.
Other things being equal, it is in groups 3 and 4, and in particular in group, 4 were
we would expect the worst growth performances.
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Table 10.5 Growth performance, output volatility and current account
volatility
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Current account 2.3 4.2 4.6 2.3
volatility (%)
Output volatility (%) 2.3 3.1 6.5 6.5
Growth ratea (%) 3.0 2.3 1.3 1.6
Exchange rate 20.4 18.7 33.4 21.0
volatility (%)
Trade orientation 0.085 0.035 0.016 0.297
index
Source: based International Financial Statistics; Chenery and Syrquin (1986).
Note
a GDP per capita for the periods indicated in Table 10.4.
Table 10.5 presents the growth performance of each of the four groups, along
with other characteristics. The table shows a number of interesting features. First,
the growth performance of the first two groups with low output volatility is
clearly better than that of groups 3 and 4. Group 1 shows the highest growth rate
as one would expect since in this case the low current account volatility indicates
the absence, in contrast to group 2, of external or internal shocks. Contrary to our
expectations, however, group 4 shows a slightly better performance than group 3.
One reason may be the high degree of real exchange volatility in group 3, arising
from the large shocks reflected in its current account instability, which created an
adverse macroeconomic environment for growth. It is worth noting in this
respect, the negative relationship between growth and exchange volatility that is
apparent in Figure 10.5.
A second remarkable feature refers to the composition of each group in terms
of trade orientation. The fast growing low output volatility groups 1 and 2 are
composed by economies with a clear manufacturing bias compared to those in
groups 3 and 4. In fact, only two countries in groups 3 and 4 (Israel and Syria)
have a clear pro-manufacturing bias and, with the clear exception of Spain and
Ecuador, all countries classified as having a strong primary export bias are in
groups 3 and 4.19
All this suggests, after all, a relationship between trade orientation and growth
that involves vulnerability to shocks. Vulnerability, however, should not be under-
stood so much as relating to the frequency of shocks as to the inability to absorb
these shocks without affecting the path of output growth. That is, trade orientation
towards primary exports, to the extent that it is related to external vulnerability, is
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Figure 10.5 Growth and real exchange rate volatility.
current account itself. This is so especially when, due to a lack of export diversifi-
cation, a primary exporting country finds it particularly difficult to borrow in 
international capital markets at times of balance-of-payments difficulties. The rela-
tionship between primary export bias and output volatility is apparent in Tables 10.4
and 10.5.
Trade orientation also appears to affect the effectiveness with which real
exchange rate changes can isolate the domestic economy from external shocks.
Consider groups 2 and 3. Both have a high degree of current account instability,
which suggests the presence of relatively large external shocks during the period.
Output volatility is, however, very different being much larger for group 3 with a
primary export bias. There is another key difference: the much large variance of
exchange rates in group 3 which suggests that these group of primary exporters
found it more difficult to prevent, through real exchange rate changes, external
shocks from affecting domestic output.
6. Conclusions
This chapter has investigated the relationships between the pattern of trade spe-
cialization and the rate of economic growth. We began by presenting the standard
analysis of the determinants of the pattern of specialization and extended it to con-
sider the presence of increasing returns in non-traded goods. This change alone led
to a model with multiple equilibria in which the pattern of specialization can be
affected by determinants other than the standard ones (the composition of factor
endowments, technology, and terms of trade). The model was also useful to com-
pare the dynamic implications of different patterns of specialization. This analysis
encompasses the treatment in the traditional literature on the subject (on, e.g. the
infant industry argument or two-sector models with different rates of learning) to
the extent that the different patterns of specialization compared may or may not be
consistent with the same factor endowment. The analysis also helps to elucidate
the conditions under which policy intervention geared to change the pattern of
specialization can be effective and the role of the terms of trade in generating
multiple equilibria.
The analysis highlighted two implications, which were supported by the empir-
ical evidence. First, trade specialization affects the investment share given that,
other things being equal (including factor endowments), the rate of return on cap-
ital tends to be higher in economies specialized in increasing returns industries.
Second, at the same level of income per worker specialization in increasing
returns industries is associated with a higher output–capital ratio; the rate of
capital accumulation and growth will then be higher, for the same investment
share, when an economy specializes in industries subject to increasing returns.
We then moved in Section 5 to an analysis of the macroeconomic aspects of
trade specialization and their effects on growth. Our main finding here is that the
lack of a clear and direct relationship between primary export bias and current
account instability should not be attributed to the fact that primary exporting
countries are less vulnerable than manufacturing exporters to external shocks.
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Rather, the lack of such a relationship, together with the existence of a clear rela-
tionship between primary export bias and output volatility, suggests that primary
exporting countries faced particularly severe borrowing constraints during the
period analysis (broadly the last two to three decades). These borrowing con-
straints forced the absorption of the external shocks through changes in the real
exchange rate, the level of economic activity or both and resulted in a degree of
output and exchange rate volatility in primary exporting economies that were
much larger than in economies with a pro-manufacturing bias.
Appendix
The model with constant returns in sector I
The two sectors (A and B) use, as indicated in the text, Cobb–Douglas technolo-
gies. Given this technology and the competitive conditions assumed, the first
order conditions for profit maximization imply the following employment and
profit rate functions in sectors A and B:
, (1)
. (2)
Employment in sector I and the profit rate in sector A are determined as
, (3)
. (4)
The schedule of labor market equilibrium is obtained by substituting from the
labor demand functions into the full employment condition: (L LBLI), setting
KBK KA. As is readily verified, for pBpA (i.e. considering only the effect of
technological parameters on capital intensity) the slope of this locus is negative
(see Figure 10.1). An increase in the capital stock, holding the overall labour force
constant, shifts the locus upwards. Intuitively, a higher overall capital–labor ratio
raises the market-clearing wage for each given allocation of the capital stock. The
schedule of capital market equilibrium is derived by substituting from the profit
rate functions into the condition for profit rate equalization (rArB). In (w, KA)
space, there is a unique value of the wage, independent of the capital stock in 
sector A, that satisfies the condition for profit rate equalization. This value
depends on technological parameters and the terms of trade but not on factor
endowments (see eqns (2) and (4)).
The model with increasing returns in sector I
Non-tradable inputs in sector I are now produced under internal increasing
returns and monopolistic competition. More precisely, I represents now the input
rA  a[(1  a) pA/w]
(1a)/a  rA (w/pA)
LI  [(1  a) pA/w]
1/a KA  LI (w/pA, KA)
rB  b (pB/pA) [(1  b) pB/w]
(1b)/b  rB (pB/pA, w/pA)
LB  [(1  b) pB /w]
1/b KB  LB (w/pB, KB)
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of a set of intermediate goods,
, ,
where n is the number of intermediate goods, assumed to be given. Production of
these intermediate goods is subject to internal increasing returns:
, ,
where Li is labor input and µ is the increasing returns parameter in the production
of I-goods. Moreover, producers operate under conditions of monopolistic com-
petition and face downward sloping demand curves:
, ,
where D is a position parameter and  is the price elasticity of demand facing
individual producers. As shown in Skott and Ros (1998), these assumptions imply
that, in a symmetric equilibrium in the I sector, employment in sector I and the




The slope of the schedule of labor market equilibrium in (log w, log KA) space
is now
,
where LB/LI, from the labor demand functions, is given by
,
, .
The slope of the locus is negative, tending to zero, at low levels of KA and
becomes positive, tending to ‘a’, at high levels of KA (provided that such high val-
ues exist given the size of the overall capital stock). The equilibrium value of the
wage thus first falls as KA increases, and eventually rises, becoming an increas-
ing function of KA (see Figure 10.3).
The schedule of capital market equilibrium is derived as before from the con-
dition of profit rate equalization. The slope of the schedule in (log w, log KA)
space is now
.d log w/d log KA 
[ (1  a)/f]
[(1  a) (1  )/f  (1  b)/b]
A  [(1/n)1fGpA]
1/fB  [(1  b) pB]
1/b
LB/LI  (B KB/A KA
a/f) w1/f 1/b
d log w/d log KA 
[a/f  (KA/KB) (LB/LI)]
[1/f  (1/b) (LB/LI)]
rA  a KA
(1  a)/f[(1/n) G / (w/pA)]
(1  f)/f  rA (KA, w/pA)
f  a   (1a)G  (1  a) (1  ) (  1)/
LI  [(1/n)
1  f G KA
a pA/w]
1/f  LI (w/pA, KA)
  1I i
d  D pi

  0Ii  Li
1
0    1I  ((1/n) I i
)1/
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We have two cases depending on technological parameters in sectors A, B and I.
The case of b  f implies: (1a) (1 ) (1b), which says that the ‘indirect’
labor share of sector A is larger than the labor share of sector B. In this case, a
wage increase (given KA) reduces the profit rate in sector A more than it does in
sector B. An increase in KA (which affects positively rA through its positive effect
on the productivity of sector I) is required to restore the equality of profit rates,
which makes the slope of the schedule positive.
In the second case, we have: b  f. This implies: (1a) (1 + ) (1b), i.e. the
‘indirect’ labor share of sector A is smaller than the labor share of sector B. An
increase in the wage (given KA) will thus reduce the profit rate in sector B more
than it does in sector A. This requires a fall in KA (which reduces rA) to restore the
equality of profit rates. The slope of the schedule is then negative.
When there is an intersection this intersection is unique: In the first case, this
is because the locus of the capital market remains steeper than the locus of the
labor market at high levels of KA. Necessary and sufficient conditions are a b
and f 0. In the second case, the intersection is unique, because the locus of the
capital market is steeper, at low levels of KA, than the locus of the labor market
(when the latter is relatively flat).
Existence of multiple equilibria
As stated in the text, the existence of multiple equilibria depends on the existence
of an A-equilibrium. An A-equilibrium, in turn, will exist if profitability in sector A,
when the whole of the capital stock is allocated to this sector, is higher than that of
sector B (evaluated at the market clearing wage corresponding to LIL). Consider,
first, the wage in the A-equilibrium (w*A). From eqn (5), setting LIL and
KAK and solving for the wage, we have
w*A . (7)
Substituting from (7) into eqn (6), setting w*A wA and KAK, we obtain the
profit rate in the A-equilibrium (w*A):
r*A . (8)
The profit rate in sector B, evaluated at the A-equilibrium wage, is obtained
from substitution of (7) into eqn (2):
. (9)
Note that the profit rate in sector B, evaluated at the A-equilibrium wages, wbA, is
an increasing function of the number of producers of I-goods (n). A larger num-
ber of producers raises the unit cost of each of the I-goods and reduces the
demand for labor in sector I. This has a negative effect on w*A and therefore tends
to increase the profit rates in sector B, which does not use I-goods. This negative
rA
b  b(pB/pA)
1/b [(1  b) n1  f Lf/G Ka](1  b)/b
 a (L/n)1  f / K 1  a
 G (1/n)1  f) pA K
a/Lf
318 J. Ros
effect on the wage is offset in the case of the profit rate in sector A, since a higher
number of producers implies higher costs for sector A: r*A is a decreasing function
of the number of producers (n).
From (8) and (9), the condition for r*Ar
b




Suppose that the condition for multiple equilibria is fulfilled and compare the
wage and profit rates in the two stable equilibria. In an A-equilibrium, the wage
and profit rate are given by eqns (5) and (6). In a B-equilibrium, we have KBK
and LBL. Using eqns (1) and (2), the B-equilibrium wage and profit rate are
w*B , (10)
r*B . (11)
Comparing (6) and (11) shows that for r*A to be higher than r*B requires
. (12)
Comparing (8) and (12), we can establish that K* K1. The assumption of a b
and the second-order condition for a profit maximum among Ii producers ensure
this inequality.20 It follows that when an A-equilibrium exists (K  K*), the profit
rate in this equilibrium is higher than in the B-equilibrium (since K then is also
higher than K1).
Inspection of (5) and (10) shows that for w*A to be greater than w*B the aggregate
capital stock must be such that
. (13)
From (8) and (13), we can establish that K2K*.
21 The existence of an 
A-equilibrium does not guarantee that the wage in the A-equilibrium is higher
than in the B-equilibrium. This requires that the aggregate capital stock is larger
than K2. In this case, with K K2, and therefore K larger than K* and K1, an 
A-equilibrium will exist and feature both a profit rate and a wage rate higher than
in the B-equilibrium.
Notes
01 The author is grateful to Maiju Perala for research assistance.
02 See, on the subject, Ros (1987).
Ka  b  K 2
a  b  (1  b) (pB/pA) n
1  f Lf  b/G
Ka  b  K 1
a  b  (b/a) (pB/pA) n
1  f Lf  b
 b (pB/pA) (L/K)
1  b
 (1  b) pB (K/L)
b
Ka  b  K* a  b  (b/a)b (pB/pA) [(1  b)/G]
1  bn1  fLf  b
Trade specialization and economic growth 319
03 These links are emphasized in the research proposal on International Trade,
Competitiveness and Finance, CEDES 1996.
04 More precisely, capital accumulation increases the wage at the initial allocation but the
increase in the wage itself implies that the initial allocation no longer satisfies the 
condition of profit rate equalization. The reallocation of capital towards the capital-
intensive sector then brings the wage back to its initial value.
05 Note that the labor demand in sector I is an increasing function of KA (0 ensures
that a  f ).
06 If there is no effect, i.e. if KA does not appear in the profit-wage function, there will be
no reallocation that is able to restore the equality of profit rates. The schedule would
then be a horizontal line at that unique value of the wage that is consistent with the
equality of profit rates. As can be readily verified, this is the case if m 5 0, that is when
the technology of the integrated A/I sector exhibits constant returns to scale. This is the
case examined in the previous section.
07 The appendix examines both cases and the reader may verify that the analysis is sym-
metrical for the case in which the indirect labor share in A is larger than that in B.
08 As we shall see later, this is due to the assumption that sector B does not use interme-
diate goods produced under increasing returns. At low levels of KA, the profit rate in
sector A tends to zero while it remains positive in sector B no matter how large the cap-
ital stock is. There are thus some capital allocations, at sufficiently low levels of KA,
for which sector B is more profitable than sector A.
09 The threshold value is also smaller, the smaller the number of firms (n) in sector I,
which affects positively the profitability of sector A. The effect of the overall labor
endowment on the threshold value of aggregate capital stock depends on the sign on
the size of the ‘indirect’ labor share of sector A compared to that of sector B.
10 In the presence of differences in the size of the labor force, the difference in the steady-
state level of income would also be proportional to the size in the labor force (due to
the existence of increasing returns to scale in sector I).
11 One source of this difference is the adoption by Rodriguez-Clare of a Dixit–Stiglitz–
Ethier specification in sector I, with a preference for variety and an ever-expanding
number of I goods (and with a zero profit condition in equilibrium).
12 That is, it measures, for a given country, the deviation between the observed manufac-
turing trade bias and that predicted for a typical country of similar income and size. 
In Chenery and Syrquin (1986), the trade orientation index measures the primary
export bias. We use this index multiplied by 1. This yields the manufacturing export
bias.
13 The thirty-four countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Yugoslavia.
14 At the same time, it is possible to argue that the effects of openness are dependent on
the pattern of specialization that it induces (as in the model of Section 1). In some
North–South models, such as Young’s (1991), openness can even lead to a lower rate
of technological change for the South. Moreover, foreign direct investment is a major
vehicle of technology transfers and there is no clear positive relationship between
openness to trade and openness to foreign investment.
15 It is worth emphasizing that De Long and Summers’ observation is not an objection to
models in which openness – in the sense of absence of trade barriers – has a positive
effect on investment. Rather, it is an objection to using trade shares as a measure of
openness. The implication, however, is that we should not interpret the correlation
between investment and trade shares as evidence supporting models in which openness
enhances investment.
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16 We have already mentioned Rodrik’s (1994) argument that a higher investment share
may lead to a higher trade share, as result of increased imports of capital goods in
industrializing economies. In this argument causality runs from investment to trade and
not the other way around. Our main focus in what follows will take a different and
complementary direction.
17 Exceptions include, as already noted, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) and Sala-i-Martin
(1997).
18 See Razin (1996) for a discussion of these measures.
19 Mexico is a marginal country between groups 2 and 3 and thus is not a clear exception.
Similarly, Morocco is a marginal case of manufacturing bias (with a TO index of 0.07).
20 For K* K1, the following condition must be fulfilled:
,
a b implies that (1  b)/b (1a)/a. For the second-order condition for a profit
maximum among Ii producers to be fulfilled, it is necessary that (1) (11/) 1.
Taken together, these inequalities ensure the fulfillment of the condition above.
21 This requires as in the previous case:
.
The fulfillment of this inequality is guaranteed by the same conditions as before
(a b, and the second-order condition for a profit maximum among Ii producers).
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11 Two problems in bank lending for
development
Rodney Schmidt
1. Introduction: Two problems in bank lending for development
Most investment in developing countries is financed externally, by borrowing
from banks. Banks retain this central role because they are the best at monitoring
projects and enforcing contracts when public information is limited and the legal
and financial infrastructure is immature. They often do this by establishing long-
term relationships with firms.
Banks in developing countries, however, tend to lend either too little or too
much to firms, with two important effects. First, chronically low lending is asso-
ciated with low levels of investment and growth, and, moreover, constrained 
lending restricts growth. Second, periodic surges in lending end in systemic bank
and economic crises. For convenience, we refer to the first pattern as ‘under-
borrowing’ by firms, and to the second as ‘over-lending’ by banks.
The role of financial agency costs in firms and banks helps to understand these
related, and seemingly conflicting, lending patterns. Financial agency costs refer
to the impact on lending behavior of the stakes that firms and banks have, respec-
tively, in the outcomes of investment projects. These stakes grow out of features
of the balance sheets of firms and banks. A simple version of how this works is
as follows.
On the one hand, when firms have low net worth, they cannot put up collateral
for investment projects. Then banks do not lend to them, since the firms have 
little to lose from project failure, and are more likely to choose or accept poor
projects. This yields under-borrowing. On the other hand, when banks have low
net worth, or there is deposit insurance, they also have little to lose from failure,
and are more willing to lend to poor projects. This yields over-lending. If deposit
insurance is implicit and systemic, then banks may require collateral for individ-
ual projects, while ignoring aggregate credit risk associated with inflated asset
and collateral values. This simultaneously yields under-borrowing in some 
sectors where collateral is not available, and over-lending in other sectors where
collateral is available.
To assess the explanatory power of this approach, we undertake a selective
review and interpretation of evidence on patterns of bank lending, and on how
financial agency costs contribute to them. The evidence on lending patterns is
mostly from developing countries, while that on agency costs is only available for
developed countries. The latter evidence is informative for us, nevertheless,
because it identifies both the impact of agency costs on lending behavior, and the
types of affected firms and banks. These types are more common in developing
countries than elsewhere.
2. Chronic credit shortages constrain investment
The following propositions summarize evidence on the nature of the relationship
between bank lending and economic development.
Proposition 1.1. Over long periods, bank lending to the private sector is strongly
positively correlated with macroeconomic investment, productivity and growth in
developing countries (Levine 1997, and citations therein).
That is, if bank lending leads investment and growth, then lending constraints
have important macroeconomic effects.
The correlation between bank lending and economic growth has been estab-
lished largely in cross-country studies, and therefore rests on a relationship of
averages across countries. By itself, it does not show that limitations on bank
lending constrain investment. Other macroeconomic studies, however, are more
definite about this.
Proposition 1.2. Bank-lending volume predicts subsequent long-term growth,
capital accumulation and productivity (King and Levine 1993). Further, indus-
tries that rely heavily on external funding, identified outside of the context of
financial and economic development, grow faster in countries with deeper finan-
cial sectors (Rajan and Zingales 1996).
Time series evidence from individual countries suggests that causation between
financial depth and economic growth changes over time, depending on the insti-
tutional context (Arestis and Demetriades 1997). One important feature is agency
costs in the market for bank credit. For example, in a theoretical analysis,
Sussman and Zeira (1995) show that when low levels of institutional and eco-
nomic development entail high agency costs, then credit rationing constrains
growth. Whereas they build their analysis on monitoring costs, we focus on finan-
cial factors underlying effective agency costs, given monitoring technology. This
seems practically relevant since, when firms can finance investment projects
internally, agency costs are much reduced or eliminated, even if external moni-
toring costs are high (Gertner et al. 1994). Hence, in developing countries the
importance of financial agency costs, and macroeconomic lending constraints on
growth, varies with financial conditions.
Financial agency costs in firms
Agency costs in external credit markets come from a divergence of incentives
between borrower (the firm) and lender (the bank), when the lender cannot fully
324 R. Schmidt
monitor the borrower’s behavior. One important source of these divergences is the
state of the firm’s balance sheet, and, in particular, its net worth. The value of a
firm’s net worth indicates its ability to co-finance investment, or put up collateral
against external finance.
Posting partial or full collateral reduces the amount of risky lending needed
for the project. More importantly, it strengthens the combined interest of the bank
and the firm in the outcome of the project, so that they work towards a common
purpose. Otherwise the firm, which is closer to the project than the bank, may
seek financing for lower quality projects than the bank would choose. The reason
is that the opportunity cost of a project is small for a firm which borrows most or
all of the funds to finance it, while the gains from a successful outcome may be
high. The opposite is true for a bank which lends most of the funds for the same
project on a debt contract. (Gertler (1988) reviews this literature. See also
Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997).
When financial agency costs in firms are high, banks may refuse to finance
investment projects, even though they would finance the same projects in other
circumstances. Then firms cannot obtain working capital or pursue productive
and socially beneficial investment activities. This is confirmed by evidence on
firm borrowing from banks.
Proposition 1.3. Following a negative macroeconomic shock, firms’ short-term
borrowing by commercial paper rises sharply compared to their short-term bor-
rowing from banks (Kashyap et al. 1993).
Strictly speaking, this finding reflects either of a more restricted supply of bank
loans, or an only partially satisfied increase in demand for bank loans, following
a shock to firms balance sheets.
Less ambiguous is evidence that some firms, with high financial agency costs,
have a harder time borrowing from banks than others.
Proposition 1.4. During recessions, bank borrowing by large manufacturing firms
rises sharply, while that by small manufacturing firms rises modestly, if at all.
Further, bank lending to riskier or less transparent firms and to firms without lines
of credit falls (Bernanke et al. 1996; Calomiris 1995; Kashyap et al. 1993).
Large manufacturing firms have easier access to real short-term bank credit
than small ones. The former tends to be more mature, established and stable than
the latter.
Under-borrowing by firms
Under-borrowing refers to the impact that financial agency costs in firms have on
their real economic behavior.
Proposition 1.5. Investment by firms is excessively sensitive to current cash flow,
especially in new and small firms. (For a review of this large body of evidence,
see Gertler (1988).)
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Proposition 1.6. The investment, employment, research and development and
inventory behavior of firms with high agency costs and credit constraints, identi-
fied independently, is sensitive to cash flow, while that of other firms is not
(Fazzari et al. (1988) and citations therein, and Calomiris and Hubbard (1995)).
This is consistent with the aggregate evidence presented earlier of a strong rela-
tionship between bank lending and macroeconomic performance.
Not all firms at a given time and in a given context are equally affected by
financial agency costs. More susceptible firms are those with fragile balance
sheets and low and variable net worth.
Proposition 1.7. Firms with high agency costs, identified independently, tend to
be small, and to have large debts, low profits relative to sales and high rates of
growth of profits. These firms are new, untried and fast growing (Calomiris and
Hubbard 1995).
Developing countries have a preponderance of this type of firm, especially
after programs of macroeconomic reform and structural adjustment. Because
firm net worth is, on average, structurally lower there than elsewhere, especially
relative to the size of investment projects, demand for external finance is higher
at both firm or project and aggregate levels.
Proposition 1.8. In poor countries most investment is financed externally and by
borrowing from banks, while in rich countries most is financed from retained sav-
ings (Corbett and Jenkinson 1994; Eichengreen 1999; Mayer 1989; Singh 1995;
Singh and Hamid 1992).
Since most investment finance in developing countries must be obtained exter-
nally and, equivalently, project co-financing by firms is insubstantial, investment
is more expensive there than in developed countries. In the aggregate, the result
is underperformance in investment and growth. To the extent that policy can
improve on these market outcomes, financial agency costs in firms are a pressing
issue for growth and development.
3. Periodic credit surges are not sustainable
In the two decades since developing countries began liberalizing financial 
sectors, attention has increasingly focused not on under-borrowing, but on the
problem of banks lending too much, too quickly. The reason is the rising number
and increasing costliness of bank crises (Eichengreen and Rose 1998; Frydl 1999;
Goldstein and Turner 1996; Wyplosz n.d.).
A bank crisis is usually set off by a macroeconomic event which, when com-
pared to the succeeding financial upheaval, seems disproportionately minor.
Typical events are contagion from crises elsewhere, a devaluation of the currency,
an increase in global interest rates, or a decline in the international terms of trade.
They often occur at a cyclical economic and stock market peak. Economic output
then falls sharply, and the stock and real estate markets collapse. The response of
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the real estate market is particularly important, as it accounts for a large share of
collateral for bank loans. A credit crunch ensues, as banks call in loans to avoid
higher credit risk and to meet greater deposit withdrawals. The credit crunch, ris-
ing interest rates, deteriorating economy and falling collateral values reduce debt
servicing by firms, and bad loans accumulate. A crisis-induced credit crunch is
generally more severe, but shorter-lasting, than credit shortages arising from
chronically high firm agency costs.
The recent proliferation of bank crises is not due to an increase in macro-
economic volatility, but to events within the banking sector which undermine its 
ability to withstand shocks.
Proposition 2.1. Financial liberalization and a rapid rise in bank lending pre-
cede most bank crises, and contribute significantly to the probability of a crisis
(Gavin and Hausmann 1996; Gonzalez-Hermosillo 1996; Kaminsky and
Reinhart 1999; Sachs et al. Velasco 1996).
Rapid growth in lending leading to bank crises is not expected behavior in devel-
oping countries, where information is scarce and firm agency costs are high.
Banks ought to ration credit to avoid exposure to poor investment projects. From
where, then, do unsustainable bank credit surges come?
Financial agency costs in banks
Banks lend to firms to finance investment projects from their own capital and
from funds borrowed from depositors. They may also borrow by issuing securi-
ties, but in developing countries where equity markets are immature and illiquid,
this is not a viable option on a large scale (Diamond 1997; Singh 1997). In gen-
eral, ready substitutes for deposits as external borrowing instruments are not
available.
If it is hard for depositors and others to monitor bank asset portfolios, then
banks with low net worth face high financial agency costs. The mechanism is the
same as that for firms, and leads to under-borrowing by banks from depositors
just as by firms from banks. Under-borrowing by banks may constrain lending for
investment projects even when financial agency costs in firms are low (Bernanke
and Blinder 1988, 1992; Bernanke and Gertler 1987, 1995).
Proposition 2.2. The level and rate of growth of bank lending depend positively
on the quantity of bank capital and the capital asset ratio (Holmstrom and Tirole
1997; Sharpe 1995).
A substitute for high bank net worth, in terms of affecting agency costs in banks,
is deposit insurance, since it reduces depositor liability for bank asset portfolios
(Stein 1998). For given financial agency costs in firms, insurance releases lending
constraints imposed by depositors, leading to an increase in lending to firms.
Proposition 2.3. An exogenous reduction in insured deposits is accompanied by
a shrinking of bank lending (Bernanke and Blinder 1992).
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Information gaps about bank asset portfolios arise in part from individual bank
characteristics. Banks with high agency costs are those which have a harder time
finding substitutes for insured deposits than others, and they are more vulnerable
to shocks.
Proposition 2.4. Small banks cut loans by more in response to exogenously
induced deposit outflows. Among smaller banks, the impact on lending is greater
for those with lower ratios of cash and securities to assets (Kashyap and Stein
1995, 1997).
Following the same reasoning, in developing countries domestic banks face
higher agency costs than international banks, since domestic banks have less
access to international credit.
Proposition 2.5. In developing countries, domestic banks experience higher
deposit outflows in response to macroeconomic shocks, and take longer to adjust
to them, than foreign banks (Ramos 1998).
This evidence supports an unconventional interpretation of the role of deposit
insurance in developing countries. This role is to reduce under-borrowing by
firms by overriding financial agency costs in banks. For this purpose, deposit
insurance must include an expectation of bank bailouts. Otherwise, banks them-
selves ration credit to high agency cost firms, even if depositors do not restrict
credit to banks.
Over-lending by banks
Deposit insurance, operating through bailout expectations, introduces moral haz-
ard into bank-lending practices, a factor which is distinct from financial agency
costs. Moral hazard is present because banks have little to lose from failed invest-
ment projects, so they are more willing to lend to poor projects. In the absence of
effective prudential regulation and supervision, the quality of bank asset portfo-
lios may be expected to fall.
From experience with bank crises in developing countries, moral hazard oper-
ates through rapid growth in bank lending, which is associated with asset price
inflation or an economic boom.
Proposition 2.6. Deposit insurance and credit subsidies contribute to asset price
bubbles and bank crises (Calomiris 1995; Carey 1994; Demirguo-Kunt and
Detragiache 1998).
Our concept of over-lending, therefore, goes beyond insufficient project selecti-
vity by banks. It embraces aggressive lending that may simultaneously stem from
and reinforce unsustainable stock market or economic activity. In this regard,
what appears most important is implicit deposit insurance protecting banks
against systemic failure coinciding with, or following, burst collateral and asset
value bubbles. In such circumstances, governments cannot usually avoid inter-
vening to support the banking system. Lending in the context of an unsustainable
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macroeconomic boom accomplishes the same thing; the ensuing bust affects all
banks almost equally.
Theory identifies two complementary mechanisms linking deposit insurance,
bank lending and asset price inflation. On the one hand, banks underwrite specu-
lative markets, such as real estate, because a potential collapse would affect the
entire banking system (Carey 1994). On the other hand, banks take collateral,
often real estate, at face value, ignoring the possibility of a price bubble (Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997). They lend freely believing themselves to be covered individu-
ally by collateral, and collectively by deposit insurance. In either case, asset price
inflation may originate either outside the banking system, for example in a con-
sumption boom stimulated by macroeconomic and financial reform (McKinnon
and Pill 1997), or within the banking system, fueled by abundant credit itself,
which also stimulates the economy (Gavin and Hausmann 1996).
An asset price inflation-based lending surge may or may not be accompanied by
a rise in bad loans prior to the collapse of the asset bubble. If there is a large accu-
mulation of bad loans, the banking system may collapse first, followed by equity
markets (Gavin and Hausmann 1996). If there is no pre-collapse rise in bad loans,
asset prices and collateral values still depend on the expected volume of bank 
lending. An external shock that reduces expected lending has a much amplified
shrinking effect on asset prices, further reducing expected bank lending (Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997). Bad loans then appear with or after the financial crash.
4. Under-borrowing versus over-lending
Both under-borrowing and over-lending are financial policy issues in developing
countries, as they are patterns of microeconomic lending behavior with important
macroeconomic effects. They arise from a common source, namely, insufficient
project-contingent liability by borrowers, with respect to under-borrowing, and by
lenders, with respect to over-lending.
Under-borrowing can be addressed independently, by improving the trans-
parency of relations between participants in the financial system, and by 
enhancing loan monitoring technology, skills and institutions. This would reduce
financial agency costs in both firms and banks. There are, however, natural limi-
tations to what can be achieved this way, within the context of economic and 
institutional underdevelopment.
Over-lending can also be addressed independently, by eliminating deposit
insurance if possible, or at least by eliminating expectations of bank bailouts. It
can also be addressed by enhancing bank regulation, involving high bank capital,
or net worth, requirements. However, as already noted, this would likely increase
under-borrowing.
Thus arises a serious policy dilemma, or trade-off. In developing countries, it
seems that an effective way to address under-borrowing is to tolerate, or to offer,
deposit insurance, with the concomitant bailout expectations. Apparently this can
only be done by accepting increased over-lending, or financial instability, and
vice versa.
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One option for responding to the policy trade-off, advanced by Stiglitz (1994),
is to return to policies typical of the era of financial repression. These include
forcing interest rates below equilibrium levels and directing credit allocation,
which would avoid over-lending. This would cause widespread under- and mis-
directed borrowing to reappear however, due to the repression itself (which was
the reason for liberalizing in the first place (Fry 1997)), and due to high financial
agency costs in firms.
A second, widely adopted, option presented by the policy trade-off is to deal
with under-borrowing by pursuing financial liberalization. But, as seen earlier,
often this has been achieved at the cost of over-lending. McKinnon and Pill
(1997) argue that financial and macroeconomic reform stimulate overly opti-
mistic or euphoric expectations of success, which seem to be validated by low
levels of real interest rates. This is especially so if the reforms encompass capital
account liberalization (McKinnon and Pill 1998). The excessive optimism
appears as a consumption and macroeconomic boom accompanied by a great
demand for bank loans. (McKinnon and Pill (1997) refer to this as an over-
borrowing phenomenon.) Depositors and banks are willing to feed the boom 
with copious lending because they expect to be bailed out in the event it proves
unsustainable. Further, the boom creates high rates of profit and sales growth for
many firms, so that it is hard for banks, whose market skill levels may be primi-
tive, to perceive financial agency costs and other credit risks (Gavin and
Hausmann 1996).
In the worst realization of the policy trade-off, deposit insurance in the context of
financial liberalization yields simultaneous under-borrowing and over-lending.
Here, firms are not able to borrow to finance risky projects, while banks channel
lending to self-collateralizing projects, leading to unsustainable asset price inflation.
There are several reasons why banks in developing countries may concentrate
lending in real estate and other easily collateralizable sectors, even with deposit
insurance. First, deposit insurance may be accompanied by prudential regulation
and supervision, including measures to forcibly restructure individually weak
banks in a way that is costly to bank capital and management. Then the net worth
of individual banks remains at risk, and banks seek to cover themselves, or reduce
financial agency costs in firms, by requiring collateral. Regulators may also
impose collateral requirements (Stiglitz and Uy 1996). Second, it may be hard for
banks to diversify asset portfolios if it requires expertize in many sectors, stretch-
ing already low credit skills, or if firm agency costs are high in some sectors.
Finally, as seen above, banks may wish to mine high return, high risk sectors, such
as real estate.
Can the terms of the under-borrowing–over-lending policy trade-off be
improved? The question is relevant if one is not narrowly concerned with elimi-
nating financial instability in developing countries. There is evidence that finan-
cial and, presumably, economic development already is not fully set back by
banking crises (Demirguo-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). Then, under appropriate
conditions, additional financial instability in return for easier lending constraints
may yield a net gain.
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Deposit insurance always introduces moral hazard into the bank-lending 
problem. The means of addressing this however, embodied in the conventional pre-
scriptions for regulation and supervision, are well known and effective. What one
wants to avoid is the positive interaction between lending and asset price inflation.
This can be done, if deposit insurance is coordinated with two complementary
policies. The first is to impose portfolio diversification requirements on banks to
prevent too much lending to collateralizable sectors and speculative markets. It
also restrains rapid growth in bank lending when asset price inflation is exo-
genous. To achieve diversification, government might also encourage syndicated
bank lending, which has the added benefit of pooling information on borrowers.
The second complementary policy is to exert discretionary control over the rate
of growth of insured deposits, by adjusting reserve requirements and generally
controlling the supply of high-powered money. This also constrains the rate of
growth of bank lending, which is especially useful for preempting latent asset
price bubbles or unsustainable consumption and macroeconomic booms.
5. Conclusion
Banks in developing countries, the dominant source of finance for investment,
have a disturbing tendency to lend too little or too much to firms. The result is
unnecessarily low rates of investment and growth, and unnecessarily frequent
financial and economic crises.
Evidence indicates that an important part of the explanation for this is inade-
quate contingent liability for project outcomes on the balance sheets of both firms
and banks. For firms, this arises from low net worth, a structural characteristic of
developing countries. For banks, it arises from the implicit presence of systemic
deposit insurance, also characteristic of developing countries.
From this perspective, deposit insurance is a policy instrument for reducing
under-borrowing. To date it has not been effective as such, because reductions in
under-borrowing appear limited while increases in over-lending are substantial.
Nevertheless, the terms of the trade-off can be improved if deposit insurance is
complemented by bank portfolio diversification requirements and discretionary
controls on the rate of growth of insured deposits.
These conclusions are tentative. There is still surprisingly little direct evidence on
the influence of financial agency costs in bank credit markets in developing coun-
tries. The same is true for the nature of the trade-off between under-borrowing and
over-lending introduced by deposit insurance of different types, and accompanied
by different prudential regulations and policies. Neglecting such evidence carries
the risk of too narrow a concern with financial stability and unwitting acceptance
of more under-borrowing and less development than necessary.
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It is commonly understood that the determinants of competitiveness are varied
and complex, and spring from micro, macro and institutional levels, as also 
from the monetary and the real side of the economy. A key link between micro
and macro, and also between real and financial is the exchange rate. Exchange
rates link macroeconomic policies and exogenous events to sector and firm 
level outcomes; they link financial developments to output and employment; they
alter international goods and financial flows and in turn are altered by these
flows.
This chapter conceptualizes these linkages into four ‘cells’, as shown in the
table below.
Short-term exchange rate Long-term movements (i.e. 




The bulk of this chapter concentrates on the first row of the table, surveying
the issues around the matter of the effect of short-term and long-term exchange
rate volatility on international trade. These effects are relatively one way, mean-
ing exchange rates have the potential to alter trade flows, but increasingly it is
clear that the classical view of the exchange rate being determined by goods flows 
is less likely. The relationships in the second row, on the other hand, are likely 
two way and are examined at the end of the chapter; and equally importantly
(though not the subject of this chapter), investment flows in turn determine 
trade flows.
Section 2 argues that exchange rate variability is a relevant issue in trade 
modelling, while Section 3 outlines the ‘standard’ model that is used in most stud-
ies. Section 4 addresses some general issues that arise from the model, while
Section 5 concentrates on how to define and measure exchange rate variability.
Section 6 presents financial flows and Section 7 some concluding remarks.
2. Why variability matters
In making their decisions, economic agents face a range of risk. The international
trader – be he an importer or an exporter – must deal with uncertainty of supplies,
of the weather, of government policies, and in a world of floating exchange rates,
uncertainty in the rates of change of those exchange rates. The traditional litera-
ture on portfolio selection stresses that risk in one area – changes in exchange
rates – must be seen relative to all the other types of risks that a trader faces, both
in trading abroad and in trading at home.1
While exchange rate risk may be ‘just another’ risk however, this does not
diminish its importance for a number of reasons. While it may be largely avoid-
able, either by moving away from foreign trade and towards domestic trade, or at
the extreme, moving back to a system of fixed exchange rates, neither is a trivial
prospect. A move towards autarky, with all its resultant implications on global
resource allocation and comparative advantage, while acceptable in portfolio
selection terms, is hardly a solution. It essentially means running away from the
problem, and turning away from what has been the engine of economic growth
and global integration since the industrial revolution – international trade.
The prospect of a world of fixed exchange rates, while eliminating nominal
exchange rate risk, does not eliminate real exchange rate risk, and, in any case, has
implications on domestic economic policies serious enough to merit further debate.
The point being made here is that while exchange rate risk may be avoidable – as
proper portfolio selection would dictate – the two results of avoiding it – autarky or
fixed exchange rates – are serious enough for this topic to merit closer attention.
Exchange rate changes, of course, can be covered against, by trading on the
forward market. But forward markets in foreign exchange offer only partial – and
imperfect – cover, for a number of reasons. First, the transaction costs of buying
cover increase the cost of foreign trade. Second, forward markets in foreign
exchange are incomplete in both length of cover offered, and location – the latter
being a problem for traders in small LDCs, the former a problem for all foreign
traders. Third, the forward exchange rate is a poor predictor of the future spot
rate.2 Fourth, traders cannot always plan the magnitude or timing of all their for-
eign exchange transactions.
Whether for reasons stated explicitly or implicitly, all the studies cited in the
Appendix assume that in the absence of full information or complete forward
markets, exchange rate variability should hurt trade.
It should be noted here that under the Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) mean-
variance analysis framework, even this conclusion does not always hold. The
argument here is that an increase in exchange rate risk has a substitution and an
income effect. The substitution effect leads traders to shift away from foreign
trade and towards domestic trade – the usual expected effect, as argued above.
The income effect works in the opposite direction, however. When exchange rate
risk increases, the expected total utility from foreign trade receipts falls. This
leads the trader to increase his foreign trade activity, to offset the decline in
expected utility in this sector.3
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While this result is counter-intuitive, it should be noted that it follows from 
a few reasonable assumptions about utility functions and risk averseness. The argu-
ment that exchange rate variability hurts trade thus boils down to the assertion that
the substitution effect (as described above) outweighs the income effect. This is not
an unreasonable line of thought. The idea that a trader, when faced with increased
exchange rate risk, decides to increase his exposure to the riskier market seems
unrealistic, and should be borne out by a conversation with any trader.
Thus, while in theory exchange rate variability need not diminish – indeed, it
will enhance! – foreign trade, there are sound practical reasons – imperfect infor-
mation, and incomplete and costly markets for cover – for it to do just that.
3. The model
The ‘standard’ model of international trade incorporating exchange rate variabil-
ity was first rigorously presented by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), and this
model is still the theoretical basis of the empirical work in this area. Consider,
first, the case of a domestic producer who must import some of his inputs, oper-
ating in a flexible exchange rate environment. His output (Q) is an increasing
function of domestic income (Y ) and the price of other goods in the domestic
economy (PD), and a decreasing function of the price (P) and non-price rationing
(CU) of own output. This can be seen in eqn (12.1):
. (12.1)
The firm maximizes its utility, over output, as in eqn (12.2):
. (12.2)
Q
That is, utility is an increasing function of expected nominal profits (E), and a
decreasing function of their standard deviation, (V())1/2.  is the measure of risk
preference, so that 0 implies risk aversion, 0 risk neutrality and 0 risk
loving. Equation (12.3) shows the importing firm’s profits:
, (12.3)
where C is the unit cost of production, P* is the foreign currency price of imports,
i is the proportion of imports in output and H is the cost of foreign exchange to
the importer. H depends on the proportion of imports denominated in foreign cur-
rency (), and the proportion of these that are hedged in the forward market ().
This is illustrated in eqn (12.4):
, (12.4)
where F is the forward exchange rate, and R1 the future spot rate (both defined as
the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency). This cost, H, would
H  (F  (1  )R1)
  Q  P  C  Q  HP* iQ
max U  E  (V())1/2
Q  aP  bPD  CY  dCU
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be certain only if all imports were denominated in domestic currency (i.e. 0),
or all imports denominated in foreign currency could be hedged on the forward
market (1).
Since R1 is assumed to be uncertain, eqn (12.5) is the variance of the importer’s
profits:
. (12.5)
Substituting (12.3) for  , and (12.5) for V() into (12.2), and solving (12.2) 
for q (where q  iQ, the firm’s import demand function) yields eqn (12.6):
. (12.6)
Since a 0, eqn (12.6) shows that an increase in the cost of foreign exchange (H,
or its components,  and ) or an increase in the variability of R1 (R1, the stan-
dard deviation) will shift the demand for imports to the left.
The same method is used to derive analogous results for the supply of exports.
The exporter sells some of his output at home, and exports the rest, where he faces
the import demand function of eqn (12.6), times n, the number of importing firms.
Maximizing his utility from profits as before, yields an export supply function
which moves to the left when nominal exchange rate variability increases. The
import demand and export supply functions are then used to solve for a price 
equation.
Cushman (1983) extends this framework and assumes that firms maximize
expected real profits, and that prices and exchange rates are uncertain. This yields
the conclusion that it is real exchange rate variability that should be measured.
This is discussed further in Section 5.
A number of issues – other than how to measure exchange rate variability –
arise from this model, and these are discussed next.
4. Issues in the model
First, it should be noted from eqn (12.6), that so long as the trader is risk averse
(meaning 0), trade is adversely affected by an increase in exchange variabil-
ity (R1). As Newbery and Stiglitz (1981: 85–90), Coes (1981: 130–3) and de
Grauwe (1988: 64–9) point out, this result follows because of the implicit
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion of traders. This assumption effec-
tively eliminates the income effect of a change in exchange rate variability.
For the more general case of a concave and separable expected utility function,
the two conflicting effects will operate, and the effect of exchange rate variabil-
ity on trade then becomes an empirical issue.
But whether we assume constant absolute risk aversion – thus eliminating the
income effect – or not, measuring the impact of exchange rate variability on trade
is a relevant exercise. In the one case it measures the – predicted – adverse effect,
and in the other, it measures the net effect of the income and substitution effects
discussed above.
q  i(a UC  b PD  cY  d CU)  ai2 P* (EH  (1  )R1)
V()  [P* iQ(1  )]2  V(R1)
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The second issue of concern is the degree of aggregation of the dependent vari-
able in question. When total trade – meaning imports or exports aggregated
across countries and commodities – is used, this may result in biased coefficients.
Theil (1954) showed that unless all the disaggregated coefficients are equal, the
aggregated coefficients being weighted averages of the disaggregated ones, will
contain a specification bias. Subsequently, Zellner (1969) showed that for a class
of regression models with random coefficients and for a certain range of specify-
ing assumptions, there is no aggregation bias. But here, the standard error could
be very high.
Brodsky and Sampson (1983) show that exchange rate variations affect differ-
ent industries in different ways, so that an ‘industry-specific’ effective exchange
rate might be in order. Goldstein and Khan (1985) survey the empirical evidence
in trade in this regard and come out in favour of disaggregated studies – by 
country and by commodity group.
Where the data permit, this approach gives more interesting results. As the
Appendix shows, the studies that use disaggregated data – either bilateral or sec-
toral – invariably reveal differences in the effects of exchange rate variability on
trade. As Coes (1981), Maskus (1986) and Belanger et al. (1988) report, some
sectors have been measurably affected by exchange rate variability, and others
have not. Why this is so is not pursued by the authors, but is presumably of 
further concern to policy makers and those in the affected sectors.
Similarly, the studies using bilateral trade flows reveal differences in the pat-
tern of the impact of exchange rate variability. The most recent and widest rang-
ing study using this approach, Thursby and Thursby (1987), reveals significant
bilateral effects. This implies that the pattern of world trade, not merely the level,
is affected by exchange rate variability. Once again, the implications of differing
bilateral effects – are they because bilateral exchange rate variabilities differ, or
because of forward exchange rate markets of varying completeness? – are not
pursued in any of the studies.
Pooling the data rather than aggregating it will increase the sample size, but
may result in heteroscedasticity. In effect, when pooling data of large and small
countries, we must first ask – and test for – whether small countries differ in their
response to exchange rate variability from large countries. If heteroscedasticity is
present, most corrections for it assume knowledge of its correct specification.
The MacKinnon and White (1985) procedure has the advantage of not assuming
such knowledge. It yields inefficient coefficient estimates, but the t- and F-tests
are asymptotically valid.
The third issue we deal with is the capacity utilization variable. Hooper and
Kohlhagen (1978) introduce this as a non-price rationing variable that works as
the price variable does. As domestic capacity utilization increases, domestically
produced inputs are delivered with longer lags, thus decreasing the quantity
demanded of imports. On the export side, Coes (1981) suggests that as domestic
excess capacity increases, producers are driven to seek markets abroad.
It is not clear why these relative business cycle effects will not manifest 
themselves via the price and income variables, and indeed, not all studies include 
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a capacity utilization variable. For the industrialized economies, indices of capac-
ity utilization in manufacturing are available. For primarily agricultural
economies, it is not clear how capacity utilization should be measured. For Brazil,
Coes (1981) uses the residuals from a semi-log time trend of GNP.4 In Medhora
(1990), capacity utilization at home and abroad, thus measured, was found to be
insignificant in explaining West African imports, and dropping it did not change
the results reported.
Finally, there is some latitude on what the dependent variable should be. Not
all the estimations are the result of a rigorously specified model of trade. Thus,
whether it is import/export volume, as most of the studies use, or whether it is
growth of imports/exports, as Kenen (1979) and de Grauwe (1988) use, or the
import/export to GNP ratio, as Coes (1981), Thursby (1981) and Thursby and
Thursby (1985) use, depends on the authors’ notion of what is being affected by
exchange rate variability. Similarly, it is not always explicitly stated why only
imports or exports are used as the dependent variable. In a general equilibrium
framework of the Hooper–Kohlhagen–Cushman type, both imports and exports
are affected by exchange rate variability. Yet they do not estimate separately
demand for imports and supply of exports equations – their export equations
incorporate the effect of exchange rate variability on imported inputs.
While most studies that have estimated separate import and export equations
have found no asymmetric effects, Akhtar and Hilton (1984) and Belanger et al.
(1988) have. Moreover, Kenen and Rodrick (1986) found an adverse effect on
imports of exchange rate variability for many of the industrialized countries
whose exports had been found to have been unaffected by exchange rate vari-
ability – see, for example, Bailey et al. (1986, 1987) and Côté (1986). Even
allowing for slight differences in sample size, time period and the measure of
exchange rate variability, these results seem anomalous, and an estimation of
both, imports and exports, seems appropriate. For LDCs, changes in government
policies – especially producer prices – and the weather, along with movements in
relative prices and world income, may well dwarf the effects of exchange rate
variability on the supply of exports. But, properly modelled to incorporate these
factors, a study of LDC exports may yield interesting results.
5. Defining and measuring exchange rate variability
Two issues will be addressed here. First, are we concerned with real or nominal
exchange rate variability? Having made this decision, second, what statistical
measure of variability should be used?
At the outset it should be noted that measured variability is only a proxy for
what is really at issue – uncertainty. It is possible for a low level of variability to
be associated with a high degree of uncertainty, and vice versa. Some measures
are better than others at overcoming this dilemma, as will be seen below. But to
the extent that forward exchange markets do not exist everywhere and for long
time horizons, measured variability captures the uncertainty well. But different
variability measures have different characteristics.
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The use of real exchange rate (meaning nominal exchange rates corrected for
differing relative price changes across countries) variability is advocated prima-
rily because it takes into account the possible offsetting nature of price move-
ments to nominal exchange rate changes. Optimal resource allocation decisions
should, of course, be made on the basis of nominal exchange rate and price – that
is, based on real exchange rate – changes. But nominal variability should not be
ruled out entirely, for a number of reasons.
First, because the real exchange rate is composed of two (possibly) offsetting
components, it does not follow that real variability is always less than nominal
variability. Indeed, as Helleiner (1981), Lanyi and Suss (1982) and Akhtar and
Hilton (1984) show, through most of the 1970s and early 1980s, real variability
has often exceeded nominal variability in many countries. Whatever variability is
chosen should depend on stronger reasons than which type has been larger.
Exchange rates both influence, and are influenced by prices. The individual
trader faces two separate risks – a nominal exchange rate risk, and a price risk.
By fusing the two, a measure of real exchange rate variability obscures this dis-
tinction. For example, even if, on day thirty, a price inflation is perfectly offset by
a nominal exchange rate depreciation, leaving the real exchange rate unchanged,
on day one the trader faced two uncertainties – the price movement and the
exchange rate movement. His decisions of day one – how much to import/export,
and from/to who? – must thus be based on these actual uncertainties, not the
happy ex post coincidence of day thirty, which shows zero variability – and also
zero uncertainty.
If we assume traders have a short time horizon in a world where nominal
exchange rates move more often (or, at least more visibly) than prices, then a
measure of nominal variability should be used. But if we assume that traders are
more sophisticated, keeping in mind not just nominal exchange rate changes but
also the impact of monetary and fiscal policies at home and abroad, then a meas-
ure of real variability should be used.
Having determined which type of variability should be of concern, it remains
to be decided on how it should be measured. The range of measures available
include the standard deviation, deviations from trend, difference between previ-
ous forward and current spot rates, Gini mean difference coefficient (GMD),
coefficient of variation and the scale measure of variability.
The use of deviations from trend assumes that the trend itself is predictable and
costless, thus leaving only the misfits as ‘true’ measures of the cost of uncertainty.
In economies where forward exchange markets are thin and/or expensive, even
the trend, known and predictable as it may be, will have welfare implications
because allowing for it consumes resources. If it is determined that deviations
from trend best approximate exchange rate uncertainty, there is still the question
of how to ‘de-trend’ the data.
IMF (1986) uses two measures that do this: (1) a weighted average of the 
standard deviation of changes in the natural log of the exchange rate, and 
(2) the standard deviation of changes in the natural log of a weighted average of
bilateral rates (i.e. of effective exchange rates). Lanyi and Suss (1982) show that
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so long as the covariance between two exchange rates is non-zero, (1) and (2) will
diverge, so that both measures should be used in estimation.5
The standard deviation measure, while it does not take the trend and deviations
from it into account, does not render the trader completely uninsightful. Rather,
it assumes that deviations from an intra-period mean of observations best reflect
uncertainty. Since the mean of a group of observations is easier to compute than
their trend, the standard deviation measure is less informationally demanding of
the trader than the deviations from trend measure.
The use of the difference between the previous forward and current spot rates
to measure variability assumes that hedging is a viable alternative to cover for-
eign transactions. As noted earlier, this measure reflects uncertainty only insofar
as hedging is costless (which it is not), or can cover all foreign transactions
(which it cannot).
The relative merits of the GMD and scale measure of variability as against the
standard deviation has been the subject of a debate between Rana (1981, 1984)
and Brodsky (1984). Rana argues that if the variability measure is a non-normal
stable Paretian distribution (as he finds for his sample of effective exchange
rates), then the second moment does not exist, making the sample standard devi-
ation unstable, and therefore, statistically inappropriate in use. As alternatives, he
suggests the GMD and scale measure. The GMD is the average of the difference
in all possible pairs of values regardless of the sign, while the scale measure uses
only the middle 44 per cent of the range of observations.
Whereas Rana speaks of leptokurtosis and interfractile ranges, Brodsky’s argu-
ments are based on economics, or as he puts it ‘a somewhat more practical point
of view than that employed by Rana’ (1984: 295). Essentially, a non-normal dis-
tribution has too many observations in the tails, thus giving them more weight
than they would have in a normal distribution. Brodsky asserts that if we assume
risk aversion, then in fact greater weight should be given to extreme observations.
On the other hand, the scale measure drops 28 per cent of the observations at each
end, making it economically meaningless.
The GMD is similar to the standard deviation in that all observations are given
equal weight, but while the former uses absolute differences, the latter uses 
second-order (i.e. squared) differences, making it more relevant under the
assumptions of risk aversion. It may well be argued that the GMD could be mod-
ified to use squared differences as well, but then it still pairs all observations with
one another, rather than with an intra-period mean – as the standard deviation
does – which at least implies some intelligence for the trader. After all, the point
of the variability measure is to closely approximate uncertainty. By averaging all 
possible pair differences, the GMD makes any and all exchange rate changes
‘uncertain’. The standard deviation, on the other hand, grounds all changes to 
a base – the intra-period mean.
Finally, it should be noted that the issue of periodicity has been largely ignored
in the discussion on measuring exchange rate variability. In the context of export
earnings instability, Gelb (1977, 1979) posed this question – for a given degree of
fluctuation around a mean, does it matter whether the frequency of fluctuations is
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high or low? He found that low frequency variability, meaning a deviation from
trend that persists for over two years, is more costly than high frequency vari-
ability because the financial system is unable or unwilling to give medium- or
long-term credit to exporters facing such an earnings risk.
In the absence of complete forward exchange markets, it is unclear whether low
frequency exchange rate variability is more or less harmful to trade than high fre-
quency variability. Indeed, none of the measures outlined above allow for the
impact of persistently misaligned exchange rates on trade, which has also become
a feature of the post-Bretton Woods system.
The decision, then, on variability – real or nominal? how measured? – depends
on the researcher’s a priori belief of the system at hand. Is it fairly well covered
by forward exchange markets? How well informed are traders?
Studies that use multiple measures of variability in effect avoid this problem by
trying to take into account all, or most, possibilities. If all the measures used show
consistent results – one way or the other – then all is well. But it must be remem-
bered that such an approach has no basis in theory. The author is saying, ‘I can’t
say much about the system and its traders, so let’s try everything.’
6. Financial flows
The literature and methodology to assess the impact of exchange rate volatility on
financial flows is less extensive than that for trade flows. The Newbery–Stiglitz
framework can be used here too, and is the standard wherein savings and invest-
ment decisions are analysed. Typically, this is done with respect to an uncertain
rate of return, which captures exchange rate movements in addition to other con-
cerns such as the interest rate or country risk. Aizenman (1992) distinguishes
between real and nominal shocks to show that in an intertemporal model with
monopolistic competition and risk neutrality, a fixed exchange rate regime is
more conducive to FDI relative to a flexible exchange rate. Empirical evidence
presented in Goldberg and Kolstad (1994) confirms a negative correlation
between real exchange rate volatility and FDI in US bilateral FDI flows with
Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom. A more extensive survey of the empiri-
cal evidence on the matter is contained in Bailey and Tavlas (1991). They con-
clude that the ambiguity predicted in the theoretical findings is reflected in the
empirical literature (which, to be sure, is focused on developed countries).
The theoretical and procedural issues involved in analysing the link between
exchange rate volatility and investment are much the same as those discussed ear-
lier in this chapter. Questions of the basic underpinnings of the theoretical model,
of how to measure volatility and what to make of the results remain. It is this last
issue that is the focus of the concluding section of this chapter.
7. Conclusion
Historically, and using admittedly crude methods of measurement, Yeager (1976)
argues that throughout the nineteenth century and during the interwar years, there
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was no correlation between exchange rate variability and world trade. Several
authors, among them Bailey and Tavlas (1991), Bini-Smaghi (1991), Dellas and
Zilberfarb (1993) and Willett (1986) attempt to assess the reasons behind the
admittedly mixed bag of results that we possess. Interestingly, while most are
common to trade and investment flows, the policy implications of each set of
results differ. Put more precisely, the policy implications for each of the four cells
in the figure at the start of this chapter are different.
Interestingly, there is convincing evidence to suggest that most exchange rate
changes during the past three decades have been unexpected. This is borne out by
the failure of most models to consistently and accurately predict exchange rate
movements, survey data on the topic, and indicators of expected exchange rate
movements such as interest rate differentials and forward discount premia
(Frenkel and Goldstein 1989). Exchange rates have also become more not less
variable over time. Why then, do exchange rates that have become more volatile
and more unpredictable still yield ambiguous results in their impact on trade and
investment?
The results of the early studies reported in the Appendix, while mostly showing
no adverse effect, must be reconsidered in a critical light. First, many straddle the
period of transition from fixed to floating exchange rates. This regime shift is
strong enough to cast doubts on any trade model that ignores this fundamental
structural shift – the standard Lucas critique.
But even for the studies that use as their time period the early part of the post-
Bretton Woods era, there are two counter-acting reasons why their results should
be considered tentative.
First, contracts, trade and investment relationships are made over a number of
years, and will not be broken or changed right after a new exchange rate regime
begins. This ‘inertia’ effect, then, may result in understatement of the true costs
of exchange rate variability on trade.
Second, in the early phase of the new regime, there may well be greater uncer-
tainty among traders, as they adjust to the new rules of the game. Forward mar-
kets need time to develop, and the early jumps in exchange rates may only be the
inevitable result of a system finding its equilibrium. This ‘growing pains’ effect
would overstate exchange rate variability costs on trade.
The evidence for the more recent period – the mid-1970s and after – is mixed,
although it is fair to say that there are more studies that find no effect than there
are that do. This, however, is not the last word on the issue.
For one, the evidence is quite convincing that exchange rate variability, both
real and nominal, has, indeed, increased over time.6 Studies of the mid- and late
1980s may well show more convincingly an adverse effect of exchange rate
variability on trade.
It is possible, of course, for the ‘no effect’ results to have economic meaning.
As Willett (1986) argues, if exchange rate variability merely reflects other
(meaning policy) variability, or if relative to domestic variability, exchange rate
variability has not increased, then empirical studies will, in fact, find no adverse
effects.7 The call here is for trade and investment models to be set in a more
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general framework in which exchange rate variability is not the only type of vari-
ability that traders and investors must face. Indeed, Bailey and Tavlas (1991)
report that during the 1970s and 1980s, exchange rate volatility has been less than
volatility of commodity prices and interest rates, a trend that holds for the 1990s.
One also needs a measure of changes in country risk over time before exchange
rate volatility on trade and investment decisions can be situated in a more general
(and germane) context.
Indeed, the studies reported in this chapter do not address the other effects of
exchange rate variability on trade and investment. As mentioned earlier, persist-
ent misalignments of exchange rates have resource allocation implications that
are not addressed here.8
If, in fact, a persistently over-valued exchange rate in a country squeezes the
traded-goods sector and thus provokes calls for increased protection which is then
not removed when the exchange rate falls back into line, then trade will be fur-
ther affected.9
Another possible reason to answer the question posed at the start of this section
is given in Gonzaga and Terra (1997). In comparing their results on the impact of
exchange rate volatility on exports in Brazil with those of Gagnon (1993) for
industrial countries, they postulate that Brazil’s much higher exchange rate
volatility might explain their more significant and robust results. That decision
making is not a linear or even predictable function of risk or volatility is a very
intuitively appealing concept, which merits further examination.
Finally, it should be noted that the bulk of the literature uses developed coun-
try data. In LDCs, where forward markets are less developed and the cost to
adjust to changes in the economic environment is higher, exchange rate variabil-
ity – coupled with developed country protectionism – may have a measurable
impact on trade and income. Yet, to the extent that financial markets are less
developed (and therefore carry higher transactions costs) in developing countries,
it is there that the policy implications of volatile exchange rates need to be best
understood.
Clearly, there is no substitute for complete financial markets. There is an exten-
sive theoretical and empirical literature that links the level of financial sector
development with favourable growth outcomes. More germane to this chapter,
Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that in a sample of forty-one developed and
developing countries during the 1980s, industrial sectors that need relatively
more external finance developed disproportionately faster in countries with
well-developed financial sectors. The principal policy conclusion, then, even
(or perhaps especially) bearing in mind the large recent outpouring of thought in
relation to the East Asian crisis, is that there is no substitute for a deep and effi-
cient financial sector to minimize risk (i.e. allow economic agents to minimize
risk) and permit an optimal allocation of resources.
But as a guide to policy, this statement may be more helpful in principle than in
practice. For a given state of the financial sector, the causes of short-term exchange
rate movements differ from those of long-term (i.e. persistent) exchange rate
movements. The current preoccupation with Tobinesque taxes, indeed capital
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account regimes more generally (summarized in chapters one and six of Helleiner
1998), is most suited to addressing issues related to short-term volatility. Even
here, diminution of said volatility is likely to have a greater impact on goods flows
and short-term investments, which have a relatively short time horizon, than
investment flows, rather than medium- and long-term investments with a longer
pay-off period. So ‘sand in the wheels’ types of policies are likely to be a useful
addition to the arsenal of macroeconomy managers so long as: (1) they do not
impede financial sector development (relative to the alternative), and (2) their lim-
its in effectiveness even if ideally applied are understood.
Persistent misalignments of exchange rates pose a different set of issues. The
most obvious case that can be assessed relates to ‘Dutch disease’, where it is the
attraction of a country’s natural resource endowments (or size of overseas remit-
tances) rather than a capital market imperfection per se that is the root cause of
the disequilibrium. Sterilization policies assuming the domestic financial sector
permits this, are not long-term solutions, and often lead to significant side effects
even in the short term.
A second and no less important dimension of this problem is the potential for
international capital flows themselves to lead to persistent misalignment prob-
lems. The jury is still out on whether domestic policies alone (as is alleged for
many East Asian countries and some European ones) could have created the envi-
ronment within which persistent capital movements lead to persistent exchange
rate misalignment.
The important things to understand here are that (1) exchange rates alter and
are altered by trade and financial flows, especially the latter; (2) but that they are
but one factor in the decision-making process of economic agents. Also, (3) while
there is no obvious substitute for complete markets, the policy implications for
dealing with various sets of outcomes vary, not only depending on the nature of
the volatility (short or long term) but also the context within which policies are
framed and implemented.
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Appendix – Summary of salient studies
Study Data, Measure of Dependent Results
period, variability variable
countries
Clark and Haulk Quarterly, Standard deviation of Aggregate real No effect
(1972) 1952–72, forward exchange rate of imports and
Canada, US (moving average)  previous exports
four quarters
Makin Quarterly, Standard deviation Aggregate real No effect






Hooper and Quarterly, Average absolute Bilateral export No volume
Kohlhagen 1965–75, difference between volume and price effect except
(1978) France, forward and spot US and UK.





Abrams Annual, Variance of previous Bilateral export Adverse effect




Abrams Annual, Variance of previous Bilateral export Adverse effect
(1980b) 1973–6, year’s real exchange volume
19 developed rates (monthly)
countries
(pooled)
Gupta India, Israel, Standard deviation Aggregate export No effect
(1980) Mexico, Korea, of exchange rate volume
Taiwan changes around trend
Kenen Annual, Monthly standard Growth of No effect
(1980) 1974–6, deviation of aggregate real
33 countries nominal and real exports
(cross-section) spot rates
Thursby Quarterly, Per cent difference Aggregate real No effect
(1980) 1953–77, between a hypothetical exports
Canada ‘fixed’ rate and
actual rate, in
each quarter
Coes Annual, Integral difference Export–production Adverse, except 
(1981) 1957–74, cumulative distribution ratio, by sector for two countries
Brazil of real exchange rate for two industries 
and the ‘certain’
exchange rate
Thursby Quarterly, Variance of nominal Aggregate No effect
(1981) 1972–9, and real effective export–GNP





Study Data, Measure of Dependent Results
period, variability variable
countries
Cushman Quarterly, Standard deviation Bilateral export Adverse volume
(1983) 1965–77, of changes in spot volume and prices and price 
France, real exchange rate, effects in some





Justice Quarterly, Average changes Bilateral export Adverse effect 
(1983) 1973–81, and average standard volume and price  in some cases
UK deviations of nominal
and real exchange rates
Akhtar and Hilton Quarterly, Standard deviation Aggregate export Adverse effect
(1984) 1974–81, of effective and import volume, except US




Bank of England Quarterly, Average absolute Aggregate import No effect on
(1984) 1976–83, changes in daily and export volume, trade. Adverse
UK rates; standard price of imports price effect
deviation within and exports
each quarter
IMF Quarterly, Standard deviation Bilateral export No effect
(1984) 1965–81, of changes in spot volume
Canada, real exchange rate,






Gotur Quarterly, Standard deviation Aggregate import No effect







Thursby and Annual, Trade-weighted Bilateral real No aggregate
Thursby (1985) 1973–77, algebraic mean of exports; change effect; adverse
20 countries the per cent change in in export–GNP bilateral 
(pooled) bilateral exchange ratio effects
rates; trade-weighted
mean of absolute




of per cent changes in
above series
Appendix Continued
Study Data, Measure of Dependent Results
period, variability variable
countries
Bailey et al. Quarterly, Absolute value of Aggregate real No effect









Côté Quarterly, Standard deviation Aggregate import No effect
(1986) 1972–83, of changes in spot and export volume,
Canada real exchange rate, price of imports




Kenen and Rodrik Quarterly, Standard deviations Volume of Adverse effect
(1986) 1975–82, of real exchange aggregate in many cases
11 developed rate; standard manufactured
countries deviations of the imports
trend in real 
exchange rate;
standard deviation
of the real exchange
rate from an AR1
equation
Maskus Quarterly, Three-month spread Bilateral real Adverse 
(1986) 1974–84, US between spot and exports, by sector aggregate 
forward rate, effect, no
adjusted for effect in some
expected inflation sectors/countries
Bailey et al. Quarterly, Absolute value of Aggregate real No effect
(1987) 1973–84, per cent change exports
Canada, in nominal and real
France, effective exchange
Federal rate, standard
Republic of deviation of nominal
Germany, and real spot rates
Italy, Japan,
UK, US
Thursby and Annual, Variance of spot Bilateral real Adverse effect
Thursby (1987) 1974–82, rate around exports and
17 countries its trend export price
(pooled)
Belanger et al. Quarterly, Variance in Bilateral real Adverse effect 
(1988) 1974–87, per cent difference imports and in some sectors
Canada, US between spot and exports, sectoral
forward rate
de Grauwe Annual, Standard deviation Change in nominal Adverse effect
(1988) 1960–9 and of exchange rate exports
1973–84, changes around




Study Data, Measure of Dependent Results
period, variability variable
countries
Medhora Annual, Standard deviation Aggregate real No effect
(1990) 1976–82, of weekly, monthly imports from






Gonzaga and Terra Daily, weekly, Standard deviation, Export volume, No to slight




1 See, for example, Markowitz (1952), Debreu (1959), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965),
Mossin (1966) and Arrow (1971).
2 The empirical evidence here is quite strong. See, for example, Hodrick and Srivastava
(1987), Cumby and Obstfeld (1981, 1984), Hsieh (1984), Dooley and Shafer (1983),
Hansen and Hodrick (1980, 1983), Bilson (1981) and Frankel (1980).
3 For a more rigorous discussion of the Newbery–Stiglitz framework in this context, see
de Grauwe (1988) and Coes (1981).
4 For more on measuring capacity utilization, see Lim (1976), Artus (1977) and
Christiano (1981).
5 Cuddy and Della Valle (1978) proposed a measure to de-trend time series data, which
was subsequently refined by Duggan (1970). On this matter, see also Della Valle (1979)
and Brown (1979). The method essentially involves ‘correcting’ the conventional coef-
ficient of variation by a factor reflecting the goodness of fit of past observations to a
time trend. Tsui (1987) shows that Duggan’s measure of variability will always be less
than the conventional coefficient of variation.
6 See, for example, Kenen (1979), Gupta (1980), Brodsky et al. (1981), Helleiner (1981)
and Kenen and Rodrick (1984, 1986).
7 Some studies like IMF (1984) and Gotur (1985) have found a ‘perverse’ sign on the
exchange rate variability measure, meaning it is positive and significant. In the
Newbery–Stiglitz framework, of course, this is not perverse, but rather evidence of their
income effect overriding their substitution effect – difficult to conceive as this may be.
8 Cushman (1986) has found significant ‘third country’ effects on US exports to its six
largest partners. That is, an increase in, say, the variability of the dollar–DM rate will
shift exports away from Germany and towards, say, the UK. This is consistent with
Thursby and Thursby (1987), who find that exchange rate variability affects not just the
volume but also the pattern of world trade.
9 This is what de Grauwe (1988: 69) calls the ‘political economy of exchange rate 
variability’.
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